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Introduction 
Who were the Nazis? How could this tiny, obscure party capture 
power so quickly in Germany, the land of poets and philosophers? 
How could it grow so fast and yet remain coherent and effective? 
And how did ordinary human beings become Nazis? Even fifty years 
later, these are still some of the greatest questions of the twentieth 
century, and we only have partial answers. This book will move a 
step closer to a full answer. It studies the lives and careers of the men 
who occupied the top leadership positions of the paramilitary wing 
of the Nazi Party, the Sturmabteiluhg (storm troopers), also known 
as the SA or Brown Shirts. 
Specifically, this book looks at the political and military activi-
ties of the 178 men who eventually held one of the three highest 
ranks in the SA hierarchy on an active basis at any time between 
1925 and 1945. 1 Although the titles varied, by 1932 these ranks were 
Stabschef, Obergruppenfiihrer, and Gruppenfiihrer in descending or-
der.2 These men built the SA, guided it to victory in 1933, and con-
tinued to lead it until they suffered defeat in 1945. 
The SA was an extremely important part of the Nazi move-
ment. More than any other single element, it was responsible for the 
Nazi Party's success in gaining power and intimidating all opposi-
tion. The ceaseless activism of the SA (shared by the Nazi Party in 
general), its imposing presence at meetings, its uniformed public 
marches, and the terrorism and violence that it practiced against op-
ponents were all critical in transforming the Nazi Party from a small 
band of fanatics into the largest mass political party in the history of 
Germany up to that time. The SA was largely responsible for the 
Janus face of National Socialism, which was so fatally attractive: on 
the one hand, their uniforms and their marching symbolized the dy-
namism and discipline of the NSDAP, in contrast to the "somnam-
bulism" of traditional right-wing parties and the "slovenliness" of 
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left-wing parties. This same dynamism further seemed to bear out 
the NSDAP's claim to represent youth and, by extension, the future. 
On the other hand, the violence of the SA appealed to the visceral 
frustrations of many (certainly many males) in a defeated and inter-
nally divided Germany, and contrasted with the alleged "laxity" and 
"weakness" of the democratic parties of the middle. 
The key to the SA's success as an organization and to its special 
value in the political arena was its combination of political mission 
with military forms and attitudes, creating what it called "political 
soldiers." This is a new element in political life characteristic of the 
Weimar Republic and, indeed, of many other European countries in 
the long truce between the two world wars.3 
The SA leaders (officers) whose careers are analyzed here were 
the ones who adapted the various models set by the Imperial Army, 
the Wehrverbande (paramilitary organizations), and various volkisch 
(integral German nationalist and usually racist) political organiza-
tions to form the SA and who thus invented political soldiering.4 As 
will be amply demonstrated in the following pages, they did so based 
on their own experiences and training. This is why it is so important 
to study this particular group of men: to understand the SA is to 
understand that part of the NSDAP which, particularly during the" time 
of struggle" (Kampfzeit, the common Nazi expression), was most re-
sponsible for defining its image and providing much of the dynamism 
and muscle behind Nazi electoral efforts and Nazi intimidation.5 
The men in this study produced the world's most effective para-
military auxiliary, and in doing so, they catapulted the NSDAP into 
power. Although the reward for this efficiency was the purge of the 
SA in 1934 and its demotion within the Nazi system, the basic forms 
and principles of organization created for the SA lived on in its more 
sinister successor and former sibling, the Schutzstaffel, also known 
as the SS or Black Shirts. In many ways, the SS merely followed the 
model developed by the SA's leaders when they "invented" that or-
ganization.6 
The decision to limit this study to the three highest levels of rank 
found within the SA was made because they were largely responsible 
for planning, organization, administration, and decision making_? 
They were thus responsible for "setting the tone" in the SA. The 
next lowest level of rank in the SA, Brigadefiihrer, largely carried out 
administrative duties and did not participate in decision making or 
policy setting in a fundamental sense, and so they are not included. 
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SA leaders in the Propaganda Ministry, November 1, 1934. Descending the 
staircase, left to right, are (1) Hans Elard Ludin, (2) Arthur Rakobrandt, (3) 
Osturmf. Morenga, (4) Johann Heinrich Boehmcker, (5) Joachim Meyer-
Quade, (6) Wilhelm Helfer, (7) Heinrich August Schoene, (8) Emil Ketterer, 
(9) Max Paul Wilhelm Werner Jiittner, ( 10) Emil Steinhoff, ( 11) Hans Friedrich, 
(12) Herbert Robert Gerhard Fust, (13) Hans-Gunther von Obernitz, (14) 
Heinrich August Knickmann, (15) Otto Herzog, (16) Arno Manthey, (17) Otto 
Schramme, (18) Dietrich Wilhelm Bernhard von Jagow, (19) Adolf-Heinz 
Beckerle, (20) Arthur Bockenhauer, (21) Gustav Zunkel, (22) Max Otto 
Luyken, (23) Wilhelm Schepmann, (24) Siegfried Karl Viktor Johannes Kasche, 
(25) unidentified, (26) Otto Marxer, (27) Viktor Lutze, and (28) Karl-Siegmund 
Hermann Julius Litzmann. Courtesy of the Bundesarchiv. 
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Moreover, the three top levels of rank of active duty SA leaders 
amounts to a very manageable group of 178 individuals. Confining 
this study to the three top levels of rank in the SA means that it is 
limited to a small, well-defined, and homogeneous group. In addi-
tion, the surviving documents about them are comparatively large in 
number, comparatively complete (despite some inevitable gaps), suf-
ficiently rich in detail, and sufficiently similar to allow comparison. 
These practical considerations may seem a bit removed from the his-
torical problems that this book will address, but they are important 
methodologically. 8 
Certainly, this group of the very highest SA leaders is not nec-
essarily representative of the SA as a whole. It is an important por-
tion of the SA but also a select group. Although the SA claimed to be 
a particularly egalitarian organization in its class makeup,9 no hier-
archical organization is actually uniform or homogeneous at all lev-
els. Senior leaders are a select group in almost any organization. 
Others have tried to make more generalized statements about 
the SA, but there is still room for more research. 10 The problem with 
trying to examine the SA as a whole is that its composition varied 
according to both locality and time, yet the surviving SA records 
make capturing the nature of these variations very difficult. Given 
these problems, a viable alternative for social historians is to investi-
gate clearly defined subgroups within the SA for which suitable 
records are available. This is the approach taken here. 11 
Although this study focuses on the SA elite, the original im-
pulse behind this project was anything but elitist. Even today, spe-
cialists writing about the NSDAP have a tendency to proceed as if 
Adolf Hitler himself were responsible for the organizational success 
of the SA. There is some truth to this in the sense that Hitler did set 
broad policy guidelines, and it can serve as a kind of shorthand on a 
macrolevel, but it is illogical and absurd to credit one man with the 
design of any organization as large as the SA. My goal has been to 
draw attention away from Hitler to the group of men who imple-
mented his guidelines and did the real work of creating the SA's orga-
nizational structure.12 
This book began as a study of how the top SA leaders found their way 
into the Nazi movement. It still discusses this process, but in doing 
so, it must also pay close attention to the SA's evolution as an organi-
zation. In effect, this study is also a new kind of organizational his-
tory, which traces the growth and elaboration of the SA through the 
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evolution of its leaders and through the particular skills and experi-
ence they brought to the organization. An organization grows and 
changes not as a function of the set of organizational techniques 
known to it but rather as a function of the willingness and ability of 
its members to implement certain organizational methods and forms 
(and therefore not others). In other words, the SA did not become a 
mass paramilitary organization simply because a certain set of orga-
nizational forms and tools existed; instead, it developed as it did be-
cause its leadership consciously made certain decisions and because 
the forms of organization they chose to use were familiar to them 
and fit their particular goals and ideological preconceptions. In this 
sense, no study of an organization is complete without taking the 
background of its decision makers into account. 
Partly in consequence, and unlike nearly all social historical 
investigations of the Nazi Party or its affiliates, this study will not 
concentrate on defining and describing class basis or composition. 
Instead, the focus will be on the military and political activities of 
these men before they became Nazis and, to a lesser extent, on their 
careers as SA leaders afterwards. It will trace their evolution and pay 
particular attention to their voluntary political affiliations. This is a 
new approach. It is possible because the SA kept thorough records on 
its leaders. It is necessary because the class basis of the Nazi Party 
and the SA is now fairly well known, at least in its broad contours. 13 
Although this is important to know, it comes nowhere near a full 
explanation of the Nazi movement. After all, what does knowing the 
class composition of a given group really tell us? All it truly does is 
allow us to presume that the individuals in question share the atti-
tudes, status, education, needs, etc., commonly associated with their 
class14 and that the group or organization therefore must somehow 
recognize and reflect these class interests. This is not negligible, be-
cause it is sometimes the only available window into the motiva-
tions or backgrounds of the group. being studied, but in the end, it 
remains only a set of assumptions. 
By looking at the organizations to which the top SA leaders 
belonged before they joined the Nazi Party, this book adds a new 
element to our knowledge of who the Nazis were and how they oper-
ated. By following the paths these men took into the SA and Nazi 
Party, it shows as never before the dynamic process of how at least 
this particular group became Nazis and how they learned how to be 
Nazis. By looking in particular at the voluntary associations that these 
men chose to make before they became Nazis, this book can also go 
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beyond what an analysis of class background can tell us about their 
character and motivation. Finally, by exposing the prior experiences 
and training of SA leaders, this book can help to explain why the SA 
took the form it did, how it could be so effective in its tasks despite 
often difficult circumstances and sometimes vertiginous growth, and 
how such a complex and effective organization could be built in such 
a short time. 
It is important, however, to note the limits of the approach taken 
in this book. The question of individual motivation is tricky for his-
torians. Because all the SA's top leaders are now dead, the question of 
why they became Nazis can only be surmised. Examining their vol-
untary associations and the kinds of organizations that socialized 
them can certainly help to explain their characters and motivations 
better than an analysis of their class backgrounds can, but this alone 
cannot answer the question of individual motivation. Except in very 
rare cases, the SA and SS personnel records upon which this study is 
based contain very little of the kind of personal information that 
would permit an investigator to speak of what motivated a given 
individual. 
This book describes the lives of SA leaders both individually and 
collectively. In the latter case, it uses very simple descriptive statis-
tics. These statistics are drawn from the analysis of a database con-
taining biographical information about the 178 men in this study, 
including their organizational activities from 1914 to 1945. For the 
key period from 1918 to 1935, these activities were recorded in three-
month segments. A fuller discussion of the methodology may be found 
below in chapter 7. Here at the beginning of this study it is useful to 
point out that, despite the sometimes overwhelming presence of per-
centages and numbers, this is emphatically and deliberately not a 
conventional statistical study. It does not involve using a "sample" 
to describe some larger group through complex mathematical infer-
ence; instead, it includes all of the SA's top leaders. It also very rarely 
tries to compare SA leaders with some larger group, such as the Ger-
man population at large. It is a collective biography that describes a 
discrete and unique group of individuals in the most efficient way 
possible, and this means it often uses simple percentages, but noth-
ing more complex than that. 
Trying to compare the SA leadership with all Germans in the 
1930s would not be very profitable at present. It would only tell us 
that SA leaders were different from the general population, but it 
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could not tell us much of significance about these differences. The 
reason is that there is no legitimate basis for comparison. No study 
exists, for example, that measures the voluntary associations of the 
entire German population. Comparisons with other, narrower social 
groups are also still problematic for the same reasons. Studies simi-
lar to this one of comparable groups, which would provide a genu-
inely meaningful basis for comparison, are completely lacking. 15 
The highest SA leaders came from a military background. They con-
tinued their military activities by joining the private paramilitary 
associations that were so characteristic of the Weimar Republic, the 
so-called Wehrverbande. A significant minority were also volkisch 
zealots active in political organizations. This common military, para-
military, and volkisch background led these men into the SA and 
prepared them for their future role as SA leaders. 16 
They were a homogeneous group, but the practical foundation 
of their homogeneity was not class or status (although they were 
homogeneous in this respect as well) so much as it was common 
experience in the army, Wehrverbande, and volkisch groups. They 
"spoke the same language," but it was not in its essence the lan-
guage of a social class. It was the language of the parade ground and 
the battlefield. Their military training gave them the skills essential 
to building and running a complex mass organization like the SA. 
Their domestic military experiences during the German Revolution 
and especially their civilian experiences in the Wehrverbande taught 
them that military forms could be applied to civilian problems. Their 
participation in volkisch parties and organizations and the general 
influence of those organizations within the Wehrverband milieu gave 
them an ideology and a set of political goals, culminating in the de-
struction of the Weimar Republic, an end to the Versailles treaty, and 
the elimination of socialist, foreign, modernist, and Jewish influence 
in Germany. Finally, after the failure of the Hitler Putsch, the NSDAP 
taught them that, although the use of outright military force against 
the Weimar Republic was not likely to succeed for the moment, their 
goals could still be pursued with military forms through electoral 
politics. This is the equation, the recipe for the success of the Nazi 
Party, as well as the formula for the creation of "political soldiers." 
The SA leadership were both the inventors of political soldiering and 
a part of the invention itself. The evolution of these men will be 
illustrated below. 
1 
Background 
The men examined in this book were participants in an arcane and 
complex right-wing military and paramilitary subculture that will 
be foreign to most readers, but its details will be important in the 
following study. Since the "language" of this subculture is not widely 
spoken today, the reader might appreciate a short general introduc-
tion to the world in which these men lived. 
The majority were born into the smug, secure European middle 
class of the late nineteenth century, a world which even then was in 
the throes of profound social, cultural, economic, and demographic 
change. This change was accelerated by the outbreak of the First World 
War in 1914. 
The scale and speed of this process was unprecedented and was 
not always easy to accept. The men who eventually became the top 
SA leaders lived in a peculiar postwar subculture that saw itself un-
der attack by change or modernity. This subculture reacted with an 
aggressive mixture of nostalgia for an idealized past, hatred of the 
present, and messianic hope for a future that would somehow put to 
right everything that was seen to be wrong. This caused these men to 
see themselves as engaged in social war. It allowed them to speak in 
the name of tradition yet act as revolutionaries, and it allowed them 
to embrace distinctly modern tools and techniques in their struggle. 
This was and is a significant contradiction but, unfortunately, one 
that is still with us. 
THE HERITAGE OF THE 11 OLD ARMY 77 
If they lived in a larger society marked by "cultural despair" 1 and 
wrenching modernization, they also came from a very particular so-
cial subculture within the German Empire. Nearly all of the men in 
this study had a military background. Most served in the First World 
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War, but a large number had already become professional soldiers 
before 1914. The German army on the eve of the First World War, 
like most contemporary armies, had firmly embraced modern tech-
nology, yet it was also dedicated to tradition. 2 The military in gen-
eral and officers in particular had tremendous social prestige in Ger-
many. Tradition dictated that the officer corps be kept as socially 
exclusive as possible. Despite (or because of) the sweeping social and 
technological changes of the period, the officer corps of the German 
army and navy at the turn of the century nevertheless still tried to 
form a corps of men homogeneous in outlook and background and 
still claimed to represent a moral elite dedicated to serving the em-
peror and state.3 The social hierarchy of the Wilhelmine Empire was 
mirrored in miniature within the armed forces themselves. Some 
units were more prestigious than others, and there was a deep gulf 
between professional and reserve officers. 
The fact that many men in this study were not only officers but 
professional (regular, not reserve) officers before the war was very 
important to them. It also speaks volumes about the way they were 
socialized as young adults and about how they originally saw them-
selves fitting into society. No other factor in the background and 
training of the future top SA leaders is as significant. As a whole, SA 
leaders defined themselves as military men. What was to change in 
their lives was not this fact but what they perceived as the proper 
role of a military man in society. 
THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE GERMAN REVOLUTION 
The exigencies of total war placed great pressure on the social and 
military structure of Wilhelmine society. It tended to call all exist-
ing social hierarchies into question, and it greatly reduced the ability 
of the nobility and the upper middle class to claim social superiority 
and special privileges. This leveling effect was felt within the mili-
tary as well. The high casualty rate among junior officers and the 
huge increase in the size of the officer corps during the war diluted 
its social exclusivity, despite extreme attempts by the high command 
to preserve it. Moreover, combat amply demonstrated that the fa-
vored social groups were not necessarily the best equipped to lead 
men into battle, especially since success in battle was increasingly a 
function of technological rather than moral prowess. 
A new concept of leadership came out of the war, which re-
jected the Kadavergehorsam (absolute obedience) based on hierarchy 
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and deference to one's superiors in favor of a voluntary subordina-
tion based on common ideology, mutual respect, and deference to 
the personal ability and charisma of a leader. This was a revolution-
ary element within the army. It threatened the old hierarchy by set-
ting young combat officers against older staff officers, but did not 
threaten either the military or hierarchical leadership as such. This 
was emphatically not a democratization of the military, since it still 
definitely called for the establishment and maintenance of hierarchy 
and discipline, but it was a populist and a popular concept that dis-
tinguished a new generation of officers. 
The men in this study were all deeply marked by this new con-
cept of leadership. While the army and navy, which were reestab-
lished as the Reichswehr after the turmoil of the German Revolu-
tion, remained largely in the hands of the old-style noble and upper-
middle-class officers, the upheaval in the concept of leadership played 
a strong role within both the armed units formed during the German 
Revolution and the later paramilitary organizations that were their 
heirs. This is the reason why there is very little mention in this book 
of SA "officers." Both the NSDAP and the SA itself rejected the term 
and consciously chose to use the term leader (Fuhrer) instead. This 
symbolized the self-proclaimed social revolutionary mission of the 
Nazis and expressed the new definition of leadership that emerged 
among veterans. It is also the reason why Hitler (the former corporal) 
could become simply "der Fuhrer," first of the NSDAP and then of 
all Germany: it expressed his claim to be a new sort of leader who 
(ostensibly) relied on the power of his innate personality rather than 
on the force of a formal title or rank. 
The German Revolution of 1918-19 (the November Revolution) 
was only the symbolic manifestation of larger social forces at work 
that swept away the old Wilhelmine Empire and the entire world of 
the nineteenth century. It was neither planned nor intendedi rather, 
it was a spontaneous collapse of the old order. Nevertheless, it cre-
ated a profound crisis of values and identity for large numbers of 
Germans, and this related directly to the rise of the NSDAP and kin-
dred organizations. 
In the resulting power vacuum, a wide range of organizations 
emerged, some based on older, collapsing institutions, and some new. 
While the old empire was clearly doomed, the exact form that the 
future of Germany would take was in no way predetermined. Al-
though Germany turned into a reasonably successful democratic re-
public after the First World War, the conflict over Germany's proper 
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identity and form implicit in the revolution was never settled. It 
brought the Weimar Republic constant conflict and ultimately led to 
its destruction by the combined forces of moderate and radical con-
servatives who hotly contested the republican definition of a new 
Germany. The men in this book were all on the front lines of this 
conflict, and they were among the most responsible for the tempo-
rary defeat of the republican ideal in Germany. 
The Republic's survival was complicated by the circumstances 
surrounding its birth. Not only was it born in revolution (however 
superficial that revolution may have been) but it was burdened with 
having to sign the Versailles treaty. Worse, the German military lead-
ership, which clearly understood in the fall of 1918 that Germany 
was facing total and unavoidable military defeat, later ignored or ac-
tively assisted in spreading a popular myth which held that Germany 
had not lost the war militarily but had instead been "stabbed in the 
back" by profiteers, leftists, and Jews.4 This famous "stab-in-the-back" 
legend conveniently freed Germany's military leaders from responsi-
bility for losing the war.5 It thus served to further delegitimize an 
already unstable nascent democratic system, and turned thousands, 
perhaps millions of Germans irreparably against it, particularly those 
already predisposed to oppose the Republic. 
POLITICAL pARTIES AND THE V OLKISCH MOVEMENT 
Political parties dedicated to electoral politics-even if many ulti-
mately rejected democracy and sought to abolish the Republic-domi-
nated and led the political debate in the Weimar Republic. Interest-
ingly, only two parties figure prominently in the backgrounds of the 
highest SA leaders: the traditional conservative Deutschnationale 
Volkspartei (German National People's Party, or DNVP) and the 
NSDAP. 
The DNVP was founded in November 1918 as the heir of anum-
ber of conservative parties of the Wilhelmine Empire.6 The fact that 
it contained so many diverse elements made it hard for the DNVP to 
coherently define itself. It was a monarchist party, opposed to the 
democratic system, the Versailles treaty, and the policy of "fulfill-
ment." Although it participated in parliamentary politics, it was never 
quite comfortable within the Weimar "system" and tended to avoid 
participation in government coalitions. While its politics were mainly 
traditional conservative, it tolerated a great deal of sympathy for anti-
Semitism in its ranks, and many members condoned a more radical 
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form of conservatism. Although its members came from all classes, 
the party leadership was particularly sensitive to the interests of big 
business and big agriculture. Organizationally it was a conventional 
political party, and yet it maintained close ties to the Stahlhelm, a 
veterans' association and paramilitary organization. From 1924 to 
1928 it was the strongest middle-class party in the Reichstag, but 
losses in the 1928 election (and a major split in 1929-30) caused it to 
adopt a more intransigent and antirepublican course under its new 
chairman, Alfred Hugenberg. Its tactical alliances with the NSDAP 
in 1929 in the campaign against the Young Plan and in 1931 against 
the Bruning government (the "Harzburg Front") merely served tole-
gitimize the latter party, while not slowing the DNVP's gradual de-
cline. As this study amply demonstrates, the end result was that 
DNVP members increasingly migrated to the NSDAP. The DNVP 
was a major participant in the coalition government that brought 
Hitler to power as chancellor in 1933. Dreaming that it could "tame" 
or "use" the Nazis, it was quickly outmaneuvered by them. The party 
was formally disbanded on June 26, 1933. 
The second political party, and the one to which all of the high-
est SA leaders belonged, is of course the Nationalsozialistische 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, or NSDAP.Y It presents us with a paradox: 
even though it eventually became the largest single political party in 
German history, it began in January 1919 as a tiny sectarian party in 
the southern German state of Bavaria called the Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei (German Workers' Party, or DAP). It existed in the 
beginning as just one of many tiny splinter groups and parties on the 
extreme right end of the political spectrum that made up the volkisch 
movement. 
The volkisch movement had its roots in the nineteenth cen-
tury.8 This broad and diverse movement had as its common tenants 
a form of ultranationalist, antidemocratic populism which claimed 
to represent a kind of integral Germanness. Xenophobic in general, 
the volkisch movement was particularly identified with a virulent 
anti-Semitism. It was strongly influenced by the Social Darwinism 
rampant in European society at the end of the nineteenth century. 
The volkisch movement embraced such mainstream political posi-
tions as the need for a powerful army and a strong state, but indi-
vidual volkisch thinkers and movements also embraced a wide range 
of more marginal ideas, which could include such things asnudism, 
vegetarianism, mysticism, or reincarnation. While volkisch parties 
or organizations such as the Christlich-soziale Partei (Christian So-
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cial Party) of Adolf Stocker or the separate Christlich-soziale Partei 
of Karl Lueger in Vienna did occasionally become something like 
mass movements before the First World War, the organized volkisch 
movement generally remained small and on the margins of society 
at that time. 
In the atmosphere of revolution, defeat, and despair, the volkisch 
movement in Germany grew significantly after the war and served 
to focus the fears and resentments of many Central Europeans. Per-
haps just as important, even before the war volkisch ideas had begun 
to infiltrate mainstream society. The radicalization of the political 
climate, combined with the earlier gradual acceptance of volkisch 
ideas by moderate conservatives, allowed for a much closer coopera-
tion between moderate and volkisch (radical) conservatives after the 
war than had previously been possible.9 
It is important to emphasize that from the time of its founding 
in 1919 until about 1927, the NSDAP was just one of many volkisch 
organizations in Germany and Austria and was seen to be, and gener-
ally saw itself to be, just one part of a larger volkisch movement. 10 
Although Nazi ideology and policy distinguished itself from that of 
other contemporary volkisch organizations on a handful of points, it 
really represented little that was new or original;l 1 instead, anyone 
familiar with the larger volkisch movement would instantly recog-
nize and feel comfortable with most of what the Nazis represented. 
The very familiarity of the Nazis to those attracted to volkisch 
ideology allowed the NSDAP to grow in its early years by gradually 
absorbing members of other volkisch organizations or their hangers-
on. Furthermore, as a minor member of a larger movement, the 
NSDAP was ensured a safe and congenial, if limited, social space in 
which to organize and grow in its early years. The NSDAP first ab-
sorbed the members of other organizations in this political "niche," 
which allowed it to reach a certain size and consolidate itself organi-
zationally before it began to take on the much more difficult task of 
crossing over into the political mainstream, which it had begun to do 
by 1927. This process can be seen clearly within the top leadership of 
the SA, and it is therefore not surprising that volkisch groups or par-
ties figure prominently in the backgrounds of many (but by no means 
all) of the highest SA leaders. 
One of the earliest volkisch organizations to achieve national 
prominence during the German Revolution was the Deutsch-
volkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund (German Volkisch Defense and 
Defiance League). 12 Although it did not have a very tight national 
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organization, and though it only existed from 1919 until1922, it was 
extremely important because it served to give a volkisch focus to the 
great and general resentment, hatred, fear, and disappointment felt 
by many Germans after the loss of the war and during the upheavals 
of the revolution. For many of the future top SA leaders, this was 
their first exposure to volkisch ideas. 
A second group of volkisch organizations to which many future 
SA leaders belonged included both contemporary competitors of the 
NSDAP, such as the Deutschsoziale Partei (German-Social Party), 
the Deutschsozialistische Partei (German-Socialist Party), or the 
Deutschvolkische Freiheitspartei (German Volkisch Freedom Party), 
or volkisch organizations formed to continue the volkisch movement 
after the NSDAP and similar organizations were banned in the wake 
of the failed Beer Hall Putsch, such as the Deutschvolkische 
Freiheitsbewegung (German Volkisch Freedom Movement), the 
Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung (National Socialist Free-
dom Movement), or the GroBdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft (Greater-
German National Community). 13 These volkisch organizations are 
important because they (and the early NSDAP) pioneered many of 
the tactics and strategies that the Nazis later used so effectively, and 
they eventually supplied political skills and ideology to the separate 
but contemporary movement of paramilitary associations, or 
Wehrverbande. 
Although the volkisch element is important in the backgrounds 
of the higher SA leaders, it is a relatively small element and it func-
tioned more like a catalyst. The military and paramilitary activities 
of these men are much more important in terms of the number of 
organizations involved or the length of time devoted to them. 
THE pARAMILITARY HERITAGE OF THE REVOLUTION 
The collapse that became the German Revolution in November 1918 
involved German society in its entirety, but it was perhaps most acute 
and of greatest consequence in the German armed forces. A naval 
mutiny in Wilhelmshaven on October 29 began the temporary but 
near total collapse of the German armed forces. Meanwhile, a politi-
cal struggle for power broke out within Germany between the mod-
erate social democrats under Friedrich Ebert (who had been handed 
the reins of government by the last imperial chancellor, Prince Max 
of Baden) and a collection of more radical socialists who sought to 
turn Germany into a Soviet-style "council republic" (Raterepublik). 
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In addition, the power vacuum in eastern Europe caused by the col-
lapse of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and German Empires set 
free the long-held national aspirations of the Baltic peoples, the Poles, 
and the Czechs, all of whom laid claim to German territory. (Austria 
faced a similar combination of domestic turmoil and foreign threat.) 
A certain degree of simple banditry also accompanied the political 
upheaval. 
The Ebert government was thus faced with an acute need for an 
armed force with which to assert its authority, while the high com-
mand was faced with an equally acute need to preserve the future of 
itself and the armed forces. This led to a deal between the Ebert gov-
ernment and General Groener (then "Erster Quartiermeister" or 
deputy chief of the general staff and effectively in command of the 
German army at that point) which was made on the evening of No-
vember 10, 1918. Each agreed to support the other. 
There was a problem, however. The high command really didn't 
have much of an armed force at its disposal, since the soldiers re-
turning from the front quickly refused to fight their fellow citizens 
in the streets. They either waited passively in their barracks for de-
mobilization or, more frequently, simply went home. The high com-
mand was thus faced with the task of quickly creating an ad hoc 
armed force for immediate use before it could really afford to think 
about rebuilding the armed forces on a permanent basis. Meanwhile, 
given the collapse of order, other organizations, from bands of citi-
zens interested in protecting their property to political organizations 
combatting the Ebert government, all set about creating their own 
armed units. These military and paramilitary forces formed during 
the revolution played a vital role in the careers and development of 
future SA leaders. They existed in a confusing variety, and it is im-
portant to distinguish between the different kinds. 
The army and navy ordered the formation of voluntary mili-
tary units made up of veterans and filled out with hastily trained 
young men who had not yet been called up to service. These units 
came to be called Freikorps, or free corps, a term previously used for 
private or irregular military units formed in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, especially those formed in the Germanies at the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars to throw out the French occupation14. 
While the high command was not the only authority that caused free 
corps to be formed, the mythology surrounding the free corps15 even 
today makes it important to describe them in some detail. 
The free corps in general were formed at the initiative and un-
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der the direction of the army and navy high command. 16 They were 
full-time military units under the control of the German government 
and its representatives. Free corps members were paid, clothed, 
equipped, and housed at government expense, and they served under 
regular military discipline. Service in the free corps counted as regu-
lar military service in terms of seniority, promotion, decorations, etc. 17 
Men, particularly career NCOs and officers, were transferred into 
and out of individual free corps by the army and navy high com-
mands as a matter of course. On occasion, this even involved trans-
fer of men serving in units in the Baltic who had nominally muti-
nied.18 Free corps units were formed by the military as temporary 
units and were intended to serve only until order was restored and 
the regular army could be reestablished. As a consequence, most free 
corps existed for less than six months. The majority were disbanded 
by June 1919, and the last free corps were disbanded by May and June 
1920. Later resurrections of the term (such as in Upper Silesia in 
1921) were just that: resurrections of a historical term to provide 
symbolic continuity, just as had been done in 1918 and 1919 tore-
vive the old tradition of the original free corps of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. 19 
A large number of free corps men were transferred into the regu-
lar army (the Provisional Reichswehr and later the Reichswehr) or 
the newly formed state police units called the Sicherheitspolizei. 
Others were only too happy to return to civilian life. Only a few men 
who had served in the free corps and who had realistic expectations 
of continuing a professional military career were forced out of the 
military by the Treaty of Versailles or their own disloyalty.20 Such 
individuals did exist, and their later role as agitators against theRe-
public was important, but they do not represent the majority of free 
corps veterans. 
Despite these caveats, the free corps were vital to the creation 
of the later paramilitary subculture from which the future higher SA 
leaders all came. The occasionai savagery of the fighting in which 
the free corps was involved contributed in a major way to the cre-
ation of a postwar political climate in which violence was much more 
likely than before the war. Most important of all, the free corps were 
later mythologized and became a symbol of idealism, self-sacrifice, 
and radical and total engagement in the fight for Germany. Tradi-
tional conservatives, radical conservatives of different stripes, and 
even the Communist Party all tried to co-opt the myth of the free 
corps for their own purposes. Moreover, the free corps did also serve 
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as a first experiment in the use of military forms and procedures in 
Germany to solve essentially civilian political problems.21 Although 
later organizations under different conditions would elaborate fur-
ther on this model before it would ultimately become the "political 
soldiering" of the SA, the free corps did provide an important first 
step. Also significant, the free corps tended to be a place where many 
of the most radical and activist elements of the later paramilitary 
underground came together. 22 The acquaintanceships, friendships, 
and contacts that were first made in the free corps were the connec-
tive tissue that held the later paramilitary subculture of the Weimar 
Republic together. Although the thesis that the free corps were the 
"vanguard of Nazism" is no longer tenable today in its simplest ver-
sion, the free corps are clearly an important (if not necessary) step in 
the careers of the men who later became the highest leaders of the SA. 
The free corps were not the only military or paramilitary units 
serving under government auspices during the revolution, by any 
means. Units of both the old Imperial Army and the new army (which 
would eventually become the Reichswehr) existed side by side. Some 
of the larger free corps formed units of part-time volunteer reserves 
called Zeitfreiwilliger, which could be called up quickly in case of 
renewed revolt or unrest.23 Many of these were former free corps 
members, often students, who had returned to their civilian occupa-
tions, but they were distinguished from the free corps in that they 
were part-time organizations. Another armed paramilitary body char-
acteristic of the revolution was a kind of civic guard or citizens mili-
tia originally formed spontaneously by middle-class Germans to pro-
tect their property. These units were later formed into a national 
system under government supervision called the Einwohnerwehren 
(civic guards).24 They, too, are distinguished by being part-time orga-
nizations. Moreover, the Einwohnerwehren were the least "military" 
and most "civilian" of all the government-sponsored armed organi-
zations in terms of their duties, membership, training, equipment, 
and leadership. 
The Versailles treaty set very strict limits on the size of the 
armed forces in Germany, and thousands of men who had been ca-
reer soldiers or who hoped to become career soldiers based on their 
wartime or free corps service found themselves out on the street. 
The Einwohnerwehr movement might have served to absorb much 
of the frustrated martial ardor abroad in German society, but an Al-
lied ultimatum forced the German government to disband it on June 
21, 192P' 
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Some Einwohnerwehr members independently took the move-
ment underground. Several of the more flamboyant free corps lead-
ers such as Gerhard RoGbach, Peter von Heydebreck, or Hermann 
Ehrhardt had already taken many of their men underground, forming 
Arbeitsgemeinschaften (labor cooperatives) when the free corps were 
disbanded in the course of establishing the new Reichswehr. More-
over, there were already a great number of legal, aboveboard veter-
ans' organizations in existence, such as the Stahlhelm. Out of these 
three wellsprings grew an entire movement of private paramilitary 
associations collectively called the Wehrverbande (singular, 
Wehrverband).26 
THE WEHRVERBANDE 
In contrast to the free corps, the Reichswehr, and the Einwohn-
erwehren, the Wehrverbande were strictly private organizations with 
no overt state influence or control. Moreover, in contrast with the 
Reichswehr and the free corps, they were part-time organizations 
with a local power base and relatively decentralized or at least weak 
organizational structures. They were also strictly voluntary and had 
no legal way of compelling obedience or secrecy from their members. 
Ostensibly, the Wehrverbande existed to maintain the martial 
will and military skills of the German people. In fact, they also ex-
isted as militarized political pressure groups, fighting for everything 
from a change in the form of national government on down to purely 
local concerns, although most avoided any direct contact with po-
litical parties and opposed electoral politics until at least 1924. 
Even this is only half the story. Many, even most, of the 
Wehrverbande maintained illegal stocks of weapons in case of either 
a domestic uprising by the leftists or the assault of a foreign enemy, 
such as Poland. Weapons were hidden both for their usefulness and 
as a means of circumventing the destruction of surplus weapons stocks 
mandated by the Versailles treaty. Many of the Wehrverbande en-
joyed the covert support of the Reichswehr in these illegal activities. 
They obtained weapons and training from the Reichswehr, which 
sought to organize their members into an illegal militia27 to supple-
ment the military in times of emergency. Furthermore, men were 
drawn from the Wehrverband milieu by the military to participate in 
covert operations on behalf of the government, such as sabotage 
against the French in the Rhineland or opposition to the Polish at-
tempt to seize Upper Silesia in 192 1_2H 
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The dividing line between the so-called Black Reichswehr (and 
other army-sponsored covert operations) and the Wehrverbande was 
fluid and not always clear to the men involved. This led to a curious 
situation: the German government went behind the backs of many 
of its own officials and conspired to break its own laws in order to 
have the benefit of an unofficial reservoir of military talent. Yet many 
of these same men and organizations that it employed were in fact 
virulently opposed to that government and actively engaged in con-
spiracy against it. The German government was then forced to toler-
ate or even aid in hiding the illegal activities of its protegees, to the 
great detriment of the democratic system.29 This even included the 
government tolerating, ignoring, or even concealing beatings, mur-
ders, or other physical intimidation committed by the private orga-
nizations employed in covert military preparations. This unofficial 
system of "justice" was called the Feme and its murders Fememord.30 
As will be seen below, the Wehrverbande played a crucial role 
in the backgrounds of most SA leaders. They, and not the free corps, 
were the place where future leaders truly learned to apply military 
organization to civil politics and civilian problems. The semiclandestine 
world of the Wehrverbande was the perfect incubator for future Nazis. 
BIRTH OF THE SA 
The SA sprang directly out of the Wehrverband milieu, and indeed it 
functioned as a Wehrverband in its early days. Basic decisions were 
made in this period about the forms that the SA would take, and 
these forms were later repeated, even if in modified form. More im-
portant, the early years provided Hitler and other Nazi leaders with 
an example of what could happen if the SA were allowed to become 
too divorced from the control and the goals of the political party ap-
paratus. 
The beginnings of what became the SA are found in the very 
informal Ordnerdienst (usher service) and Saalschutz (hall defense) 
established in 1919 on an ad hoc basis to maintain order and fend off 
outside attacks on meetings of the fledgling Nazi Party in Munich.31 
As the NSDAP began to feel the need for a more organized system of 
protection for its meetings, and as it began to make more of its own 
direct attacks on its opponents, it gradually evolved a separate and 
distinct paramilitary wing, the SA. 
The first step in this direction was the collection of a perma-
nent core of members for the Saalschutz Abteilung (hall defense sec-
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tion) of the DAP around Emil Maurice on or shortly after February 
24, 1920.32 Although similar groups were soon founded in other 
NSDAP party cells,33 there was no central organization and very little 
structure at all to the Saalschutz Abteilung. Other party members 
were still gathered on an ad hoc basis to aid the Saalschutz in its 
duties whenever the need arose. 
It was not until over a year later (August 3, 1921) that the NSDAP 
felt the need for a more formal and better organized group to protect 
its meetings. Even then, the new Turn- und Sportabteilung (Gym-
nastics and Sports Division) hardly went beyond the earlier Saalschutz 
Abteilung. 
By September 17 at the latest, the Turn- and Sportabteilung was 
being called the Sturmabteilung (SA) on an informal basis. The name 
was formally awarded to the group after the infamous Battle of the 
Hofbriiuhaus of November 4, 1921, an event which soon assumed 
mythic proportions within the Party.34 By this time, small SA groups 
had already been formed outside Munich, and shortly after the battle, 
a Munich police intelligence report quoted Hitler as telling the SA 
that one of its jobs was to disrupt the meetings of groups that the 
NSDAP opposed.35 
By the fall of 1921, command of the SA (storm troopers) had 
been turned over to Hans Ulrich Klintzsch, a young ex-naval officer.36 
Klintzsch was a former member of the Ehrhardt Brigade, and at the 
time he was named SA commander he was an active member of the 
shadowy Organisation Consul (OC) and its more aboveground 
Wehrverband, the Bund Wiking.37 In fact, Klintzsch and several other 
members of the OC/Bund Wiking were sent to the NSDAP "on loan" 
from an infamous putschist and antirepublican conspirator, Captain 
Hermann Ehrhardt, in order to aid in the organization and training of 
the fledgling SA. Despite a later parting of the ways, both sides felt in 
1921 that they could profit from the arrangement. The NSDAP gained 
the services of former officers with experience in the formation and 
organization of conspiratorial paramilitary groups and contacts, through 
the OC, with the twilight world of the Wehrverbiinde not only in 
Munich but throughout Germany and Austria. Klintzsch and the other 
Ehrhardt men were good organizers who were able to infuse the SA 
with a different spirit than had the brawling watchmaker, Emil Maurice. 
Moreover, the acceptance of this outside help shows that, although 
opportunistic, Hitler and the other Nazi leaders were also interested 
in seeing the SA develop into something more than just a simple group 
of muscle-bound ushers to keep order at Party gatherings. 
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Out of this deliberate association with the Wehrverbiinde grew 
a unique form of organization. Partly through the design of the lead-
ers of the NSDAP and partly through contact with its political en-
vironment, the SA became a synthesis of several independent po-
litical styles current at the time, something that was not quite ei-
ther a political party or a Wehrverband, but partook of elements of 
both. 
The development of a new style combining military organiza-
tion with political activism, coupled with increasingly aggressive 
behavior, began slowly in the late summer and fall of 1921 and gradu-
ally picked up speed throughout 1922. More and more SA units were 
formed outside Munich, such as in Landshut in November 1921. May 
1922 saw the creation of enough SA groups outside Munich that guide-
lines for the formation of a local SA group had to be issued in order to 
ensure uniform organization and some measure of control by the 
central party leadership. By August 1922, a year after its official for-
mation, the SA held its first public march in Munich as part of a 
larger march and demonstration by many Wehrverbiinde and veter-
ans' groups.38 This marked the debut of one of the most characteris-
tic and effective SA propaganda tactics-the mass public march.39 
The NSDAP rapidly embarked upon a series of its own marches both 
within Munich and, for the first time, well beyond. The most fa-
mous of these marches, which became with time another of the myths 
of the Kampfzeit, was the expedition to the Koburger Deutscher Tag 
(Coburg "German Day") on October 14-15, 1922.40 
The growing importance of the NSDAP within Munich led to 
its inclusion in a cartel of conservative and radical groups in Novem-
ber 1922 called the Vereinigte Vaterlandische Verbande Bayerns 
(United Patriotic Organizations of Bavaria, or VVVB). This marked 
the crest of the political phase of the early SA before it became trans-
formed into a more exclusively military organization. The aggres-
sive tactics that the NSDAP was able to adopt due to the unique 
character of the SA as half-Wehrverband, half-political movement, 
gave the NSDAP a high profile in the political environment of 
Munich. Through this high profile, the NSDAP was able to attract 
new converts, spread outside Munich and then outside Bavaria, and 
to attain a certain prestige in right-wing circles. The NSDAP, in sig-
nificant measure due to the innovative use of the SA, had arrived.41 
Although the SA of late 1922 was not the fully developed organiza-
tion it became by 1932, and although it may not have been exactly 
what Hitler had wanted to create, in light of subsequent events Hitler 
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was able to look back on the SA of late 1922 as being the prototype of 
the militarized mass political organization that he needed. 
1923: MILITARIZATION OF THE SA AND FAILED PUTSCH 
In January 1923, events occurred outside Bavaria which were to change 
the SA radically as an organization and to set back the growth of the 
NSDAP by several years, a setback only partially compensated for by 
the gain of national notoriety for the Party in the process. On Janu-
ary 11 the French and Belgians invaded and occupied the left bank of 
the Rhine, in alleged response to German failure to deliver repara-
tions on time. This action radically changed the political climate in 
Germany and sent the value of the German mark into freefall. 
Expectations of further attacks by the French or Poles or both 
led the army to prepare for active resistance, which included even 
closer cooperation with the Wehrverbande. Many politicians of all 
affiliations called for more active measures of resistance, and some 
dreamed of a new war of liberation that would sweep the French out 
of Germany and break the shackles of the Versailles treaty. For many, 
in the face of growing economic hardships caused by runaway infla-
tion, the dream included the destruction of parliamentary democ-
racy and the Weimar system. This situation of external crisis and 
economic collapse was compounded by a smoldering conflict between 
Bavaria and the central government over states' rights, and by the 
formation of left-wing coalition governments in the states of Saxony 
and Thuringia on Bavaria's northern border. 
The change in the political climate caused the NSDAP to alter 
sharply the course of SA development. Swept along in the general 
mobilization of the Wehrverbande for national defense, and eager to 
use the confusion and radicalization of the situation to set off the 
long-awaited internal battle against the left and against the present 
government, the SA was transformed into a party army, a pure 
Wehrverband organized for national defense or civil war or both. Be-
cause of this alteration of emphasis, the role of the "first SA" as the 
pioneers of "political soldiering" was suspended. It would be left to 
the reestablished SA from 1925 on to make good on the promise first 
shown in 1921 and 1922. 
Hitler was widely respected on the right as a politician, but he 
was not a military leader. His influence over the SA therefore de-
clined in proportion to the emphasis placed on a narrow military 
mission and organization for the SA. Whether or not Hitler foresaw 
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this development is immaterial, because there was little he could do 
to stop it in the general rush to mobilize the Wehrverbande. In early 
January 1923, Hitler broke with the VVVB over the question of a 
front of national unity.42 
A month later, the NSDAP joined the most radical Wehrverbande 
to form a new cartel, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der vaterlandischen 
Kampfverbande (Working Group of Patriotic Combat Organizations).43 
The militarization of the SA proceeded apace. At the first National 
Party Congress of the NSDAP in Munich, January 27-29, 1923, a por-
tion of the SA appeared for the first time in what approached a uni-
form.44 Throughout the spring of 1923 the SA was reorganized and 
given a more military structure, with ranks and unit names chang-
ing to parallel those of the army.45 Military exercises were stepped 
up. On March 1, 1923, an SA high command was formed, which gradu-
ally developed a military staff structure. Several days later, Klintzsch 
resigned as commander of the SA and became its chief of staff. He 
was replaced by Hermann Goring, a flamboyant, charismatic, and 
highly decorated former army officer and flying hero from World War 
I. Hitler hoped that having such a man at the head of the SA would 
attract new volunteers and thus help it to expand into a more cred-
ible fighting force. 46 An added benefit of this change of command 
was that it put a party member and Hitler follower at the head of the 
SA, instead of someone whose first allegiance belonged elsewhere. 
After a flurry of activity on the part of the NSDAP and the other 
members of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft, the summer of 1923 passed 
relatively quietly, with continued preparation for conflict on the part 
of the Wehrverbande, Reichswehr, and Bavarian government, but with 
no major incidents. All parties adopted a waiting policy. Events be-
gan to accelerate again only in September. By the fall the economic 
situation had reached such a point that wide elements of German 
society were willing to accept almost any solution so long as it prom-
ised to bring economic relief, including the violent overthrow of the 
RepublicY The members of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft, under the im-
pact of the economic situation and the strident tones of its own pro-
paganda, were growing increasingly impatient. Moreover, in Septem-
ber they began to grow fearful that either the Reich government or 
the Bavarian government would take the initiative away from the 
Wehrverbande and make a putsch on their terms impossible. A se-
ries of setbacks all served to put Arbeitsgemeinschaft members on 
notice that the moment for action might be at hand but was rapidly 
passing: the NSDAP was banned in the state of Braunschweig on 
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September 18, 1923,48 the official end to the policy of passive resis-
tance in the Ruhr was declared on September 26, and the conserva-
tive former Bavarian prime minister, Dr. Gustav von Kahr, was ap-
pointed general state commissar of Bavaria at the same time as a 
proclamation of martial law gave him near dictatorial powers. Von 
Kahr began to take more of a hard line against the Wehrverbande 
than had previously been the case in Bavaria, while continuing to 
negotiate with them. Both sides attempted to commit the other to 
its own plans. Meanwhile, right-wingers in Berlin were making their 
own plans for a coup in conjunction with the Reichswehr, and they 
were in loose contact with the Arbeitsgemein-schaft and rather closer 
contact with von Kahr. 
It is within this context that Hitler and the rest of the 
Wehrverbande with whom he was allied (called the Deutscher 
Kampfbund, or German Alliance for Struggle, since September 1, 1923) 
attempted a putsch on the night of November 8, 1923. Weary of the 
continued talks with other elements of the right and fearful that oth-
ers might steal their thunder, they made one last desperate and ill-
planned attempt to seize the initiative and impose their policies on 
the Bavarian government. It is unnecessary to recount the details of 
the putsch itsel£,49 except to say that in the end it was a failure. Nei-
ther the Bavarian government nor the Reichswehr were ultimately 
willing to go along with the plans of the Wehrverbande, and alone 
the Wehrverbande were simply not strong enough to succeed. The 
putsch ended in disgrace. The NSDAP, SA, and the other Wehrverbande 
who had participated in the putsch were banned, their leaders were 
under arrest or in hiding, and their members were scattered. 
1924: THE REASSESSMENT OF PUTSCHISM 
The period from the failure of the putsch in November 1923 to the 
reestablishment of the Party and SA in February 1925 was not a happy 
one for the supporters of National Socialism. The Party, the SA, and 
most of the organizations closely allied with them were banned and 
their assets were confiscated. Hitler and the top putsch leaders were 
in jail. The Bavarian government and the Reichswehr had turned their 
backs on their former allies, and the leaders of more moderate volkisch 
and paramilitary groups tried to steal away as many of the former 
NSDAP supporters for their own groups as they could. The entire 
volkisch and paramilitary movement was rent with internal divi-
sions and rivalries and subject to careful state scrutiny. National So-
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cialism appeared to be dead, and many of its supporters despaired 
that the movement could ever be resurrected. 
This was hardly a positive development for Hitler in the short 
term, but the putsch and the trial that followed brought Hitler to the 
forefront of the volkisch movement, and the failure of the putsch 
and Hitler's enforced isolation in Landsberg prison brought a thor-
ough reassessment of Party strategy and also the willingness to try 
out a new strategy that ultimately led to the victory of the Party in 
1933. Ironically, the failure of the putsch gave Hitler and his move-
ment a second chance to successfully blend a political party with 
paramilitary organization. 
It would have taken a perceptiveness bordering on the clairvoy-
ant to have predicted the subsequent rise of the NSDAP in 1924. But, 
in fact, many of the fundamental decisions that laid the groundwork 
for the future rise of the Party and the rebuilding of the SA grew out 
of the experiences of this period of forced dormancy. While it was 
not well understood at the time, what happened in the mid-1920s 
was a fundamental shift in the political ecology of the Weimar Re-
public. The old climate-which had favored putschist tactics, large-
scale government support for private armies, loose cartels of tiny 
political movements under jealous and independent leaders, and a 
general avoidance of participation in the hated parliamentary sys-
tem-died out, and a new one replaced it. 
The change was not total: elements of the old putschist out-
look survived into the new era, and many of the later difficulties that 
the Nazi Party had with the SA can be traced to a preference for 
military solutions which had not disappeared but had only lain dor-
mant after 1923. Many individuals and organizations, particularly in 
the Wehrverband movement, either did not notice the change or re-
fused to adapt to it. They struggled on into the mid- and late 1920s, 
but ultimately they could not survive in the altered environment 
and so became politically extinct. Later, the refounded NSDAP and 
SA absorbed many of the individuals left "orphaned" as the 
Wehrverband movement decayed. Only those individuals and groups 
who understood that a fundamental change had occurred and that 
they had to adapt to it were able to survive and prosper. 
By having set a national example in the putsch attempt and 
then by being kept out of the atmosphere of division and jealousy 
that followed, Hitler was able to leave prison in December 1924 as 
the only volkisch leader of any stature who was not compromised by 
bickering with all his rivals.40 Parallel to this development, count-
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less groups who felt some kinship with NSDAP policies and ideas 
were made aware of the Party and were unwittingly prepared to join 
it by its own putsch-inspired myth and the negative example of the 
ineffectiveness of all the other similar groups under the new condi-
tions. Ironically, the spread of National Socialism to northern Ger-
many, although it had begun before the putsch, gained crucial mo-
mentum in the dark days when the Party itself was banned. 
One of the most significant developments of this entire period 
was the increased contact that developed between the Wehrverbande 
and the volkisch movement. Although organizationally still sepa-
rate, the volkisch groups and the Wehrverbande became much closer 
in 1924 because of the volkisch movement's participation in parlia-
mentary politics in the two Reichstag elections of 1924. 
Both types of organization often shared the same members. 51 
Moreover, they shared many ideological and political ideas and ex-
isted in an often uneasy symbiosis within the same general subcul-
ture on the far right. For example, they attended each others' meet-
ings and public ceremonies. The Wehrverbande generally volunteered 
to protect volkisch meetings against disruption by outsiders and, per-
haps most significant of all, in the several elections of 1924 they 
often performed propaganda and campaign duties for the volkisch 
and conservative parties. At the very least, the exposure to the idea 
of electoral politics, which came from even a loose association with 
the volkisch groups, created a new awareness that such a tactic ex-
isted as a real possibility and forced even the Wehrverbande to dis-
cuss the question. This is true even if the decision of most 
Wehrverbande in 1924 was not to become directly involved them-
selves but rather to simply support the conservative and volkisch 
parties. In many areas this provided the first experience of participa-
tion in electoral politics for many individuals who later joined the 
SA and NSDAP. For many others, it provided the first serious consid-
eration of alternative tactics in the fight against the Republic and all 
other enemies, especially given the fact that the previously favored 
approach, an armed putsch, had so recently failed. 
Immediately after it became clear that the putsch was a failure, 
SA members scattered to avoid prosecution. Most of the rank and 
file returned home, and they either abandoned politics entirely or 
joined one of the Wehrverbande or volkisch groups that were not 
banned after the putsch. 52 Some of the more loyal SA members were 
just able to hold together the remnants of their old SA units under 
new names.53 While these diehards managed to keep the faith and 
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even form the core of new SA units to be created after the Party was 
rebuilt, they were largely isolated from one another by the lack of a 
central command structure, the difficulties of communication, the 
need for secrecy, and the lack of effective leadership. 
Despite the near total collapse of the SA, a great deal of plan-
ning regarding the future SA actually occurred in 1924. Rohm, a 
former general staff officer and a compulsive organizer, pushed the 
formulation of plans for the SA (and also for his pet project of a new 
union of all the Wehrverbiinde, the Frontbann) that had little basis in 
reality in 1924 and 1925 but that included many ideas that were later 
extremely useful in the refounding of the SA and its expansion into a 
national organization. The later use of these ideas is not always di-
rectly traceable back to Rohm, and many of them were simple com-
mon sense to anyone with military training. Yet it is incontestable 
that these ideas were aired at this time within a circle of men who 
later became important SA leaders. 54 
THE FRONTBANN: STEPFATHER OF THE FUTURE SA 
The Frontbann was intended to be a central cartel of all volkisch 
Wehrverbiinde, much like the Kampfbund but with more centralized 
control and organization. 55 It was formally founded on May 31, 1924, 
although Rohm had apparently been working toward such an organi-
zation for some time. Although solidly in the conceptual framework 
of the older Wehrverband idea and thus not well suited for the changed 
climate after the Beer Hall Putsch, the Frontbann was at least a larger 
and more widespread organization than the old SA ever was. Although 
there was much wrong with the Frontbann, Rohm managed to create 
a framework within which a large number of programmatically and 
geographically diverse Wehrverbiinde could be brought together. This 
was significant and, in a sense, successful because a serious cartel of 
northern and southern German, Bavarian, and Austrian organizations 
was finally formed. For the first time since the days of the 
Einwohnerwehren, there was a national forum for the cooperation of 
paramilitary leaders in northern and southern Germany. Had such a 
national cartel been created in 1923, the outcome of the Beer Hall 
Putsch might have been quite different.56 
In turn, although the days of the "pure" Wehrverbiinde were 
past and the Frontbann could not possibly succeed in influencing 
political events or becoming a partner to the Reichswehr, it did pro-
vide an organizational basis for the spread of the SA to northern Ger-
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many. Also important in this regard was the diffusion of former SA 
members throughout other Wehrverbande and volkisch groups. The 
active attempts by the leaders of many of these groups to profit from 
the banning of the SA by picking up new members aided this devel-
opment. The NSDAP itself also gave impetus to this process, by or-
dering all local party group and SA leaders to join other volkisch 
groups when they couldn't maintain independent underground Na-
tional Socialist groupsY The return home of many northerners who 
had been living in Munich after the putsch and the cooperation of 
northern and southern groups through the Frontbann helped to spread 
individual National Socialists into middle and northern Germany. 58 
These men helped to radicalize the groups to which they became 
attached and to spread faith in the NSDAP to places where it had 
hardly been known before. As will be shown below, the Frontbann 
figured in the immediate past of many men who became the highest 
SA leaders. 
Hitler was paroled in December 1924, and in February 1925 he 
reestablished the Party and SA. Although he offered Rohm the com-
mand of the SA, the two could not agree on the relationship between 
the SA and the Party, nor was Rohm willing to give up his dream of a 
cartel of all the Wehrverbande. After a final meeting between the 
two on April 16, 1925, Rohm and Hitler parted company, and on 
May 1, 1925, Rohm proffered Hitler his resignation as both SA and 
Frontbann leader. Hitler did not even bother to reply.59 It would be 
five more years before Ernst Rohm would be willing to forgo the old 
Wehrverband dream, albeit temporarily, and head an SA that was an 
integral part of the NSDAP. 
This background made up the collective "memory" or recent experi-
ences of the men in this study. They could have done many things 
based on these experiences. What they did was build the SA into a 
new kind of organization synthesizing military forms and civilian 
political content. The further history of the SA is also the history of 
their lives and will be described in the following chapters. 
2 
The Pioneers, 
1925-1926 
When Hitler walked out of Landsburg Prison shortly before Christ-
mas in December 1924, he seemed to have few prospects. Although 
the ban on the NSDAP and SA had just been lifted, both organiza-
tions had to be completely rebuilt, and Hitler himself was still pro-
hibited from public speaking in nearly all of the German states. He 
had no choice but to cling strictly to a policy of the utmost legality, 
for he could be rearrested at any time and returned to finish out his 
prison sentence if he or a significant number of his followers strayed 
from the conditions of his parole. Hitler was not even a German citi-
zen and could face deportation at any moment. He was seeking an 
end to the ban on his public speaking in Bavaria in early 1925, and 
with his precarious personal situation he was in no mood to run un-
necessary risks. 1 
Far worse than this for Hitler was the fact that political condi-
tions no longer favored the growth of radical outsider movements 
fed by irresponsible and violent demagoguery. Although the anti-
Semitic and extremist volkisch organizations had managed to score 
significant electoral successes in the first half of 1924, they had slipped 
badly in the second elections that year, 2 and their support continued 
to wane in 1925 and 1926. 
The reason for this lack of support was simple: the reforms ini-
tiated by the Stresemann and Marx governments and vigorously 
backed by the Reichswehr were in the process of restoring economic 
stability and domestic peace and were even finding a modus vivendi 
with France and the rest of Germany's former enemies.3 In short, the 
Republic had proved that it was strong enough to weather the ex-
treme instability and conflict of 1920-23, and with a return to stabil-
ity came a corresponding abandonment of support for extremist poli-
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tics-whether from the electorate or from the government in search. 
of extralegal allies in a time of crisis. The challenge to Hitler and his 
followers was to rebuild a movement from scratch, at a time when 
its appeal to the public was minimal and out of a potential stock of 
supporters who were both demoralized and divided. 
It was no simple task, but despite the illogic of his beliefs, Hitler 
took to the task at hand with exemplary rationality. The movement 
could not be re-created all at once, so priorities had to be established, 
and the men beginning to recoalesce around Hitler wisely chose to 
put the bulk of their energy into reestablishing the political organi-
zation, the NSDAP. For the time being they allowed the paramilitary 
affiliates to go their own way-without, however, ignoring them com-
pletely. 
The decision to concentrate on the political organization and to 
delay establishing a central command over the burgeoning local SA 
groups was in part accidental and in part deliberate. Of course, it 
made good sense to focus scarce resources where they would do the 
most good, but it was also a reflection of Hitler's view that the SA 
was just an auxiliary of the Party, important but not an end unto 
itsel£.4 The potential worth of the SA in a situation where a putsch 
was (temporarily) out of the question was unproven and unrecog-
nized by most of the political leaders of the NSDAP in 1925. More-
over, the experience of losing control of the SA to the military lead-
ers in 1923 when the SA was converted from a Party troop into a 
Wehrverband left a bad impression on Hitler and the political leader-
ship of the Party and made them reluctant to allow a potentially 
rebellious organization to become established until the political ap-
paratus of the Party was firmly in place.5 
The NSDAP was formally reorganized at a mass meeting in the 
Munich Hofbriiuhaus on February 27, 1925.6 The day before, the 
Volkischer Beobachter, in its first issue since the ban on its publica-
tion was lifted by the Bavarian government, published Hitler's "Fun-
damental Guidelines for the Reestablishment of the NSDAP."7 In 
this document Hitler's two main goals shone through: strict central-
ization of the rebuilt Party under his personal command, and strict 
legality. 
These "fundamental guidelines" included general instructions 
for setting up SA as well as Party units, so it is clear that Hitler still 
intended for the NSDAP to have a paramilitary auxiliary and to re-
build the SA as well as the Party organization. But because his priori-
ties lay elsewhere, the central Party leadership put no real effort into 
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rebuilding the SA until Franz von Pfeffer was appointed Oberster SA-
Fuhrer (supreme SA leader, or OSAF) as of November 1, 1926.8 With 
the simultaneous collapse of the Frontbann, the SA remained a dis-
parate collection of local groups.9 
Despite the lack of attention given to the SA by the central 
Party leadership, SA units rapidly sprang up all over Germany as soon 
as the Party was reestablished. 10 The circumstances surrounding the 
founding of individual SA sections varied according to region and 
locality. 11 In some cases, SA groups that had gone underground in 
1923 simply resumed operations. 12 In other cases, entire local 
Wehrverbande were transformed into SA units, either immediately 
or gradually. 13 In still other cases, local members of various volkisch 
and paramilitary groups left them and formed an SA unit. In some of 
the above cases, indeed, the local SA antedated the Ortsgruppe (local 
Party chapter). 14 In other cases-probably the majority-no truly sepa-
rate local SA existed at first: the local SA was simply formed on an ad 
hoc basis from whatever Party members were available for the pro-
tection of a given meeting. But even in this latter case, former mem-
bers of local Wehrverbande were often very much involved, since 
they were more willing and able to defend Party meetings and to 
possess a uniform. In cases where the local SA unit was formed out 
of an earlier Wehrverband, it might have remained somewhat inde-
pendent of the local Party leadership, but in general, the practice was 
just the opposite. The Ortsgruppenleiter (local Party group leader) 
was often the commander of the local SA unit, and the use and orga-
nization of the SA regionally was dominated by the Gauleiter (the 
head of a Gau, or regional division of the Party). This was reflected in 
the organization of the SA nationally at the time, since there was 
actually no provision for any unit beyond the local level, and the 
highest SA rank then in existence was that of Sturmabteilungsfiihrer 
(local SA group leader). 15 In some local areas, it was group policy for 
all Party members to belong to the SA, which then as a matter of 
course was led by the local Party chapter leader. 16 The result was an 
SA that was regionally heterogeneous yet widely subordinated to the 
political activities and leadership of the Party and in large part in-
distinguishable from the membership at large. This made the rebuilt 
or "second" SA different from the previous SA of 1923 in three im-
portant ways: it was no longer uniquely military, no longer confined 
to Bavaria, and no longer internally homogeneousY 
Despite the many good reasons for the Party to neglect the SA 
in 1925 and 1926, it was ultimately forced to establish a central lead-
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ership for the SA by pressure from local groups and the sheer risk 
involved in allowing the SA to develop without firm direction. The 
steady stream of requests from local Party groups for guidance re-
garding the SA had to be answered, and this took time away from 
those working to establish the political organization of the Party. 
More seriously, the unsupervised local groups showed a desire for a 
more centralized command structure that would allow for the mass-
ing of SA units from many local branches when needed, and they 
proceeded to create such structures independent of central control. 
Naturally, many of the local SA leaders were former officers, who 
were accustomed to thinking in terms of larger units and had the 
kind of military administrative skills needed to establish them. 18 
Moreover, the parade of 3,600 to 6,000 SA and SS men at the first 
Reichsparteitag (national convention) in Weimar in July 1926 showed 
that there were definite advantages to mass groupings of SA men. 19 
More seriously, the lack of central control over the SA and the 
great heterogeneity of its units made it possible and even likely that 
some day a local SA leader would seriously violate the legality policy 
of the Party, with disastrous consequences for the fledgling Party or-
ganization. Almost as dangerous, the lack of strong central control 
over the SA favored disagreement and rivalry between local SA and 
Party leaders,:w and the lack of a command structure to unite the 
different local and regional SA units favored the use of the SA as a 
private army and power base by the powerful and jealous regional 
leaders. These problems could potentially threaten the dominance of 
Hitler and the central Party leadership in Munich. 
The omission of central control over the SA in 1925 and 1926, 
the allowance of the spontaneous and independent formation of lo-
cal SA groups without uniform guidelines or planning, and the dan-
gerous usurpation of control over the SA by the Gau leaders and other 
local Party officials set the stage for later conflicts. The regional and 
local Party leaders were particularly upset at later having to relin-
quish control over the SA to a central SA command, and thus to see 
the SA develop as an organization over which they would have but 
limited control.21 Although Hitler's favorite strategy of avoiding a 
decision until absolutely necessary may have worked in 1925, by the 
late spring and summer of 1926 it had become increasingly risky. 
The Party had already taken steps to formalize the organization 
of the newly created SS.22 As a new organization with a very small 
membership, it was more amenable to central control from Munich 
and could serve as a counterweight to overly independent SA lead-
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ers. This was considered necessary in part because the SA in the north 
tended to have close ties with potentially dissident Party leaders, 
such as Gregor Strasser and Joseph Goebbels,23 and in part because 
the continued (though diminished) existence of the Frontbann threat-
ened a repeat of the loss of Party control over the SA as in 1923. 
These dangers gradually receded, and by May 1926, with the SS 
fairly well established, the central Party leadership began to hint that 
it was considering some sort of aggregation of the SA into larger 
units.24 In the summer of 1926 (probably after the Party Congress in 
July), Hitler traveled to Westphalia and spent considerable time dis-
cussing the organization of the SA with Franz von Pfeffer, who was 
the leader of Gau Westfalen. They managed to reach an accord, and 
in August 1926 von Pfeffer moved to Munich to begin forming a cen-
tral SA command. In October his appointment was formally an-
nounced, and the new supreme SA command took up its duties as of 
November 1, 1926.25 The days of neglect and independence were over, 
and a new period of centralized control and planning began. In a sense, 
the actual refounding of the SA was marked by the appointment of 
von Pfeffer, not the spontaneous and unsupervised creation of local 
SA groups in 1925 and 1926. 
The SA, if it were to survive, needed a particular kind of leader in 
these very early days of the refounded NSDAP. It needed men who 
had experience in military organization, and who could command 
respect from the veterans and current members of the Wehrverbiinde, 
the SA's natural recruiting ground. The SA also needed men who 
would become effective parts of the political organization of the 
NSDAP as well, for this was a time when every Party member wore 
several hats and the Party could not afford specialists. The SA also 
required tireless activists, men who could speak well and who had 
the political skills to unify the faithful, but who were also capable 
then of putting these faithful into uniform and building a tightly 
organized paramilitary organization. More than anything else, the 
new SA also needed self-starters, men wlio could act independently 
and who would not easily be discouraged, men with a worldview and 
a sense of ideological mission equal to that of Hitler himself. It took a 
special individual with many skills to help Hitler rebuild the SA and 
NSDAP. Unfortunately for Germany and the world, he found them. 
Heinrich Bennecke is a perfect example of the kind of man required 
to rebuild both the Party and the SA. 26 He was born in Dresden in 
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1902 to the family of a military physician. Not unusual for the son of 
a prominent military family, he was imbued with a love of the mili-
tary and a strong sense of patriotism at a very early age. In 1917, he 
was already working as a voluntary harvester (Erntehelfer) while most 
adult males were at the front. Like all young men of his age, he cer-
tainly expected to be called to military service one day himself, and 
given his background and patriotism, he certainly looked forward to 
it. Yet the war ended suddenly in a disastrous defeat, and Germany 
experienced a revolution before Bennecke could become a soldier. 
He could have simply gotten on with his life and career. Instead, he 
became a political and paramilitary activist and soon joined the 
NSDAP. 
In 1919, only seventeen years of age and still in high school 
(Gymnasium), he became a member of Zeitfreiwilligenregiment 
Dresden (Dresden Regiment of Part-Time Volunteers), a unit of tem-
porary local volunteers formed during the German Revolution to pro-
vide a reserve force in times of civil unrest. Dresden was the scene of 
some violence in early 1919, and "order" had to be restored with 
force through the intervention of Freikorps Garlitz. This may have 
contributed to Bennecke's radicalization at a young and impression-
able age.U 
Though he saw no real combat yet, in 1919 he did receive mili-
tary training and an initiation into the male world of the barracks. 
The military life pleased young Bennecke, for he remained a 
Zeitfreiwilliger with the Reichswehr into 1920, at which time he 
was activated during the Kapp Putsch and served in Dresden, Leipzig, 
and the Vogtland. It pleased him so much that in May 1921 he ran off 
to Upper Silesia to fight against the Poles in Freikorps Ha:Bfurther, an 
ad hoc unit formed during the fighting itself. The campaign in Upper 
Silesia attracted many of the most activist elements of the radical 
right in Germany, and it served to spread and intensify antidemo-
cratic and volkisch sentiment among those who participated in it 
due to active recruitment among the men by the anti-Semitic 
Deutsch-volkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund.28 Although Bennecke did 
not become a member of the Schutz- und Trutzbund, he was cer-
tainly exposed to its propaganda. Bennecke also saw his first real 
combat here. 
Bennecke's military and political activities did not apparently 
slow his academic progress. In the same year that he fought in Upper 
Silesia, he passed his Abitur (university entrance exams) and began 
studies at the Dresden Technische Hochschule (technical university) 
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Ogruf. Dr. Heinrich Bennecke (left) giving a handmade wooden chest to 
Stabschef Viktor Lutze and his wife, December 1938. Courtesy of the 
Bundesarchiv. 
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in economics (Volkswirtschaft). In 1922, Bennecke, a proud combat 
veteran, left home to begin his studies at the university in Munich. 
He again majored in economics, but this was apparently too tame to 
occupy all of his time. He became involved in the conspiratorial world 
of the far right, which soon brought him into contact with the NSDAP. 
This small extremist party with its Austrian leader appealed to him, 
and he became a member of both the NSDAP and the SA in May 
1922. He remained a loyal member of both organizations (or their 
surrogates) down to the capitulation of Germany in 1945. 
Bennecke quickly distinguished himself and became an adju-
tant of SA Regiment Miinchen. His commitment to the SA was strong 
enough that he temporarily abandoned his studies to devote all of his 
time to his (assuredly more exciting) SA duties. Bennecke was cer-
tainly not one to stand on the sidelines, especially when things got 
violent: he participated in both the celebrated Coburg German Day 
(October 14-15, 1922) and the Hitler Putsch just over a year later. 
Later he proudly wore the Blutorden (Blood Order) and the Co burger 
Abzeichen (Coburg Medal) in honor of his participation in these 
events, two of the most hallowed of all the Nazi Party's decorations. 
The failure of the putsch and a close brush with the law (he was 
expelled from Bavaria as an undesirable citizen of another German 
state) sent Bennecke packing but did little to dampen his activism or 
his commitment to antidemocratic action.29 
Upon his arrival home in Dresden he worked as a shop assis-
tant (Handlungsgehilfe) in the paper business. His dedication to the 
Nazi movement did not weaken, and he was active in surrogate orga-
nizations that allowed former SA and NSDAP members to remain 
together. Unlike many of the other SA leaders in this chapter, he did 
not become a member of a volkisch organization, but only because 
he still considered himself to be a member of the banned SA. 
Once back in Dresden he quickly joined the Frontbann and be-
came a squad leader (ZugfiihrerL despite his youth and the fact that 
his only active military service had been his few weeks in Upper 
Silesia. In May 1925, while still a member of the Frontbann, he was 
among the first members of the refounded Nazi Party.30 His early 
Party membership and subsequent long years of uninterrupted ser-
vice later brought him the coveted Golden Party Pin (goldenes 
Parteiabzeichen) and the even rarer Golden Party Service Award 
(Dienstauszeichnung der NSDAP in Gold).31 Like many of the men 
in this chapter, Bennecke had originally joined the NSDAP in Ba-
varia, but in 1925 he rejoined it north of the Main River, proof that 
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the banning of the NSDAP in 1923 helped spread the Nazi move-
ment northwards as northerners resident in Munich returned home. 
Unlike many of the other men in this chapter, Bennecke did 
not rejoin the SA at the same time at which he rejoined the NSDAP. 
Instead, he remained a member of the Frontbann for a time until the 
fall of 1925, when he led his entire Frontbann squad as a unit into the 
GroEdeutsche Jugend (Greater-German Youth), a volkisch youth or-
ganization founded in Saxony by Kurt Gruber, which later became 
the nucleus of the Hitler Youth.32 
Bennecke remained the Party's youth leader for East Saxony until 
the end of 1926. In the spring of 1926 he resumed his studies, this 
time majoring in journalism ("Zeitungskunde") and philosophy at 
the university in Leipzig. Here he immediately joined the local SA 
unit. He must have been quite a natural leader, or else the local SA 
was completely lacking in other leadership material, because in July 
1927, at only twenty-five years of age, Bennecke was given command 
of SA Standarte I"' Leipzig.33 He remained the leader of the Standarte 
until August 1929, when he became the adjutant of OSAF-
Stellvertreter Mitte (SA district leader for central Germany) in 
Dresden. By this time he was also editor (Schriftleiter) of the NSDAP 
party paper in Saxony, the Siichsischer Beobachter (Saxon Observer). 
He was awarded a doctoral degree in history, journalism, and phi-
losophy in June 1930. This milestone in his young life did not prompt 
Bennecke to relax a bit. At roughly the same time he also became the 
commander of SA Brigade V, Dresden, the press representative 
(Pressewart) of his Gau and a member of the Saxon state parliament 
(Landtag) for the NSDAP. In his spare time he was a Party speaker. 
Bennecke was typical of many of the SA's highest leaders who 
joined (or rejoined) the SA in 1925 or 1926. He was a natural leader 
and was active in a string of military and paramilitary organizations 
from the end of the war on. But he was also very active in the politi-
cal organization of the Nazi Party and served it in a number of public 
positions. He could clearly command the respect of the veterans and 
members of the Wehrverbande, but he could also cooperate with the 
Party leadership and speak publicly to "civilian" crowds. He was a 
flexible and tireless activist, equally capable and at home on the pa-
rade ground, in parliament, in the press, and in the Party bureau-
cracy. 
From 1930 until the end of the Second World War, Bennecke 
made a career as a full-time SA leader. The Nazi assumption of power 
found him in command of SA Untergruppe Dresden (later Brigade 
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33). In September 1933 he was transferred to the "Chef des 
Ausbildungswesens" (Chef-AWi "chief of training") organization to 
become the head of the SA-Hochschulamt (SA office of higher educa-
tion). This was a politically and militarily sensitive position, for the 
Chef-AW was designed to funnel young men through a secret and 
illegal Reichswehr training program, and the Hochschulamt was re-
sponsible for coordinating the training of university students.34 
Bennecke's political skills were further demonstrated when he sur-
vived the Rohm Purge and was assigned to head the SA's national 
leadership school (Reichshihrerschule) in July 1934.35 In 1936 he was 
promoted to head SA Gruppe Pommern, and in late 1944 he was 
transferred to head SA Gruppe Sudmark. Again, this shows both his 
own leadership qualities and the Nazis desperate search for capable 
leaders: Gruppe Sudmark was in southeast Austria (Carinthia and 
Styria), hard on the Italian and Yugoslav borders, and by then, practi-
cally the front line. Bennecke was no stranger to combat by then, 
having served with the Wehrmacht as an officer in 1939-41 and again 
in 1943. 
After the war Bennecke became a historian. Incidentally, he 
wrote one of the standard works on the SA, making him one of the 
fortunate historians who have been able to write about themselves. 
Ironically, even after the defeat of Nazism he continued to make a 
living with the SA. 
Thirty-six future top leaders of the SA joined in 1925 and 1926.36 
They came from the Wehrverband tradition but were also broadly 
committed to the volkisch movement. They were both soldiers and 
politicians and thus well equipped to blend these two traditions in 
the creation of the reformed SA. Most of these men were responsible 
for building the SA in this formative period and almost immediately 
achieved high rank, while others grew into the second generation of 
the SA's leadership. Many of these men showed their continuing com-
mitment to the volkisch movement by also becoming some of the 
earliest leaders of the political organization of the NSDAP (as op-
posed to the SA), combining paramilitary activism in the SA with 
political leadership in the Party. 
All of the SA's higher leaders had military backgrounds. But the 
men who joined in 1925-26 differed in some interesting ways from 
the rest. This first group had the fewest veterans of the First World 
War: 22 percent did not participate, and 5 percent served in the war 
but did not see combat.37 This still means that 72 percent did see 
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combat. Of the veterans, 53.5 percent were officers, and of the offic-
ers, 26.6 percent were professional officers.38 The proportion of former 
professional officers is striking at first glance, but the high propor-
tion of nonveterans is actually much more significant. The presence 
of so many nonveterans in the group joining the SA in 1925 and 1926 
indicates that there was a substantial subgroup of young but very 
dedicated activists like Heinrich Bennecke who were not veterans 
and who had gotten involved in volkisch politics, a Wehrverband, or 
both during the crisis of 1923 or the dark days of 1924, and they were 
now continuing their activities within the NSDAP and SA. 
The activities of the men in this chapter during the Revolution 
and in the early 1920s are equally significant. Immediately after the 
war, one-third were in a free corps,39 and three were very early mem-
bers of the Schutz- und Trutzbund and thus already exposed to 
volkisch ideology. 40 The men in this chapter tended to belong to radi-
cal free corps, and several remained active in their free corps until 
they were officially disbanded, when they often immediately joined 
Wehrverbiinde or other paramilitary organizations.41 A few dedicated 
individuals participated in the fighting in Upper Silesia in 1921, but 
this only involved 10 percent of the entire group.42 An even smaller 
number of militants were involved in sabotage in the Ruhr against 
the French and Belgians.43 
Another significant characteristic of these early SA members is 
that they had the highest percentage of membership in the pre-putsch 
SA and NSDAP. Nearly two-thirds had joined either the SA or the 
NSDAP (or both) by the end of 1923.44 This is a further sign that this 
group was strongly committed to the kind of volkisch politics that 
the NSDAP represented. True believers, they had followed Hitler 
before the putsch, and they hurried back to carry his banner as soon 
as he rebuilt the Party. 
One man whose career was typical of those of the older military men 
who joined the SA in 1925 or 1926 is Kurt von Ulrich.45 He was born 
in Fulda in 1876, the son of a Prussian general. Young Kurt was brought 
up to follow in his father's footsteps, but he took a roundabout route 
into the Prussian officer corps. Instead of entering a military acad-
emy at an early age, Kurt remained at home, attended a Gymnasium, 
and passed his Abitur. He was therefore a man of above-average in-
telligence, and he apparently continued to study. By 193 7 he claimed 
at least some familiarity with five modern languages and he had at-
tended the military interpreter school to learn at least one of them. 
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After he finished his Gymnasium education, Kurt von Ulrich 
entered a prestigious regiment of dragoons in Hesse, in which he was 
commissioned as an officer and served until the beginning of the 
First World War, with short absences for training at the Prussian war 
college (Kriegsakademie) and royal Prussian rifle factory. He served 
during the war as both a combat and a staff officer. He earned distinc-
tion in both activities and ended the war with one wound, the rank 
of major, and a chestful of medals. After the war he remained in the 
army until1920. In that year he left active service as an Oberstleutnant 
(lieutenant colonelL but continued to work for the army for several 
months as a civilian official. 
Kurt von Ulrich was an early member of the Verband 
Nationalgesinnter Soldaten (Association of Nationally Minded Sol-
diers), a right-wing veterans' organization, and in 1924 he joined the 
more radical National Association of German Officers (Nationalver-
band Deutscher Offiziere). Sometime before 1925 he was also a mem-
ber of the German National People's Party (Deutschnationale 
Volkspartei, DNVP). This was the extent of his political activity un-
til1925, perhaps because he was trying to establish himself in a new 
career as an independent salesman and later as a bank official. In 
1925 he joined the Stahlhelm and served it until1927 as a local group 
leader and then as a district leader. Interestingly, within six months 
of attaining the latter position in the Stahlhelm, he joined the SA 
and NSDAP. Although he was still a member of the Stahlhelm and of 
the National Association of German Officers, he immediately be-
came the Gau SA leader for Hesse-Nassau, and he soon was head of 
the NSDAP Party cell in Kassel and chairman of the Gau supreme 
Party court, positions he kept until mid-1927. 
Von Ulrich led the SA in Hesse-Nassau until 1928, when he 
became the commander of all National Socialist paramilitary affili-
ates in Western Germany, the Oberster SA-Fuhrer Stellvertreter West 
(literally, the western deputy of the highest SA leader). In 1930 he 
was made General Inspector of the SA and SS for all of Germany and 
Austria, a position he held until 1934, when he left active SA ser-
vice. His career as a leading Nazi was not finished, however. After he 
left the Party's political administration in 1927, he served as an occa-
sional speaker and from 1930 on as a member of the Reichstag. In 
1933, after the NSDAP took power in Germany, von Ulrich was made 
a Prussian state councilor (Staatsrat) and was named the administra-
tive head (Oberpriisident) of the Prussian province of Saxony. He also 
became a leader of the German Red Cross. 
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Although von Ulrich was never a member of a Wehrverband or 
volkisch Party as many of his fellow SA officers were, he did undergo 
a gradual process of radicalization in the early 1920s, as his progres-
sion through the DNVP and several veterans' organizations to the 
SA and NSDAP shows. His administrative abilities, his staff train-
ing, and even his status as the son of a Prussian general, member of 
the nobility, and former officer were all important to the NSDAP as 
it became a major political force in Germany. Although von Ulrich 
did have some experience in political organizations before joining 
the NSDAP, his most valuable experience was as a staff officer and 
administrator. 
The activities of these men did not stop with the end of the German 
Revolution and the failure of the Hitler Putsch. Of the group of thirty-
six higher SA leaders who joined in 1925-26, sixteen were not politi-
cally active just before joining the SA or the exact nature of their 
activity is unclear.46 Of the remainder, several groups stand out as 
being the springboard to membership in the SA. 
First, of all the organizations to which these men belonged in 
the last quarter of 1924, two-thirds were Wehrverbande or other mili-
tary associations. Sixteen of the earliest members of the "second SA" 
came directly from the Wehrverbande.47 They belonged to a wide 
range of moderate48 and radical Wehrverbande, but within this range 
the Frontbann is clearly the most important. Seven were in the 
Frontbann,49 whereas only one other Wehrverband was represented 
by more than a single man. Almost as important as the Frontbann as 
a vehicle for joining the SA was, surprisingly, the SA itself; six of the 
men in this chapter were members of the (illegal and underground) 
SA at the end of 1924.50 Together, twelve out of the nineteen whose 
activities are known were in the SA, the Frontbann, or both. 
But the Wehrverbande are only one side of the activities of the 
men in this chapter; the other side is provided by organizations ori-
ented toward political action. Many were not involved in political 
activity at all, and none of the 1925-26 SA members were ever mod-
erates or leftists. But a few organizations do stand out as being im-
portant in the careers of our group. The most important are volkisch 
parties or movements: the Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung 
(NSFB) with three members, the GroBdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft 
with four members, and the Volkisch-Sozialer Block with six mem-
bersY Eleven were thus members of one or more of these organiza-
tions just before they joined the SA. 52 
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In fact, many were in both a Wehrverband and a volkisch politi-
cal organization, a sign of their commitment to both paramilitary 
activity and volkisch ideology. This is concrete proof of the impor-
tance of membership in both volkisch and paramilitary organizations 
in 1924 for the formation of the NSDAP from 1925 on. All but a 
handful were also in more than one organization at the same time or 
in rapid succession. Multiple memberships are a common feature of 
this group, again an indication that they were strongly committed to 
these activities. The men who, in 1924, had learned to blend mili-
tary organization with a political message were the ones who then 
created and built the NSDAP and SA in 1925 and subsequent years. 53 
One other very important factor in the political and military 
background of the men in this chapter before 1925 remains to be 
discussed. This is membership in the NSDAP before the 1923 putsch 
and subsequent banning of the Party. Many members of the group of 
1925 and 1926 SA joiners had been members of the NSDAP before 
the putsch. Of these men, some joined the first NSDAP as early as 
1921, and many more were members by the end of 1922. By the last 
quarter of 1923, twenty of the entire group in this chapter had joined 
the SA, NSDAP, or both. 54 This is one of the strongest patterns that 
emerge in the activities of these men. Many show a pattern of spend-
ing little or no time in an organization in 1920-21, then joining the 
SA and NSDAP and sticking with it (or a surrogate in some cases, 
such as the Frontbann) from then on and rejoining both as soon as 
the SA and NSDAP were officially reestablished in 1925.55 A strong 
characteristic of the men who joined the SA in 1925 and 1926, then, 
is that they tended to be "true believers," men who became con-
verted to National Socialism at a rather early date and who did not 
swerve from that conviction ever again. The higher SA leaders who 
joined later often showed a very different development, as will be 
demonstrated below. 
The earliest members of the SA within its top leadership had a close 
relationship to the NSDAP. Every one of the 1925 and 1926 SA men 
were Party members. All but two (out of the thirty-one for whom 
both dates are known) joined the Party and the SA within six months. 56 
One of these two joined the Party first, and then the SA. All joined 
the SA and NSDAP in either the same town or in places close to each 
other, suggesting that often the Party branch was in a smaller town 
that did not have an SA unit in the early days. 57 
At least on this basis, it cannot be said that this group of SA-
The Pioneers, 1925-1926 43 
men neglected their Party responsibilities or avoided joining the Party 
out of opposition to "politicians" or for any other reason. Joining 
both the SA and the Party seems to have been a matter of course for 
these men, and there is no indication that Party membership was 
taken less seriously than SA membership at this early stage. This is 
an important point to make, because it underscores the interpreta-
tion that these men were political as well as military activists, and it 
contradicts attacks against the SA by some members of the NSDAP 
in the early 1930s, who claimed that many of its leaders deliberately 
avoided becoming Party members. 
The place where the men in this chapter joined the NSDAP in 
1925 and 1926 is significant, particularly when compared with the 
geographical dispersion of the NSDAP before its ban in November 
1923. Instead of being dominated by southern German locations, as 
in the early 1920s, the reverse is true in 1925 and 1926. Of the twenty-
six men whose records state where they joined the NSDAP in 1925 
or 1926, nineteen (73%) joined north of the Main River. Five of these 
twenty-six men were also members of the "first" NSDAP and joined 
it in a known location. Of these five, four joined the Party for the 
first time in Munich, but rejoined north of the Main River. This dem-
onstrates the very different geographical dispersion of the post-1925 
Nazi Party. Of the nineteen who joined the second NSDAP north of 
the Main, at least nine were members of either the Frontbann, the 
Vo1kisch-Sozialer Block, or the NSFB, further proof that these orga-
nizations were among the most important agents for the spread of 
the Party to northern Germany. 
The top SA leaders who joined in 1925 or 1926 were not just 
simple dues-paying members of the NSDAP; they also held positions 
of leadership. This is not too surprising, given the need for compe-
tent leaders. What is surprising is the number of men occupying rela-
tively high Party positions. By the end of 1925, the twenty-two men 
out of the group in this chapter whose Party ranks were known boasted 
one Gauleiter (Franz von Pfeffer), one deputy Gauleiter (Viktor Lutze), 
one Gau staff member (Heinrich Himmler), one leader of a local Party 
chapter (Wilhelm Stegmann), and three holding one other office within 
their local group (Wilhelm Dittler, Kurt Gunther, and Heinrich 
Schoene). By the end of 1926, out of the twenty-eight whose Party 
rank is known, four were deputy Gauleiter, one held an office in the 
national administration of the Party, three were leaders of local Party 
chapters, and two more held another office within a local Party 
group. 58 This shows that there were many who were equally at ease 
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and equally as important leading both the political and paramilitary 
wings of the Nazi movement. The early joiners among the future 
highest leaders of the SA were not as a group simple one-dimensional 
military men with no feeling for politics or civilian affairs. Instead, 
they were political activists for whom the Party, its ideology, and its 
success were very important-flesh-and-blood political zealots in-
stead of cardboard soldiers. 
If any further proof is needed as to their commitment to the 
Party and to its ideology, then a quick look at the highest Party rank 
ever held by these men will dispel any lingering doubts. Six of the 
thirty-six eventually became Reichsleiter (nationalleaders),59 and two 
of these six were earlier Gauleiter. Nine held positions in either a 
Gau or on a national Party sta££,60 four were the heads of a Kreis 
(Party district, equivalent of a county), 61 and three were the heads of 
a Party cell or local Party chapter.62 Altogether, twenty-one of the 
thirty-six men who joined the SA in 1925 or 1926 held some sort of 
rank within the Party apparatus outside of their SA positions.63 The 
men who joined the SA in 1925 or 1926 and who rose to the highest 
levels of its leadership were true believers, committed equally to the 
SA and to the Party, who remained active in both to the very end. 
Heinrich Schoene presents a good example of an early SA leader who 
was also active in Party administration.64 He was born in 1889 in 
Berlin, the son of a bricklayer and carpenter who later apparently 
made enough money to buy an estate. He attended a Gymnasium for 
several years, but transferred to an agricultural school, from which 
he obtained an Obersekundareife.65 He worked as an agricultural la-
borer and then became an agricultural administrator. He did not stay 
long in this position, however, even though he listed it as his actual 
profession, and soon he opened up his own building company. He 
served in the war as an infantryman, messenger, and sergeant. He 
was wounded and decorated with the Iron Cross Second Class. He 
did not serve in a free corps or a Wehrverband, and his sole political 
activity before 1924 was a short membership in the DNVP from 1919 
to 1920. Schoene's political activity accelerated in 1924. In that year 
he joined the Volkisch-Sozialer Block and the NSFB, serving both 
groups as a local secretary. In April1925 he joined the SA and NSDAP, 
becoming a founding member of his local Party cell. From 1925 his 
Party career paralleled his SA career. In 1926 he became the head of 
the SA in his town, as well as head of the local Party cell. He was a 
Party speaker and in 1927 became Kreisleiter. At the same time he 
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Ogruf. Heinrich Schoene in 1941 or 1942. Schoene wears his Golden Party 
Pin, an insignia indicating that he attended the 1928 Nuremberg Party Con-
gress, and a decoration showing that he was wounded in the First World 
War. His medals include the Iron Cross Second Class, the Military Service 
Cross from the Second World War (Kriegsverdienstkreuz), and a Medal for 
War Participants (Ehrenkreuz fur Frontkiimpfer) from the First World War. 
Courtesy of the Bundesarchiv. 
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led the local Hitler Youth and was adjutant of his SA Gausturm. In 
1929 he rose to command the SA Gausturm of his Gau, and very 
likely left his position in the Party apparatus at this time, although 
he did not provide the exact date of the latter in his records. His SA 
career continued upwards, and he became a Gruppenfiihrer in 1932 
and an Obergruppenfiihrer in 1934. His services to the Party did not 
stop, however. He had earlier been a member of the Prussian Provin-
cial Council (Provinzialrat). In 1932 he was elected to the Prussian 
Landtag for the NSDAP, and in 1933 became a member of the 
Reichstag. He continued to command an SA Gruppe, and also headed 
the corresponding administration of the Reichsluftschutzbund (Reich 
Civil Defense Association) from 1934 to 1939. He was named to sev-
eral other Prussian administrative organizations, but the height of 
his career came in 1941, when he was named the general commissar 
(Generalkommissar) for part of the German-occupied Ukraine. Al-
though this and many of his former positions were technically state 
positions, it is clear that he obtained them because he was a loyal 
member of the NSDAP. A successful and influential early SA com-
mander, he was equally as successful and influential as an early Party 
leader. By 1929 or 1930 his SA duties had taken precedence for a 
time, but his service to the Party did not stop, and like other high SA 
leaders, he could be called upon by the Party whenever it needed a 
leader who was loyal and competent (in that order). 
The future highest SA leaders who joined in 1925 and 1926 immedi-
ately played important roles. By the end of 1925, at least half of the 
thirty men who had already joined the SA were officers at some level. 66 
Interestingly, the percentage of leaders from this group rises only 
slowly through the end of 1930, reaching just below 60 percent in 
that year. This seems strange, given that this is, after all, a group of 
men who went on to hold one of the three highest ranks in the SA. 
One answer to this might lie in the ages of the men involved; about 
a third of the group who joined in 1925 or 1926 were born after 1900 
and thus were young even by 1930. Failure to achieve leadership rank 
by 1930 was due almost always to age. If only those men born in 
1900 or before are considered, then fully 75 percent of the men whose 
rank in the first quarter of 1930 is known were leaders.67 In fact, all 
but one of the men who were SA leaders by the end of 1926 are drawn 
from this group of older men, as might be expected.68 
Aside from the group of "youngsters," the early members of the 
SA from our group left their mark. By the end of 1930, eight were in 
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command of Standarten, 69 six were in command of larger units. 70 
Dincldage was an OSAF-Stellvertreter (regional commander), 71 von 
Ulrich was general inspector of the SA, SS, and Hitler Youth, Reschny 
was the head of the SA in Austria, Himmler was the head of the SS, 
and von Pfeffer was Oberster SA-Fiihrer. Most of those holding higher 
rank by this time had, of course, passed through lower ranks such as 
Sturmfiihrer, which were so crucial to building the SA, especially in 
its earliest years before larger units existed, and there was a new gen-
eration of younger leaders still in lower-level positions. 
There were thus two distinct patterns to the early SA careers of 
the 1925 and 1926 joiners. The first group held command positions 
immediately and were among the earliest higher leaders of the SA. 
These are the men who built the SA. The second pattern is charac-
teristic of men who were too young and inexperienced to become 
leaders right away. These men slowly ripened into leaders within the 
SA itself, providing the SA with a backbone of capable young men, 
steeped in the ethos and traditions of the SA and experienced in the 
ways of the Party. This group provided continuity in later years of 
high turnover in SA membership among the rank and file, and they 
were a cadre of young men who could begin to replace the oldest 
cohort of SA leaders when they died or moved on to other positions 
outside of the SA. 
In summary, the men who joined the SA in 1925 or 1926 were both 
paramilitary and volkisch activists, true political soldiers long be-
fore the term became current in the Party. They were generally mem-
bers of a Wehrverband and a volkisch political organization immedi-
ately before joining the SA in 1925 or 1926, and often this meant that 
they were pre-putsch SA and Party members. A large number were 
also members of the Frontbann and of a radical volkisch party such 
as the NSFB. Some showed a strong history of military activism in 
free corps, Upper Silesia, and the Ruhr, although many did not have 
any particular history of political activism at all. In either case they 
were as strongly committed to the Party as they were to the SA, and 
they often held office in the Party at the same time that they were in 
the SA. Many, particularly those old enough to have served in the 
war, were among the first leaders of the SA, often rising to relatively 
high rank by the end of 1930, while the younger members of the 
group tended to remain in much lower ranks until later. 
The NSDAP in 1925 and 1926 was a small and struggling orga-
nization on the volkisch fringe. Its potential for success was ques-
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tionable at best, and its later importance was not at all foreseeable. It 
could only attract and admit the completely committed. Nor could 
it afford the functional specialization of later years, and all Party mem-
bers were expected to perform a variety of tasks. This explains the 
strong commitment to both political and paramilitary activism, both 
SA and Party leadership of this early cohort. They were the men of 
the first hour in both the NSDAP and SA, and they served both mas-
ters. Their abilities as both paramilitary and political leaders were 
crucial to the survival of the young (reestablished) NSDAP. Con-
versely, without the presence and availability of a core group of men 
skilled in both political and military organization and committed to 
the radical volkisch principles of the NSDAP, it never could have 
survived, let alone expanded. 
For the Weimar Republic there was a tragic confluence of a large 
body of men trained in violence and military organization, with wide-
spread alienation of the public and resentment toward the entire post-
war political system. These were not a handful of marginalized mal-
contents or military adventurers, as some historians have character-
ized the paramilitary activists of the 1920s.72 Most were well edu-
cated, came from middle-class families, and had established careers 
before the First World War. Although few men entered the SA and 
NSDAP in 1925 or 1926, there were countless others in the vast right-
wing and paramilitary subculture, far too many to simply dismiss as 
rootless adventurers. At the same time, it is important to recognize 
that the politically active radical right in Germany in 1925 or 1926 
was a relatively small part of the total population. Two things al-
lowed the SA and NSDAP to make the most of these numbers. The 
first was the ability of the SA to maximize or "multiply" (in the 
current military jargon) its limited numbers through the use of mili-
tary or paramilitary forms of organization. This gave the SA and 
NSDAP a force far beyond their size. The second factor was the abil-
ity of the SA (and presumably the NSDAP) to grow like an amoeba 
by absorbing the members and particularly the leaders of similar but 
rival organizations. This will be illustrated in the following chapter. 
3 
The Defectors, 
1927-1930 
The period from 1927 to 1930 was crucial for the development of the 
SA and the NSDAP. During this time both organizations became more 
centralized and developed highly efficient administrative and com-
mand structures. Both also grew from marginal, locally based organi-
zations into large, centrally directed national ones. Both did so by 
absorbing many of the former members of rival right-wing organiza-
tions. The two processes of expansion and centralization were in fact 
related. The leaders necessary to organize and administer both the 
SA and the NSDAP beyond what had existed in 1926 came as part of 
the influx of new members who were absorbed from rival groups. 
This process is graphically illustrated in the careers of the men dis-
cussed below. 
Between early 1927 and January 1931 the SA transformed it-
self from a loose collection of isolated activists and Wehrverband 
remnants into a disciplined national organization of considerable 
strength. Given the original heterogeneity and disorganization of 
the early SA and Party in 1925 and 1926, and given the changes in 
the political climate of Germany since 1923, which had become 
unsuitable for the formation of paramilitary groups, this was a con-
siderable feat. 
The man responsible for this transformation was not Adolf Hitler 
but retired captain Franz von Pfeffer. More than any other individual, 
von Pfeffer was responsible for molding the SA into the organization 
that brought the Nazi Party to power. He may rightly be called the 
father of the SA and the Party's first political soldier. Yet von Pfeffer 
did not act alone. He was aided by a corps of capable and committed 
SA leaders. Without such subordinates, no leader is capable of any-
thing except mere gestures. 
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11 F ATHER OF THE SA" 
Franz von Pfeffer was born in Dusseldorf in 1888.1 His father was a 
Prussian bureaucrat, and he himself chose to become a professional 
officer in the Prussian army after studying law for a short time. He 
served on the western front in the First World War in both general 
staff and combat positions. Ending the war with the rank of captain, 
he formed a free corps in January 1919 thatfought in the Ruhr, Baden, 
and the Baltic. He was involved in the Kapp Putsch, served in Upper 
Silesia in 1921, and was a member of various Wehrverbiinde that 
evolved out of his free corps. He also had contacts with the 
Reichswehr, and in 1923 was a member of one of the secret sabotage 
units operating against the French and Belgians in the Ruhr. By 1924 
he was the leader of Gau Ruhr of the Volkisch-Sozialer Block and in 
contact with Hitler and the NSDAP. In 1925 he led his Gau into the 
NSDAP and served as Gauleiter and Ruhr SA leader of the NSDAP 
until1926. 
By all accounts he was a genuine leader, a strong-willed person-
ality of great energy and ability, but of equally great arrogance and 
independence, who did not lack enemies within the NSDAP because 
of his ambition and lack of tact. 2 Clearly he was a man who believed 
he was right and therefore did not like to compromise.3 Yet it was 
only through just such a combination of will, ability, and leadership 
that he was able to transform the SA into a national organization. 
And despite a certain inflexibility and brutal directness of character, 
von Pfeffer had learned to adapt to changing conditions and political 
contexts. By training and sentiment a military man with intimate 
ties to the old Imperial Army, the free corps, and the conspiratorial, 
putschist Wehrverbiinde, he could see beyond the world of guns and 
uniforms.4 It is this political side of von Pfeffer which enabled him 
to create a new form for the SA, different from that of the 
Wehrverbiinde and better adapted to current conditions. Critical of 
the "dilettantism" of the Beer Hall Putsch, he was able to draw the 
lesson from it that if the "national revolution" were to succeed, what 
was needed was not a better organized putsch, which was the solu-
tion proposed by many who continued to think in exclusively mili-
tary terms, but rather entirely new tactics. As Gauleiter of the Ruhr 
he gained the experience necessary to adapt the paramilitary form of 
the Wehrverband to the substance of a political movement. In this 
he was aided by Viktor Lutze.5 
According to von Pfeffer's own testimony, he was appointed su-
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Oberster SA-Fuhrer and retired captain Franz von Pfeffer in 1924. Note the 
whip and his mixture of military and civilian clothing. The photograph is 
autographed. Courtesy of the Bundesarchiv. 
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Viktor Lutze (to Hitler's left) in 1931. Lutze wears the early insignia for a 
Gruppenfiihrer. Courtesy of the Bundesarchiv. 
preme SA leader for several reasons. First, as a professional officer 
and successful free corps leader, he would not permit a repetition of 
the sloppiness characteristic of the Beer Hall Putsch. Moreover, as a 
member of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Nord- und West-deutschen 
Gaue (Working Organization of the North and West Districts), he 
had shown early signs of independence, even rebellion, and his Gau 
Ruhr was a dangerously large power base. Bringing him to Munich 
put him in a position where he could be watched, and his oversized 
Gau Ruhr was broken up.6 Conversely, the north German Party lead-
ers were suspicious of the Munich leadership and wanted a northerner 
to take over a key position in Munich in order to guard their inter-
ests and bring fresh talent into the central organization. Despite some 
contrary indications, it is difficult to dispute von Pfeffer's own ac-
count/ yet the most important reason of all for his selection was 
simply because Hitler accepted his ideas as to what the SA should be 
and do. R Hitler gave him certain basic guidelines, but von Pfeffer was 
allowed to decide how these instructions were to be carried out. 
Although he was not supposed to begin operations until No-
vember 1, 1926, von Pfeffer was ready one month earlier. His first act 
was to send a letter to all Gauleiter, telling them that he was now 
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OSAF, explaining his idea of the SA's proper role, announcing that 
his plans for its reorganization were complete and ready to appear, 
and asking for their cooperation, particularly in naming suitable can-
didates for SA leadership in their area.9 Between November 1 and 
February 1927, von Pfeffer released a steady stream of orders (SA-
Befehle, or SABE). These orders resumed in May 1927 with funda-
mental regulations (Grundsiitzliche Anordnungen der SA, or Grusa). 10 
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK 
Von Pfeffer's grand design laid the groundwork for the organization 
of the SA, which did not change in any fundamental way down to the 
end of the Third Reich. Essentially he adopted the familiar military-
style hierarchy but introduced a great deal of flexibility. This was 
necessary in order to adapt it to the needs of a voluntary organization 
which, while attempting to create a centralized, hierarchical struc-
ture, in fact had to tolerate a great deal of local autonomy and which 
depended on the initiative of local leaders for growth. 11 The need to 
observe the strictest legality and the political mission of supplement-
ing the NSDAP, assigned to him by Hitler, also helped to push von 
Pfeffer into adapting a military organization to parliamentary poli-
tics. His SA was quite different from the old-style Wehrverbiinde, yet 
retained those elements which had made the Wehrverbiinde strong. 
In particular, he rejected a slavish imitation of the Imperial Army (or 
the Wehrverbiinde, for that matter) in favor of a structure that better 
fit the essentially civilian and domestic arena and that also expressed 
the volkisch and revolutionary ideals of the early Nazi Party. 
The basic building block was the Gruppe (section), whose name 
was later changed under Rohm to Schar. 12 This was to be a squad of 
three to thirteen men. Von Pfeffer stipulated that this was to be a 
permanent group of men who knew each other and who were tied 
together by personal bonds and associations. This was a sharp break 
with the practice of the Imperial Army (and indeed, most modern 
armies), which had treated soldiers as interchangeable parts, arbi-
trarily thrown together according to height or other outward charac-
teristic.13 The emphasis on the smallest unit was also very intelli-
gent from the standpoint of the degree of organization present within 
the Party and SA in 1926 and 1927, since almost any Ortsgruppe 
(local Party group) could form an SA unit right away. All higher units 
were formed like building blocks from groups of smaller units. More-
over, the number of subordinate units needed to form a superior one 
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could vary, so that new units could be added as growth demanded, 
and the creation of larger units could begin from a relatively small 
base. 
The next step after the Schar was the Trupp (platoon or troop). 
It was made up of several Scharen. Just like the Schar, it was always 
supposed to remain together as a unit so that its members would 
form tight personal bonds. Several Trupps made up a Sturm (com-
pany),14 which was the smallest unit to be led by the equivalent of an 
officer, a Fuhrer, as opposed to a noncommissioned officer, or 
Unterfiihrer. 
Several Stiirme then formed a Standarte (regiment), and several 
Standarten could be united in a Brigade (brigade), although this level 
of organization remained largely on paper for several years, until the 
SA increased sufficiently in size. More commonly, several Standarten 
were grouped together into a Gausturm. Originally nineteen 
Gaustiirme were created. 
The boundaries of the Gaustiirme as first conceived were delib-
erately drawn by von Pfeffer so as not to coincide with the bound-
aries of the Party regions, nor did they coincide with either the 
Wahlkreis (electoral districts) or the Wehrkreis (military recruiting 
districts) or even the boundaries of the German federal states. In-
stead, they were drawn to coincide with the Stammesgrenzen (tribal 
boundaries) of the German Volksgaue (tribal regions or provinces). 15 
This attempt to draw organizational consequences from volkisch ide-
ology was also indicative of von Pfeffer's wish to separate the SA 
from the Party Political Organization as much as possible. 
Until 1928, the Gaustiirme were the largest SA units actually 
in existence, and all were directly subordinate to the supreme SA 
command. In 1928 von Pfeffer introduced a regional level of com-
mand between the OSAF and the Gaustiirme, in order to facilitate 
cohesion between Gaustiirme. These were the seven regional 
Oberfiihrer (rank between colonel and brigadier general). In February 
1929, their title was changed to OSAF-Stellvertreter (deputy supreme 
SA leader). 16 
Von Pfeffer made other additions to the SA to give it flexibility 
in its employment, but also in order to make it as independent as 
possible from state and public institutions. These additions brought 
about a growing internal specialization and elaboration, as different 
types of units were added and as the SA staff and command structure 
expanded. This included the development of SA liability and life in-
surance,17 the establishment of a system of sales outlets for uniforms 
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and equipment (the so-called Reichszeugsmeisterei), 18 and even a plan 
to purchase large stocks of food conserves in case the regular supply 
of food was ever cut off. 19 Von Pfeffer also oversaw the formation of 
special SA communications troops (Nachrichtenstaffeln)20 and SA 
motor vehicle troops (Kraftfahrstaffeln) in 1928. Although the mo-
torization effort proceeded slowly, by 1930 the NSDAP, under the 
auspices of the SA, was able to create the Nationalsozialistische 
Automobilkorps (National Socialist Automobile Corps) and to order 
the formation of motorized SA units down to the Standarte and Sturm 
levei.21 In·a similar vein, SA mounted units were formed in 1928 by 
rural SA members, contributing both to the mobility of the SA and 
to its attraction for those interested in horses or simply interested in 
learning to ride.22 A similar effort in coastal areas was the formation 
of special SA naval units (Marine-Stiirme), first attempted in 1928 
and successfully established in 1929.23 
Other measures were introduced to broaden the appeal and scope 
of the SA. As early as 1927, von Pfeffer considered forming SA re-
serves. Although the SA was not yet large enough to support reserve 
units-in the early days every man was needed regardless of age or 
infirmity-by 1929 the situation had changed, and in March the SA-
Reserve (SAR) was formally established.24 Its purpose was to allow 
older men who were physically not up to the day-to-day demands of 
SA service to participate in a less active capacity and still be avail-
able for service on special occasions. 
Finally, in June 1930 the SA expanded its medical service. The 
idea of having SA medical officers was not new; as early as 1923 the 
SA had recruited doctors, and beginning again in 1927 each Standarte 
was expected to have a physician. This was expanded in 1930 with 
the introduction of a medic for each thirty men in local-level units, 
and the introduction of a chief physician within the supreme SA com-
mand.25 The expansion and elaboration of the SA medical service 
permitted sympathizing physicians to participate in a professional 
capacity. More important, the SA was thus assured of prompt medi-
cal help "in case of emergency." This was a part of von Pfeffer's long-
range plans to make the SA independent of all outside help, but as 
the street battles in which the SA engaged became increasingly bit-
ter and violent, the expansion of the SA medical services took on a 
very practical and immediate dimension. 
In addition to developing the formal structure of the SA, von 
Pfeffer was instrumental in giving the SA its own particular identity 
and its own agenda in the political struggle against the Weimar Re-
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public. Without this new identity, the SA would have remained just 
another Wehrverband at a time when their day had long passed. But 
if the new identity that von Pfeffer gave to the SA was the source of 
its success and thus its utility to the NSDAP, it was also the source 
of much conflict between the SA and the Party. As the SA became an 
institution distinct from and often separate from the Political Orga-
nization, and as the Political Organization itself became more estab-
lished, it became clear that von Pfeffer's vision of the SA and Hitler's 
were actually more divergent than they had appeared to be in 1926. 
There was ultimately very little difference between what von Pfeffer 
did as the head of the SA and the proposal from Rohm that Hitler 
rejected in 1925, save that von Pfeffer's concept for the SA was 
nonconspiratorial and exclusively National Socialist, whereas Rohm's 
was not. Nevertheless, both men saw the SA as an organization sepa-
rate from the Party and independent in its day-to-day workings.26 
Ultimately, the differences between Hitler's concept and von Pfeffer's 
caused von Pfeffer to resign his post in the fall of 1930. Yet by then he 
had succeeded so well in giving the SA a solid yet flexible organiza-
tion and its own distinct identity that the fundamental conflicts be-
tween the SA and the Party apparatus did not go away when he did. 
Rather, they continued to smoulder until the accession to state power 
gave Hitler the strength to finally confront the problem and force a 
decision. 
After resigning as supreme SA leader in 1930, von Pfeffer re-
mained active as chief of staff of the General Inspector of the SA and 
SS until Aprill933, at which time he left active service but remained 
an honorary SA officer at the disposal of the SA (SA-Fuhrer zur 
Verfiigung der SA). He later claimed to have run a private diplomatic 
intelligence agency supported by Reichswehr funds until 1941. He 
seems to have remained close to the center of power, but his exact 
activities are not recorded. He fell from favor in 1941, and in Novem-
ber he was expelled from the Party and arrested. He was later re-
leased, and at the very end of the Second World War he commanded 
a Volkssturm division. He survived the war and is known to have 
lived into the early 1950s at least. 
NEW BLOOD 
Von Pfeffer had considerable help in organizing the SA. His "offic-
ers" included the military and volkisch true believers discussed in 
the previous chapter, but as the SA grew into a mass national organi-
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zation and its hierarchy and mission became more and more com-
plex, it needed increasing numbers of new leaders and administra-
tors. A new group entered the SA between 1927 and 1930 and rose to 
leadership to fill this need. These men are the focus of this chapter. 27 
They were strikingly similar to the men who had already joined 
the SA, yet they differed in significant ways. They tended not to have 
quite the same background in volkisch politics as the previous group 
and to have been more involved in military groups. They were also 
more likely to come from northern Germany, symptomatic of the 
spread of the NSDAP out of southern Germany after 1927 to become 
a truly national organization. Most important, they tended to follow 
one of several characteristic "paths" into the SA and NSDAP. The 
men following each path showed a number of similarities not only 
in their backgrounds but also in their later careers within the Third 
Reich. 
Although they showed some key differences from the 1925-26 
group, they shared a basic outlook and a strikingly similar background 
with the men already in the SA. They also brought with them ex-
tremely valuable experience in the nuts and bolts of the kind of para-
military-political activities in which the SA was engaged. They were 
thus able to fit into the SA organization very quickly and with a 
minimum of adjustment. By coming to the SA at this time, they 
became the backbone of the future, post-1930 expansion of the SA. 
At the same time, they robbed competing organizations of their skills 
and numbers, further strengthening the relative position of the SA 
and NSDAP among its competitors on the far right. Some of these 
new men were radicals who could no longer find a place in tradition-
ally conservative organizations such as the Stahlhelm. Others were 
already members of organizations similar to the NSDAP, who gravi-
tated to it simply because they decided that it had a greater potential 
for success. 
A surprisingly high proportion of those joining the SA between 
1927 and 1930 were former regular army officers.28 This is even more 
remarkable when the men who joined the SA in 1929 or 1930 are 
considered: close to half were former professional officers.29 There 
were also many reserve officers, so that 59 percent of those joining 
from 1927 to 1930 had been military officers.30 This is clearly much 
higher than the percentage of officers in the German adult male popu-
lation at large'11 and is also higher than the percentage of army veter-
ans among the men in this study who joined the SA in 1925 or 1926:12 
Moreover, the percentages of professional vs. reserve officers in the 
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two groups are nearly reversed: not only were those who joined from 
1927 to 1930 more likely to have been officers but they were also 
more likely to have been professional officers.33 
This is significant and has several causes. Von Pfeffer was al-
ways interested in recruiting former officers. Moreover, by 1930 the 
SA was particularly interested in recruiting men with the special 
skills needed to occupy staff positions and lead large bodies of men. 
Conversely, as the NSDAP and SA grew, they became more attrac-
tive to former officers. Greater size meant that the NSDAP and SA 
could offer the opportunity to put military leadership skills to full 
use. 
A prime example of this is the case of Otto Wagener, who was 
invited to join the SA in order to develop a central staff structure, a 
kind of SA general staff, and who immediately became chief of staff.34 
Aside from the fact that he was known to von Pfeffer personally and 
had impeccable nationalist credentials, Wagener's prime qualifica-
tion for this post was that he was a former general staff officer in the 
regular army.35 While Wagener had been a successful businessman 
after leaving the service in 1919, many of the professional officers 
who had remained in the Reichswehr were beginning to retire in the 
late 1920s. Serving in a staff position within the SA offered them a 
means of essentially continuing their military careers, offering fa-
miliar work as well as a moderate supplement to their pensions, and 
allowing them to continue to work for what they saw as the national 
good.36 
Other former officers had been in rival political and/or para-
military organizations. Often these were slightly less radical than 
the NSDAP, since professional officers tended to support traditional 
conservative organizations. By the late 1920s, some were becoming 
dissatisfied with the policies of their organizations, and they began 
to look for something more dynamic, while others, seeing their own 
organizations stagnating, sought alternatives. Many of them landed 
in the NSDAP. As we will see below, these processes of "defection" 
to the NSDAP were important for the entire group of 1927-30 join-
ers, not just for the former professional officers. 
As might be expected, most of the highest SA leaders who joined 
between 1927 and 1930 were combat veterans of the First World War.37 
They were slightly older and more experienced than the 1925-26 
group.38 Three-quarters had been active in some kind of political or 
military organization in 1919, during the confusion of the German 
Revolution, which Ernst von Salomon calledder Nachkrieg (the post-
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Dr. Generalmajor Otto Wagener in 1945, by then a former SA Stabschef. 
Courtesy of the Bundesarchiv. 
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war).39 Just over half of these were in a free corps.40 Seventeen free 
corps were listed by the twenty-five men who claimed membership 
in a free corps in 1919.41 These are a mix of radical42 and moderate43 
groups. The three most often cited were Freikorps Ehrhardt (officially, 
the Second Naval Brigade), the Eiserne Division, and Freikorps Epp, 
all among the most radical groups. They each had three or more men 
from the 1927-30 group. Others, each with two members from the 
group, are Freikorps Maercker and the Loewenfeld Brigade (officially, 
the First Naval Brigade). What is clear, and what is also a change 
from the pattern observed in the group joining the SA in 1925 or 
1926, is the dominance of north German free corps and the relatively 
low representation of Bavarian free corps. Only Freikorps Epp and 
the Freiwillige Sturmabteilung Schlichtingsheim were Bavarian, and 
the only other south German free corps represented was based in 
Wiirttemberg. The preponderance of north German free corps reflected 
the fact that the SA became firmly established in northern Germany 
between 1927 and 1930. As the SA and NSDAP tended to spread 
from south to north, many northerners joined after their cousins in 
the south. 
Many men in this chapter were in the army during the revolu-
tion,44 three were in the Grenzschutz,4~ and one was in the police.46 
This considerable range of military activities demonstrates that the 
free corps were not the only nurturers of future radicalism. 
Military activities were not the only choice during the German 
Revolution: two men were in a radical volkisch association, the 
Schutz- und Trutzbund, and one of these men was simultaneously in 
the Grenzschutz.47 A third belonged to the DNVP and the Stahlhelm, 
a veterans' association-cum-Wehrverband, and another was briefly a 
member of the Zentrum (Catholic Center Party).48 Three were asso-
ciated with patriotic societies (often with a paramilitary aspect in 
1919).49 
The pattern of activity of the men in this group between 1920 
and 1923 was similar to that seen in the previous chapter, with some 
important differences. The number involved in political or military 
organizations fell in 1920 and 1921 and rose again in 1922 and again 
sharply in 1923. Nevertheless, the 1927-30 group generally tended to 
vary less in its level of activity over time than the 1925-26 group, 
indicating a more even temperament or mature outlook. 5° 
Both the 1925-26 group and the 1927-30 group tended to em-
phasize paramilitary and military organizations more than political 
ones in their activities from 1920 to 1923, and the strong activity in 
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radical volkisch groups that characterized a minority of those who 
joined in 1925 or 1926 was almost completely absent from the 1927-
30 group. 51 In 1921 and 1922 a single member of the 1927-30 group 
belonged to the Schutz- und Trutzbund, and in 1923 one member of 
the same group joined the Deutschvolkische Freiheitspartei (DVFP), 
both radical volkisch organizations. 52 
By 1923, ten were members of the NSDAP and eight were mem-
bers of the early SA.53 However, the corresponding numbers of the 
1925-26 group was much higher, both numerically and as a percent-
age. 54 Those joining in 1925 or 1926 were more than twice as likely 
to have been members of the SA or NSDAP before the 1923 putsch. 
Activity in nonmilitary political organizations beyond the 
volkisch fringe was equally low. One member of the 1927-30 group 
had been a DNVP member since 1920, and two others had belonged 
for shorter periods. 55 One was a member of the OstpreuBischer 
Heimatbund, a conservative and regionalist organization in eastern 
Prussia. 56 All other organizations to which this group belonged were 
military in nature, the majority being Wehrverbande or the 
Reichswehr. In almost every case, members of the 1927-30 group 
outnumbered the 1925-26 group in any given Wehrverband. 
The only exceptions to the above rule reflect the shift in geo-
graphical focus from the 1925-26 period to the 1927-30 period. Thus, 
the 1925-26 group outnumbered the later group in such organiza-
tions as the Reichskriegsflagge and the Reichsflagge, which were 
mainly Bavarian Wehrverbande, and in the Bund Olympia and Bund 
Fredericus, which were Berlin-based Wehrverbande. (Berlin had been 
an early center of National Socialist activity in northern Germany, 
dating from before the Beer Hall Putsch.) 
Several Wehrverbande that were well represented in the careers 
of those joining the SA from 1927 to 1930 are completely absent from 
the backgrounds of those joining in 1925-26, such as the Jungdeutscher 
Orden (Jungdo) and the Wehrwolf, Bund deutscher MannerY Others 
are not absent from the 1925-26 group but are much more heavily 
represented among the 1927-30 group, such as the OC/Bund Wiking, 
the Stahlhelm, and Bund Oberland.58 These organizations were strong 
rivals of the NSDAP and SA, but by 1927 they were slowly beginning 
to decline. Except for Bund Oberland, they were also mainly north 
German organizations, so the inroads made by the SA in their mem-
bership also reflect its spread northwards. 
Also striking is the number of the 1927-30 group who joined 
the Reichswehr or police in 1920-23. In 1920 this was as high as 
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eighteen (30.5%).59 Although the absolute numbers fell by 1923, the 
percentage of those in the Reichswehr or police is still much higher 
in the 1927-30 group.60 This is further proof that by the late 1920s, 
the NSDAP and SA were able to attract conservatives closer to the 
mainstream than in 1925 or 1926, where the core constituency of the 
Nazi movement was still on the volkisch fringe. 
Roughly the same percentage of both groups fought in Upper 
Silesia, 61 although all of the Upper Silesian veterans joined the SA by 
the end of 1929. This is also true of those who actively participated 
in sabotage actions against the French and Belgians in the Ruhr in 
1923, although the percentage is slightly higher in the 1925-26 group.62 
In summary, the highest SA leaders who joined the SA from 
1927 to 1930 tended to come out of north German organizations, and 
they tended to have been members of either the police/Reichswehr 
or of Wehrverbande but almost never of political organizations. Some 
of the north German Wehrverbande were quite radical, like the 
Wehrwolf, whereas others were comparatively moderate and associ-
ated with traditional conservatism, such as the Stahlhelm or the 
Jungdo. Indeed, army and police veterans must also be counted among 
the participants in traditional or moderate conservative organizations, 
at least in the sense that their organizations were dedicated to the 
preservation of order and the status quo.63 
pATHS INTO THE SA 
The year 1923 was marked by high political tension and, consequently, 
high levels of involvement in political and military organizations for 
the men in this chapter. Participation began to taper off in mid-1924 
as tensions cooled and as the Wehrverbande began to languish. The 
future highest officers of the SA who did not join it immediately in 
1925 or 1926 followed one of several different paths into the SA. 
The first path presents a paradox: several men showed no orga-
nized activity whatsoever between 1920 and the date when they joined 
the SA and NSDAP, usually in 1930. This group will be called the 
"passive activists." This oxymoron was deliberately chosen to de-
scribe the paradoxical lack of political experience of men who later 
rose to command the SA, an organization which prided itself on its 
extreme political activism. 
The second path was also characterized by little organized ac-
tivity except in crisis periods. These men were active in 1919, again 
in 1923 (and into the first half of 1924), and then not again until they 
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joined the SA/NSDAP. They tended to join rather late, in 1929 or 
1930 (with some exceptions). These are the "sporadic activists." 
The men following the next two paths were characterized by 
more frequent activity, even nearly continuous participation in po-
litical or military organizations. The third path led through a chain 
of organizations, as if the individuals were searching for just the right 
one.64 This is the path taken by the "serial activists." The fourth 
path is that of the "defector." It was followed by men who were ac-
tive in (and presumably loyal to) a single organization (or several small 
organizations simultaneously) for a long time before they left to join 
the SA/NSDAP. Many of these men often did not join the Nazis im-
mediately, but rather were inactive for one to six months first, again 
suggesting dissatisfaction followed by a period of searching. 65 
The men following the fifth path joined the NSDAP fairly early 
and only joined the SA a year or more later. This group presumably 
was attracted to the NSDAP more for its political message and ideol-
ogy, and only later got involved with its paramilitary auxiliary. Many 
who followed this path could equally as well have followed Party 
careers but ended up as SA officers instead, perhaps out of a sense of 
duty or simply by chance. These men will be called the "Party sol-
diers." 
The Passive Activists 
As odd as it might seem, some of the highest leaders of one of the 
world's most activist and dynamic political movements apparently 
were not active in paramilitary and political organizations before join-
ing the NSDAP/SA.66 
The "passive activists" category of this study comprises only 
seven men, or just over 11 percent of those joining the SA between 
1927 and 1930.67 The reasons for their high SA rank are not always 
clear and are often very personal. August Burger's skills as a physi-
cian explains his rapid rise in rank. Because of their education and 
skill, physicians are generally accorded officer rank in nearly all 
armies. The head physician of an SA-Gruppe was accorded the rank 
of Gruppenfiihrer. Judging from the careers of the early SA doctors, 
those who joined before 1930 were able to rise to this rank quickly. 
This was true simply because the SA lacked physicians, so the first 
to join soon occupied the higher ranks, even with little prior SA ser-
vice. 
Three others also rose to relatively high rank soon after joining. 
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Ludwig Uhland was promoted quickly due to his skills as a staff of-
ficer, since he had served in the army in this capacity and began his 
SA career in a staff position. Although he began as an SA field com-
mander, Leopold Damian spent much of his SA career as a depart-
ment head in the central command. Udo von Woyrsch had also been 
a professional officer, but he had only just been commissioned when 
the Great War broke out, and he did not possess any extraordinary 
military or administrative skills. Instead, he joined the SS from the 
beginning, where the cachet of his nobility, the comparatively greater 
opportunity for quick promotion within the SS organization, and his 
utter ruthlessness brought him quick advancement. 
For the rest, there seems to be no discernible reason why they 
would be able to go so far within the SA after years of inactivity. 
Most of the men in this "passive" category didn't join the NSDAP 
until1929 or 1930, and their high SA rank is not attributable to any 
corresponding high rank in the Party.68 In fact, all but one joined the 
SA only after joining the Party, quite in keeping with their earlier 
reluctance to become involved in paramilitary activity.69 None of 
the "passive activists" had any special leadership ability that set them 
apart. Most were officers in the First World War, but none had an 
exceptional military career and none ever held an especially high 
rank.7° Several may have been promoted out of sheer longevity: three 
did not became SA-Gruppenfiihrer until the Second World War, when 
casualties and transfers to other activity gave them an unexpected 
chance for advancement. 
The career of Max Lehmann well represents the passive activ-
ists. 71 Friedrich Wilhelm Max Lehmann was born in Cottbus in the 
Prussian province of Brandenburg in September 1892. His father was 
a Brenner72 who died when Max was nineteen. Max attended pri-
mary school and then a Handelsschule (a high school concentrating 
on business skills). He served an apprenticeship as a Kaufmann, 73 
then attended a trade school for the textile industry. He lost an eye in 
combat and was awarded the Iron Cross Second Class, but he did not 
rise above the rank of private. 
He was not active in any sort of political or military organiza-
tion from 1918 to September 1930, when he joined the NSDAP. Un-
til 1933 he listed his occupation as cloth manufacturer (Tuchfabri-
kant). He immediately became active in the administration of his 
local Party group, supervising the Zellenorganisation (factory Party 
cells) and keeping some of the financial accounts for about a year. 
This was the end of his service in the Political Organization of the 
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Party. He also joined the SA in October 1930, beginning as a paymas-
ter with the rank of Sturmbannfuhrer (major), then serving as an ad-
jutant and later as a chief of staff of an Untergruppe. He was pro-
moted to Standartenfuhrer (colonel) and given command of a Standarte 
in July 1932. 
In 1933 he was promoted to the command of a Brigade, which 
he held until1937 (still only serving in the SA on a part-time basis), 
at which time he was transferred to a full-time staff position in the 
SA central command. It was while serving in this capacity, as head of 
the Abteilung Organisation und Einsatz (organization and operation 
department) that he was promoted to Gruppenfuhrer in 1940. In 1944 
he was placed on the inactive list, possibly because he returned to 
his business activities. 
From 1933 to 1937 he also served in city government in Cottbus, 
as was typical of the usurpation of state positions by SA and Party 
leaders. He did not serve in the Second World War, most likely due to 
his wounds in the First World War. Lehmann is a good example of a 
"passive activist." He was politically inactive from the time he left 
the army at the end of the First World War to the time he joined the 
SA and NSDAP in the fall of 1930. His subsequent career in the SA 
was successful, but he never rose as far as more activist colleagues 
did, and his greatest strengths and most important service to the SA 
seem to have been administrative in nature. Moreover, the fact that 
he was exempt from military service gave him a sudden, new value 
to the SA during the war: he didn't count against the limited number 
of exemptions from military service granted to the SA by the army, 
which controlled such matters. While not a complete explanation, it 
likely contributed to his ability to rise to the rank of Gruppenfuhrer. 
The Sporadic Activists 
The next path into the SA was followed by those who were active in 
other political and paramilitary organizations before they joined the 
NSDAP and SA, but were only intermittently active, during moments 
of crisis and tension. Eight of the group examined in this chapter 
followed this basic pattern. 74 
Typically, they began as officers in the First World War.75 Dur-
ing the 1919 revolution, they were involved in a free corps.76 After 
that they were inactive until late 1922 or 1923, when inflation, do-
mestic unrest, and the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr again 
spurred them into action. 77 They dropped out of organized activity in 
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1924 or early 1925, when both the international situation and the 
domestic situation in Germany cooled. 
The next stop in the political careers of the "sporadic activists" 
was the SA and NSDAP. With one exception, they all joined the 
NSDAP in 1929 or 1930, as the Weimar Republic again slid into po-
litical and economic crisis. This was comparatively late for the men 
in this chapter. 78 The single exception is Fritz Lauerbach, who joined 
the Party in August 1925, although he waited until1928 before join-
ing the SA. He may have joined the Party early due to his member-
ship in a volkisch organization, the N ationalsozialistische 
Freiheitsbewegung (NSFB), in 1924. The others joined the SA when 
they joined the Party. 79 
The explanation for the sporadic nature of the activism of this 
group is that they repeatedly responded to the series of major politi-
cal crises that plagued the Weimar Republic. Their activism was strong 
enough to cause them to risk life and limb in a free corps in 1919 and 
often again later, and it was strong enough to cause them all to be-
come involved repeatedly in right-wing activities, and it was cer-
tainly strong enough later to help them rise to high careers in the SA, 
yet they were not willing or not able to sustain this activism except 
in times of relative crisis. Of course, each "sporadic activist" often 
had personal motivations as well. 
One explanation lies in a combination of age and social posi-
tion. Otto Wagener, Ernst Heinrich Schmauser, and Max Luyken were 
professional officers before the war. Likewise, Friedrich Wilhelm 
Bruckner was a prewar reserve officer. All four were therefore poten-
tially closely tied to the more orderly and law-abiding world of the 
prewar period. They were also the four oldest "sporadic activists."80 
The combination of age and position led them to exercise some de-
gree of restraint in their activities. 
Others simply did not have enough time to become involved in 
politics unless prompted by a crisis. Fritz Lauerbach was studying 
medicine until 1920, and was then just establishing a career when 
the crisis of 1923 occurred. He very likely felt that he simply could 
not afford the time then, although he joined the NSFB in 1924. 
Carl Caspary was also deeply engaged in his studies from 1920 
to 1924 and working hard to support himself in his spare time. This 
limited his activity, although he did find time to become involved in 
the SA and NSDAP from late 1922 to late 1923.81 Caspary is, in fact, 
a typical"sporadic activist.'' 82 He was born in August 1898 in the 
village of Illingen in the Saar. His father owned a pharmacy and must 
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have counted as a part of the local village intelligentsia. Carl attended 
a Realgymnasium (a high school with an emphasis on modern lan-
guages and the sciences). At age seventeen, in the second year of the 
First World War, he left school for the trenches. He did not finish his 
schooling then, but was able to pass the Abitur after the war. 
He served on the eastern and western fronts and was wounded 
three times. His left hand was crippled. He served in the infantry and 
later became a pilot. He was decorated for bravery and finished the 
war as a second lieutenant. His war record as a pilot and infantryman 
showed that he was a fighter, and his war did not stop with the armi-
stice. In November 1918 he immediately joined a volunteer forma-
tion, the Deutsche Schutzdivision. In January 1919 he was badly 
wounded in the foot in a clash in a Berlin suburb. He must have liked 
the military life and planned to stay in the army, because he fol-
lowed his unit into the Reichswehr, only leaving the service in April 
1920. In this, he is not typical of the group. 
After his free corps service, he attended universities in Munich 
and Erlangen. He joined a student corps or fraternity, but was not 
active in politics until late 1922. Typical of the "sporadic activists," 
he could not sustain his activism in the relative calm of 1921 and 
1922. By October 1922 it was a different story. On October 1, he 
joined both the NSDAP and SA in Erlangen. His military background 
could be put to good use, and by June 1923 he commanded a battal-
ion of the Nuremberg SA regiment.83 Despite the subsequent ban on 
the SA and NSDAP in November 1923, he remained active in both 
until1924, when he received a Ph.D. in Volkswirtschaft (economics) 
and left the university town of Erlangen. 
His first job was as a temporary employee in the Reich Finance 
Ministry, and later he became a economist (Volkswirt) and industrial 
salesman in a private company. From 1924 to late 1929 he eschewed 
membership in any political or paramilitary organization, again typi-
cal of his group and most likely because of his business activities. 
But in October 1929 he rejoined the SA and NSDAP in the solid 
middle-class Berlin neighborhood around the Nollendorfplatz. In 
Berlin he was active in the Party administration, but was only a mem-
ber of an SA reserve unit. This changed in 1931, when he moved to 
Pirmasens in western Germany. Here he was a Party speaker and the 
propaganda chief of his local Party district (Kreis). He also quickly 
rose to a position of responsibility on the staff of the local SA 
Untergruppe, and by July 1932 he was in command of his own SA 
Standarte. 
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Caspary became employed full-time by the SA in 1934, at first 
only as the commander of a Standarte, later of a Brigade. Just after 
the AnschluB with Austria, he was transferred to head the new SA 
school in Vienna. In the Second World War he served in the Luftwaffe 
and again saw combat, rising to the rank of major. In 1942 or 1943 he 
was apparently released from service for SA duties at the home front. 
In early 1942 he was promoted to SA Gruppenfiihrer and took over 
the command of SA Gruppe Kurpfalz. At the very end of the war he 
was appointed to advise the local Gauleiter for the Volkssturm.84 
A typical 11 sporadic activist, 11 Carl Caspary was in a free corps 
in 1919, then did nothing until1922, was active in the SA and NSDAP 
until1924, then was inactive until 1929, his activity corresponding 
to periods of domestic crisis in Germany, his inactivity to periods of 
relative calm. His activist pedigree and his skills were enough to 
gain him full-time employment with the SA as early as 1934, but he 
was not promoted to the highest ranks until war cleared the path for 
advancement. 
The Serial Activists 
Nine SA leaders who joined between 1927 and 1930 ran through a 
chain of organizations before ultimately ending up in the NSDAP 
and SA.85 They jumped from one organization to another, as if seek-
ing a spiritual home. Alternatively, this moving from one organiza-
tion to another can be seen as a progression, the development of the 
individual from a traditionally conservative outlook to a more radi-
cal, activist, and volkisch outlook. In this latter case, each organiza-
tion through which the individual passed actively contributed to the 
further development of that ideology in a more radical direction.86 
This can be observed in several cases. 
Typically, the men in this category go from service in the First 
World War87 to service in a free corps,88 pass through a Wehrverband, 
then join a political party or a volkisch group, again pass through a 
Wehrverband or two, and finally join the SA and NSDAP. The order 
may vary, as may the exact number of Wehrverbiinde and volkisch 
organizations, but this basic pattern holds true for 15 percent of the 
high SA officers who joined between 1927 and 1930. 
Aside from service in the Great War and in a free corps, it is 
difficult to find terms with which to describe the actions of these 
nine men, since each belonged to his own particular series of organi-
zations in his own particular order. Yet certain organizations do stand 
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out as figuring in the past of more than one member of this category. 
The most common single organization that these men passed through 
was the Stahlhelm. Five men in this category belonged to it, all but 
one before 1924. Four also passed through the Frontbann. Two of 
these men joined the NSDAP immediately afterwards. Four of the 
nine also belonged to one or more volkisch organizations, and again, 
this led two of them to join the NSDAP as their next step.89 Indeed, 
five claimed to have been members of the NSDAP or SA in 1922 or 
1923. Two of these men were also in other volkisch groups after-
wards. Thus, if we include the "first" NSDAP, it can be said that 
seven of the nine passed through at least one volkisch organization 
on their way to the post-1925 NSDAP. Three individuals passed 
through the DNVP, and two passed through the police. At least five 
of the nine can be said to have progressed in a more radical direction 
as they changed organizations. 
The "serial activists" were all extremely active. Each belonged 
to at least four political or military organizations before they joined 
the NSDAP, and many passed through considerably more. All but 
one joined at least one Wehrverband and at least one nonmilitary 
political group or party. Although the military/paramilitary organi-
zations dominate, the members of this group were clearly not one-
sided militarists. Indeed, their interest in a combination of military 
and civilian modes of political activity may have been one of the 
major factors leading them to remain in the NSDAP (as opposed to 
continuing on to yet another organization), since it combined both 
in one organization. It also made them resemble the men discussed 
in the previous chapter much more than the "passive activists" or 
"sporadic activists" did. Certainly the growing success of the Nazi 
movement kept them from moving on after joining the NSDAP. It is 
quite possible that they would have eventually left the NSDAP /SA 
and continued their search if this had not been the case. Neverthe-
less, their commitment to Party values should not be doubted; six of 
the nine joined the NSDAP before 1930, at a time when its later 
success was by no means guaranteed. 
A typical member of the group of "serial activists" is Herbert 
Fust.90 He was born in June 1899 in the village of Langenfelde in 
Pommerania. His father leased and ran a large estate, and he intended 
to follow in his father's footsteps. He attended a Gymnasium for a 
short time, then a Realschule (high school with a practical and tech-
nical emphasis) from which he graduated with a Sekundareife, a de-
gree which would have entitled him, had he wished, to fulfill his 
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military service obligation as a one-year voluntary officer cadet (a 
status with some prestige in the Wilhelmine Empire). When Fust 
finished Realschule, however, the normal peacetime conditions didn't 
apply, for Germany was at war. Instead of finishing his training as an 
agricultural administrator, Herbert Fust joined the army. He served 
at the front for two years in a machine gun company and ended the 
war as a sergeant. In December 1918 he joined free corps Graf Kanitz 
in the Baltic, again serving in a machine gun unit, but this time with 
a promotion to staff sergeant (Unterfeldwebel). His service there ended 
in May 1919. 
The following year, he resumed his career training and spent 
two years as an agricultural apprentice. He then studied agriculture 
for two semesters in Munich. There is no evidence that he ever came 
into contact with the NSDAP at that time. Unlike most of the group, 
who began their chain of activities much earlier, Herbert did not 
really participate until 1923. In that year, he joined the Stahlhelm, 
but remained in it only until 1924. Also in 1923, he joined the 
Deutschvolkische Freiheitspartei, to which he belonged until1927. 
He was working as an agricultural inspector on an estate, and later 
he became an independent farmer. In 1924 he resumed his paramili-
tary activities by joining the Frontbann, to which he belonged until 
1927, when his local unit was disbanded and the entire Frontbann 
organization folded.91 
Fust clearly had a strong desire to continue to belong to a para-
military organization, since he immediately joined another loosely 
associated with Gerhard RoEbach, an infamous free corps leader. He 
remained until late 1930, at which time he joined both the SA and 
the NSDAP. He did not hold any Party offices, but he served in 1932 
first in the Mecklenburg-Schwerin Landtag and then in 1933 in the 
Reichstag. 
He began his SA career as a simple SA-Mann (the lowest SA 
rank), but within three months Fust was already a Sturmfi.ihrer (the 
equivalent of a lieutenant), and by September 1931 he had risen to 
command his own Standarte. In 1933 he was promoted twice and 
was given a full-time position in the SA, and in 1936 he was pro-
moted to the rank of Gruppenfi.ihrer. By this time his experiences in 
the Kampfzeit (the "period of struggle" before January 30, 1933) had 
left him depressed and out of control, for in that year his private life 
was in such a state that he was hauled before the Party court and 
nearly expelled from the Party. Only direct appeals from the national 
commander of the SA, Victor Lutze, and the powerful local Gauleiter, 
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Karl Kaufman, saved him. The sentence was commuted to an official 
warning.92 
This brush with the Party court system must have done the 
trick, for his career continued unabated. He was in command of vari-
ous SA Gruppen from 1933 until at least 1942, when he was trans-
ferred to command Gruppe Hansa. During the Second World War he 
again served in the army. He reached the rank of first lieutenant in 
1940, and by 1942 he had served in France and Africa, where he was 
wounded and decorated. His fate since 1942 is unknown. 
Herbert Fust was a typical" serial activist" because of the string 
of organizations to which he belonged before finishing in the SA and 
NSDAP. Although he was not continuously active from 1919 to 1930 
(most others were), he did manage to belong to three Wehrverbande 
and one volkisch political party between 1923 and 1930. Among the 
group just discussed, he was actually one of the more "stable" mem-
bers; several managed to belong to five or six organizations during 
roughly the same time. Within the SA he rose rapidly in rank and 
was employed full time soon after the NSDAP gained power (and 
access to state funding). Clearly, he must have been an energetic, 
ruthless, and dynamic personality to progress so quickly. But the hint 
of possible instability contained in his boundless serial activism be-
fore joining the NSDAP was borne out by his later difficulties in the 
Party courts and by his dissolute private life. Effective activists are 
not always stable individuals. 
The Defectors 
The group of "defectors" is the largest and most important of the 
highest SA leaders joining the Party between 1927 and 1930. In a 
way, it is similar to the group of "serial activists." Both groups are 
characterized by a consistently high level of activity in organized 
paramilitary or political organizations. The difference is that the "de-
fectors" settled into one (sometimes several) particular organization(s) 
for a long time instead of skipping regularly from one organization to 
another. Long-term membership has been defined here as at least 
two years, but in fact all but two of the seventeen men in this group 
were members of their organization for at least three years.93 Pre-
sumably, they were loyal until something caused them to become 
dissatisfied and leave. Roughly half then joined the NSDAP within 
one year of quitting their former organization, and the rest joined the 
NSDAP after two or more years. 
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This group is important for two reasons. It graphically illus-
trates the process whereby the NSDAP and SA began to attract mem-
bers of rival right-wing organizations, particularly those more mod-
erate than the NSDAP by 1929 or 1930.94 Also, while the greatest 
numbers of those wooed away from other organizations belonged to 
the rank and file, many rival leaders were also won over. This influx 
of skilled leaders came mainly in 1929 and 1930, just as the SA was 
expanding and consolidating its organization to the point where 
skilled leaders, and particularly potential staff officers, were urgently 
needed and in short supply.95 
The value of these men as potential leaders is neatly shown by 
the high percentage of former officers. Twelve of the seventeen men 
in the group were officers by the end of the First World War.96 This in 
itself is not unusual for the highest SA leaders, for we have already 
seen that a great many of the men in previous chapters were former 
officers, albeit mainly junior officers. The difference comes here in 
the high number of professional officers, in the relatively high rank 
of these officers, and in the relatively high number of officers with 
general staff experience.97 Eight of the twelve officers among the 11 de-
fectors" were prewar professional officers.98 All but one of these eight 
held the rank of captain or higher by 1918, and since several contin-
ued their service after the war, by the time they left the army two 
were generals, one was a major, and one was a colonel.99 One was a 
member of the elite general staff corps, another served on the GroBer 
Generalstab (great general staff of the Imperial German Army), and a 
third served in the Wiirttemberg Ministry of War. Five served in staff 
positions during the war. 100 
Their leadership qualities are also demonstrated by the posi-
tions that they later occupied in a Wehrverband or political party. At 
least twelve of the seventeen "defectors" occupied leadership posi-
tions in other organizations before joining the NSDAP, often rather 
high positions. 101 In detail, two were leaders at the national level, 102 
four were leaders at the state level, 103 three were leaders at a lower 
regional level, 104 two were leaders at the county level, 105 and one was 
a local leader. 106 These men brought considerable leadership skills 
into the SA, but the very fact of their defection increased the stand-
ing and prestige of the NSDAP. Many of the rank and file of these 
organizations soon followed them into the NSDAP. 107 
The organizations from which these men 11 defected," and the 
moment at which they left, depended very much on internal factors 
within these organizations. 108 On the whole, the men came from right-
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wing Wehrverbiinde. The only exceptions were the two who "de-
fected" from the armed forces and one who was a member of the 
DNVP.109 Only a few Wehrverbande were represented, however. 110 
Six "defectors" came from the Stahlhelm, 111 three came from the 
Jungdeutscher Orden, 112 three came from the OC/Bund Wiking, 113 
and two came from the Bund Oberland.114 These were among the 
biggest of the Wehrverbande in the Weimar Republic, but it is not 
their size alone which makes them appear here. 
On the whole, those coming from the Wehrverbande did so at a 
time when the whole concept of paramilitary associations was on 
the wane, although this must be seen only as a backdrop of general 
crisis within the Wehrverband movement, and not as a full explana-
tion of why these particular individuals chose to leave and join the 
NSDAP at this time. Indeed, personal reasons may have played a 
very large part in their decision to quit and later switch to the NSDAP, 
and the politics of the local branch of the organization from which 
they "defected" most certainly did. For example, both of the long-
term members of Bund Oberland left it in 1926.115 This was a time 
when Bund Oberland was split by internal dissention and was cast-
ing about for a new policy to follow that would be appropriate for the 
contemporary political climate. 116 Likewise, those coming from the 
Jungdo came in 1926 or 1927, out of disagreement with its policy of 
rapprochement with France or due to a conflict between the Jungdo 
branch in Saxony and its central leadership over the question of par-
ticipation in electoral politics. 117 
Similarly, the former members of the OC/Bund Wiking all left 
it in 1928. It had already seen many of its members leave since the 
failure of the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923. In 1926 the Bund Wiking was 
banned (the OC had already been banned), and Hermann Ehrhardt, 
its leader, led his men under the protective wing of the Stahlhelm, 
less out of support for that organization than in the hope of finding a 
place to hide with a chance of perhaps subverting it for his own ends. 
By 1926 he had abandoned his former putschism for an outward con-
version to electorial politics, and he had also begun to advocate a 
rapprochement with France, policies which alienated many of his 
more radical supporters and which generally cost him much sympa-
thy in right-wing circles. In 1928 he quit the Stahlhelm once again 
and gradually lost much of his influence. This provoked a crisis among 
his followers. 118 
The Wiking members who left in 1928 may have done so out of 
a feeling that their beloved "Chief" no longer had a chance of sue-
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cess, and they certainly did so at a time when the organization was 
languishing. 119 Those who were in the Stahlhelm present only a slight 
variation on this same theme: two members of this organization left 
it in 1927, and three left in 1930. In contrast to all other organiza-
tions, the majority of those coming from the Stahlhelm joined the 
NSDAP in the same year that they left that organization.120 The dates 
are significant, because by 1927 it was clear that the new Stahlhelm 
policy of "hinein in den Staat" (literally, "into the state"), announced 
in October 1926, was a serious effort to gain political influence for 
the Stahlhelm, and the internal conflict over its exact meaning exac-
erbated existing divisions within the organization. By 1930 the ef-
fects of the Great Depression were being felt, making all political 
questions in Germany more difficult. By this time, too, Stahlhelm 
members were confused about its political policy and its relation-
ship to the Republic, and one of its major projects, the referendum 
against the Young Plan, was a failure. 121 The referendum against the 
Young Plan had brought cooperation with the NSDAP, however, and 
it is possible that the contrast between the dynamic and decisive 
NSDAP and the Stahlhelm caused at least some of the more radical 
Stahlhelm members to reconsider their loyalty to an organization 
that increasingly seemed to lack a clear and consistent antirepubli-
can policy. 
While many of the organizations out of which the "defectors" 
came had begun some sort of a compromise with the Republic, the 
NSDAP was able to stick to a hardline radical position. This made it 
attractive to radicals who were alienated by the lack of firmness and 
clarity in their own organizations. The fact that those who left their 
original organization in 1926, 1927, or 1928 did not join the NSDAP 
until1929 or 1930 may be because it was not a clear alternative until 
it began to have a substantial national impact. On the other hand, it 
is not surprising that those who were able to recognize the potential 
of the NSDAP by 1930 subsequently rose to high positions in the 
Party or, in this case, the SA. They were able to join the SA and 
NSDAP just at a time when they were gaining momentum and be-
ginning to expand rapidly, offering quick advancement, yet early 
enough so that they faced relatively little competition for new lead-
ership positions. As we will see, a rather low percentage of the high-
est leaders of the SA joined after 1930, and nearly all had some sort of 
special skill that brought them to high rank. 
Georg Oberdieck is a good example of a "defector."122 Born in 
Hanover in January 1869, the son of a physician, Oberdieck attended 
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a Gymnasium and earned an Abitur before entering Field Artillery 
Regiment no. 10 of the Royal Prussian Army in 1890 as an officer 
cadet. In 1891 he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the 
regular army. He served in several artillery regiments and on the 
GroBer Generalstab in Berlin, reaching the rank of major. When war 
broke out he ~as assigned as the general staff officer of the zeppelin 
Viktoria-Luise, and he later served as a staff officer and a regimental 
commander. He was wounded twice during the war and highly deco-
rated.123 He commanded an artillery regiment in the Reichswehr from 
1919 to 1920, and left the service in October 1920 as a full colonel. 
Typical of many of the other 11 defectors, 11 he was not in a free corps124 
and was not active in a number of organizations. In fact, he loyally 
served only one organization, the Stahlhelm, to which he belonged 
from 1924 to 1930. During this time, he occupied the important post 
of Gaufuhrer (regional leader) of Hannover for one year. 125 
Within two months of leaving the Stahlhelm, Georg Oberdieck 
had joined the NSDAP, and a month later he joined the SA. After a 
short period as an ordinary SA·Mann, he rose to command a Sturm 
and received the rank of Sturmfuhrer, the lowest of the SA officer 
ranks. After several months he was transferred to a staff position 
with Gausturm Hannover-South. He remained in staff or SA school 
positions until September 1939, when he was made acting head of 
SA Gruppe Niedersachsen, standing in for Max Linsmayer and later 
Gunther Grantz, who were the actual commanders of the Gruppe 
but who were serving with the Wehrmacht at the time. 126 
Oberdieck was promoted to Obergruppenfuhrer in early 1944. 
Although it is not known if he served in the Second World War, his 
age makes it doubtful. It was more efficient to leave him at home to 
look after the SA, freeing a younger SA commander for military ser-
vice. He is typical of many of the skilled administrators and soldiers 
who joined the SA in the middle years of the Kampfzeit, who were 
too old or too conservative to lead soldiers physically into street 
battles, but who were nevertheless able to perform yeoman service 
by organizing the staffs, doing the planning, and training younger 
leaders. While much of the shock force of the SA came from young 
men eager to physically take control of the streets, it should not be 
forgotten that it took much detailed planning and dedicated training 
to turn those aggressive young men into a formidable and well-orga-
nized Party army. 
Oberdieck's 11 defection" to the NSDAP cost the competing 
Stahlhelm an important leader, and it surely brought the NSDAP not 
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only Oberdieck's skills but also considerable prestige, at least locally 
where Oberdieck was known. Although his personal motives can't 
be determined from the documents at hand, Oberdieck's "defection" 
in 1930 was clearly a sign of problems within the Stahlhelm and one 
more milestone on its path to decline. 
The Party Soldiers 
The final path into the SA between 1927 to 1930 led through the 
NSDAP. Five men joined the NSDAP in 1925 or 1926 but did not 
immediately join the SA. Instead, they waited a year or longer. The 
fact that they did not get involved in the SA immediately leads one 
to assume that they were first attracted to the ideological or political 
side of the NSDAP, and only later became interested in the paramili-
tary activities of the SA. This is a small group, for whom informa-
tion is often less complete than for the average SA officer in this 
study. 127 This makes any conclusions drawn about them rather ten-
tative. Nevertheless, three of the five are clearly men who were lead-
ers in the Party organization before joining the SA and who contin-
ued to be afterwards. 128 They began as Party activists, joined the SA 
somewhat later, perhaps out of a sense of duty more than anything 
else, but nonetheless were active in both organizations in parallel. 
Then, at a given point, they switched their main efforts to the SA 
and finally left the Party administration altogether, at least for a sig-
nificant time. 
The reasons why they were forced to make a choice between 
leadership in the Party and leadership in the SA are clear. By the late 
1920s the SA began insisting that SA leaders should devote their full 
energies to the SA and should not be leaders in the Political Organi-
zation of the Party at the same time. The reasons why they joined 
the SA at all, after first being active in the Party, and why they then 
made the decision to devote full time to the SA instead of to the 
Party organization are not as clear and may often have been personal 
in nature. 
It is known that many older veterans did not physically feel up 
to participating in the SA in the early 1920s, but did participate later, 
in the early 1930s, when the street battles between the SA and its 
opponents had reached such a critical point that the Party encour-
aged every man who could to don SA uniform. Personal advance-
ment may also have seemed easier in the SA. In some places by the 
late 1920s, the SA was much better organized and much more dy-
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namic than the corresponding local Party organization, and this fact 
must have had a bearing on any man's decision to opt for the SA. In 
any case, the above considerations suggest that too sharp a distinc-
tion between SA leaders and Party leaders in terms of character or 
background may not be justified, at least as far as the Alte Kampfer 
are concerned. The decision to opt for a career in either the Party or 
the SA may have been as much a matter of chance or local condi-
tions as something that was based on some fundamentally different 
type of background or character common to SA or Party leaders as a 
group. 
Three of the five "Party soldiers" were veterans of the First World 
War. None were professional officers, and only two were reserve of-
ficers. 129 The two nonveterans were too young to have served. At 
least two of the five were subsequently in a free corps, 130 and one, 
Finck von Finckenstein, was active in various paramilitary organiza-
tions after that. The rest do not seem to have been particularly ac-
tive, although this may be a reflection of the lack of information. As 
far as can be determined, only one member of the group joined the 
NSDAP before the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923.131 
Two members of the group joined the NSDAP in 1925, and three 
joined in 1926. All but one waited at least two years before joining 
the SA. The sole exception to this is Robert Bergmann, who joined 
the Party in 1926 and then joined the SA a year later. But even then, 
he served in the SA for only one year before quitting, and he only 
rejoined it in 1931. 132 
Three of the five were Ortsgruppenleiter (leaders of a local Party 
chapter) and then district leaders (Bezirksleiter) in the Party organi-
zation before joining the SA, and one of these three was even a busi-
ness manager in the administration of his Gau. 133 Four of the five 
subsequently went on to become Reichstag deputies for the Party, 
and one later resumed his Party career. 134 
All seem to have risen swiftly in the SA hierarchy once they 
joined. This may have been due to their existing Party seniority and 
connections, or it might have been due to the fact that they were 
simply skilled leaders. With the exception of Bergmann, all actually 
commanded an SA-Gruppe and had considerable other "frontline" 
command experience with the SA, the point being that they were 
capable SA leaders and not just Party hacks who owed their ranks to 
their connections or to their standing in the political administration 
of the Party. Robert Bergmann, the exception, actually owed his high 
rank to the fact that he was Ernst Rohm's adjutant while Rohm was 
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SA chief of staff, and he was chosen for this august position because 
he had served as Rohm's adjutant in the army during and after the 
First World War and had even saved Rohm's life. 135 In fairness to 
Bergmann it should be pointed out that he had commanded a 
Sturmbann and had been promoted to the rank of Sturmbannfiihrer 
(roughly equivalent to major in the army) on his own before becom-
ing Rohm's adjutant. 
The top leaders of the SA who joined from 1927 to 1930 made a sig-
nificant contribution to both the NSDAP and the SA. While the top 
SA leaders who joined in 1925 or 1926 generally played a more im-
portant role in the NSDAP and were more often active in volkisch 
organizations beforehand, the group joining between 1927 and 1930 
was also deeply committed to Nazi ideology. Although less active in 
Party leadership than the group who joined the SA and NSDAP in 
1925 or 1926, eighteen members of the 1927-30 group did hold posi-
tions of responsibility in the Party apparatus. 136 The greatest number 
were Kreisleiter (district leaders)l37 or served in the administration 
of a Gau or at the national level. 138 Moreover, all but two of the ten 
who served at the Gau or national level did so before 1933. Interest-
ingly, the majority of those who were district Party leaders or who 
served at the Gau or national level came out of the "defector" or 
"Party soldier" groups discussed above. 139 This again illustrates the 
value of the "defectors" as leaders. 
The men in this chapter took one of several paths into the SA. 
Two of these paths were especially significant. These were the "de-
fectors," and "serial activists." Both categories are important in sup-
plying the SA with men who combined leadership ability and experi-
ence with drive and activism. The careers of these men vividly illus-
trate the process whereby the SA (and therefore the NSDAP) grew by 
absorbing many of its rivals and competitors. It is extremely signifi-
cant for the growth of both the SA and NSDAP that they were able to 
attract capable people. It is also significant that these new recruits 
were so fundamentally similar to the body of SA leaders already in 
place and that they already possessed the skills necessary to lead a 
mass paramilitary organization. Without this influx of capable lead-
ers at a time when the SA and NSDAP were expanding, the twin 
organizations could never have risen to power. 
With the steady growth of both the SA and NSDAP and the 
perfection of their organization, the depression years saw the Nazi 
movement increasingly capable of acting nationally on a massive 
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scale. During the early 1930s, not only was the scope of SA activities 
greater than ever before but the degree of violence it engaged in was 
also far greater. With a basically sound organizational structure in 
place thanks to the efforts of von Pfeffer and his commanders, the 
expansion of the scope and violence caused the SA to recruit a vari-
ety of specialists into its higher leadership. These men are the sub-
ject of the next chapter. 
4 
The Specialists, 
1931-1932 
No man is more closely associated with the SA than Ernst Rohm. 
The SA's contribution to the expansion and success of the Nazi Party 
in 1931 and 1932 while under his leadership was absolutely crucial 
to its assumption of power in January 1933. These two years were 
the most pivotal of the entire Kampfzeit, a time when the NSDAP 
had to prove to itself and to Germany that it had made the transition 
from a small sectarian collection of cranks and true believers into a 
modern mass political party. Two factors gave these critical years a 
special tension and immediacy for members of the Nazi Party and 
indeed for anyone engaged in political activity in Germany at this 
time. The first was the Great Depression and the enormous hardship 
and suffering that it caused. In 1931, over one-fifth of the German 
workforce was unemployed, and in 1932 this percentage had risen to 
almost one-third. 1 The second factor was the increased radicalization 
and violence of political activity. The two factors were, of course, 
intimately related. For the SA and NSDAP, the radicalization of po-
litical discourse was expressed in two overriding ways: the increase 
in violence and an all but unbearable acceleration of political activ-
ity. In 1931 and 1932 an ever-tightening spiral of electoral campaigns 
fought on the local, state, and national levels stretched the institu-
tional and personal resources of the SA and NSDAP almost to the 
breaking point. 
The pressure was intense. The growing level of violence, for 
which the SA was of course not without blame itself, meant that 
Party members and especially SA members were in constant danger. 
By the summer of 1932 the level of violence approached a state of 
latent civil war. The endless electoral campaigns brought increasing 
success to the NSDAP (at least until the November 1932 Reichstag 
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election) and to that extent helped to keep morale high and ensure a 
steady stream of converts to the Party. But they also kept the Party 
and SA working at a fever pitch, and this gradually ate up and wore 
out not only the savings and physical property of the Party and SA 
but also the patience and nerves of the members. Sacrifices (and debts) 
mounted, but even the greatest effort did not bring a majority of votes 
to the Party, and many began to question the validity of any further 
pursuit of the legality policy, while others voiced fears that the move-
ment could not continue under the strain. It was within this context 
that Rohm took command of the SA. 
RoHM, THE PouncAL SoLDIER 
Ernst Rohm was a soldier.2 For him this was not an occupation but a 
way of life. He was straightforward and down to earth, even earthy, 
and capable of brutality and violence. Yet many contemporaries, even 
among his opponents, acknowledged that he was one of the few genu-
inely likable Nazis. He said that he never felt comfortable in civilian 
clothes, and he led the simple life of a soldier, yet he also acquired a 
taste for luxury, and in the days after the takeover of power he could 
be seen riding in his posh limousine or holding lavish banquets for 
the Berlin diplomatic community. By all accounts he was brave, and 
he was wounded and decorated in the First World War. Yet his mili-
tary reputation was that of an extremely competent and energetic 
staff officer, a capacity in which he served through most of the Great 
War, during the German Revolution in Freikorps Epp, and later in 
the Reichswehr. Indeed, for some he was too competent. He seemed 
to positively delight in complicated decrees and tables of organiza-
tion that often could not be put into practice with the means at hand. 
Yet for all his desire to be a soldier and for all his ability as a cool and 
calculating staff officer, Rohm had thrown away a secure and reward-
ing career as a professional officer and had been forced to resign from 
the army due to his ceaseless and illegal political activities in sup-
port of the radical nationalist, racist, and above all putschist forces 
in Munich in 1923. For if Rohm was a soldier, he was also a political 
soldier, a curious combination of the professional military man-
often showing boundless contempt for civilians-and the volkisch 
politician who was at home in the corridors of the Reichstag or in 
beery meeting halls. 
Rohm was a loyal follower of Adolf Hitler, yet he was never 
blinded by the myth of the Fuhrer. He was the only high Party leader 
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SA Stabschef and Captain Ernst Rohm with adjutant (possibly Count Carl 
du Moulin-Eckart), October 11, 1931, at the time of the founding of the 
"Harzburg Front. " Courtesy of the Bundesarchiv. 
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who addressed Hitler with the familiar du instead of the more for-
mal Sie, and he never hesitated to tell Hitler the truth as he saw it-
with ultimately tragic results. He also seems to have been much less 
of a radical anti-Semite than most high Party leaders, and equally as 
unlikely, he seems to have pursued a genuine policy of rapproche-
ment with France in his brief foray into foreign policy in 1933 and 
1934.3 In the final analysis, Rohm appears a bit theatrical, a Falstaff 
in a brown shirt, a freebooter out of his time, and a man of sincere if 
fatally contradictory convictions. 
Ernst Rohm was born on November 28, 1887, in Munich. His 
father was a Bavarian civil servant, and all his life Rohm maintained 
a romantic but profound attachment to the Bavarian royal house of 
Wittelsbach. He attended a prestigious Gymnasium and then joined 
the Bavarian army as an officer cadet. He was commissioned as a 
second lieutenant in the Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment no. 10, 
"Prince Ludwig," in 1908. Just before the war he was promoted to 
first lieutenant, and in 1917, to captain. He was badly wounded, and 
his face was permanently disfigured. He later served as an adjutant 
in the Bavarian Ministry of War, perhaps learning something of poli-
tics and parliaments in the process. After this he served as a general 
staff officer, and in this capacity he joined Freikorps Epp in April 
1919, apparently bored with peacetime duty in his home garrison of 
Ingolstadt and eager to help put down the revolution. He was subse-
quently taken into the Reichswehr, serving on the staff of the city 
commandant of Munich and later on the staff of Military District 
(Wehrkreis) VII. 
In both of these latter capacities, Rohm was officially and unof-
ficially engaged in hiding weapons from the Allies that were to be 
surrendered according to the Versailles treaty, and he was issuing the 
same weapons to the Einwohnerwehr (citizens' militia) and later the 
Wehrverbande in Bavaria. Although he was a serving officer in the 
army, he was also an officer in the Reichsflagge, a Bavarian 
Wehrverband, and a member of a political party, the DAP (later to 
become the NSDAP), from 1919 on. Indeed, Rohm overstepped his 
official duties and responsibilities in the supply and coordination of 
the various right-wing paramilitary groups to such an extent that he 
was forced to resign from the Reichswehr in late 1923. 
Rohm was a participant in the Beer Hall Putsch and a main 
defendant in the subsequent trial, but he served little time in jail and 
no time in prison for the crime of high treason, of which he was so 
proudly guilty. Continually active in the SA and paramilitary move-
84 The SA Generals and the Rise of Nazism 
ment in 1924 and 1925, he nominally led the SA for a time and founded 
the Frontbann, his own creation, which was intended to provide a 
national cartel of independent Wehrverbiinde in the grand but by then 
sadly outdated putschist tradition. He was given the task of leading 
the SA again in 1925 when it and the Party were rebuilt, but here-
signed with bitterness as both head of the SA and the Frontbann when 
he and Hitler were unable to agree on the SA's proper relationship to 
the Party. Employed for a time as a book salesman, Rohm eagerly 
accepted an offer to train the Bolivian army in 1928, happy once again 
to find employment as a soldier. He remained in Bolivia until Hitler 
summoned him back to Germany in the late summer or fall of 1930. 
By this time even he realized that the day of the putschist 
Wehrverbiinde was over, and he had accepted the necessity of a legal 
parliamentary strategy and of subordination of the Party's paramili-
tary wing to the "politicians." 
Yet this last statement still begs the question: Why was Ernst 
Rohm chosen to lead the SA?4 On the face of it, Hitler's choice is 
baffling.5 Few of his subordinates had shown as much independence 
and stubborn conviction in their own ideas. Rohm had no compunc-
tion about telling Hitler exactly what he thought, even if what he 
had to say was less than pleasant. Worse, his last dealings with Hitler 
had been quite unsatisfactory, and they had parted in anger. 
Significantly, this had been no trivial personal conflict but a 
fundamental disagreement over the SA's relationship to the political 
wing of the Party, and Rohm had supported the outdated and hope-
lessly inadequate putschist-Wehrverband strategy. Rohm was uncon-
strained and blunt, and he treated Hitler not as a superior but as an 
equal. Indeed, their relationship went back to a time when Rohm 
had clearly been more powerful than Hitler. Some even go so far as to 
say that he "invented" Hitler, 6 and while this may be an exaggera-
tion, it is safe to say that Hitler and the NSDAP were long dependent 
on Rohm and other military people who controlled the flow of money 
and arms in Munich. 
Rohm was also a professional officer, with strong ties to the 
army, the Bavarian officer corps, and the Bavarian royal house. Hitler 
had ambivalent feelings toward officers in general/ and if it was less 
certain that Rohm shared the lack of political acumen typical of the 
officer class, it was clear that he had loyalties that might conflict 
with those toward Hitler and the Party. 
He was a problematic figure for another reason. He was a ho-
mosexual, which was not acceptable in German society at large and 
The Specialists, 1931-1932 85 
was particularly feared in the conservative, traditional world of the 
army and the paramilitary associations. Although his homosexual-
ity did not become widely known until some of his private letters 
were published in 1932, it is highly doubtful that Hitler and others in 
the Party did not know earlier, especially given Hitler's famous de-
cree on morality, which was issued five weeks after Rohm took of-
fice. But even to those who did not know of Rohm's sexual prefer-
ence, he was suspect. His bluntness and combativeness had brought 
him many enemies over the years, and the fact that he had "turned 
his back" on Germany to go to Bolivia and thus had "shirked his 
responsibilities" in the battle for Germany's "freedom" did not make 
him any more welcome. 
Yet for all his independence, Rohm was completely loyal to 
Hitler and the NSDA~ and for Hitler, that counted for a great deal. 
His long relationship with Hitler had created a deep bond between 
the two men, and because Rohm was a Bavarian and had been a mem-
ber of the Party as long as Hitler himself, it was likely that the two 
would share a common outlook and find a common strategy. More-
over, Hitler was in a much stronger position in 1930 than he had 
been in 1923 or 1925. He was now the head of a strong national move-
ment, and he had ensured that the paramilitary wing of the Party 
would not dominate it as it had in 1923 and as it had threatened to do 
in 1925. Rohm returned from Bolivia to a vastly different political 
situation than he had left, and he was shrewd enough to see that it 
demanded new tactics. In addition, he himself was in a much weaker 
position. His absence had left him without a coherent faction of sup-
porters within the Party or elsewhere, and he was out of touch with 
the situation as it stood. 
The fact that Rohm had long been absent from the political 
scene in Germany was an advantage for Hitler. Aside from some now 
long out-of-date feuds, Rohm returned as a man uncompromised by 
the recent conflicts in the SA and Party. His lack of supporters and 
his sexual orientation isolated him, making him dependent on Hitler 
and thus more malleable than almost anyone else whom Hitler could 
have chosen. 8 On the other hand, Rohm was a proven quantity as a 
leader and administrator. As a former officer, he had the technical 
knowledge and skills to do the job, and he was not about to tolerate 
disobedience and poor discipline within the SA. He was also a strong 
enough personality to make sure that the SA remained under con-
trol, a constant concern for Hitler and the leadership of the NSDAP 
who always feared that the actions of the SA could lead to a ban of 
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the entire Party. The guarantee of SA discipline, combined with 
Rohm's military background, outlook, and personal contacts, would 
also make the SA attractive to the Reichswehr, a factor which was 
taking on added importance at just the time of Rohm's appointment. 
Above all, remember that Rohm was a political soldier. He shared 
Hitler's basic goal and outlook, and if he was a soldier first, he had 
also learned to think like a politician. 
CoPING WITH SuccEss 
Rohm's tenure as the leader of the SA9 from its inception until his 
purge in 1934 was dominated by three great issues: rapid growth of 
the SA, continued problems of cohesion and discipline, and the ques-
tion of the relationship between the NSDAP /SA and the state. Rohm's 
main contribution to the Party in 1931 and 1932lay in the way in 
which he helped it to address all three of these issues, just as ulti-
mately his downfall after the Nazis seized power resulted from his 
failure to address them in a way that was appropriate to new condi-
tions and to Hitler's new policies. 
At the time Rohm officially assumed his command on January 
5, 1931, the SA had roughly 77,000 members. 10 Within three months 
the SA had passed the 100,000 mark and was numerically stronger 
than the Reichswehr for the first time. 11 By December 15, 1931, it 
had grown to 260,438, more than three times its strength of just one 
year earlier. 12 In 1932 this figure more than doubled once again. 13 
There could be no more vivid proof that Hitler had been persuaded to 
drop all earlier plans to limit the size of the SA and that he had de-
cided to allow it to develop into a mass organization, parallel to a 
similar tendency in the Party. 14 One of Rohm's most important 
achievements for the Party was his mastering of the rapid and unex-
pected growth of the SA and all of the problems that came with it. 
These problems were many, because the expansion of the SA and the 
intensification of the political struggle in which it was engaged were 
driven by the Great Depression and the immense suffering it caused 
the German and Austrian people. 
On the level of organization, it was a tribute to the soundness 
of Franz von Pfeffer's original planning that the SA was able to em-
brace these new members with only a few changes in its basic orga-
nization. Rohm immediately discussed abandoning von Pfeffer's equa-
tion of rank with position, although this measure did not actually go 
into effect until the fall of 1931. 15 More important, he created a new 
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unit, the Sturmbann, which came between the Sturm and the 
Standarte in the hierarchy of SA units. In terms of size, it was identi-
cal to the old Standarte (250-600 men). This provided more flexibil-
ity to the SA in absorbing ever larger numbers, and it brought the 
organization of the SA closer to that of the army. 16 The Sturmbann 
not only provided the SA with greater flexibility to expand but it also 
was part of an effort to save money for the Party. Since 1923 the 
NSDAP had awarded an expensive metal and fabric insignia, the 
"Standarte," to well-established Hundertschaften (the precursor of 
the Standarte), and the custom continued with the Standarten. By 
inserting the Sturmbann at the level where an SA unit had been en-
titled to receive a Standarte, and increasing the size of the Standarte 
to between 1,000 and 3,000 men, the party was saved the expense of 
having to award hundreds of new Stan dart en insignia to keep up with 
recent expansionY Rohm also introduced the Untergruppe as are-
placement of the former Brigade18 as the next level above the 
Standarte, and in the cases where size permitted, the Untergruppe 
was to be coterminous with the Gau boundaries and be called a 
Gausturm. 19 Above the Untergruppe, Rohm introduced the Gruppe 
and replaced the five OSAF-Stellvertreter with eleven Gruppenfi.ihrer, 
again increasing flexibility and, perhaps more important, decreasing 
the power of the sometimes rebellious OSAF-Stellvertreter.2° From 
February 1931, when these new regulations were first published, to 
mid-1934, the lower levels of the SA were in almost continuous reor-
ganization and expansion, as Trupps grew into Stiirme, Stiirme grew 
into Sturmbanne, Sturmbanne became Standarten, old Standarten 
subdivided, and new Untergruppen, Brigaden, and Gruppen emerged. 
To manage these new units, control them, and do the increas-
ingly complex planning necessary to perform the tasks of the SA given 
its new size, Rohm also greatly expanded the staff structure of both 
the SA supreme command (OSAF) and subordinate units. He recruited 
specialists to fill many of these staff positions. Some of these men 
were Rohm's old cronies and former Bavarian officers. 
In part, the expansion of the SA staff was necessary to enhance 
the cohesion and discipline of the organization. The necessity of such 
measures was made plain by the rapid expansion of the SA and by 
continued outbreaks of poor discipline, not least among the higher 
leaders of the SA. Efforts at establishing cohesion focused on ensur-
ing that the organizational structure and workings of the SA were as 
uniform as possible, increasing the training of SA leaders, many of 
whom by now were not veterans of the First World War, and ensur-
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ing that the SA was ideologically uniform and in tune with the Party. 
These were life-and-death questions in an organization that was un-
dergoing rapid expansion yet lacked capable leaders at lower levels 
and had barely begun to develop any real cohesion before it was faced 
with the task of absorbing thousands of new members.21 
The chronic lack of qualified lower-level leaders was only one 
of the factors Rohm had to address in order to establish better disci-
pline and control within the SA. He had taken over an organization 
that was still in the process of changing from a collection of indepen-
dent regional and local bands into a uniform national unit. Such a 
transformation was not without conflict, and Rohm inherited all of 
the resentments associated with it, yet he created a command appa-
ratus capable of consolidating it. Older resentments against the Party 
organization, the money shortages, and the disagreement about ap-
propriate strategy for the Party had been temporarily suppressed but 
could erupt at any time. On top of all this, Rohm naturally provoked 
the usual mistrust and resentment faced by any newcomer replacing 
an old and respected leader (von Pfeffer, in this case). In the long run, 
the uniform system of training and indoctrination that he instituted 
would transform the SA into a relatively homogeneous and disci-
plined organization, but in the short term, Rohm had to establish his 
own authority and ensure discipline and a proper working relation-
ship with the Party organization. 
After receiving bitter complaints from Walther Stennes, the 
powerful OSAF-Stellvertreter in eastern Germany, 22 Hitler suddenly 
removed Stennes from his command and ordered him to meet him in 
Weimar. Stennes refused.23 This open attack on Stennes helped Rohm 
assert his authority. Despite attempts to form a rival organization 
and the mass resignation of many SA leaders in the east who were 
loyal to Stennes, the affair passed quickly, with little real damage to 
the SA. The rebels were quickly isolated and systematically purged 
from the SA, and a concerted Party and SA effort restored order and 
never allowed the revolt to spread beyond a fairly narrow group in 
eastern Germany. After this, there was no chance of effective resis-
tance to Rohm on the part of the other OSAF-Stellvertreter, and they 
quickly fell into line. 
Although the handling of the Stennes affair actually increased 
resentment and lowered morale within the SA at the time, it estab-
lished Rohm's authority and formed the basis of his further actions. 
It also deepened the tensions between the SA and SS, especially in 
eastern Germany, for the SS had sided with Hitler and against Stennes 
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and his supporters from the beginning of the conflict. The tension 
between the SA and SS (still both part of the same organization) would 
be one of the factors leading to the purge of the SA in 1934. 
In the spring of 1931, shortly after the Stennes affair had been 
laid to rest, Rohm announced he was replacing the five (six, if Aus-
tria is included) large and powerful OSAF-Stellvertreter regions with 
ten Gruppen, thus spreading their power among twice the number of 
SA leaders, and allowing for better control by making each 
Gruppenfuhrer responsible for a smaller area than before. 24 Although 
individuals might grumble, after the reorganization Rohm was clearly 
in control, and the higher SA leaders were all forced to dance to his 
tune. 
By putting himself in complete control of the SA, Rohm was 
also ensuring that the level of friction between the SA and the Party's 
Political Organization would drop to a tolerable level. He went to 
great lengths to ensure a good working relationship. The SA was sub-
ordinated to the Party in a clear fashion, and he reiterated the neces-
sity of obtaining permission from the Party (now referred to as the 
Politische Organisation, or PO, to distinguish it from the SA and 
other Party affiliates) for any public appearance of any SA unit of 
Sturm size or above. SA leaders were also required to consult with 
the local Gauleiter before appointing any subordinate commanders. 
Rohm was nevertheless careful not to sacrifice any real control over 
the SA in his campaign to conciliate the P0.25 Yet it is important to 
recognize that Rohm could only do so much and that any effort to 
establish discipline in the SA and ensure cooperation with the PO 
could only smooth over and cover up fundamental conflicts. 
Without the power to compel obedience instead of merely ask 
for it, no one could guarantee that the SA would remain obedient to 
anyone. And without a fundamental clarification of the roles of the 
SA and PO and their relationship to one another, tension and friction 
between the two organizations would always exist. Rohm could not 
and did not bring about any definitive resolution of either of these 
two issues.26 Just as in the case of the organizational structure of the 
SA, discipline and relations with the PO were characterized from 
1931 to 1934 by constant and often remarkably skillful temporiza-
tion and ad hoc solutions. It was the ability to do this, particularly in 
the organizational realm, which was Rohm's major contribution. 
As important as Rohm's organizational talents and leadership 
were, what actually maintained discipline and held friction between 
the SA and PO to a tolerable level was the fact that the SA and Party 
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were both exceptionally busy in 1931 and 1932 and riding the crest 
of an extraordinary wave of success. Problems could easily be ignored 
as long as the SA and Party were kept busy and as long as their efforts 
seemed to bring progress. Yet, with the mounting pace and level of 
political conflict in 1932, Rohm was less and less able to control the 
SA and more concerned with simply keeping it moving in the right 
direction. Given the conditions under which he had to work, this 
may have been the best that he could expect, but in any case, the 
failure to resolve the fundamental issues of discipline and the rela-
tionship to the PO would rebound upon Rohm and the SA in 1933 
and 1934 after the takeover of power. 
During Rohm's early tenure as Stabschef (chief of staHL the 
NSDAP radically altered its attitude toward the state and its institu-
tions.27 Since the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch in Munich in 1923, 
Hitler had strictly prohibited cooperation with state institutions, 
including the army. A change in the noncooperation policy, fraught 
as it was with risks for both sides, had great potential benefits for the 
NSDAP and for the army as well. 
The army stood to gain the support of a party whose paramilitary 
wing was now quite large. The Reichswehr had long been working 
secretly with organizations like the Stah1helm on matters of national 
defense, but they were beginning to be eclipsed by the SA in many 
areas. This was particularly the case in Germany's eastern border re-
gions and eastern Prussia, where the Reichswehr maintained a covert 
and illegal defense militia. The change in the NSDAP's policy came at 
a time when the Reichswehr was expanding this illegal militia system 
and SA participation was welcomed, albeit with certain reservations.28 
As for the NSDAP, all levels of the Party agreed that any seizure 
of power, legal or otherwise, could only be carried out with the ac-
ceptance if not support of the Reichswehr. The events of 1923 had 
shown this without a shadow of a doubt. In this light, the opening 
toward the Reichswehr was a necessary political chess move if the 
NSDAP was to be a serious contender for power in Germany. Partici-
pation in the national defense and other activities in support of the 
state was also a way of building bridges to the more traditional con-
servative parties. As a result, the NSDAP would have more contact 
with them through these activities and would begin to appear more 
respectable, perhaps even regierungsfiihig (capable of forming or par-
ticipating in a government). Equally as important, it would begin to 
undermine the greater support that these parties (like the DNVP) 
enjoyed in government and military circles.29 
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Mass meeting of Stahlhelm (left) and SA, SS, and NSDAP in Bad Harzburg, 
October 11, 1931, marking the founding of the "Harzburg Front, " a loose 
alliance between the NSDAP and other conservative organizations includ-
ing the Stahlhelm and DNVP. In the SA group, left to right, are Heinrich 
Himmler (in black SS cap and tie), Ernst Rohm, two unidentified SA leaders, 
Adolf Hiihnlein (with goggles), and Hermann Goring. Courtesy of the 
Bundesarchi v. 
Rohm, who certainly favored greater cooperation with the 
Reichswehr, thus gained an additional and highly sensitive area of 
SA activity to master. As it turned out, despite the modification of 
the NSDAP's policy at this time and the close cooperation with the 
Reichswehr that developed in many areas, the issue of the relation-
ship between the two organizations remained problematic. Although 
it was not foreseeable in 1931 or 1932, this would eventually become 
the issue over which Rohm would lose his life and the SA would 
forfeit its preeminent position within the Nazi movement . 
Despite the growing support for the SA within the Reichswehr, 
the rising level of violence in the streets prompted the government 
of Chancellor Heinrich Bruning to ban the SA on April 13, 1932.30 
The ban was lifted on June 14, 1932, and was supremely ineffective 
in its stated goal of lessening political violence. The SA had been 
warned beforehand, possibly by the Reichswehr, and had quickly hid-
den important documents and equipment.3 1 Since the Party itself 
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had not been banned, the SA could easily go underground and carry 
on as before under the guise of Party work or innocent-sounding sports 
associations. 
The true results of the SA ban were unexpected. It brought the 
NSDAP a strong wave of sympathy from nearly the entire conserva-
tive camp in Germany. It also led to opposition within the Reichswehr, 
which caused the resignation of the Reichswehr minister, General 
Wilhelm Groener, and his replacement by his former protegee, Gen-
eral Kurt von Schleicher. In the end, the political fallout of the SA 
ban served to further the cause of the NSDAP. But the ban had an-
other positive result for the SA in particular. 
Although the SA ban did disrupt SA operations somewhat and 
cost the SA a certain amount of money, it also allowed the SA high 
command to reorganize at its leisure for the first time since the mas-
sive membership expansion had begun in 1930-31. The fiction that 
the SA had been disbanded and thus needed to be completely rebuilt 
. when the ban was lifted also gave the SA a means of purging its ranks 
of unsuitable leaders, for all SA leaders had to be "reappointed" or 
confirmed in their posts when the ban was lifted and the SA was 
"reestablished."32 When the reorganization was complete, the SA 
stood in its final form prior to the Machtergreifung (seizure of power), 
the culmination of eight years of development, a finely tuned instru-
ment poised to help the NSDAP to gain power. 
On the eve of the Machtergreifung in January 1933, the SA 
boasted 500,000 members and was still growing.33 The last reorgani-
zation had created five Obergruppen as an intermediate level between 
the OSAF and the Gruppen, designed to coordinate efforts of two or 
more Gruppen, deal with state agencies on a regional basis, and coor-
dinate training and discipline.34 It had expanded the number of 
Gruppen to 18, with 58 Untergruppen and 234 Standarten, guided by 
5 inspectorates and a greatly expanded central command. The reor-
ganization had also created the new Gruppenstab zur besonderen 
Verwendung (Gruppe-staff for special duties), a secret staff unit in-
tended to coordinate general relations and covert military training 
with the Reichswehr.3s 
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Like Franz von Pfeffer before him, Ernst Rohm deserves credit for 
managing the reorganization and expansion of the SA, but he did not 
do this alone. The SA already had a strong yet flexible organization 
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in place when he took command, as well as a large number of rela-
tively homogeneous and competent officers. By 1931 it was late in 
the day to join the SA or, for that matter, the NSDAP and expect to 
rise very far in the ranks. By this time the upper levels of administra-
tion were already filled, despite a chronic lack of good leadership at 
lower levels.36 Moreover, one would expect that any future additions 
to the top leadership ranks of either the SA or the Party would come 
from the next lowest echelons of leadership and not from the out-
side. This was mainly true, but there was a clearly defined group 
among those who rose to the top levels of the SA hierarchy who did, 
in fact, join the SA and often even the NSDAP in the early 1930s. 
Forty-six SA leaders joined in 1931 or 1932.37 In the main, these 
men were specialists, possessing distinctive skills that the SA needed 
as it expanded into a mass national organization. Yet though they 
offered important skills, it was not an accident that these particular 
individuals joined the SA. Others, sometimes with even better skills, 
might have been chosen or might have offered their services if pro-
fessional qualifications were all that mattered. A key factor was that 
these men also possessed backgrounds in the military, Wehrverbiinde, 
and volkisch organizations that closely matched those of the exist-
ing highest SA leaders. They were thus able to fit into the organiza-
tion and work with the SA leaders who were already in place. These 
men were outsiders, but in a fundamental way they were not strang-
ers, since they shared many experiences and, on this basis, many 
common attitudes with the existing leadership. Many came to the 
SA because they knew Ernst Rohm or already had close ties to the 
NSDAP. Yet most of these men also followed the same "paths" into 
the SA that were established in the previous chapter. 
As might be expected by now, most of the highest SA officers 
who joined the SA in 1931 and 1932 were combat veterans of the 
First World War.38 Many, in fact, had been professional soldiers be-
fore the war, the majority of them officers.39 By 1918, most veterans 
had been commissioned as officers if they had not already been offic-
ers before the war broke out.40 The rank held by the end of the First 
World War was higher in this group than in previous groups; almost 
half of the officers were either captains or majors by 1918.41 More-
over, a significant number had held a staff position either before or 
during the war.42 The presence of so many officers and especially 
professional officers with staff experience and training in the group 
that joined the SA in 1931 and 1932 is a sign of the type of skills 
sought by the SA when they were recruited. 
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The immediate postwar years of turmoil and revolution saw 
most of the highest SA leaders who joined in 1931 and 1932 engaged 
in some sort of military activity. Roughly one-third were still in the 
regular army through the end of 1919.43 Several of these same men 
had earlier served in free corps. Together, roughly one-third of the 
entire group had served in a free corps,44 and several others served in 
limited-term volunteer units (Zeitfreiwilligenverbiinde) or civic guard 
units (Einwohnerwehren).45 Of the free corps, only Freikorps Epp 
stands out as being represented by more than one member of the 
group. Fourteen free corps are represented in all, of which two were 
based in Bavaria.46 Several men were members of veterans' organiza-
tions in 1919 or 1920, usually while they were serving in the army or 
a free corps, and only a few were members of a political organiza-
tionY As in previous chapters, the men here were active in a wide 
range of military organizations during the German Revolution. 
This same pattern of activity primarily in paramilitary, mili-
tary, or veterans' organizations holds true for 1921-23 as well. Al-
though the men in this chapter were active in thirty-three organiza-
tions from 1921 to 1923, very few of these organizations are repre-
sented more than once. In what will be a familiar pattern by now, 
most were military or paramilitary-not political-in nature.48 The 
organization to which the largest number of the group belonged by 
the end of 1923 was the Reichswehr,49 followed closely by the NSDAP. 
By the end of 1923 seven members of the group (15.2%) had 
joined the NSDAP. This is surprising, since these are men who joined 
the SA at a fairly late date ( 1931 or 1932 ), while earlier chapters have 
shown that members of the pre-putsch NSDAP tended to be quick to 
(re)join the SA. 5° Eight of the men in this chapter also participated in 
the Beer Hall Putsch of November 8-9, 1923.51 In part, these high 
numbers are due to the fact that there are many Bavarians in this 
chapter (where the NSDAP was founded), and many of them entered 
the SA because of their old connections with Rohm and other SA 
leaders. 
The Stahlhelm and the Reichskriegsflagge are two other organi-
zations to which these men belonged in the early 1920s, especially 
in 1923.52 In that year, the highest SA leaders who joined the SA in 
1931 or 1932 were engaged in military or paramilitary activities, and 
one-quarter were on the government payroll. 
By mid-1924, the level of membership in political or military 
organizations among the group had dropped dramatically, and many 
of those who remained active tended to change their affiliation, in 
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part because many organizations had been banned in the wake of the 
putsch. Although the Wehrverbiinde remained favored, a significant 
number of the group became active in political organizations during 
this time. This was less a blossoming of new interest in politics than 
a forced switch of allegiance: with one exception, it was the former 
members of the NSDAP who now became involved in the volkisch 
groups and parties. 53 The former NSDAP members also tended to 
join the Frontbann, sometimes in conjunction with a volkisch group 
or another Wehrverband.54 This only illustrates the way in which 
the Frontbann brought together men active in both paramilitary 
groups and volkisch organizations, former members of the NSDAP, 
as well as both south and north Germans. The Frontbann was in-
deed one of the most heavily represented organizations in 1924 
among the group, and it ranks only behind the Stahlhelm and the 
Reichswehr. 55 
From 1925 to 1931, the number of men active in political or 
paramilitary organizations and the number of different organizations 
to which they belonged both fell steadily. Over the same period, the 
number who joined the NSDAP steadily increased. It should be re-
membered that, although members of this group often joined the Party 
at an early date, none of them (by definition) joined the SA until1931 
or 1932. Membership in volkisch organizations fell off first, but here, 
too, it should be kept in mind that very few men in the group were 
ever engaged in them. By the end of 192 7 the two men from this 
chapter who were members of the Deutsch-Volkische Freiheits-
bewegung, the Gro~deutsche Arbeiterpartei, and the Tannenberg Bund 
had quit those organizations.56 Membership in the Frontbann also 
fell off very quickly after Ernst Rohm resigned as its leader in 1925. 
But contrary to the findings in previous chapters, the NSDAP was 
rarely the next step for the former members of the Frontbann or 
volkisch organizations in the 1931-32 groupY Some went to other 
organizations, and many others simply dropped out of politics alto-
gether. The organizations that held the loyalty of the largest num-
bers from the 1931-32 group and that held these loyalties the longest 
were the Reichswehr and the Stahlhelm. 58 While the Reichswehr was, 
of course, a profession for the men belonging to it, the Stahlhelm was 
not, and thus its ability to hold on to more of its members longer 
shows it to be one of the NSDAP's more effective competitors in the 
nationalist camp. On the other hand, this also made it a potential 
source of particularly good leaders, since it had a strong bureaucratic 
organization much like that of the NSDAP /SA. 59 
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PATHS INTO THE SA 
Many of the men in the 1931-32 group showed patterns of political 
and military activity that were remarkably similar to the "paths" 
followed by the men who joined the SA in 1927-30. This confirms 
that the patterns of activity found in the careers of the top SA leaders 
who joined from 1927 to 1930 are in fact significant and characteris-
tic of the top SA leadership as a whole. 
While there were strong similarities, there were also slight but 
notable nuances to the basic patterns that are unique to the men in 
this chapter. The pattern or path of the "serial activists"60 is repre-
sented by only four individuals in this chapter, whereas the "spo-
radic activists" are as good as absent. 61 On the other hand, the "de-
fectors," "passive activists," and "party soldiers"62 are heavily repre-
sented in the 1931-32 group, although these" defectors" differ in some 
respects from those of the preceding chapter. 
The Serial Activists 
All four "serial activists"63 joined the SA (or SS) in 1931, and two of 
the four were field commanders for most of their SA careers, as op-
posed to being staff specialists.64 Richard Aster was a good example 
of a serial activist from the 1931-32 group.65 He was born in Breslau 
in 1900, the son of a postal functionary (Postassistent). He attended a 
Realgymnasium, from which he graduated with an Obersekundareife. 
After this, he spent two years as an apprentice agricultural official 
(Landwirtschaftlicher Beamter). He later worked as a traveling sales-
man for photographic articles and was then employed full time by 
the SA from April 1932 on. 
Although he could have escaped military service because of his 
age,66 Aster volunteered for the army in September 1918 and actually 
managed to reach the front as part of an assault battalion 
(Sturmbataillon) several weeks before the armistice. His martial ar-
dor was not satisfied by this short exposure to combat, however, and 
he rapidly volunteered for a series of free corps, serving first in the 
Grenzschutz in Posen in 1919 and early 1920 and then joining 
Freikorps Aulock during the Kapp Putsch. The putsch failed, and he 
found himself in civilian clothes again, but early in 1921 he found an 
opportunity to serve in Upper Silesia. Here he belonged to the resur-
rected Freikorps RoBbach. Although young, Aster was a firebrand 
and a good soldier. By November 1921, he held the rank of sergeant, 
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although he was only twenty-one and commanded older men with 
more combat experience. He had also been wounded three times, 
twice while in the Grenzschutz and once again in Upper Silesia. 
Typical of many serial activists, Aster was not just a soldier. As 
early as 1919, while in the Grenzschutz, he joined the Deutsch-
Volkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund, and belonged to it until1922.67 
After the fighting ended in Upper Silesia, he joined an Arbeitsgemein-
schaft (work collective) formed out of Freikorps RoBbach. It supported 
itself by performing labor on the large Junker estates in the east, but 
its real purpose was to keep RoBbach's men together in anticipation 
of future military action.68 After leaving the Arbeitsgemeinschaft, he 
again engaged in volkisch politics as a member of the Deutschvol-
kische Freiheitsbewegung and of the GroBdeutsche Arbeiterpartei. 
At roughly the same time, he joined the Stahlhelm and led one of its 
local groups until1927. 
From 1927 until mid-1930, he was politically inactive, but in 
July 1930 he joined the NSDAP,69 and in February 1931 he joined the 
SS. By the end of 1931 he was already an SS Sturmfiihrer (the equiva-
lent of an army lieutenant). In October 1932 he transferred to the SA 
and gradually rose through the ranks. He was promoted to 
Standartenfiihrer in November 1934 and to Gruppenfuhrer in 1942. 
During the war he served in the army, first as a sergeant and then as 
an officer in an antitank unit. In 1941 he was transferred to the 
Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.7° He served in 
the administration of occupied Estonia and later as the Haupt-
kommissar (governor) of that hapless country. He was last reported 
fighting in "Fortress Breslau" in 1945 and probably did not survive 
the war. 
Aster was typical of the serial activists. He was active in eight 
organizations between 1919 and 1927, and the organizations with 
which he was involved included the military, paramilitary, and 
volkisch political ones. Like most of the serial activists, he got his 
start in the First World War as a member of the old Imperial Army, 
continued into the postwar period with a military organization, and 
then became involved with both paramilitary and volkisch political 
organizations. Like many, he dropped out of politics in the "good 
years" between 1925 and 1929 when the Wehrverbande and the 
volkisch organizations fell on hard times, but then joined the NSDAP 
and SA (SS) in the very early 1930s. The break between 1925 and 
1930 is especially typical of the entire 1931-32 group, not just of the 
serial activists. 
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The Defectors 
The "defectors" present the largest single block among the 1931-32 
group, although the "passive activists" are a close second.71 Just as in 
the earlier chapter on the 1927-30 group, remember that, by defini-
tion, the "defectors" participated in a single organization for a mini-
mum of two years before joining the SA. In fact, all of the" defectors" 
in the 1931-32 group belonged to their respective organizations for a 
minimum of three years and many of them for substantially longer. 
Nine organizations were involved, 72 and they are very much like those 
from which the earlier (1927-30) defectors came. All but one (the 
DNVP) are military or paramilitary organizations. Only the 
Reichswehr and the Stahlhelm figured in the backgrounds of more 
than one of the 1931-32 cohort of defectors. 
The Reichswehr was the second largest source of defectors, with 
four men, all of them officers.Y3 If the other state-supported organiza-
tions are included, such as the police and Grenzschutz, 74 the number 
rises to six, making state organizations the largest single source of 
defectors. Clearly, the majority of the men coming from the 
Reichswehr and police do not represent true defectors in the sense 
that they were driven to quit the service out of any basic political 
disagreement with its policies. Rather, most were men who retired 
honorably from one profession and were now looking for a similar 
type of occupation. 75 On the other hand, the fact that men leaving 
the Reichswehr would join an organization that had a very definite 
political program and that they had previously been forbidden to join 
as long as they were Reichswehr officers is an indication that they 
must have been in at least basic ideological agreement with it, not 
that they were simply interested in a familiar line of work.Y6 The 
degree to which the SA could draw leaders from the officer corps of 
the elite Reichswehr demonstrates the spread of sympathy with Na-
tional Socialism that existed by the early 1930s. 
The largest category of defectors came from the remnants of 
the collapsing Wehrverbande. Thus, former leaders of the Frontbann, 
Organisation Damm, and Bund Oberland came to the SA, and the 
continued fissures in the Stahlhelm brought another four men, for a 
total of seven_?? With experience in similar organizations, these men 
made ideal SA leaders. 
The one factor that sets the defectors in this chapter apart from 
those in the previous chapter is that the ones here were often inac-
tive between leaving their original organization and joining the 
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NSDAP/SA. Many of the defectors out of the 1931-32 group were 
active, loyal members of a political or military organization in the 
early years of the Republic, and then they temporarily abandoned 
political activity. After a period of inactivity, often a year or two, 
they eventually found their way to the NSDAP and SA when the 
growing crisis caused by the Depression again called the stability of 
the Republic into question. 
Two short biographies will illustrate the careers of representa-
tive "defectors." The first is Karl Lucke, a long-term member of a 
Wehrverband in Baden, and the second is Hans Fuchs, a member of 
the Bavarian State Police who left it in 1925 and then dropped out of 
political activity for several years before joining the NSDAP. 
Karl Lucke was born in Postdam in 1889.78 His father was a 
skilled machine worker (Maschinenmeister). After attending primary 
school, Lucke found work as a rider or horse exerciser (Bereiter) in 
the Imperial Stables in Berlin. After three years in this position, he 
began his military service and volunteered as a professional soldier 
in the First Baden Dragoons Regiment no. 20 in 1906. He served in 
another dragoon regiment throughout the First World War, was deco-
rated for bravery, and was retired by his old regiment in October 1919 
with the rank of Offizierstellvertreter. 79 As a former professional sol-
dier, he was entitled to and obtained a job as a minor government 
functionary (rising to the post of Verwaltungsinspektor), a position 
which he held until1934 when he became employed full time by the 
SA. In 1921 he joined Freikorps Damm (also known as Organization 
Damm), a locally based Wehrverband in Baden that grew out of the 
Einwohnerwehr (citizens' militia) movement. Lucke participated in 
this organization until 1928, when it disbanded. He was inactive in 
1929, but joined the NSDAP in 1930. He served the Party as an ad-
viser to his Gau on issues relating to government employees. He later 
served as a member of the Baden Landtag (state parliament) and the 
Darmstadt City Council. Ten months after becoming a member of 
the Party, he joined the SA. The SA was beginning to expand, and 
within three months he was placed in command of a Standarte and 
promoted to Standartenfiihrer. In 1934 he was given command of a 
Brigade, and he remained in command of several brigades until1942. 
He did not serve in the Second World War, most likely because of his 
age, but was instead promoted to SA Gruppenfiihrer in 1942, and he 
commanded two different SA Gruppen, allowing younger SA leaders 
to serve at the front. 
Born in Regensburg in 1877, Johann Baptist Fuchs was the son 
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The highest SA leaders congratulate Stabschef Viktor Lutze (right) on his 
fiftieth birthday. Hans Fuchs is the short man in the center of the photo, 
holding his hat with both hands. Max Jiittner is shaking hands with Lutze. 
Courtesy of the Bundesarchiv. 
of a railway conductor.80 He was fortunate enough to attend a hu-
manistic Gymnasium. He graduated with the coveted Abitur. After 
graduating from the Gymnasium, he entered the Bavarian War Col-
lege (Kriegsschule) and was commissioned as an active officer in 1899. 
He served in the Bavarian 17th Infantry Regiment until the outbreak 
of the First World War. He then served in one Prussian unit and sev-
eral Bavarian units as a brigade adjutant, battalion commander, and 
general staff officer. He was highly decorated and ended the war as a 
captain in the general staff corps. After the war he continued his 
military service, first as chief of staff of Freikorps Bamberg, then as a 
battalion commander in Wehrregiment Miinchen, a unit formed by 
the Bavarian government to occupy and pacify Munich after its "lib-
eration" from the hands of left-wing rebels in 1919. In November 
1919 he was transferred to the Staatliche Polizeiwehr Bayerns (Ba-
varian state protective police), which later became the Bavarian 
Landespolizei (state police).R 1 He served as a staff officer and district 
commander in Munich and Ansbach through October 1925, when he 
was retired as a police major. He also studied law and politics at the 
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University of Munich between 1923 and 1925. From 1925 until1931 
he worked in business. Throughout this time he was not active in 
political or military affairs. In early 1931 he joined the NSDAP and 
SA and immediately took full-time employment in the SA as a staff 
officer. He left active duty in the SA in 1934 after serving in the 
Bavarian Interior Ministry. By 1935 he was involved in unspecified 
Party settlement organizations. 
Lucke and Fuchs illustrate different types of defectors. Lucke 
was a long and loyal member of a paramilitary organization. When 
that organization folded, he remained inactive for only a short time 
and then found the NSDAP. Fuchs was a professional soldier and 
police officer who retired in 1925 after several years of loyal service. 
He remained politically inactive for six years before he joining the 
NSDAP. While neither left his organization as the result of a dis-
agreement over politics or for some other voluntary reason, the po-
litical character of their decision to join the NSDAP cannot be dis-
puted. 
The Passive Activists 
Those of the "defectors" who abandoned politics completely for a 
year or two before joining the NSDAP and SA show some affinity 
with the "passive activists" of the 1931-32 group. At least fourteen 
men in this chapter fit the category of passive activists.82 Five of them 
ended their activity by the end of 1925, and the rest were inactive for 
five or more years at any time. In one case, this long inactivity is 
known to have been imposed by a long prison sentence for the mur-
der of suspected informers while serving in the Black Reichswehr. 83 
In some other cases, although no information is given, it may be 
assumed that a lack of participation in political or military groups 
was the result of pressing family or job concerns. Nearly half of the 
passive activists were physicians, for example.84 But the physicians 
in the previous chapters were among the most radical and active SA 
men, so profession alone is not a sufficient explanation for the lack 
of involvement prior to joining the NSDAP and SA. Given the abil-
ity of others to find time for political or paramilitary activity despite 
active careers or family difficulties, it must be assumed that the 
majority of the passive activists in this chapter were inactive out of a 
simple lack of interest or motivation.85 
A short biography will illustrate the career of a typical passive 
activist in this chapter. Wilhelm Morchen was a man who did not 
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engage in any political or military activity after the war until he 
joined the NSDAP and SA in 1931. 86 Morchen was born in 
Erndtebriick, Westphalia, in 1891 to the family of a workshop su-
pervisor (Werkstattenvorsteher). He attended a Realgymnasium and 
graduated with an Abitur. He then studied medicine. He served a 
year in the army just before the war broke out, possibly as an 
Einjahriger Freiwilliger (voluntary officer cadet). He served again 
from August 1914 to February 1919 in a variety of medical units, 
and finished the war with the rank of auxiliary field physician 
(Feldhilfsarzt).87 He passed his certification exams in 1919 and be-
gan work as a state insurance physician (Landesvertrauensarzt).88 
From 1919, when he was demobilized, until February 1931, when 
he joined the NSDAP, Morchen was a member of a fraternity 
(Landsmannschaft) and of a medical association, but he was not a 
member of any political or paramilitary organization. He joined the 
SA in February 1931, serving as the doctor for a Sturmbann and 
later for an Untergruppe. In 1933 he was promoted to Sanitats-
gruppenfiihrer and made chief doctor for SA Gruppe Hessen. After 
1933 he also served the Party in minor positions in the Office of 
Social Health (Amt fiir Volksgesund-heit) and the National Social-
ist German Association of Physicians. During the Second World 
War he served as a physician in the Wehrmacht. He was never a 
very committed political activist, and he clearly owed his high SA 
rank to his profession. As his work for the Party showed, he was a 
good soldier who did what was expected of him, but he was not a 
born leader or a street fighter and would never have attained an 
equivalent rank in the SA if he had not had his skill as a physician 
to offer at a time when the SA needed him. 
Contrast Morchen with the only clear "sporadic activist" in 
this chapter, Paul Holthoff.89 He was born in 1897 in the village of 
Filehne in western Prussia, in the area which later became the Polish 
Corridor. He attended the Gymnasium and entered the army in Au-
gust 1914. He was soon wounded and became a heavy machine gun 
specialist. He ended the war as a sergeant after attending two courses 
for machine gun officers. Soon after the war he joined Freikorps 
Weickhmann and later Freikorps Libow, both in the Baltic. He was 
promoted to second lieutenant, but this promotion was never recog-
nized by the Weimar government, which caused him some bitter-
ness. In 1919 he joined the radical nationalist Verband National-
gesinnter Soldaten, and from 1922 to 1923 he was a member of the 
equally radical Nationalverband Deutscher Offiziere. He served in 
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the latter as a machine gun instructor, proof that in 1922 and 1923 he 
and the organization were involved in something far beyond veter-
ans' affairs. He withdrew from political and military activity between 
1923 and May 1931, when he joined the SA and the NSDAP.90 He 
served in the SA most often as a staff officer, but he also commanded 
an Untergruppe (later Brigade) for four years. He served with the SA 
until1937. In 1938 he became the head of a National Political Edu-
cational Institute.91 It was in this capacity (and simultaneously as a 
member of the Main Office for Education in the OSAF), that he was 
promoted to Gruppenfuhrer in 1942. 
Morchen and Holthoff illustrate different kinds of SA leaders 
whose political mobilization before joining the SA was not terribly 
consistent. Morchen wasn't an activist at all, and there appears to be 
very little in his previous career that would have led him to join the 
NSDAP. The Great Depression may have sparked a sort of political 
conversion, but he certainly wasn't directly threatened with unem-
ployment, so the connection between the Depression and his first 
real engagement in political activity is unclear at best. Whatever the 
reason, it is clear that if he had not been a medical specialist (a phy-
sician), he never would have reached such high rank in the SA. 
Holthoff is quite different. He had once been active in radical para-
military and political organizations, and had then dropped out of 
political activity after the 1923 putsch. It is very possible that he felt 
the effects of the depression much more directly than Morchen did, 
since he omitted to list his occupation on his 1934 SA questionnaire. 
What is important is not that he was driven to political activity but 
rather that he chose the NSDAP over other organizations. For him, 
the decision to join the NSDAP was not a matter of a sudden politi-
cal conversion. It was a return to a radicalism which he had earlier 
espoused as a member of two radical veterans' organizations from 
1919 to 1923. His experience is more the norm than that of Wilhelm 
March en. 
The fact that the passive activists could still rise to high rank in 
an organization like the SA despite an earlier lack of interest in po-
litical activity prompts two observations. First, there must have 
been a rather broad and far-reaching identity in outlook between the 
NSDAP and general conservative and nationalist circles that permit-
ted these men to fit into the SA despite their former inactivity. Sec-
ond, many of the men involved had specific skills or abilities that 
were needed enough by the SA to be rewarded with high rank and 
important position. 
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The Party Soldiers 
In the previous chapter, some of the future higher leaders of the SA 
fit the pattern of "party soldiers": they joined the NSDAP first and 
only some months later joined the SA. The case was made that they 
must have originally been attracted to the NSDAP by its ideological 
message rather than by the chance of playing soldier in the SA. A 
similar paradigm can be found in the careers of the men who joined 
the SA in 1931 or 1932, but the category would have included so 
many that it would have been difficult to construct other categories 
that would have had any meaning. Instead, joining first the Party and 
then the SA is a general characteristic of the entire body of future top 
SA leaders who joined in 1931 or 1932. Seventy-four percent92 of the 
group joined the NSDAP six or more months before joining the SA, 
and the rest joined the Party and SA at approximately the same time. 
No member of the 1931-32 group joined the SA more than four months 
before joining the Party. This suggests that most of 1931-32 SA join-
ers were attracted to the NSDAP by its ideological message, and they 
only became involved in the SA once they had become a part of the 
movement. It also implies-unless one wants to argue that the choice 
of the NSDAP was essentially random-that a significant number of 
the members of rival organizations, even those usually considered 
traditional or moderately conservative in nature, in fact harbored some 
existing predisposition toward much of the NSDAP's ideology and 
message. The implication is that the "responsibility" for the rise of 
National Socialism must be shared across a much broader spectrum 
of German conservatism than is generally acknowledged. 
THEIR AREAS OF EXPERTISE 
The different paths taken into the SA shed light on the background 
and thus presumably also on the motives of the men who became 
the SA's highest leaders, but this still begs the question of why the 
SA would need to recruit such men in 1931 and 1932. In a nutshell, 
most who joined the SA in 1931 or 1932 and later became its highest 
leaders had some special skill to offer that the SA needed. This is 
why these men were quickly accorded rank and power within the SA 
over the heads of longtime members. For example, fifteen out of the 
forty-six in the group entered the SA at the rank of Sturmbannfiihrer 
(major) or above,93 and nineteen immediately accepted staff assign-
ments.94 That this could and did cause resentment within the ranks 
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of SA men who were passed over is understandable, but had to be 
balanced with the growing need for more specialists as the SA grew 
into a massive organization with an elaborate command structure. 
Although recognizing a need for certain specialists and then 
recruiting them are rational or 11objective" processes, the selection 
of these particular men had a strong subjective side to it. They were 
not just any specialists but men who shared common types of train-
ing, experience, and attitudes with those SA leaders already in place. 
Many not only had similar backgrounds but were well known to the 
SA leadership either personally or by reputation in nationalist circles. 
Thus, Ernst Rohm himself was selected to head the SA because he 
was an old and personal friend of Adolf Hitler with ties to the Party 
that reached back to the very earliest days of its existence.95 Kurt 
Kiihme, a former Prussian officer, was recommended to Rohm by 
Walther Stennes, who knew him.96 The world of the far right during 
the Weimar Republic was a remarkably small one in the sense that 
personal ties were very close. 
Similarly, Rohm picked former Bavarian professional officers 
in 1931 and 1932 for various posts in large part because he knew and 
trusted them. Examples of men who entered the SA in this way abound 
in 1931 and 1932. They included Karl Schreyer, Josef Seydel, Franz 
Ritter von Horauf, and Fritz Ritter von Kraussner.97 Others, who owed 
their SA positions to their general reputation in nationalist circles, 
included Paul Schulz,98 Walter Luetgebrune,99 and Hans Peter von 
Heydebreck. 100 In other words, although these men owed their high 
rank within the SA in part to their special knowledge and skills, 
which the SA needed, the reasons for selecting them over others were 
often highly personal. 
The majority of the highest leaders of the SA who joined in 
1931 and 1932 can be divided into six categories according to their 
special skills: 101 officers and military specialists, lawyers, physicians, 
finance and administrative specialists, Nazi Party officials, and a small 
miscellaneous category of SS specialists. 
Military Specialists 
The largest functional category is that of the officers and military 
specialists. Thirteen men of the total group of forty-six (28.2%) fall 
into this category.102 The importance of this group for the SA is ap-
parent. After all, it was organized along military lines, and who bet-
ter to run such an organization than professional officers, who had 
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the special skills needed to direct large groups of men organized in a 
military fashion? However, these were no longer just any soldiers, 
for the SA had plenty of them. What were needed above all were 
qualified and skilled staff officers who were proficient at solving the 
kinds of problems that were arising as the SA simultaneously grew 
in numbers and perfected its organization. The group of former offic-
ers here had a very high proportion of men with either staff training, 
including members of the elite Prussian General Staff Corps, 103 or 
else relatively high rank, including one general. 104 Not surprisingly, 
all of these military specialists immediately entered the SA (or SS) in 
staff or high command positions.105 Some were selected for more spe-
cific reasons. Kurt Kiihme, a retired major, had also been director of a 
sports school for five years. 106 As a result, Kiihme was recruited to 
lead the newly formed SA national leaders' school (Sa-Reichsfiihrer-
schule), where his pedagogical and military skills were needed. Hans-
Georg Hofmann, on the other hand, was well known to Hitler from 
the days of the putsch and had been close to the Party since at least 
1928. In fact, he later alleged that Hitler had offered him the com-
mand of the SA in 1926, a command which he had to refuse at the 
time because he was engaged in secret work for the Reichswehr. 107 
And, of course, there was the most famous military specialist re-
cruited by the SA at this time, Ernst Rohm. Many of the other mili-
tary specialists were Rohm's friends or former comrades whom he 
brought into the SA. 
Physicians 
The second largest functional grouping is that of physicians. Although 
the SA officially had its own doctors since at least 1927, 108 and unof-
ficially even earlier, 109 the expansion and formalization of the sys-
tem of SA physicians was given new impetus by the appointment of 
Dr. Paul Hocheisen to the position of head physician (SA-Reichsartz) 
in June 1930. The creation of a corps of SA physicians and of a broad 
hierarchy of SA physicians and medical personnel at all levels of the 
SA took time110 and extended well into the period covered by this 
chapter. 
Nine physicians who later were among the highest SA leaders 
joined in 1931 or 1932.111 They seem to be of two types. The first (six 
of the nine) did not engage in much or even any political activity 
before joining the NSDAP (all but one are passive activists). All were 
veterans of the First World War. The two "passive activist" physi-
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cians who were politically or militarily active at all after the war 
were only involved for a short time and only in strictly local organi-
zations. 112 Two of the six were employed as physicians by the state 
or private enterprise instead of being in private practice, suggesting 
that they were perhaps less successful or ambitious than their col-
leagues.113 On the other hand, one was apparently quite successful 
and worked as a specialist for internal medicine at the University of 
Bonn. 114 All six were SA physicians attached to 11 frontline" SA units, 
and they did not make policy in the SA high command. They were 
never employed full time by the SA or any other Party organization. 
The other three present a different picture. 115 Again, all three 
were veterans, but two were also quite active in political and mili-
tary organizations after the war, and the third was a former profes-
sional officer in the German Imperial Navy who studied medicine 
only after retiring. All three seem to have been successful physicians 
in private practice, and two were specialists. All three occupied high 
positions as policymakers in the SA high command, and all three 
held high positions in the Party or state bureaucracies or both. 
It is easy to draw a contrast between the majority of only slightly 
politically active, perhaps less successful frontline SA physicians and 
the few activist, successful, and highly placed SA and Party 11 staff" 
physicians found in the group. The former were promoted to 
Gruppenfiihrer (and no further) as doctors attached to an SA Gruppe, 
whereas the latter, while all beginning in "line" positions, rapidly 
moved on to staff positions and became involved in similar high-
level positions as physicians in the Party apparatus. This contrast 
may be nicely illustrated by looking at the careers of two physicians. 
Eberhard Pagels116 was born in Frankfurt am Oder in 1894 as the 
son of a physician. He attended a Gymnasium and passed a Kriegsabitur 
(special wartime college entrance exam) before volunteering for the 
First World War as an infantryman. He was not decorated, and he ended 
the war only as a noncommissioned officer. He then studied medicine 
in Berlin, and for a short time he belonged to a student militia at his 
university in 1920, the sum total of his organized political activity 
before he joined the NSDAP. He took over his father's practice but 
apparently couldn't keep it up, since he later became a police doctor 
(Polizeiarzt), which was not exactly the fast track to success. He later 
claimed to have been active in the NSDAP since June 1929 and that he 
lost his job as a police physician because of "political unreliability," 
but there is no corroborating evidence in his files, and he did not join 
the SA and NSDAP officially until July 1931. He began as an SA phy-
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sician attached to a Sturmbann, the lowest unit with its own doctor. 
Later he was the physician for an Untergruppe and a Gruppe. He was 
promoted to medical Gruppenfuhrer in July 1932. Unlike most of his 
fellows in the group of "line" physicians, he did get involved in the 
Party apparatus, but only at a relatively low level. He also occupied a 
few minor positions in city government, the highest of which was on 
the city council. Although he found himself in the army again dur-
ing the Second World War, he did not see combat. He died of a heart 
attack on his way to the front in 1942. 
Contrast the career of Pagels with that of Emil Ketterer. 117 He 
too attended a Gymnasium and then the University of Munich. Un-
like Pagels, who was a general practitioner, Ketterer specialized in 
internal medicine and sports medicine. Ketterer had been an 
Einjahriger Freiwilliger before the war, and he later served as an of-
ficer, ending the war with the rank of Stabsarzt d.R., the equivalent 
of a captain. He was also highly decorated, being awarded, among 
other things, the Knight's Cross of the Lion of Zahringen and the 
Iron Cross Second Class. 118 After the war he was involved in sponta-
neous resistance to the "reds" in Munich, and he later belonged to 
the Heimwehr and then to Organisation Lenz (both Wehrverbande). 
At the beginning of 1923 he joined the NSDAP and soon thereafter 
the Reichskriegsflagge. He later was awarded the Blutorden in recog-
nition of his participation in the Beer Hall Putsch. In 1924, following 
a split in the Reichskriegsflagge, he joined the Altreichsflagge, and in 
April1925 he again joined the NSDAP, receiving party number 697, 
which suggests that he might even have attended the Party's found-
ing meeting. 119 He did not officially join the SA until July 1931, but 
he claimed to have worked with it on an ad hoc basis much earlier. 
Beginning as a Sturmbann physician like Pagels, in 1933 he was trans-
ferred to the SA high command, where he became the chief of staff of 
the SA's chief of medical services (Chef der Sanitatswesen der SA). 
Within a few months he succeeded his boss in this position and held 
it until1937. In that year he resigned and accepted detached service 
from the SA as its representative with the Reich leader of physicians 
(Reichsarztefuhrer). He also served in the Party as the chief of Ger-
man sports physicians (Fuhrer der deutschen Sportarzteschaft) and 
was elected to the Munich City Council. 
Administrative and Financial Specialists 
The next largest group includes four experts in administration and 
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SA Sanitatsobergruppenfiihrer and Chef des Sanitatswesens der NSDAP Dr. 
Emil Ketterer, shown here in Party uniform. Note the saber cuts on his face, 
a souvenier of his participation in a dueling fraternity. Courtesy of the 
Bundesarchi v. 
110 The SA Generals and the Rise of Nazism 
financial affairs, although they did not really form as homogeneous a 
group as the physicians and officers did. 120 By 1930 the Party and SA 
were chronically short of money, yet their expanding organizations 
required more and more of it. As a part of his general elaboration and 
centralization of the SA command structure (and under pressure from 
the Party to clean up the SA's money management problems), Rohm 
also instituted a more formal structure for the financial administra-
tion of the SA at the Untergruppe and Gruppe level, as well as in the 
SA high command. This is where the men of this group found their 
niche. Karl Schreyer is chief among them. 121 
Schreyer was a former Bavarian officer from Rohm's regiment. 
He had become a businessman after the war, and then had opened a 
private bank, which unfortunately went bankrupt in 1929 and which 
brought Schreyer a three-month prison sentence for some rather 
murky financial dealings. 122 This hardly recommended him as a fi-
nancial expert or efficient administrator, but what mattered to Rohm 
was that the man was known to him and knew at least something 
about money matters. Schreyer entered the SA on February 1, 1931, 
at the urging of Rohm, and served as the SA's head of administration 
(Chef des Verwaltungsamtes) until 1934. His financial dealings for 
the SA were no more transparent than they had been in his business 
affairs, and he was also compromised as a protege of Rohm. In the 
purge of 1934 he was very nearly shot, then expelled from the Party. 
In 1936 he was sentenced to four years in prison for financial mis-
deeds while in the SA. 
Schreyer's legal problems were not necessarily typical of the 
other administrative specialists joining in 1931 or 1932, but the rather 
casual manner in which these men became SA employees was. The 
main qualifications of another member of the group, Ernst Beii~ner, 
were that he had been a state lottery collector. True, he was also an 
early Party member and had occupied a series of local and district 
Party positions from 1930 to 1932. He entered the SA at the very 
beginning of 1931 and rapidly became the head financial administra-
tor for an SA Gruppe, a post which he held until1940, when he was 
transferred to the SA central command. This was a lucky break for 
him, since it kept him out of the army in the Second World War, 
although he was drafted in 1943 into a local antiaircraft unit. The 
qualifications of the other two members of the group were similar: 
one was a former paymaster in the Imperial Navy and an activist in a 
series of veterans' and volkisch groups, and the other was a former 
kaufmiinnischer Angestellter (sales employee) who was also a minor 
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official in the Party administration until he became active in the SA. 
All four were full-time employees of the SA by 1933. 
Party Specialists 
The next three categories are all very small, with two or three mem-
bers each. One group of the highest SA leaders who entered the SA in 
1931 or 1932 was made up of men who were high Party officials who 
were awarded active SA commissions on the basis of their Party po-
sition but who were really honorary SA leaders. 123 Rohm began his 
tour of duty as SA Stabschef just after a period of great tension be-
tween the SA and the Party. This tension had died down somewhat 
by the time he took command, but it clearly still smoldered just be-
low the surface. In order to build bridges to the Party leadership, and 
especially to the office of the powerful Reich organizational leader, 124 
two top leaders of this organization were given nominally active SA 
rank and the right to wear the SA uniform. 125 The two were Gregor 
Stra.Ger himself, the Reich organizational leader, and one of his depu-
ties, Paul Schulz. Many others were awarded honorary SA commis-
sions.126 
StraEer's commission was almost purely honorary, since he never 
really played any role in the SA after the mid-1920s. 127 On the other 
hand, Paul Schulz actually did command an SA Gruppe for a very 
short time. In early 1931, in the wake of the Stennes revolt, 12x he was 
called in to be the temporary head of SA Gruppe Ost and to help in 
its purge and reorganization. 129 Schulz was famed as a military and 
organizational genius, and his great prestige and respect in nationalist 
circles was useful in limiting the damage after the Stennes incident. 
The third high Party official who entered the SA in 1931 or 
1932 and who held high (active) SA rank was Willy Liebel. His ap-
pointment was also largely honorary, since he was both a high Party 
official and the mayor of Nuremberg, but he also did command an 
SA unit and later served in various SA staffs as an adviser on commu-
nal and Party questions. 130 
Note that these high Party officials shared some connection to 
the SA independent of their Party posts, even though the Party posi-
tion was decisive for their promotion to Gruppenhihrer or 
Obergruppenhihrer. All were also veterans and former officers at that, 
and all had been involved in Wehrverbande or other paramilitary ac-
tivities after the war. All but Paul Schulz were also Bavarians, with 
long ties to the movement. 
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SA Ogruf. Willy Liebel, Oberburgermcister of Nuremberg. He is shown here 
in SA uniform, wearing his chain of office as mayor and decorations from 
fascist Italy and Hungary. Courtesy of the Bundesarchiv. 
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Lawyers 
Both the Party and the SA were constantly in need of legal advice, 
primarily because of their violent political activities. As both organi-
zations grew, the establishment of complicated administrative struc-
tures with full-time employees, the collection and disbursement of 
large sums of money, the ownership of large amounts of property, 
and all the other complications of a major organization created a new 
need for permanent and systematic legal advice. At the same time, it 
became financially and organizationally feasible to employ full-time 
legal council. The two men represented here, Walter Luetgebrune 
and Hans Frank, were not the only lawyers employed by the SA and 
Party, but they were the most important, and as such they were 
awarded high commissions as SA leaders. Hans Frank131 was the chief 
lawyer for the NSDAP and head of its legal department from 1929 to 
1942, and he had worked for the Party even earlier. In late 1931 he 
was made the head of the SA legal department as well. Later, as the 
SA and Party began to develop along separate lines, he was replaced 
by Walter Luetgebrune.132 Luetgebrune, who was brought in by Rohm, 
had not formerly been particularly close to the NSDAP, although he 
was prominent as the defender of numerous right-wing activists and 
had even defended Party members on occasion. As a protege of Rohm 
and an outsider, he fared poorly in the Rohm Purge. He barely es-
caped with his life but was expelled from the Party and forced to 
spend years in obscure poverty. 
SS Specialists 
Two men entered the SA (or in this case, the SS) in 1931 based solely 
on their particular expertise but did not fit into any of the categories 
above. The first is Walter Darre, a professional agronomist and ani-
mal breeding specialist who was brought into the SS to head the Rasse-
und Siedlungs Hauptamt (race and settlement main office) and who 
became the SS's resident theoretician on race and agriculture. The 
second is the infamous Reinhard Heydrich, who was brought into 
the SS to organize its intelligence operations on the strength of his 
experience in the navy as a communications officer. Both men had 
been officers, although Darre was a veteran and a reserve officer, 
whereas Heydrich had been a professional officer in the Weimar-era 
Reichsmarine but had not served in the First World War. 13'' Both had 
also been involved in Wehrverbande, yet had not long been members 
of the NSDAP before joining the SS. "'4 
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The "Good Soldiers" 
A final group of the highest SA leaders might best be called the "good 
soldiers." It comprises ten men who joined the SA in 1931 or 1932 
and who were able to work their way up slowly through the ranks to 
be promoted to Gruppenfiihrer. 135 All but three of these men were 
only promoted to the rank of Gruppenfiihrer in the early 1940s, a 
clear indication that they were not a part of the "first team," but 
rather were men who worked their way up through the ranks. 136 In-
deed, the majority entered the SA at ranks which were the equiva-
lent of enlisted ranks in an army, although some were able to be 
promoted to the equivalent of officer rank very quickly. Yet this group 
was quite similar to the rest of the highest leadership corps of the SA 
in background. All but two of the ten came squarely out of the 
Wehrverband milieu, all but one were veterans of the First World 
War, and all of the veterans were officers or noncommissioned offic-
ers. It is probable that this group did not rise to higher rank earlier 
simply because they joined relatively late, but they did manage to 
work their way to the top. 
Ludwig Schmuck is an example of the career of a "good sol-
dier."137 He was born in Bavaria in 1892, the son of a vocational school 
director (Gewerbeschuldirektor). He attended a Progymnasium and 
then a teacher training institute. He became a primary school teacher 
and later a vocational school teacher like his father. He served as a 
one-year volunteer in the army before the war and was promoted to 
lieutenant during the fighting. He was wounded and decorated in the 
First World War. After the war he joined Freikorps Oberland andre-
mained with it as it became Bund Oberland. In 1923 he joined a splin-
ter group from Bund Oberland, the Bund Blucher and, as he proudly 
wrote, he once paraded before Adolf Hitler in his capacity as a com-
pany commander. In 1923 he joined the Deutsche Werksgemeinde, a 
volkisch, social-populist group led by Julius Streicher. 
After dropping out of political activity in the mid-1920s, here-
joined Bund Oberland in 1927. By 1929 he was dissatisfied again, and 
in May he joined the NSDAP. He immediately began to serve in dis-
trict-level posts in the party administration. In 1930 his military back-
ground led him to participate in a secret Reichswehr militia, the 
Feldjagerkorps. This satisfied his martial longings and explains why 
he did not join the SA until January 1932. He first joined an SA re-
serve unit and was involved in training new SA men, possibly are-
flection of his activities in the secret Reichswehr unit. But in 1933, 
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just before the Nazi assumption of power, he was promoted to 
Standartenfiihrer and given command of a Standarte in recognition 
of his loyalty to Gauleiter Streicher in the "Stegmann revolt." 138 This 
gave him his chance, and within two years he had been promoted to 
command of a Brigade. Then, almost two years later, his abilities as a 
teacher gained him command of the SA leadership school in Dresden. 
His next assignment was to the central SA command, where he was 
made bureau chief of the Office of Organization and Operations (Amt 
Organisation und Einsatz). A year later, he was promoted to the rank 
of Gruppenfiihrer and given command of the Office of Physical Edu-
cation. 
Meanwhile, he continued his relationship with the army and 
followed a training program for former officers who wished to rejoin 
the army as reserve officers. He was in the Wehrmacht from 1939 to 
1944, where his last post was on the staff of an army group. He left 
active service in 1944 with the rank of major. Although he was on 
active military duty at the time, in 1942 he was also finally given 
command of an SA Gruppe. He only actually assumed command when 
released from active duty with the army. His fate after the war is 
unknown. He is a good example of a "good soldier" from within the 
milieu of the Wehrverbiinde, a man of clear abilities, who joined the 
SA rather late, but who still managed, with a bit of luck and ability, 
to work his way up to the second highest rank that the SA had to 
offer, the equivalent of a major general. 
SA CAREERS OF THE SPECIALISTS 
The careers that the men joining in 1931 or 1932 had in the SA are 
consistent with the picture of them as specialists and technicians. 
While all attained at least the rank of Gruppenfiihrer by definition, 
less than one-third were promoted to Obergruppenfiihrer. 139 Of those 
who did rise this far, close to one-third were promoted only after the 
Second World War began and the ranks of the existing Obergruppen-
fiihrer had begun to be thinned out by casualties and transfers to 
other duties. Yet equally consistent with their positions as special-
ists, eight became full-time SA employees immediately, and at least 
three others did so within a year of joining. 140 While this number 
may seem small, it is actually quite large for the SA, which was chroni-
cally short of funds and relied largely on volunteers to lead and staff 
the organization, at least until 1933, when the state's coffers were 
suddenly opened to it. Nearly half of the group first served in the SA 
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in a staff position and/or entered as Sturmbannfuhrer (major) or 
higher. 141 
The highest SA leaders who joined in 1931 or 1932 did not fare 
well during the Rohm Purge. Many of them carried the stigma of too 
close an association with Rohm, and five paid for this with their 
lives. 142 Two others143 were expelled from the Party and SA and suf-
fered other penalties, and many more were arrested and threatened 
with prosecution. Although victims were drawn from all categories, 
no physicians were shot, expelled, or even arrested in the purge. Per-
haps this is because their rank was clearly due to their profession, 
and they were not suspected of being close associates of Rohm. 
Yet most of those who survived the Purge continued to have a 
good relationship with the Party. Fourteen wore the Golden Party 
Pin, 144 normally denoting those who had a party number under 
100,000, but in fact, nine of these were awarded the Golden Party 
Pin as an honor, 145 even though they had much higher membership 
numbers and had joined later than the (mid-1928) date when the last 
party number under 100,000 was awarded. 146 Although many of the 
experts never played much of a role in the Party administration, some 
did: one eventually became a Gauleiter, 147 and three others served in 
some other Gau or Reich staff position. 148 Finally, one was a district 
party leader (Kreisleiter) and two were local group leaders. 149 Although 
latecomers to the SA and often to the Party, and although recruited 
mainly for their specialist knowledge, it is clear that the men in this 
chapter were also committed National Socialists. 
The highest SA leaders who joined in 1931 and 1932 were ei-
ther good soldiers who slowly worked their way up through the ranks 
or specialists who had desirable knowledge or skills. But this chapter 
has shown that there was another element in the equation besides 
the pure usefulness of the services that these men could provide. 
Indeed, they may not always have been the most skilled or best-suited 
men available, but they were all squarely in the nationalist camp 
and were receptive and favorably disposed to the ideology of the Nazi 
Party. Moreover, they shared a common background of army, war, 
Wehrverband, and sometimes volkisch activity with the men who 
already commanded the SA. In the most extreme cases, they were 
recruited because of their personal association or friendship with 
Rohm or some other leading SA commander. The majority also joined 
the Party before joining the SA, indicating that they were attracted 
first to its ideological message and not to the prospect of playing 
soldiers in the SA. Yet equally as important, many were men who 
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had not previously engaged in political or paramilitary activities but 
were somehow motivated to join the NSDAP and then the SA. They 
usually did not have profound ties to the volkisch movement and the 
Nazi Party as did many of those who joined in 1925 or 1926, but they 
could at least recognize something in the NSDAP or SA that was 
familiar to them and that they could support. 
The majority of these men became committed National Social-
ists, but first they were all part of a broader conservative nationalist 
movement that shared much in common with the NSDAP in terms 
of ideology and belief. This was the prime precondition which then 
allowed them to either turn to the NSDAP in a moment of national 
crisis or be drawn into it on the basis of their personal connections to 
individuals in the Party and SA. The fact that a few were more bound 
to the SA by personal ties to Rohm than by ties to the Party was a 
factor causing suspicion, and this eventually led to some of them 
being killed in the Rohm Purge, but those killed, while significant as 
individuals, remained a minority. The rest were able to continue in 
their SA careers and become permanent parts of the SA and Party 
apparatus. 
The selection of many of these experts was haphazard, to say 
the least, and would seem to bear little relationship to the efficiency 
and success of the Nazi apparatus. Yet it must be remembered that 
personal ties counted for a great deal in the Nazi world, and common 
background greatly facilitated the growth of those ties. While not 
the most efficient way to choose key administrators, personal con-
tacts did help guarantee loyalty and ideological commitment. It must 
also be recognized that the NSDAP had an entire right-wing subcul-
ture to draw upon for members and leaders that was much larger 
than itself. If one fellow did not work out, there were many others 
who had the basic qualifications of common ideology and background 
who could take his place. 
5 
The Latecomers, 
1933-1934 
On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler was appointed chancellor of Ger-
many by the president of the Republic, Paul von Hindenburg, in ac-
cordance with the Weimar constitution. 1 This was the moment for 
which every member of the Party had waited so long. After years of 
struggle, sacrifice, and political impotence, the National Socialist 
German Workers' Party had legally taken power in Germany. True, 
it was still a long way from total power. To begin with, the judicial 
framework of the Weimar Republic endured, and if there were few 
who supported the Republic, there were many who opposed the Na-
zis. The National Socialists did not even form the government alone, 
but were forced to share power in a coalition with traditional conser-
vatives. Field Marshal von Hindenburg still presided as the guardian 
of the constitution, and at his side stood the most powerful force in 
Germany, the Reichswehr, which jealously insisted that the form of 
the law must be obeyed. Yet the cabinet and even the army shared 
much of Hitler's basic political outlook while lacking the support of 
a dynamic mass movement, which only Hitler had. This meant that 
they were likely to acquiesce in many measures taken to "restore 
order" and were susceptible to being outmaneuvered, since they could 
not match the Nazis' political guile nor, in the case of the traditional 
conservatives, could they as easily mobilize large numbers of their 
supporters in the streets. The Reichswehr did represent an indepen-
dent center of power within the German state and could seriously 
challenge the NSDAP, but it had a rather limited political horizon 
and a relatively short list of demands which, if satisfied, would cause 
it to lend its support to whatever nationalist or nonsocialist regime 
happened to be in power. Being forced to share power, being faced 
with many on the right and on the left who opposed a National So-
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cialist government, and being forced to tread carefully around both 
von Hindenburg and the army meant that the NSDAP would have to 
act with great caution in consolidating its power over the state, but 
this did not prevent it from acting. 
Out in the streets, beer halls, shops, factories, villages, and back 
alleys of Germany, the situation presented itself quite differently to 
the Party rank and file. They were the ones who had borne hardship, 
sacrificed property, and even risked death. With Hitler in power, they 
now felt that the time had come to sweep away the hated product of 
the November 1918 revolution. All of the frustrations, tensions, and 
hatreds that had built up during the Party's long struggle for power, 
especially in the near civil war conditions that had characterized the 
political debate of 1932, now boiled over. Guided but hardly con-
trolled from the top, the members and supporters of the Nazi Party 
set out on their own to begin their revolution and crush any and all 
opposition. At the very forefront of this outbreak stood the SA.2 
During the spring and summer of 1933, the SA played a crucial 
role in the consolidation of the new regime. This consisted of several 
functions. First, the SA served as the power behind the "revolution." 
It was the SA which gave the words of Hitler and the other Party 
leaders their force. It was the SA which intimidated the opponents of 
the new government and which legally or illegally carried out many 
of the measures that were designed to destroy the old system and 
consolidate the power of the government and the Party. 
Second, the SA served as one of the main vehicles for the 
Gleichschaltung (coordination) of non-National Socialist political 
bodies, particularly the remaining Wehrverbiinde, which were a po-
tential source of opposition. The SA played the same role, with less 
finesse and less success, in the Gleichschaltung of the police. 
Third, the SA brought large numbers of German men into the 
new order. From the appointment of Hitler as chancellor to the R6hm 
Purge in June 1934, the SA swelled with a torrent of new members, 
so that by June 1934 it included roughly 20 percent of all German 
males over the age of fifteen. 3 Even without making reference to theo-
ries of totalitarianism or social atomization,4 it is clear that by in-
cluding such a large portion of German society in its ranks the SA 
had become a wholly new kind of tool for the coordination and in-
doctrination of an entire society, as well as a power to be reckoned 
with even apart from the Party. 
After having entered the government legally, the Nazis' first 
task was to consolidate and expand their power. They counted on 
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general agreement and support from the traditional conservatives and 
on general support and tolerance from wide sections of the German 
population. Their first overt moves were against the Communists 
and others on the left. The Nazis could use the police in the states 
that they controlled, but could neither completely trust them nor 
count on them to go very far beyond the bounds of legality. The army 
was unwilling to become actively involved in the conflict unless there 
was a genuine attempt at a putsch from the left, which there was 
not, and in any case, the Nazis preferred that the army remain neu-
tral lest it throw its weight behind the traditional conservatives, who 
resembled army officers in ideology and background. Unhappily for 
Germany, the Nazi Party possessed its own forces for intimidating or 
eliminating its enemies.5 
In a sense, the actions of the SA and SS were simply a continu-
ation of the guerilla war against the opponents of Nazism and against 
the left in particular which had characterized the last several years of 
the Weimar Republic. The difference now was that all restraints which 
had been imposed by both the Party and the state were suddenly 
removed, and the SA was given free rein to vent its anger on its en-
emies. Much of this violence was carried out according to orders. 
Much, too, was illegal but nonetheless encouraged, and some of it 
was undertaken on purely individual initiative and often for personal 
reasons. But whatever triggered the violence, whether ordered, per-
mitted, or for private reasons, the key factor was that at the begin-
ning of the "revolution" it was tolerated, encouraged, and used by 
the Party and its leaders, including the SA leaders. Calculated and 
spontaneous violence went hand in hand to intimidate any and all 
possible opposition. It was only later, when the Nazis felt secure 
enough to come to some sort of a modus vivendi with existing forces 
in society, that the Party sought to end the spontaneous violence of 
its members and to return the use of deliberate violence to the agen-
cies of the state, which traditionally have a monopoly on it.6 
The impressive, near tenfold growth of the SA from 1931 to 
January 1933 pales when compared with the rate at which the SA 
grew from January 1933 to June 1934. Over these eighteen months 
the SA underwent an expansion whose only parallel in all of German 
history is the equally sudden growth of the NSDAP. 
When the Nazis assumed power on January 30, 1933, the SA 
had roughly 500,000 members_? Eight months later, the SA had an 
estimated 2,500,000 men,8 and by January 1, 1934, that number had 
increased to 2,950,000.9 The maximum size of the SA, estimated at 
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4.5 million, was reached in June 1934 after it had absorbed large vet-
erans' groups and paramilitary societies. 10 
The SA had to work hard at all levels to assimilate new mem-
bers. In the final analysis, even the best run and most efficient orga-
nization could not completely cope with such massive growth. Add 
to this the fact that it occurred at a time when the reins of discipline 
were deliberately being relaxed to encourage "spontaneous" terror in 
the streets, and the problem for the overstretched SA leadership was 
clear. Many of the events that led to the purge in 1934 can be traced 
back to the wild expansion of 1933 and the 1933-34 absorption of 
competing paramilitary groups. For the SA, the task was made even 
more difficult by a chronic lack of competent lower and middle-level 
commanders, by the breadth of the responsibilities that it had under-
taken, and by the need to detach SA leaders for other duties. 
The SA was especially hampered by the fact that it was not 
always able to promote lower-level commanders up from the ranks. 
Many of the competent members who had leadership potential had 
already been promoted in 1931 and 1932, whereas the pool of rank-
and-file members underwent a drastic turnover between 1931 and 
1933. 11 This meant that there were actually relatively few rank-and-
file members left who had enough experience to merit consideration 
as leaders or to impress something of the character and spirit of the 
SA upon the flood of new members. Many, indeed, of the "old" sol-
diers, especially those who had not yet been promoted to some sort 
of leadership position, were in fact much less capable than many of 
the newcomers. As Mathilde Jamin has pointed out, for this reason 
as well as through sheer numbers alone, the wave of newcomers in 
1933 and 1934 threatened to overwhelm the existing structure and 
character of the SA. She notes that, given the high rate of turnover 
since 1931, and given the large number of new members, 75 percent 
of the SA in 1933 had been members of that organization for less 
than one year. 12 It was understandable, perhaps even inevitable, that 
problems of discipline, indoctrination, and sheer assimilation would 
result. 
By May 1933, the flood of new members had reached such an 
extent that the OSAF was forced to raise the minimum strength of 
SA units at all levels from Sturm (company) to Untergruppe (brigade) 
because the number of new units that were being formed were sur-
passing the means of the SA to staff and finance them, and because 
the SA command wanted to keep the number of its units relatively 
stable in anticipation of putting them on the state budget. 13 Rela-
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tively junior SA leaders were also now allowed to command units at 
a higher level in the hierarchy than before to give greater flexibility 
and to make up for a shortage of qualified commanders. May 1933 
also saw a major expansion and reorganization of the OSAF staff ap-
paratus. This enabled the SA to better deal with both its expansion 
and the wider scope of its activities after the assumption of power. 14 
By July 1933 the first phase of SA expansion was capped with a 
complete reorganization, the first since the ban was lifted a year ear-
lier.15 The most original element of this reorganization was the in-
troduction of Brigaden (brigades) in place of the former Gausti.irme. 
The new Brigaden were no longer coterminous with the Gau bound-
aries as those of the Gaustiirme had been. This gave the SA more 
flexibility in its geographical organization, but tended to separate it 
from the Party organization. Moreover, the introduction of the 
Brigaden later allowed the SA to tie its geographical organization more 
closely to that of the Reichswehr, an important consideration in view 
of the far-reaching cooperation that the SA had in mind. 
The July-September 1933 reorganization created a total of 8 
Obergruppen with 21 Gruppen and 129 new Brigaden. At the Party 
Congress in 1933, 118 new Standarten insignia were awarded, for a 
total of 190 officially recognized Standarten.16 (Compare this with 
five Obergruppen and eighteen Gruppen with roughly fifty 
Untergruppen containing seventy-two "official" Standarten in Sep-
tember 1932 after the last complete reorganization.jl 7 This increase 
of three Obergruppen and three Gruppen and the replacement of 50 
Untergruppen with 129 Brigaden demonstrates how the SA organiza-
tion was gradually stretched to accommodate the increases of 1933. 
Furthermore, it shows how the need also increased for SA leaders at 
all levels. 
The main reason for conducting a major reorganization of the 
SA in the summer of 1933 was to cope with its swollen membership, 
but there were other reasons. One, which has been alluded to, was 
better cooperation with the Reichswehr, particularly in border de-
fense in the east. Another reason, which rapidly took on major sig-
nificance, was the Gleichschaltung and absorption of competing vet-
erans' and paramilitary groups. This was an important yet generally 
overlooked step in the expansion and consolidation of power by the 
NSDAP and in the elimination of all possible rivals. 
Although the heyday of the private paramilitary associations in 
Germany had come and gone in the early 1920s, in 1933 they were 
still present on the political scene. Although sharing many of the 
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same ideas and enemies as the NSDAP, yet lacking much of the ac-
tivism, youth, and dynamism of the SA, these groups were at least 
potential sources of organized opposition to the Nazis and thus by 
definition a danger. Chief among them was the Stahlhelm, Bund der 
Frontsoldaten, which had roughly 600,000 members in January 1933. 
Its size, its strong support for von Papen and the traditional conser-
vatives in the coalition government, and its long-standing ties with 
the Reichswehr all made it a particular concern.18 Although there 
had been occasional clashes and hard feelings between the SA and 
members of the Stahlhelm before the assumption of power, there 
had also been much cooperation. Moreover, the NSDAP and the 
Stahlhelm were even coalition partners and allies in the "govern-
ment of national regeneration." 
Allies and comrades in arms could not simply be banned and 
broken up like the left-wing Reichsbanner or the industrial unions, 
so the Nazis were faced with an especially delicate problem if they 
wanted to eliminate the potential power of the Stahlhelm. This is 
where the SA came in. Through a series of careful steps, the organi-
zational independence of the Stahlhelm was gradually eliminated so 
that it could not become a threat. Smaller paramilitary and veterans' 
organizations were treated the same way, but the process of their 
absorption was generally much quicker. 
The absorption and subordination of rival nationalist paramili-
tary groups was aided by their leaders' genuine desire to join the 
"movement of national regeneration" that they saw taking place, 
knowing full well that the failure of earlier attempts to destroy the 
"Weimar system" had often resulted from a lack of unity. Personal 
ambition and a craven desire for personal gain sometimes went hand 
in hand with this desire for unity. 
During the first few months of 1933, relations between the 
Stahlhelm and the SA were mixed. Although the Stahlhelm provided 
members for the Hilfspolizei (auxiliary police) and joined with the 
SA and SS in terrorizing the left, 19 many National Socialists, flushed 
with victory and eager to settle old scores with the Stahlhelm, began 
to treat it more like an enemy than an ally. In large part this was due 
to a certain hubris and arrogance on the part of Nazis, especially the 
SA. Many SA men equated the Stahlhelm with the verkalkte Reaktion 
(ossified reactionaries) whom they saw as an enemy of the "national 
revolution" nearly as great as the left. Yet there was some truth in 
the charges that many opponents of National Socialism had found 
refuge in the ranks of the Stahlhelm, which also experienced a sud-
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den jump in membership in the first half of 1933.20 Many in the 
Stahlhelm reciprocated the SA's suspicion and were not happy with 
the way the NSDAP began to shoulder aside its former coalition part-
ners. 
It was in this atmosphere that Franz Seldte (minister of labor in 
the coalition government and coleader of the Stahlhelm) suddenly 
announced that he was joining the Nazi Party and that he was subor-
dinating the entire Stahlhelm to it on April 27, 1933. This was a 
misguided attempt to curry favor with the Nazis and both enhance 
his own position as minister and preserve the independence of the 
Stahlhelm. This announcement surprised and annoyed the leader-
ship of both the NSDAP and the Stahlhelm. It was demoralizing to 
many conservatives who had hoped that the Stahlhelm would pro-
vide a certain counterweight to the SA and NSDAP. After this act, 
morale in the Stahlhelm leadership plummeted. Some Stahlhelm lead-
ers resigned in frustration, whereas others rushed to emulate Seldte's 
opportunism and immediately transferred into the SA.21 
Soon after Seldte's action the process of absorbing the Stahlhelm 
began. First to be absorbed on June 21, 1933, was its potentially most 
dangerous unit-the Jungstahlhelm, or Wehrstahlhelm, made up of 
younger men who often participated in paramilitary sports (Wehrsport, 
a common euphemism for paramilitary training) or even covert mili-
tary training.22 Members of the Stahlhelm were allowed to believe 
that its autonomy would be preserved as much as possible. This made 
them more willing to accept what they expected to be only nominal 
subordination. Then, once subordinated to the SA and thus subject 
to a degree of control and discipline, the pretense of autonomy was 
abandoned, and complete absorption was carried out.23 This pattern, 
first used with the Wehrstahlhelm, later was used for the rest of the 
organization. 
During talks at a common SA-SS-Stahlhelm leadership meet-
ing in Bad Reichenhall July 1-3, 1933, the entire Stahlhelm was sub-
ordinated to the SA and reorganized, although technically it remained 
independent. 24 Just one month later, the Brigade Ehrhardt, another 
famous and once powerful paramilitary organization descended from 
the free corps of the same name, was officially taken over by the SS. 25 
In November 1933 Rohm instituted two new subordinate parts of 
the SA proper that were designed to accommodate most members of 
the paramilitary and veterans' groups and smooth the consolidation 
of National Socialist power. These were the SA-Reserve I (SARI) and 
the SA-Reserve II (SAR II). While the younger, more "valuable" part 
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of the Stahlhelm had already been taken into the SA proper, the rest 
of the Stahlhelm was to form the SAR I, where it would supposedly 
have a reasonable degree of internal autonomy while still being sub-
ject to OSAF control and discipline. The SAR II was to be made up of 
the older and less activist members of the Kyffhauserbund and less 
overtly political veterans' groups. Being less important and having 
only the function of holding these veterans' groups in check until 
the power of the Nazi regime was consolidated, the organization and 
formation of the SAR II didn't really proceed beyond the formation 
of staffs and cadres.26 Gradually, while preventing any dilution of the 
regular SA by the influx of Stahlhelm members, the SAR I was tied 
ever closer to the SA and separated from the Stahlhelm leadership.27 
By the late fall of 1933 Rohm was confident that his plan was 
working well and that the Stahlhelm and the other coordinated 
Wehrverbande were in no position to resist. He then placed increasing 
pressure on nationalist groups of all stripes who dared to preserve any 
sort of existence outside of the NSDAP. His demands went so far as to 
require that the SA have a member on the board of directors of any 
patriotic organization if SA men were to be allowed to belong to it.28 
In early 1934 SA attacks, both verbal and physical, increased on 
the Stahlhelm and its members, both within and outside of the SA. 
On March 28, 1934, the Stahlhelm was officially transformed into 
the Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Frontkampferbund (National 
Socialist Veterans' Association, or NSDF), which was to be an affili-
ate of the NSDAP much like the Nationalsozialistische Betriebs-
zellenorganisation (National Socialist Industrial Cell Organization, 
NSBO) or the Nationalsozialistische Deutscher Juristen-Bund (Na-
tional Socialist German Association of Jurists, NSDJB). This move 
was intended to pacify the few remaining conservatives who hoped 
that the Stahlhelm could have some sort of independent existence 
and to make a token concession to the aging president, von 
Hindenburg, who was an honorary member of the Stahlhelm.29 In 
practice it had little effect, save that a number of lukewarm mem-
bers of the SAR I resigned and joined the NSDF. The NSDF slum-
bered on until the NSDAP, confident of its strength and now sup-
ported by the Reichswehr,30 disbanded it on November 7, 1935.31 
In the long run, most of the Stahlhelm members who were ab-
sorbed into the SA and who swelled its size by nearly a million men32 
did not remain. Most left the SA voluntarily or were eased out by the 
mid-1930s. This was completely unimportant to theN azi leadership, 
even if the size of the SA and the problems caused by SA-Stahlhelm 
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clashes and the alleged instability of the SA in 1934 contributed to 
the decision to purge the SA in June 1934. Although the expansion in 
1933 and 1934 whetted the appetites of Rohm and some of his cro-
nies for a larger policymaking role for the SA,33 and although some 
Stahlhelm leaders did remain in SA positions of authority,34 increas-
ing the SA's size was never actually the point. The main benefit gained 
from the absorption of the Stahlhelm and other patriotic groups in 
1933-34 was that potentially dangerous sources of opposition to the 
NSDAP and its plans were robbed of their independent organizations 
and thus of the possibility of actually resisting, all without serious 
violence or opposition. The coordination of the Stahlhelm and oth-
ers probably did as much to stabilize the new Nazi regime as any 
other action of the SA in 1933 or 1934. 
By the summer of 1933, the Nazi regime's power had been con-
solidated to an irreversible point and its strongest enemies had been 
eliminated. The Law for the Protection of the German People (Feb-
ruary 4, 1933) and the Law for the Protection of the People and the 
State (February 28, 1933) had suspended basic constitutional liber-
ties and proclaimed a state of emergency. The Law for Removing the 
Distress of the People and Reich (the Enabling Act of March 23, 1933) 
transferred legislative power to the executive and made the Reichstag 
simply a rubber stamp. A series of other laws destroyed the indepen-
dence of the federal states and strengthened the powers of the central 
government. Finally, beginning in May 1933, all political parties ex-
cept the NSDAP were banned or dissolved, a process which was then 
made legal with the Law to Secure the Unity of Party and Reich (De-
cember 1, 1933). 
At this point the regime confronted several important questions 
that demanded resolution. What would be the subsequent course of 
the "national revolution"? Would it become a National Socialist revo-
lution, and if so, just what would that mean? What would be the role 
of the SA in society, now that the Party's enemies had been silenced 
or eliminated? What course would the rearmament of Germany take, 
and what would be the relationship of the Party to the Reichswehr in 
the process? Hovering over all the others was the question of who 
would succeed the infirm Paul von Hindenburg. The search for an-
swers to these questions dominated all events and eventually found 
resolution in the Rohm Purge of June 1934. 
By 1933 or 1934 it was very late for anyone to join the SA and expect 
to rise to a position of importance. Although the Machtergreifung 
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brought a torrent of new members to the SA, the Party, the SS, and 
all other Party organizations, and the organizational expansion which 
this brought about caused many low- and medium-ranking members 
of these organizations to achieve higher rank and greater responsi-
bilities quickly, there were already enough SA leaders in the pipeline 
to fulfill manpower demands at the very top, and the SA no longer 
needed to look outside for top talent.35 The case of the SA was com-
plicated even more by the Rohm Purge, which arrested the expan-
sion of the organization and considerably diminished its overall sig-
nificance. This further reduced the possibility that newcomers could 
rise to the very top of the SA hierarchy, since the reduction in size 
that was ordered after the purge meant that there were more than 
enough high SA leaders to fill the remaining positions. 
Nevertheless, eleven men who only joined the SA in 1933 or 
1934 did manage to become Gruppenfuhrer or even Obergruppen-
fuhrer and thus become part of this study.36 These eleven men fall 
into two distinct categories.37 Two men owed their SA ranks in part 
to longtime service in the Party and in part to special circumstances. 
Nine led non-Nazi veterans' and paramilitary groups that were ab-
sorbed under the Nazi wing as a part of the Gleichschaltung or elimi-
nation of all rival political organizations in Germany. These co-opted 
members present an interesting case study in the reciprocal relation-
ship between the Nazi Party and other conservative groups. While 
one or possibly two of these nine men later had differences with the 
SA, the rest made the transition practically seamlessly. There is an 
important lesson here in both the differences and similarities between 
the NSDAP /SA and other conservative organizations. 
The smaller group may be dealt with quickly. In the case of 
Hans Petersen,38 several reasons combined to bring him to high rank 
in the SA. He was a retired major with valuable military skills. He 
had also been a Party member since Aprill925. Most important, he 
was a longtime Party officeholder with valuable contacts.39 After he 
had joined the SA and risen to command a Brigade, he also became a 
high official in the administration of the state of Anhalt, further rea-
son for the SA to encourage his career. 
Petersen officially joined the SA in January 1933, just before the 
takeover of power, at the prompting of his local Gauleiter. His duties 
were first of a political nature: soon after the Nazi assumption of 
power he became the SA commissar (SA Sonderkommissar)40 for the 
town of Immenstadt and for the district of Sonthofen, as well as the 
vice mayor of Immenstadt. His next major SA appointment came in 
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January 1934, when he was appointed head of a department in the SA 
Reich Leadership School (Reichsfiihrerschule). The name of the de-
partment is not known, but very likely it had to do with his expertise 
in history and military organization. He stayed two years at the school, 
and from 1935 to 1937 he was also a permanent member of the spe-
cial verification commissions set up to evaluate and judge the SA 
leadership in the wake of the Rohm Purge. Up to this point his ac-
tivities were largely political in nature and obviously related to his 
close ties to the Party's political apparatus. Surprisingly, in 1936 he 
was transferred to command an active SA Brigade in Anhalt. 
Petersen commanded SA Brigade 39 until1941, but in 1940 he 
also became acting head of the SA Gruppe Thuringia while its actual 
chief was serving in the armed forces. It was in this capacity, and 
also in recognition of his high position in the state administration of 
Anhalt, that he was promoted to Gruppenfiihrer. Certainly, the war 
influenced his promotion. He apparently did serve in the Wehrmacht 
(again with the rank of major) and won the Iron Cross First and Sec-
ond Class. Yet he was born in 1885, and as an older man who had 
already served at the front, he was a likely candidate to be released 
from active service back to the SA so that a younger SA leader could 
take his place in the army. He was therefore just the type of man the 
SA needed to keep the home fires burning. More than this, he was a 
valuable link with the state and Party administration. Petersen was 
also named a member of the Reichstag in 1942, and from 1940 to the 
end of the war he was a lay member of the infamous Volksgerichtshof 
(Nazi People's Court), even serving as a member of its Besonderer 
Senat (Extraordinary Senate). 
Petersen served as acting head of Gruppe Thiiringen until late 
1941, then he was transferred to the supreme SA high command. 
There he headed the personnel office (Personalhauptamt) for there-
mainder of the war. He was a longtime Party member and activist 
with strong military skills who gained a midlevel position in the SA 
by virtue of these two activities, despite joining the SA very late. His 
later career was clearly influenced by his political position and con-
nections, and he seems to owe at least some of his success to the fact 
that he was trusted by the Party leadership and could generally work 
well with them. Nevertheless, it took the war to bring him com-
mand of a Gruppe and later of a Hauptamt within the SA central 
command. 
The second case is that of Hans Lukesch.41 He too was a former 
professional military man who also joined the Party several years 
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before joining the SA, but his case is not really comparable to 
Petersen's. Hans Lukesch owed his high rank solely to the extreme 
disruption of the SA in his native Austria after the abortive putsch of 
July 1934. Born in 1901, he had been a professional officer and pilot 
in the Austrian Federal Army from 1925 to 1933. He lost his army 
commission in 1933 because of his Nazi affiliation. Obviously an 
aggressive and activist personality, he immediately became a weap-
ons consultant for the Austrian SA. After the putsch, he initially 
managed to evade arrest, and so became the commander of an Aus-
trian SA Brigade and later even the commander of SA Obergruppe 
Austria. This lasted until his arrest in 1935, and resumed again for 
one month in 1938 just before the AnschluK After Austria became 
part of the German Reich, however, Lukesch was removed from any 
active SA command and was shunted off to the inconsequential 
Reichsarbeitsdienst (Reich Labor Service, or RAD) at a rank consid-
erably below his last SA rank (Brigadefuhrer). He was not promoted 
to SA Gruppenfuhrer until1943 (again, while serving on an inactive 
basis), when he was also promoted within the RAD to General-
arbeitsfuhrer, the equivalent of Gruppenfuhrer in the SA. He was 
clearly an expendable, last resort leader for the SA when it was forced 
underground in Austria in the wake of the failed coup. With the ma-
jority of its commanders under arrest or in hiding, the SA was will-
ing to use a brash young leader such as Lukesch who had managed to 
keep himself out of jail in order to maintain some semblance of an 
SA organization in Austria. Although he was later paid off with a 
sinecure in the RAD and an inactive commission in the SA, he was 
clearly not considered fit to command an SA Gruppe or Obergruppe 
under normal circumstances. 
The second group is far more important. The nine men con-
cerned all came from the leadership of either the Stahlhelm or the 
Kyffhauserbund.42 The Stahlhelm members are the key, since only 
one member of the Kyffhauser Bund became a Gruppenfuhrer or 
Obergruppenfuhrer. 
With the information at hand, not much can be said about how 
these eight men compared with other top Stahlhelm leaders. As of 
1933, the eve of their absorption into the SA, three of the eight were 
Landesfuhrer (leaders at the level of a German state or region).43 Three 
were members of the Stahlhelm centralleadership,44 and two of these 
were also heads of state-level Stahlhelm organizations such as the 
Gaue of the NSDAP. Two were commanders of Stahlhelm Wehrsport 
regiments.45 These were all high positions, but represented only a 
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small portion of the Stahlhelm's centralleadership.46 For example, 
there were roughly twenty-three Stahlhelm state or regional divi-
sions (Landesverbande ),47 yet only five Landesfuhrer are present here. 
Even the head of the Stahlhelm, Franz Seldte, is not among the group.48 
Although this might suggest that the former Stahlhelm leaders who 
rose to the top levels in the SA were not representative, caution is in 
order. In fact, very few Stahlhelm members were actually taken into 
the SA at the rank of Gruppenfuhrer or Obergruppenfuhrer, and com-
paratively few of the others managed to work their way up that far in 
the SA hierarchy-just like any of the other SA leaders of the same 
rank. In fact, many more former Stahlhelm leaders would have been 
present if lower SA ranks had been included in this study. What can 
be said with certainty, as the remainder of this chapter will demon-
strate, is that there was at least a significant minority of former 
Stahlhelm leaders who were not only willing to work with the SA 
and NSDAP in a way which allowed them to rise to the very highest 
levels of rank within the SA, but who were also quite similar in train-
ing and experience to the SA leaders already in place. 49 More careful 
studies of the Stahlhelm leadership will be necessary to confirm these 
findings, but they suggest that there may have been more similari-
ties between the SA and the Stahlhelm in terms of their leaders than 
has commonly been realized. 
Six of the nine higher SA leaders who came from the Stahlhelm 
or Kyffhauserbund were prewar professional officers.5° Four of the 
six professional officers were members of the Prussian officer corps, 
one was a Bavarian, and the sixth was a Wurttemberger. 51 Most were 
lieutenants, first lieutenants, or captains when the war broke out, 
and all saw combat.52 Five of the six prewar professional officers were 
taken into the Provisional Reichswehr, but all had left the service by 
the end of 1920.53 This might have been due to age if nothing else, 
since all of the professional officers were born between 1869 and 1888, 
but on the other hand, even the oldest was only fifty years old in 
1919. Moreover, they all had the sort of military background and 
individual attributes that put them among the most likely to be taken 
into the Reichswehr. 54 Von Stephani hinted at a likely answer when 
he mentioned participation in the Kapp Putsch in his files, as did 
Jiittner, who stated that he was refused admission into the Reichswehr 
because he was "politically compromised."55 Whether age or politi-
cal unreliability was the cause, strong resentment against the Weimar 
Republic was certainly one result, but the real point is that the 
Stahlhelm leaders who joined and stayed with the SA shared similar 
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backgrounds and common resentments with their SA comrades. 
At least two of the nine were not prewar professional officers 
but were appointed reserve officers during the war. 56 Like their pro-
fessional comrades, these two men also saw combat. There is no in-
dication that either of them wanted to remain in the army. On the 
contrary, both entered the university immediately after the war to 
prepare for future careers, one as a dentist (Zahnarzt), the other as a 
teacher. 
The activities of these men in 1919 and 1920 are worthy of note. 
All but one were under arms in those yearsY One was in the regular 
army, two were Zeitfreiwilliger, 58 and six were in free corps. This is 
not unusual, but three of the five free corps members were in fact the 
commanders. 59 This runs counter to the commonly held notion that 
there was a special affinity between the extremely radical NSDAP 
and the equally radical free corps, and it seems surprising that these 
three former free corps commanders would have been senior leaders 
in the more moderate Stahlhelm. Yet it must be noted that all three 
were Prussian officers, whose free corps were formed in northern 
Germany, and who acted under the close supervision and leadership 
of the army high command. They were clearly a different breed from 
the more independent free corps leaders who served in the Baltic or 
who came out of the German navy. The NSDAP and SA were cer-
tainly not alone in being able to attract veterans, even prominent 
veterans of the free corps movement. 
The activities of the coordinated veterans' organization leaders 
from 1921 to 1933 were much like those of other higher SA leaders, 
particularly some of those of the 1927-30 group. The major differ-
ence is that they did not join the NSDAP and SA. 
No one in the group was ever a member of a moderate party, let 
alone liberal or socialist. Over half the group did belong to a political 
party or other political organization, but only to traditional or radi-
cal conservative ones. This is much like what has already been found 
in the careers of the other SA leaders who have been discussed up to 
now. One of the group60 was a member of the DNVP until1933, and 
another was a member for an unspecified time.61 Given the ties be-
tween the Stahlhelm and the DNV~ this is only what one would 
expect. On the other hand, membership in the DNVP among the 
other top leaders of the SA, although less frequent, was certainly not 
uncommon. 
Another of the coordinated veterans' leaders was a member of 
the Nationale Vereinigung through the Kapp Putsch, when it was 
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banned. As a reactionary north German group dedicated to organiz-
ing the right in preparation for a putsch, the Nationale Vereinigung 
fell into the pattern of participation in conservative and radical con-
servative organizations which is typical of the higher SA leaders.62 
Another led two small conspiratorial organizations, the Schwarze 
Garde and the Braver Heinrich. 63 One was a leader in the Reichsflagge, 
a traditional conservative/monarchist Bavarian Wehrverband, and 
another was a member of the Reichsverband der Baltikumkiimpfer, a 
radical organization of veterans of the free corps in the Baltic.64 Fi-
nally, one was a leader in the Verband Nationalgesinnter Soldaten 
(Association of Nationally Minded Soldiers), a right-wing veterans' 
organization. 65 Most of these organizations figure in the backgrounds 
of the SA leaders already discussed in this book. 
What is slightly different in the careers of the Stahlhelm lead-
ers is that they tended not to be involved in Wehrverbiinde (other 
than the Stahlhelm) or volkisch groups to the extent that most of the 
highest SA leaders were. Only one of the nine Stahlhelm or Kyffhauser 
leaders in this chapter was in a volkisch organization. Interestingly, 
the volkisch organization was the early NSDAP, and the individual 
who belonged to it also belonged to the Stahlhelm and DNVP at the 
same time.66 One explanation of these differences is that the 
Stahlhelm leaders were slightly older than most of the highest SA 
leaders, and they were more traditional conservatives who did not 
support the violence of the Wehrverbiinde. Of course the Stahlhelm, 
especially in its early years, often functioned as a Wehrverband it-
sel£.67 Note also that two of the group68 fought in Upper Silesia in 
1921, one as a member of the Stahlhelm and one not. Given the above, 
the seemingly lower participation in Wehrverbiinde compared with 
the highest SA leaders is put into perspective, and the differences are 
reduced to the near absence of participation in volkisch organiza-
tions.69 
The careers of the 11 coordinated" Stahlhelm leaders can be bro-
ken down into two types that were characteristic of many of the 
other highest SA leaders as well. Four of the eight fall into a pattern 
much like that followed by the 11 defectors. 1170 They belonged to one 
organization for a long period without a break before joining a sec-
ond organization. In this case, the second organization is not the SA 
but rather the Stahlhelm. This is important, because it shows just 
how much they resemble their SA counterparts, right down to the 
paths they followed into their respective organizations. Moreover, 
two of these three might be called 11 dual defectors, 11 since they first 
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were absorbed into the Stahlhelm from other organizations, served it 
loyally, and then were absorbed into the SA.71 
Here is one example: In the fall of 1927, the Reichsflagge merged 
with the Stahlhelm, much as the Stahlhelm later merged with the 
SA, save that in 1927 the Reichsflagge had slightly more say in the 
matter. Georg Dechant72 was the Gaufiihrer of the Reichsflagge in 
Franconia at the time. Since the Stahlhelm was traditionally weak in 
Bavaria, this brought a great increase in its strength there, and it es-
sentially built on the Reichsflagge organization. Dechant became the 
Stahlhelm Landesfiihrer for Franconia. In 1933, when the Stahlhelm 
first began to be absorbed by the SA, Dechant became the leader of 
the SAR I in Franconia and then of the SAR I Brigade there. 73 He 
went on to serve the SA in several staff positions and in 1942 became 
the head of the entire SA Gruppe in Franconia. Although in some 
ways his career was exceptional, it is nevertheless striking that he 
could so easily switch from leading one group to leading another. It 
was as if all that was needed was a change of uniform, and Georg 
Dechant would serve any master-at least as long as that master stood 
on the far right. 
Three of the other coordinated Stahlhelm leaders had careers 
very like the "serial activists. " 74 They passed through several organi-
zations before they established a stable membership in the Stahlhelm. 
The assumption is that this pattern is characteristic of a highly ac-
tivist personality who presumably drifted from one organization to 
another until he found one that fit his character. This pattern of ac-
tivity is characteristic of a significant portion of the highest leader-
ship of the SA. 
Thomas Girgensohn will serve as an example of a "serial activ-
ist" Stahlhelm leader. He was born in the well-to-do Grunewald sec-
tion of Berlin in 1898.75 His father was a historian. He entered the 
army in December 1914, apparently as an officer candidate. He was 
awarded the Iron Cross, and in 1915, at age seventeen, was wounded, 
losing his left leg. By this time he was already in command of a com-
pany. Despite the gravity of his injury, he did not slow down. In 1917, 
probably while on convalescent leave, he passed his Abitur exam. He 
then served in staff positions. At the end of the war he was a lieuten-
ant. Instead of going home for rest and rehabilitation, he immedi-
ately joined the assault section of the Baltische Landeswehr, a self-
defense organization made up of Germans from the Russian Baltic 
provinces of Latvia and Estonia, which included a very high percent-
age of Baltic-German nobles. 76 He became its chief of staff and fought 
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SA Gruf. and Captain Thomas Girgensohn (seventh from left) with the staff 
of the Baltische Landeswehr in 1919. He stands between Hans (left) and Heinz 
(right) von Manteuffel. Courtesy of the Bundesarchiv. 
with it until November 1919.77 He left service with the Baltische 
Landeswehr as a captain. 
Upon his demobilization he began his university studies. This 
was not, however, the end of his paramilitary activities. In 1920 he 
joined the Ehrhardt Brigade, although it remains unclear in what ca-
pacity. A year later, he was active in the Upper Silesian Selbstschutz 
(self-defense militia), although he seems to have remained in Berlin. 
In 1922 he joined the radical Reichsverband der Baltikumkiimpfer 
(Reich Union of Baltic Veterans). He worked in the printing and type-
setting trade after he left the university, and remained in the 
Reichsverband der Baltikumkiimpfer until 1928, at which time he 
joined the Stahlhelm.78 
In the Stahlhelm, he quickly moved up the hierarchy from simple 
member to district leader and even commander of a regiment of the 
Wehrstahlhelm (units of younger Stahlhelm members organized on 
paramilitary lines, ostensibly for "sports" training). He was taken 
into the SA in October 1933, and immediately was posted to the staff 
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of the SARI in Berlin. In 1934 he became employed by the SA full 
time. He continued to work in staff positions until the end of the 
Second World War, heading an office (Abteilung) in the OSAF from 
1937 to 1942, and heading a division (Amt) in the OSAF from that 
point until the end of the war. He was promoted to Standartenfi.ihrer 
in 1935, Brigadefi.ihrer in 1941, and Gruppenfi.ihrer in 1944. 
Girgensohn was clearly an activist. It would be useful to know 
what effect the loss of a leg had on his motivation, but such informa-
tion is unfortunately lacking. What is clear is that he, like many of 
his comrades who joined the SA voluntarily and much earlier, passed 
through a series of right-wing paramilitary organizations from the 
time he left military service at the end of the war until he joined the 
SA. Although like all of the Stahlhelm leaders discussed in this chapter 
he probably would have remained in the Stahlhelm and never joined 
the SA if it had not absorbed the Stahlhelm, he did not choose to 
leave the SA either, as he certainly could have done without diffi-
culty given his handicap. Instead, he continued on in the SA and 
enjoyed a successful career, rising to a position of authority as if he 
had never left the Stahlhelm or as if he had been an early member of 
the SA. 
Only two of the eight Stahlhelm leaders in this study entered the SA 
as active Gruppenfi.ihrer. Both did so by virtue of their high positions 
in the Stahlhelm, but also because of the job they were intended to 
do in the SA. Franz von Stephani was the Bundeshauptmann (liter-
ally federal captain) of the Stahlhelm, which made him virtually sec-
ond in command after Seldte. Hans Elard von Morozowisc was the 
Bundesbevollmachtigter of the Stahlhelm (federal plenipotentiary) 
and he headed the Jungstahlhelm.79 This merited high rank when 
they were taken into the SA, but the fact that they were awarded 
active rank came from their new duties. Von Morozowisc was given 
the task of integrating the Wehrstahlhelm (as the Jungstahlhelm was 
renamed) into the SA. He later became one of Konstantin Hied's two 
deputies in the NSDAP's Freiwillige Arbeitsdienst (Voluntary Labor 
Service, or FAD).80 Von Stephani was made the titular commander of 
the SARI when it was created in late 1933 to bring the Kernstahlhelm 
(the older members of the Stahlhelm) into an SA organizational frame-
work. Both. men thus occupied positions of (ostensible) command 
within the new SA/Stahlhelm hierarchy. Von Stephani later resigned 
due to conflicts with Rohm, and von Morozowisc died in an automo-
bile accident. 81 
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The remaining six Stahlhelm leaders also entered the SA on an 
active-duty basis at relatively high rank, but not at the very top. In 
general, the SA was rather sparing with awards of extremely high 
rank to the newcomers out of the Stahlhelm. Jiittner, a Stahlhelm 
Landesfiihrer, entered the SA as a Brigadefiihrer. The other two 
Landesfiihrer, von Neufville and Dechant, entered the SA as 
Standartenfiihrer and Obersturmbannfiihrer, respectively. Moslinger, 
the Oberquartiermeister (supreme quartermaster) of the Stahlhelm, 
entered as a Standartenfiihrer, and the two Stahlhelm Regiments-
fuhrer, Thomas Girgensohn and Lorenz Ohrt, entered the SA as 
Sturmbannfiihrer. 
They all were eventually promoted to the very highest ranks of 
the SA in recognition of their abilities, although the war certainly 
accelerated their progress as a result of high losses of existing 
Gruppenfiihrer and Obergruppenfiihrer. 
Once in the SA, all but two of the eight Stahlhelm leaders went 
into staff positions. The two exceptions, Lorenz Ohrt and Georg 
Dechant, held field commands, but the units that they commanded 
were made up of former Stahlhelm members. There were two very 
important reasons for this. First, the other six leaders had held staff 
positions in the Stahlhelm, were competent, and were also getting a 
little old to be field commanders. Much more important, however, 
were psychological and political considerations. There had often been 
conflict between SA and Stahlhelm units in many places during the 
Kampfzeit, and this increased during 1933 and 1934, when the 
Stahlhelm was absorbed into the SA. Also, the SA and NSDAP often 
treated Stahlhelm members as second-class nationalists or danger-
ous "reactionaries." There was much ill feeling and even several vio-
lent clashes between SA and Stahlhelm units in some areas, although 
in other areas cooperation was the norm. At any rate, the appoint-
ment of former Stahlhelm leaders to command veteran SA men was 
likely to cause resentment and thus was avoided. At the same time, 
the SA was not entirely opposed to allowing Stahlhelm men to serve 
under leaders drawn from that organization, provided that their loy-
alty to National Socialism was assured. Although Lorenz Ohrt and 
Georg Dechant were returned to field commands during the Second 
World War, even they spent the bulk of their SA service on staffs. 
This is where the Stahlhelm leaders who were taken into the SA 
made their greatest contribution. 
The career of Lorenz Ohrt is a good example of a Stahlhelm 
leader who held both staff and field commands in the SA. 82 Ohrt had 
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been commissioned as a lieutenant during the war. He joined the 
Stahlhelm in 1922, after serving in Zeitfreiwilligenkorps Bahrenfeld 
in Hamburg from 1919 to 1921. Until1929 he was just a simple rank-
and-file member. In that year he became the leader of a local chapter. 
In 1932 he left this position to lead a company, a battalion, and then 
a regiment of Stahlhelm men organized for paramilitary training. 
In August 1933 he was absorbed into the SA as a part of the 
Wehrstahlhelm, and he became the commander of a Standarte in 
Hamburg composed largely of former Stahlhelm men. In 1935 he 
was transferred to the staff of SA Gruppe Hansa and later SA Gruppe 
Nordmark. He remained in staff positions until 1938. During this 
time he was involved with training and schooling, and for much of 
the time commanded an SA-Gruppenschule where low-level leaders 
were trained. In 1938 he was transferred to Gruppe Siidmark, where 
he acted as its chief of staff. In 1941 he was again transferred to the 
SA high command where he headed an office within Hauptamt 
Fiihrung (Command Main Office).83 From 1940 to 1942 he served for 
very short periods as the acting head of two SA Gruppen. In 1942 he 
was named head of the Amt Organisation und Einsatz (Office for 
Organization and Mission), and in 1944 he was promoted to 
Gruppenfiihrer. Shortly thereafter, he was made the acting wartime 
head of Gruppe Weichsel, and in 1945 he was named its official com-
mander. Although with this appointment he had reached the acme 
of his career, it was a rather hollow honor, for by this time he was 
preoccupied with fighting the Russians in Danzig as a member of the 
Volkssturm. 
Typical of many Stahlhelm leaders taken into the SA, Ohrt 
quickly occupied important staff positions. Later, as the older an-
tagonisms between the Stahlhelm and the SA were growing dim and 
the war was beginning to put a strain on the SA command structure, 
he served temporarily in field commands. Later in the war, he was 
held fit enough to be awarded a major command of his own. By then, 
nobody cared whether he had been a Stahlhelm leader or not, for 
they all had much more important things to worry them. 
The relationship of the former Stahlhelm leaders to the NSDAP 
was much different from that of the other SA leaders. Most had never 
been active in volkisch politics, and they had little motivation to 
become involved in Party work when they joined the SA, particu-
larly as their SA duties were more than enough to occupy them at 
first. Consequently, when many other SA leaders were given posi-
tions in the Party administration at the Gau level or below, or were 
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selected for other responsible and politically sensitive assignments, 
these men were not included. 84 Although they did not ignore their 
responsibilities to the Party, there was a reluctance on the part of the 
Party hierarchy to give them politically sensitive positions outside 
of the SA. 
Three joined the Party in 1933, and four joined in 1937 when 
the moratorium on new Party memberships was lifted.85 In part this 
was a function of when they were absorbed into the SA, since the 
Party moratorium on new members was put into effect on May 1, 
1933. Many were not absorbed into the SA until after this date, and 
there was no real, pressing reason to join the NSDAP before they 
became members of the SA. Nevertheless, it is significant that those 
joining in 1933 all became members of the NSDAP before they were 
absorbed into the SA. This may indicate that these particular indi-
viduals were closer to the NSDAP than many other Stahlhelm lead-
ers who waited to join the NSDAP, but is not sufficient by itself to 
make any generalizations. Interestingly, two of the nine, Max Jiittner 
and Wilhelm Reinhard, were later honored with the Golden Party 
Pin, despite the very late date of their Party membership. In general, 
then, the Stahlhelm leaders who rose to the highest levels of the SA 
were not very interested in Party affairs, although they did their duty. 
They were good soldiers, not good politicians. 
The Stahlhelm leaders who reached the highest ranks of the 
SA-whether they decided to stay in the SA or not-were quite simi-
lar in background to the men who were already in the SA when they 
arrived. Both groups shared a strong military and paramilitary back-
ground. The Stahlhelm group lacked much involvement in volkisch 
politics, and showed slightly more involvement in traditional con-
servative parties than the bulk of their SA comrades, but this was 
merely a question of degree. Neither groups was involved in moder-
ate or liberal political parties or organizations, both were active mili-
tarily in 1919 and 1920, and both later joined the Wehrverband move-
ment. 
The Stahlhelm leaders in this study-admittedly a minority of 
the central leadership core of the Stahlhelm, although the signifi-
cance of this is debatable-were able to fit into the SA hierarchy 
with remarkable ease. Only two exceptions were found to this, and 
of these two, only von Stephani refused out of his own free will to 
cooperate with the SA.86 The ease of this transition is striking for 
men who, after all, were members of a rival organization, and it bears 
further research. It shows just how important the larger context of 
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the right-wing political and paramilitary organizations was for the 
SA and NSDAP and just how close they actually could be to the 
NSDA~ despite all tactical, personal, or even ideological disagree-
ments. 
For the transition from one organization to another to be so 
easy, there had to have been more points of agreement than disagree-
ment between the two groups. These points of commonality were 
provided not least by the strikingly similar backgrounds of the men 
involved. The core of their backgrounds was the military experience 
and the soldierly virtues and attitudes that it taught. 
In the case of the Stahlhelm leaders, it must have been quite 
easy for them to transfer their allegiance to the SA, particularly since 
by 1933 the SA was in many ways already tied up with the state and 
the nation. The party to which it belonged dominated the govern-
ment and soon became the only legal political party. The SA and the 
Reichswehr teamed up for military training and Grenzschutz, an ar-
rangement which formerly had been shared with many organizations 
on the right, not least of which was the Stahlhelm. The Stahlhelm 
men now in the SA only helped cooperate with the army, since they 
had long-standing contacts with the officer corps and were all former 
officers themselves. In fact, the men from the Stahlhelm who appear 
in this chapter later were engaged in many aspects of planning for 
the SA that involved military matters and cooperation with the 
Wehrmacht. 
What real difference, indeed, was there between a leadership 
position in the Stahlhelm and in the SA, particularly when the SA's 
importance to the Party decreased from 1933 on and its obligations 
to the State increased? The SA and Stahlhelm were and always had 
been united in many ideological principles: opposition to the Weimar 
Republic and democratic government, opposition to the Versailles 
treaty and all it stood for, and support for a strong German state with 
that most fundamental symbol of sovereignty, a strong national 
army.87 The extent of this congruity is best symbolized by one final 
biography, that of Max Jiittner. 
Max Paul Wilhelm Werner Jiittner was born in Saalfeld, 
Thuringia, in 1888.88 His father was a self-made man who owned a 
printing company. Max attended a Realgymnasium, passed his Abitur, 
and then joined the army, where he became a professional officer in 
Field Artillery Regiment 55. He was commissioned in 1907 as a sec-
ond lieutenant and became a captain in 1916. During the First World 
War he served as an artillery and then as a staff officer, including a 
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SA Ogruf. and former captain Max Juttner, 1943. Courtesy of the Bundes-
archiv. 
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posting to the general staff. After the war he served as a leader of a 
Zeitfreiwilligenverband until 1920, organizing all of the Zeitfrei-
willigen units for the Landesjiigerkorps.89 In 1920 he allegedly was 
refused a position in the Reichswehr due to "political unreliability" 
and had to leave active service. He left the army in September 1920. 
This did not prevent him from continuing to be active in para-
military and political organizations. He had already joined the 
Stahlhelm in 1919, serving in succession as the leader of a local branch, 
a regional branch, and a state branch. By the early 1930s he was deputy 
to the Second Bundesfiihrer, Duesterberg. In 1920 he joined the DNVP. 
In 1921 he went to Upper Silesia to fight the Poles, and in January 
1923 he even joined the Nazi Party in Munich, while maintaining 
his membership in the DNVP and in the Stahlhelm. 
In July 193390 Jiittner joined the Nazi Party again, and in No-
vember he was absorbed into the SA. From December 1933 to 1945 
he served in the SA high command, first as an aide in the Fiihrungsamt 
(Command Office), and from July 1934 on as the head of that office.91 
He also served as an SA liaison to the army. In 1935 he was promoted 
to Gruppenfiihrer, and in 1937 to Obergruppenfiihrer. In 1939 he was 
named to the additional post of standing deputy to the chief of staff, 
and in 1943, when SA Chief of Staff Viktor Lutze died, Jiittner filled 
in until Wilhelm Schepmann could take his place. 
Despite good contacts with the Reichswehr and later 
Wehrmacht, Jiittner did not serve in the Second World War, in large 
part because his duties with the SA were considered too important 
for the war effort. By April1945, however, with the Third Reich all 
but defeated and the Allies closing in on Munich, he did fight as the 
commander of a Volkssturm unit. Jiittner was captured by the Ameri-
cans and interned as a high Nazi leader. With SA Chief of Staff 
Schepmann missing, and the rest of the senior SA Obergruppenfiihrer 
dead or in hiding, Jiittner was the most senior surviving SA leader. It 
is symbolic that in Jiittner the soldier, the Stahlhelm leader, and the 
SA leader had so fused that Jiittner could insist that he was indeed 
the senior surviving member of the SA and, as such, had to bear full 
responsibility for the deeds of that organization. In this capacity, 
former Stahlhelm Landesfuhrer Max Jiittner represented the SA at 
the Nuremberg war crimes trials.92 
6 
Conclusion 
The highest leaders of the SA were a homogeneous group, almost 
what one could call a corps. 1 They came from the same social class, 2 
and they were formed by a common set of military and political ex-
periences and attitudes. Out of a common milieu they then went to 
the SA and the Nazi Party, their common experiences serving to knit 
them and the SA into a close and efficient group. This homogeneity 
adds to our knowledge of the makeup of the Nazi Party, but even 
more important, it has immediate implications for assessing the sig-
nificance of the larger paramilitary and right-wing ecology within 
which the Nazis and so many others like them flourished. 
The discovery that the highest officers of the SA were a homo-
geneous group should not, however, be allowed to conceal from his-
torians the important differences that existed. Diversity and homo-
geneity are both relative concepts, and the assumption of one should 
not blind the historian to the importance of the other. This book has 
also shown that such differences can explain much about the chang-
ing nature of the SA and its process of growth and development within 
the broader right-wing environment of the Weimar Republic. An or-
ganization cannot exist completely apart from its members, and vice 
versa. The evolution of the higher leadership corps of the SA is inevi-
tably also the story of the evolution of the organization itself. 
At first glance, the commonalities among these men are the 
most apparent. The highest SA officers were older3 and better edu-
cated4 than the rank and file under their command. While there is 
much truth to the idea that Nazism and fascist movements in gen-
eral often represent a form of "youth revolt," in the SA this youth 
revolt was led by older and more experienced leaders.5 The exact na-
ture of those experiences is the subject of this study. They were con-
centrated in the very military and political types of activity that best 
prepared them to form and lead a mass paramilitary organization. 
Conclusion 143 
The group was heavily dominated by military specialists who 
had been trained by and had served in the Imperial Army of the 
Wilhelmine Empire. Roughly one-third had been professional sol-
diers before the First World War. 6 
The experience of the First World War only reinforces the point 
about the military character of the highest SA leaders. At least 76 
percent were veterans of the war, and 73 percent had seen combat. 
Fifty-six percent of combat veterans had been wounded, and 85 per-
cent had been decorated. Nearly all veterans who were not already 
professional officers before 1914 became reserve officers by 1918.7 
Most served in combat units and were decorated for bravery, but 37 
percent served in some sort of staff or administrative position. So the 
highest SA leaders could be characterized as military specialists both 
in the use of violence and in its planning. It was no accident that SA 
regulations and techniques resembled those of the Imperial Army to 
a remarkable degree. The experience of the First World War marked 
an entire generation of European males and had profound and lasting 
effects on the world. Afterwards, the "war generation" took the lead 
in all movements of social and political renewal, of which Nazism 
and the SA were but a part. It was not simply a demographic coinci-
dence that so many veterans found their place in the leadership of 
the SA and of other paramilitary organizations in the Weimar Repub-
lic, for they had both the technical skills needed to lead large bodies 
of men and the political will to do so. 
Yet if the highest leaders of the SA were almost exclusively 
men who were firmly rooted and socialized in the Wilhelmine Em-
pire, and if they were indelibly and profoundly marked by the experi-
ence of the First World War, it is equally true that their development 
did not stop in 1918 and that they were also fundamentally shaped 
by their actions and experiences after the war. 
Nearly all future top SA leaders were politically or militarily 
active during the revolution and unrest from November 1918 through 
the end of 1919. While this high level of activity is once again proof 
that they were a homogeneous group, the exact form of their activity 
in this period varied. Military types of activity clearly predominated, 
however. Older scholarship puts particular emphasis on the role of 
the free corps in molding Nazi attitudes.8 The reality of the careers 
of the highest SA leaders was much more complicated. Although a 
significant number did serve in a free corps/ it was not the dominant 
form of activity during the revolution. Equally if not more important 
was membership in a range of other organizations, including the new 
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regular army then being formed (which became the Reichswehr), the 
old Imperial Army (units of which persisted into 1919), 10 local or 
part-time self-defense organizations, 11 or even (usually short-lived) 
membership in political parties. 12 Rather than single out the free corps, 
one must make a more balanced assessment of the postwar influ-
ences on and experiences of future Nazis. 
After 1920, some of the men in this study abandoned organized 
political and military activity. Most future SA leaders, however, con-
tinued to be active in both paramilitary and political organizations. 
Of the two, the paramilitary organizations, or Wehrverbande, which 
arose in 1920 and continued to play a role in German politics until 
1933, clearly occupied the greater number of them. 13 These militias 
played a crucial and largely overlooked role in the formation of many 
of the forms of action and organization that later became character-
istic of the SA. It is these organizations, and not the free corps, which 
are most similar to the SA and Nazi Party in organization and out-
look. Although they were organized along military lines and stressed 
military knowledge and values, they were still civilian and part-time 
organizations, rooted in a given locality and class. Most significant 
of all, they were not organized exclusively for narrow military con-
cerns. From their inception they had a broader political purpose. 
Activity in one or more of these paramilitary organizations-such as 
the Reichskriegsflagge, Wehrwolf, or the Jungdeutscher Orden-is 
one of the most significant factors shared by the greatest number of 
the highest SA leaders in this study. On this basis alone it must be 
recognized as one of the most important factors in the formation of 
men who later joined the Nazi Party. Much further research remains 
to be done to clarify the influence of the Wehrverbande on the devel-
opment of both individual future National Socialists and of the Nazi 
movement as a whole. Even now, however, it is apparent that the 
Wehrverbande, and not the free corps, were the true "vanguard of 
Nazism." 14 
A significant minority also became involved in political organi-
zations. While the dominant characteristic of the group is its mili-
tary character, this should not blind one to the fact that many lead-
ers were also political activists and as such played an important role 
in the early growth of the NSDAP. This is particularly true of those 
who were among the first wave to join the SA in 1925 and 1926. 
Some were members of the DNVP or of some other mainstream con-
servative political party in the Weimar Republic. 15 More important, 
a vast proportion of those who were involved in a political organiza-
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tion at all were members of a volkisch political party or organiza-
tion.16 This political experience and even zealotry form the second 
of the two elements, political and military, in the equation that ulti-
mately created the SA. The fusion of paramilitary forms and dyna-
mism with the largely volkisch political message of the NSDAP was 
what made the SA both unique and effective as a political organiza-
tion. 
Two elements that did not enter into the equation producing 
the NSDAP to any great extent, and that were completely absent 
from the careers of the highest SA leaders, were membership in any 
center or left-wing political party or organization and membership in 
any confessional or religious organization. With one or two insignifi-
cant exceptions, absolutely none of the highest SA leaders in this 
study ever participated in any organization of this type. 17 The results 
are clear on this point: the highest SA leaders, to a man, were predis-
posed from the beginning in favor of not only secular and conserva-
tive political parties but also those on the radical, volkisch fringe. 
This author has discovered little to explain this apparent predisposi-
tion and does not even attempt to address the background of the SA 
rank and file, which may indeed have been very different. What I can 
state is that the highest leaders of the SA were drawn from among 
men who were already clearly situated on the far right of the politi-
cal spectrum and who had not been involved in confessional organi-
zations. They were certainly not converts from moderate or even 
left-wing political parties. 
The careers of the highest SA leaders evolved or unfolded in a 
particular way and under particular historical conditions. In a con-
crete and fundamental fashion, the model of organization that be-
came the SA grew out of the lived experiences of its leadership in 
their passage from the Wilhelmine Empire into the Third Reich. 
Their experiences in the Wilhelmine Empire and in the First 
World War were largely military in nature, although clearly these 
military experiences were associated with certain larger but specific 
types of political socialization as well, such as ideas of duty and obe-
dience to the Empire or of comradeship and violence in the war. There 
is also no "generic" set of military values; those of the Wilhelmine 
Empire and First World War were embedded in a larger but specific 
cultural context. 
The experiences of these men from 1919 to 1923 were also largely 
military in nature, although a political and even radical-political com-
ponent was increasingly present. In this stage, owing to the common 
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perception on the radical right that politics was somehow corrupt 
and dirty, whereas military forms of association and organization were 
somehow straightforward and clean (inherited from the Wilhelmine 
Empire), the political and paramilitary elements were largely sepa-
rate. Even if a man belonged to a political group and a paramilitary 
organization simultaneously, the two activities were still considered 
separate and distinct. This was true until1924. 
The failure of the Beer Hall Putsch in November 1923, as the 
last in a series of abortive attempts to overthrow the government of 
the Weimar Republic by force, and the seeming stabilization of Ger-
many that followed led to the beginning of a fundamental reappraisal 
of tactics and goals on the radical right. Not all organizations and 
groups came to the same conclusions, and not all of them embarked 
on this fundamental reassessment at exactly the same time. The Nazis 
were among the first, and they developed the most successful new 
set of tactics. These tactics amounted to the blending of the formerly 
separate traditions of the paramilitary organizations with those of 
the volkisch political parties, and they were the joint creation of the 
future leaders of the SA and of the Party. 18 This fundamental change 
in the direction of the Nazi Party and SA once they reemerged in 
1925 was due less to Hitler's genius, as even many modern histori-
ans would seem to imply, 19 and more to the experiences and ideas of 
individual Nazis in 1924 when the NSDAP was banned and they 
were members of other paramilitary and volkisch organizations. It 
was the experience of explaining the failure of the putsch tactic and 
trying to find more successful methods that led to the fusion of the 
paramilitary and volkisch traditions and the creation of the new and 
ultimately successful Nazi Party.20 
This fusion was mirrored in the activities of most future lead-
ers of the Nazi Party, including the SA leaders who have been stud-
ied in this book. In this regard it was also immaterial whether they 
actually belonged to both paramilitary and volkisch organizations. 
In the context of 1924, all became aware that the paramilitary orga-
nizations could become successful in parliamentary politics when 
animated by volkisch ideology, as the electoral successes of May 1924 
proved. Thus, the new formula so successfully adopted by the NSDAP 
from 1925 on was the creation of an entire milieu and of countless 
individuals and not of one man, even though that one man, Adolf 
Hitler, still played a central role in legitimizing the new tactics and 
in seeing that they were adopted by the entire party. The new for-
mula was henceforth followed by the SA and the Party in tandem, 
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and indeed, the two organizations were far more closely intertwined 
in their early years than is commonly recognized today. 
From 1925, when the NSDAP and SA were rebuilt, they gradu-
ally grew and became more and more important in Germany as po-
litical organizations. One of the most important outcomes of this 
study has been a better understanding of how the process of growth 
occurred. There were three general stages. In the beginning, the 
NSDAP/SA was merely one small group among many that existed in 
the isolated but fertile environment on the far right in the Weimar 
Republic. The first stage of development was the gradual assertion of 
the dominance of the NSDAP /SA within this limited ecological niche. 
In the process of asserting its dominance, the NSDAP and SA ab-
sorbed large numbers of leaders and followers from kindred but rival 
organizations. This made the NSDAP /SA strong enough to begin the 
second stage of its development, in which it moved to challenge the 
mainstream national political parties. Here again, large numbers of 
former supporters of these traditional political parties were absorbed, 
until the NSDAP/SA became the largest single political party in 
Germany and thus strong enough to proceed to the third stage of its 
development in which it assumed control over the government. 
Traditionally, accounts of the rise of the Nazi Party have stressed 
the second stage, when the NSDAP challenged the conventional par-
ties of the center and right and managed to absorb many of their 
supporters. Few have paid much attention to the crucial first stage, 
in which the NSDAP grew to dominance among the marginal volkisch 
organizations. This study emphasizes the importance of the ability 
of the Nazi Party and SA to absorb members of rival right-wing orga-
nizations during this stage and shows just how this process occurred. 
The point here is not the common one that the NSDAP was 
extremely efficient; rather, it is that it could not have existed with-
out the larger ecological niche that supported it.21 If there had not 
been a rich variety of organizations occupying the political"habitat" 
on the right in Weimar, the Nazi Party could never have survived. 
Had this original environment dried up-or been eliminated-the 
NSDAP would have perished as well. 
The rival organizations that were absorbed and became "extinct" 
due to the greater success of the NSDAP did not simply supply 
sheeplike followers who gravitated from one organization to another 
as if by instinct. Those who switched allegiances had strong ideo-
logical motivations. Moreover, the absorption of other radical right-
wing organizations by the NSDAP and SA did not bring merely fol-
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lowers. It brought the NSDAP a steady stream of leaders and activ-
ists as well. The presence of "defectors" or converts from so many 
other organizations is proof of this fact. Moreover, as leaders from 
similar organizations, each of these men brought experiences that 
were then used to make the NSDAP and SA more effective, while 
robbing its competitors of just this leadership and experience. The 
"dying" rival organizations provided capable leaders. Had these orga-
nizations not existed, had this transfer of experience and leadership 
not taken place, the Nazi Party could not have succeeded. In this 
sense, the Nazi Party was a collective effort not only of every Nazi 
but of the collective experiences of the members of its environment. 
The homogeneity of the higher SA leadership tells a great deal 
about the political environment on the far right in which the organi-
zation developed and also provides the key to understanding how 
this development was possible at such a rapid rate. Although the top 
SA leaders came from dissimilar and often competing organizations, 
these organizations also had much in common. The organizations 
occupying the far right of the political spectrum together with the 
NSDAP were rivals and were certainly not identical, but only in the 
way that members of the same family can be rivals and individuals. 
To put it another way, there was a remarkable similarity among many 
leaders and members of the organizations on the far right in the 
Weimar Republic, which allowed them to be absorbed into the SA 
leadership without any apparent decline in effectiveness. The fact 
that rival organizations had a body of members and leaders so much 
like the existing leaders of the SA meant that absorbing them caused 
relatively little disruption or "indigestion." National Socialist ideol-
ogy, the common enemy of the "Weimar system" and the mythic 
role of Hitler as "Der Fuhrer" integrated them even further and 
smoothed over any differences that may have existed between them. 
Given the above, the slight differences in background among top SA 
leaders become more important, for they allow us to trace the pre-
cise evolution of the organization over time and see the dialectic 
relationship between the shape of the SA and the experiences or char-
acter of its leadership. 
Those who joined in 1925 or 1926 did so when the NSDAP was 
little more than a sect. They were the true and original political sol-
diers of the Nazi Party. They were the ones who best combined mili-
tary expertise and experience in paramilitary groups with a singular 
political radicalism and commitment to volkisch ideology. As pia-
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neers they shaped the SA in their own image, which was a combina-
tion of paramilitary and volkisch traditions. They were both soldiers 
and politicians, and they were equally at home in ideology and in 
formation. Often they were equally active in the SA and the Party in 
the early years. It is indicative that all but one of the SA commanders 
came from within this group.22 It had the highest percentage of those 
who had been active in a volkisch organization and the highest per-
centage of those who had been in the NSDAP or SA before the Beer 
Hall Putsch. On the other hand, this group had the smallest percent-
age of former professional officers, former free corps members, and 
former Wehrverband members. 
The next group, those joining from 1927 through 1930, present 
a mixed picture. Some came out of the Party organization, illustrat-
ing that the connection between the SA and NSDAP continued to be 
closer in this period than is often thought. Others, however, show 
the ability of the SA and NSDAP to attract activists from other orga-
nizations. For some, like the groups of "passive activists" or "spo-
radic activists," the SA and NSDAP were able to reactivate men whose 
activism had waned since the revolution and the Beer Hall Putsch. 
Others, like the "serial activists," progressed from one organization 
to another, ending up in the SA and NSDAP as a culmination of their 
military-political careers. Still others best represent the countless 
members of rival groups who were persuaded to switch allegiances 
to the NSDAP, providing it and the SA with valuable leadership just 
as it was beginning to expand. 
Similar patterns existed in the body of men in this study who 
joined the SA in 1931 and 1932. Many were equally "defectors" or 
"passive activists" or "party soldiers," but above all, those joining in 
1931 or 1932 who managed to rise to one of the top ranks in the SA 
possessed special skills. Yet the fact that these men were specialists 
does little to explain why they joined or were recruited into the SA. 
The answer is important. Some had special contacts or relationships 
with SA leaders who brought them into the SA and into high rank 
relatively quickly. This is clearest in the case of Ernst Rohm's associ-
ates, whom he placed in staff positions within the SA command. Yet 
the process did not simply involve a handful of men who happened 
to know Rohm or another SA leader. What actually existed was a 
more generalized process that awarded advancement to men with 
special skills and abilities, provided that they also came from a back-
ground similar to that of existing SA leaders. The men in this study 
who joined the SA in 1931 or 1932 had special expertise which the 
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SA needed and wanted, but they were not chosen at random. Instead, 
they were men who, by virtue of their background and outlook, could 
be counted on to mesh well with existing SA leaders. 
Further proof of this comes from the men in this study who 
joined in 1933 or 1934. They were almost exclusively either Party 
leaders transferring into the SA or former leaders of rival paramili-
tary organizations that were coordinated and absorbed by the SA af-
ter the Nazis took power. At first glance it is indeed surprising that 
these former rivals could so easily and apparently effortlessly join 
the SA and continue on as before. The answer to this seeming para-
dox is that, for all the rivalry between the SA/NSDAP and organiza-
tions like the Stahlhelm, the leaders of both lived in the same moral 
world, shared the same general body of experiences and background, 
and came from the same radical right-wing political habitat. 
Men with many different ideas and backgrounds became SA 
leaders. What enabled them to work together despite all their differ-
ences and personal quarrels was not least the fact that they had par-
ticipated in many of the same types of activity. It would be rash at 
this point to attempt to extend this generalization to the rank and 
file of the SA, but it is interesting to speculate on the importance of 
the myth of the war experience, the myth of the free corps, and the 
myth of the old army in legitimizing the leadership of older men for 
the younger, generationally rebellious SA rank and file. All three kinds 
of experience were held in high value, even awe by the postwar gen-
eration, and this surely allowed them to take direction from an older 
generation with which they were otherwise in conflict. 
Certainly, one of the most important contributions of this study is to 
redirect attention to the importance of the context, or "habitat," 
within which the Nazi Party developed. It did not thrive in a vacuum, 
but instead existed in a complex net of organizations and personal 
contacts. The same is almost certainly true of the other fascist par-
ties and political organizations that were so common in the interwar 
period. "Political," after all, means being situated in a social context 
and acting within the parameters and possibilities of that social con-
text. The history of a prominent or "successful" organization, such 
as the NSDAP, is also in part the history of all the small, marginal, 
and "unsuccessful" organizations that existed around it, but all too 
often this is forgotten. Indeed, while there is much left to know about 
the interaction of the NSDAP with its political environment, it is 
still probably the best contextualized of all the fascist parties. Much 
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is still unknown about others. Did they, too, grow out of a wider 
radical right-wing context, as the NSDAP did? Did they, too, grow by 
feeding off of their competitors? And if the answer to these questions 
is no, could the absence of a broader right-wing "ecology" be one 
reason why few ever succeeded in taking power? Much research re-
mains to be done. 
Another implication of this book for future research lies in the 
way the composition of the membership of political organizations or 
movements should be studied. What emerges most strikingly from a 
study of the careers of the highest leaders of the SA is the extreme 
importance of a process of evolution in their lives. Any explanation 
for why these men became Nazis and storm troopers that is 
monocausal, such as the theory that the free corps were the vanguard 
of Nazism, or that ignores a temporal progression in their activities 
is wholly inadequate and misleading. It is not enough to use infor-
mation about individuals that is drawn from one moment in their 
lives without taking into account the evolution and development of 
that individual over time and within a given but specific historical 
context if at all possible. Instead of giving static statements like "most 
storm troopers came from the war generation," this author's object 
has been to look at the political development of the highest SA lead-
ers in a dynamic fashion. The nature of these men can only be under-
stood by following them over time and by understanding that indi-
viduals change and develop and do not remain static. The concept of 
change, the entire temporal dimension, is after all at the very foun-
dation of the historical profession, and it is one of the key elements 
that makes it different from the other social and human sciences. 
To return to the context of the Weimar Republic, the findings 
of this book underscore the fatal consequences of the Republic's fail-
ure to create a broad consensus in its own support. For this, the na-
tional government itself must bear some of the responsibility insofar 
as it felt compelled to tolerate and even support the existence of the 
subculture of right-wing paramilitary and volkisch organizations out 
of which the Nazi Party gained its early strength. Granted, the insti-
tutions and leaders of the Weimar Republic should not be faulted for 
failing to foresee that the Nazi Party would one day be such a men-
ace while it was still just a tiny handful of true believers. Yet they 
can and must be criticized for failing to take more vigorous action 
against the whole subculture of the paramilitary radical right. That 
this entire demimonde posed a clear threat to the Republic was abun-
dantly clear and often the subject of public and private warnings.23 
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Faced with a clear and present threat to its borders and to domestic 
law and order (here often by the very people who were used to main-
tain it) on the one hand, yet bound by its own law (which incorpo-
rated the Versailles treaty) on the other hand, the Weimar Republic 
felt obligated to turn to private organizations and extralegal or even 
illegal means to fulfill its obligations and policies. Once the Repub-
lic broke its own laws, it was forced to tolerate and cover up any and 
all lawlessness of the private groups used to carry out its policy, re-
gardless of whether the ultimate ainis of the Republic and its 
extragovernmental agents were compatible.24 Thus the swamp of 
paramilitary conservatism was not dried but allowed to flourish, 
spreading its poison throughout the Republic. Many governments 
today would do well to heed this lesson. 
There are other lessons in this book that are applicable to mod-
ern groups like the Nazis or SA. Most modern democracies have 
within them tiny marginal parties or organizations on the far, far 
right of the political spectrum. Usually these groups espouse or are 
suspected of espousing the use of violence, and many are organized 
along paramilitary lines or are associated with separate paramilitary 
organizations. Thankfully, nearly all of these groups, be they in Ger-
many, France, the United States, Belgium, or some other modern 
democracy, are decidedly tiny and decidedly marginal. Their danger 
should not be overstated, but the same was once true of the NSDAP. 
Given a situation where there are many such groups (such as in the 
United States today), it should be clear that it is quite possible for 
many tiny groups to become one large organization in rather short 
order. The way the SA grew into a mass national organization, as 
demonstrated in the biographies of even a tiny subset of its leader-
ship, should inoculate anyone against underestimating the danger of 
any paramilitary organization dedicated to overthrowing the demo-
cratic system, however small. The practical lesson to be drawn from 
this book for those who are engaged in tracking and controlling such 
organizations today is that they should pay particular attention to 
the links and ties (however informal or personal) between such orga-
nizations, for these are the preconditions for sudden growth. 
Perhaps a more difficult lesson can be drawn from this study for 
the post-cold war era. In this time of military downsizing combined 
with a newly multipolar world system that seems to favor the erup-
tion of many small wars, revolutions, and "police actions," the un-
controlled spread of military hardware (both sophisticated and simple) 
is naturally a matter of great concern. The modern rash of small-
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scale conflict is often born of long-standing hatred (even if many of 
these "traditions" are, in fact, recent creations), but this hatred is 
fueled by the ready and almost limitless supply of arms. The prolif-
eration of military hardware has even become a matter of domestic 
concern in many peaceful countries, most notably in the debate over 
assault weapons in the United States beginning in the mid-1980s or 
in Australia in the mid-1990s. A lesson from this study of the SA 
leadership is that it may not be enough to simply monitor and try to 
restrict the supply of arms in a phys1cal sense. As shown by the men 
who became SA leaders, the presence of a large body of individuals 
trained in the organization and use of violence is as dangerous as the 
presence of the hardware itself. This is a very difficult lesson, for 
people in a free society cannot be controlled in the same way as hard-
ware, and their dangerous knowledge cannot be removed or controlled 
in the same way as the tools of their trade may be (given the political 
will to do so). It must also be acknowledged that most of these mili-
tary experts are loyal, honorable men and women who risked much 
and gave exemplary service defending and protecting their countries. 
They don't deserve suspicion, and yet they have certain skills that 
could prove quite dangerous indeed. At the very least, the practical 
lesson from this study is that special attention must be paid to the 
presence of former (or active) military personnel in any paramilitary 
organization not tightly under state control, and states might give 
some thought to limiting not only the amounts of military hardware 
they produce but also the numbers of men and women they train in 
their use. 
7 
Methodology 
The information used in this book comes from a variety of sources, 
but roughly 85 percent comes from personnel files or internal court 
documents prepared by the SA. Another 10 percent comes from other 
materials prepared by the NSDAP, contemporary documents such as 
obituaries in the Nazi Party press, or post facto memoirs. This infor-
mation was used in its "raw" form about individuals, but it was also 
summarized to build a database that was used to make statements 
about the entire group or significant parts of it. 
WHo Is IN THE DATABASE: DEFINITION oF SA RANKS 
Because the group studied here is defined by rank, and because of the 
SA's historical development, some further definition of ranks is nec-
essary. The rank of Stabschef is defined to include all of the actual 
day-to-day commanders of the SA, whether their formal title was 
Stabschef or Oberster SA-Fuhrer. The reasons for this are found in 
the development of the SA vis-a-vis the Party. Up until September 2, 
1930, the SA had its own commander in chief, called Oberster SA-
Fuhrer. When Oberster SA-Fuhrer Franz von Pfeffer resigned his post 
on August 29, 1930, Adolf Hitler himself assumed the title. He did 
not assume any of the day-to-day duties of running the SA, howeveri 
the chief of staff of the SA (Stabschef), who until then had performed 
the duties normally associated with a chief of staff in a military orga-
nization, took over the actual duties of commander. 1 At the time 
this had a great symbolic importance, but in practical terms it 
amounted only to a change in the official designation of the SA's 
commander. Thus, this study will contain Franz von Pfeffer and 
Hermann Goring, both Oberster SA-Fuhrer, and Otto Wagener, Viktor 
Lutze, and Ernst Rohm, all Stabschefs, but not Adolf Hitler. Although 
a very small group, the Oberster SA-Fuhrer/Stabschefs were natu-
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rally of extreme importance in running the SA. Note that they were 
all former officers, but they were also generally men with high Party 
positions alongside their SA activities (Lutze, von Pfeffer) or close 
friends of Hitler (Goring, Rohm). 
The SA Gruppenhihrer and Obergruppenfiihrer are the next two 
highest SA ranks, the generals of the SA. U.S. army intelligence tables 
of comparative ranks defined Gruppenfiihrer as the equivalent of 
major general and the higher Obergruppenfuhrer as the equivalent of 
lieutenant generaP As with the Stabschefs, the holders of the ranks 
of Gruppenfiihrer and Obergruppenfiihrer are defined rather broadly; 
they also include anyone who held the earlier rank of OSAF-
Stellvertreter (in use between February 8, 1929, and February 20, 
1931 ), which was superseded by the new rank of Gruppenfi.ihrer.3 
The numbers of Gruppenfiihrer and Obergruppenfiihrer are also rela-
tively small, given the size of the SA, yet they too held positions of 
great influence. Together, 172 active SA leaders held one of these 
two ranks. 
The emphasis above on active SA leaders is an important dis-
tinction. Originally, the SA awarded only functional, not nominal 
ranks. This meant that the commander of a Standarte (an SA unit 
much like a modern battalion in size but like a modern regiment in 
function), for example, held the rank of Standartenfiihrer, but only as 
long as he actually commanded the Standarte. If he lost or resigned 
his command, he reverted to being just a simple SA-man. Ranks in 
the SA were later put on a nominal basis by Ernst Rohm (Stabschef 
between January 5, 1931, and June 30, 1934), so that they could be 
held not only by the actual leaders of units but also by leaders in staff 
positions or even by honorary or inactive SA leaders. This study in-
cludes only active SA leaders, not those men who were awarded the 
rank of Gruppenfiihrer or Obergruppenfiihrer on an honorary basis. 
The SS was a subordinate part of the SA until July 1934. Conse-
quently, any SS leader who otherwise met the criteria of selection for 
this study before June 30, 1934, is included. This is only proper, since 
there were in fact more similarities than differences between the se-
nior leaders of the SA and those of the SS down through 1934, as this 
study makes clear. Not only did SA and SS Gruppenfiihrer and 
Obergruppenfiihrer come from remarkably similar backgrounds be-
fore July 1934, but many of them were found to have transferred from 
the SA to the SS or vice versa at some point in their careers. Among 
the early leaders of the SA and SS, just who ended up in which orga-
nization was often as much a matter of chance as anything else. 4 
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THE SAMPLE 
Most studies of this type use only a small subset, or sample, and then 
use statistical manipulation to make generalizations about the en-
tire group. This is not the case here. The specialized language of sam-
pling and statistics would technically call even a complete group a 
"sample," but it is only in this counterintuitive sense that the men 
analyzed in this book represent one. In fact, all who held one of the 
three highest ranks in the SA on an active basis (as defined above) are 
included. No one was left out, and no sophisticated sampling tech-
niques were used. The group analyzed is the highest leadership of 
the SA without any further qualification. Among other things, this 
approach has the advantage of avoiding many possible methodologi-
cal pitfalls concerning the rules to be followed in sample selection 
and the interpretation of statistical results. Any statistical statements 
made about this group will be only about the group itself, not some 
larger whole. There are no inferential statistics, only descriptive ones. 
This does not mean that all possible methodological problems 
have been eliminated. There are certain problems inherent in the 
types of data used and in the survival of information about the men 
in this study that must be mentioned. To begin with, it was impos-
sible to collect completely uniform data on every individual. Infor-
mation was available for some that was not available for others. Many 
records from the SA and other National Socialist organizations were 
destroyed in bombing raids on Munich and later in fighting in Ba-
varia at war's end. This can essentially be considered random and 
should not affect the validity of any results from this study. A more 
difficult problem arises from the fact that some records were deliber-
ately destroyed by the Nazis in a more systematic manner. This is 
particularly true of records pertaining to the victims of the R6hm 
Purge. Much of this information could be obtained or reconstructed 
from other sources, since the men affected were all prominent SA 
leaders and public figures, but the possibility of important gaps must 
still be recognized. Alas, historical data are often not as perfect as the 
rules of statistical analysis would require, but this should not stand 
in the way of making the best use of the most data available. Every 
attempt has been made to verify any data coming from nonprimary 
sources and to ensure that the data are as complete as possible. Be-
yond that, all that can be done is to keep in mind that potential dis-
tortions may exist and to point out places where the available data 
are particularly thin or open to distortion. While this is not ideal, the 
Methodology 157 
fact that only descriptive statistics are used makes the situation less 
problematic. 
THE SOURCES 
The most important sources for this study are found among the col-
lections of National Socialist documents and records held in the 
former Berlin Document Center (BDCL now later known as the 
Bundesarchiv AuBenstelle Berlin-Zehlendor£.5 (For the sake of sim-
plicity, it will be referred to as BDC.) Roughly 90 percent of the infor-
mation used in this study came from documents in the BDC. 
The Berlin Document Center housed a vast collection of bio-
graphical Nazi records originally collected by the United States dur-
ing and after the Second World War for intelligence purposes and 
later for denazification. After the war, material captured by the Brit-
ish and French was added. The collection remained under U.S. con-
trol (specifically, the State Department as a part of the U.S. mission 
to Berlin)6 until July 1994, when it was officially returned to the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany. 7 The documents themselves were housed 
in an underground bunker complex topped with what looks like an 
ordinary house in a wealthy, wooded suburb in the far southwestern 
part of Berlin. Ironically, the complex originally was built to house a 
central telephone tapping and domestic intelligence center run by 
Hermann Goring. Today, only the barbed wire and armed guards dis-
turb the tranquility of the setting in which the BDC sat. 
Within the BDC are over twenty-five separate groups or collec-
tions of documents, few of which build well-defined homogeneous 
collections in the normal archival sense. Instead, they usually con-
tain documents from several or even many different provenances and 
organizations. The exact origin of many documents is impossible to 
determine with certainty today. Apparently, many former separate 
collections of documents were simply combined into one large group 
on the basis of their pertinence to a particular Nazi organization. 
Nearly all groups of documents have been filed alphabetically. In 
general, historians using the BDC submit names and dates of birth of 
the individuals whose records they wish to consult, and the staff of 
the BDC goes through all twenty-five or more groups of records and 
presents the visitor with all of the documents in the BDC that relate 
to a particular individual. (This archaic system was recently com-
puterized through the herculean efforts of the outgoing U.S. director, 
David Marwell, but until reorganization plans are put into effect by 
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the Bundesarchiv, the complex and often arbitrary internal division 
of the collections remains.) There is often little or no indication of 
which group of records a given piece of information or document 
belongs to within the BDC magazine, and it is only through experi-
ence and talking with the BDC staff that information about the dif-
ferent record groups and how they came to be built can be deter-
mined. Despite this, several groups of records within the BDC stand 
out as being particularly useful for this study. 
Two groups of SA records exist in the BDC. One is called the 
Allgemeine Personalakten (general personnel records) or simply AP 
Akten. This is misleading, since actual personnel records make up 
only a small part of this group. Those that are present in it include 
only some SA administrative or medical officers and a handful of 
active SA-Fuhrer, mostly from southern German SA-Gruppen. There 
does not seem to be even a full set from any SA-Gruppe. Dominating 
this collection are the case records of the Sondergericht (special court) 
der Obersten SA-Fiihrung and its successor, the Disziplinargericht 
(disciplinary court) der Obersten SA-Fiihrung. Mixed in are older 
records going back at least as far as 1930, which seem also to have 
come into the keeping of the Gerichts- und Rechtsamt (SA Court 
and Legal Department) at a later date, since they mostly document 
internal investigations, mutinies, etc. All of the records in the AP 
collection are arranged alphabetically in 777 loose-leaf notebooks of 
a type common in Germany called Leitz-Ordner. Each notebook con-
tains 400-500 pages. 8 
A larger group of records is called the SA Vorgange (proceed-
ings). It contains a wide spectrum of materials ranging from a single 
file card containing hardly more than a name to over 400 pages per 
individual. Less than twelve pages per individual is certainly the norm. 
Although the BDC staff considered this to be a group of SA records 
and the majority of the records do in fact come from the SA, it also 
contains material from the National Socialist Automobile Corps 
(NSAK), National Socialist Flying Corps (NSFK), Organisation Todt, 
and NSDAP, to list just the salient elements.9 The SA Vorgange are 
also filed alphabetically, and they occupy 4,074 Leitz-Ordner. The 
most important records are the various types of internal SA ques-
tionnaires. Most probably once formed a separate collection of per-
sonnel files that were centrally stored at SA headquarters in Munich 
for all SA leaders of the rank of Standartenfiihrer and above. These 
questionnaires were the backbone of this study. 
A third major collection that was frequently consulted was that 
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of SS Offiziers-Akten (SS officer files), a collection of SS personnel 
files on over 60,000 SS leaders. These dossiers are generally com-
plete, although the collection does not include dossiers from all SS-
Fiihrer who ever existed. Other groups of records that were especially 
helpful include the NSDAP Central Membership Card Files, the so-
called Parteikanzlei Korrespondenz (Party Chancellory Correspon-
dence), and records from the Oberstes Parteigericht der NSDAP (Su-
preme Nazi Party Court) and the Untersuchungs- und Schlichtungs-
ausschuss der NSDAP (Investigation and Mediation Committee).10 
Another source consulted at both the BDC and the Bundesarchiv 
in Koblenz is the so-called Schumacher Sammlung (Schumacher 
Collection). This began as a random assortment of nonbiographical 
documents that a BDC employee, Herr Schumacher, found in bio-
graphical files and brought together for internal use. It was organized 
topically. This collection eventually occupied several hundred Leitz-
Ordner and was later returned to the Bundesarchiv. Duplicate docu-
ments and copies of particularly useful materials were kept in the 
BDC for internal use, and additions were made to the BDC version 
even after the bulk of the collection was returned to the Federal Re-
public." The Bundesarchiv recently broke up its Schumacher Col-
lection and reorganized it according to provenance, making any ear-
lier references to the Schumacher Collection in the Bundesarchiv in 
Koblenz useless. For this reason, when reference has been made here 
to Schumacher materials, the reference is to the BDC version wher-
ever possible, since it still remains in its "original" form. 
Other sources that deserve mention were the eyewitness ac-
counts and other rare contemporary sources at the Institut fiir 
Zeitgeschichte in Munich and various government and NSDAP/SA 
records in the Bundesarchiv and Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv in 
Freiburg. These were supplemented with published sources includ-
ing newspapers (Volkische Beobachter and the SA-Mann), Reichstag 
handbooks, contemporary who's who guides such as Das Deutsche 
Fiihrerlexikon, 12 and published officers' seniority lists from the Im-
perial Army, Reichswehr, and SS.13 
THE DATABASE 
A standardized body of information developed by the author was col-
lected for each individual and later quantified in a database. Usually, 
the information in the SA questionnaires sufficed to fill in all the 
individual categories of information, but in many cases, this was 
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supplemented with additional information from one of the other ar-
chival sources mentioned above. In very rare cases (such as the case 
of Ernst Rohm and some others killed in the Rohm Purge), the only 
information available was from published primary or even second-
ary sources. All of this information was carefully verified. In all cases 
where information was missing or could not be verified, it was left 
blank in the database. 
The database was constructed using the popular software pack-
age dBase III+. The structure of the database is too long to be repro-
duced here; it eventually grew to encompass five database files, each 
with over a hundred pieces of information. Aside from basic biographi-
cal information, it includes all of the known organizational activi-
ties of the men included from 1914 to 1945. For the crucial period 
from the end of 1918 to the end of 1935 this information was re-
corded on a quarterly basis. In this way, the database permitted the 
activities of the men in question and the changes in those activities 
over time to be measured. The ability to see both dynamic and static 
relationships within the data is one of the most distinguishing fac-
tors of this study. 
All numerical information about groups comes from this data-
base and is not usually cited separately. Any statements or informa-
tion about individuals is cited in the usual manner, though once again, 
it almost always comes from the BDC files about that individual. 
Originally, the author had intended to do a statistical study on 
the entire SA. Although this proved impractical, it meant that raw 
data were collected not only on the 1 78 individuals in this present 
study but also on a further 2,500 SA leaders and men of all levels of 
rank. The records of close to twice that many SA members had to be 
read in order to collect all this data. Although none of this supple-
mental data is used directly in this study, it inevitably colors the 
overall interpretation of the SA, its policies, and its leadership. While 
each individual file by itself may not have brought any new insights 
into the makeup of the SA, when taken together they do provide an 
impression of the personnel politics, makeup, and structure of the 
SA, at least from 1932 to 1939. All of this information is difficult to 
quantify or cite individually, but arguably it has played a major role 
in the author's understanding of the SA and its members and thus in 
the process whereby many of the conclusions in this study have been 
reached. 
Appendix A 
The Organization of the SA 
SA ORGANIZATION, 1923 
Oberste SA-Fuhrung 
Hundertschaft 
Zug (3 Gruppen or 23 men) 
Gruppe (9 men) 
Gausturm 
Brigade 
Standarte 
Sturm 
Trupp 
Gruppe 
SA ORGANIZATION 19261 
(as of fall1927 there were 18 Gausturme) 
(2-5 Standarten) 
(2-5 Sturme) 
(2-4 Trupps) 
(5-8 Gruppen) 
(6-12 men) 
SA ORGANIZATION 19312 
Oberste SA-Fiihrung 
Gruppe (1 or more Untergruppen, not more than 15,000 
men) 
Untergruppe (Gausturm) 
Standarte (1,000-3,000 men/several Sturmbanne) 
Sturmbann (250-600 men/several Sturme) 
Sturm (70-200 men/2+ Trupps) 
Trupp (20-60 men/3-6 Scharen) 
Schar (4-12 men) 
(formerly Gruppe) 
162 
OSAF 
Obergruppe 
Gruppe 
Untergruppe 
Standarte 
Sturmbann 
Sturm 
Trupp 
Schar 
OSAF 
Obergruppe 
Gruppe 
Brigade 
Standarte 
Sturmbann 
Sturm 
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SA ORGANIZATION 19323 
(several Gruppen) 
(several Untergruppen, not more than 
30,000 men) 
(several Standarten) 
(several Sturmbanne/1,200-3,000 men) 
(several Stiirme/250-600 men) 
(2+ Trupps/60-150 men) 
(3 Scharenfup to 50 men) 
(4-16 men) 
SA ORGANIZATION 19354 
(usually 4) 
(usually 3 plus 2 reserve Standarten) 
(3) 
(4) 
1. SABE 6, "Gliederung" of November 6, 1926, in NSDAP Hauptarchiv, 
folder 302 (as filmed by the Hoover Institution at the BDC, microfilm roll 
16). 
2. OSAF I no. 208/31 of February 20, 1931, ErlaB no. 2 Betr: Gliederung 
der SA in BAK Schumacher Collection, Ordner 404. 
3. NSDAP, Oberste SA-FiihrunK Dienstvorschrift fur die SA der 
NSDAP, 2 vols. (Diessen vor Miinchen: Jos. Huber, 1932t 28-35. 
4. OSAF F no. 220/95geh. of February 27, 1935 (Geheim!) in 
Schumacher Collection, Ordner 404. 
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Equivalent Ranks 
SA German Army U.S. Army 
Oberster Sa-Fuhrer 
Stabschef der SA Generaloberst General 
Obergruppenfiihrer General Lieutenant general 
Gruppenfiihrer Generalleutnant Major general 
Brigadefiihrer Generalmajor Brigadier general 
0 berfiihrer 
Standartenfiihrer Oberst Colonel 
0 bersturmbannfiihrer Oberstleutnant Lieutenant colonel 
Sturmbannfiihrer Major Major 
Hauptsturmfuhrer Hauptmann Captain 
Obersturmfuhrer Oberleutnant First lieutenant 
S turmfiihrer Leutnant Lieutenant 
Haupttruppfiihrer Stabsfeldwebel Sergeant major 
Obertruppfiihrer Oberfeldwebel Master sergeant 
Truppfiihrer Feldwebel Technical sergeant 
0 berscharfiihrer Unterfeldwebel Staff sergeant 
Scharfiihrer Unteroffizier Sergeant 
Rottenfiihrer Gefreiter Corporal 
Obersturmmann Obersoldat Private first class 
Sturmmann (SA-Mann) Soldat Private 
Appendix C 
Men Included in This Study 
The following 178 men are included in this study. Each occupied one 
of the top three levels of rank in the SA on an active basis. The names 
of these ranks changed over time, but from 1932 to 1945 they were 
Stabschef, Obergruppenfuhrer, and Gruppenfuhrer in descending or-
der. Their biographical information, drawn mainly from SA person-
nel files, was entered into a database and used to make general state-
ments about the group. See chapter 7 for further information. 
* = Indicates that a short biography is found in the text. 
Number in parentheses refers to a man's position in the group photo 
on page 3. 
Aster, Richard Arthur * 
Bauer, Franz Bernhard August 
Beckerle, Adolf-Heinz (19) 
Beissner, Ernst Friedrich 
Bennecke, Hans Heinrich * 
Bergmann, Robert 
Bock, Franz 
Bockenhauer, Arthur (20) 
Boehmcker, Johann Heinrich (4) 
Boetel, Erich Hans Jiirgen 
Borner, Reinhard 
Brauneck, Hermann Max-Gustav 
Bruckner, Friedrich Wilhelm 
Buch, Walter 
Burger, August 
Caspary, Carl * 
Czerwinski, Bruno 
Daiber, Axel Johannes 
Da1uege, Kurt Max Franz 
Dame, Wilhelm 
Damian, Friedrich Leopold 
Darn~, Walter Richard 
Dechant, Georg Hugo * 
Detten, Georg von 
Diehl, Edmund 
Dietrich, Josef (Sepp) 
Dincklage, Karl 
Dittler, Wilhelm 
Dornemann, Karl Friedrich 
Dressler, Albert 
Eberstein, Karl Friedrich Freiherr 
von 
Ernst, Karl 
Fassbach, Paul 
Fenz, Friedrich Josef 
Fichte, Ernst Ludwig 
Fichte, Werner von 
Finck von Finckenstein, Heinrich-
Georg Wilhelm Graf 
Frank, Hans 
Friedrich, Hans ( 11) 
Fuchs, Johann Baptist * 
Fust, Herbert Robert Gerhard * (12) 
Gaudin, Heinrich Albert Wilhelm 
Giesler, Paul 
Girgensohn, Thomas Otto Harald * 
Gontermann, Leonhard 
Grantz, Gunther 
Guembel, Otto Karl 
Gunther, Kurt Wilhelm 
Haas, Karl Erwin 
Hacker, Elias Gustav Heinrich 
Haltern, Friedrich 
Hanke, Franz 
Hasse, Albert Erich Max 
Haug, Gustav Emil Walther 
Hayn, Hans 
Heiden, Erhard 
Heines, Edmund 
Heinz, Karl Hermann Rudolf Albert 
Heissmeyer, August Friedrich 
Heitmuller, Walter Willy August 
Helfer, Wilhelm (6) 
Helldorf, Wolf Heinrich Graf von 
Herzog, Otto (15) 
Hess, Ludwig Arthur 
Heydebreck, Hans Peter von 
Heydrich, Reinhard 
Hierl, Konstantin 
Himmler, Heinrich 
Hocheisen, Paul Friedrich Karl 
Hoevel, Walter 
Hofmann, Bernhard 
Hofmann, Hans-Georg 
Holthoff, Paul * 
Hi:iraut Franz Ritter von 
Huhnlein, Adolf 
Ivers, Otto Wilhelm Georg 
Jagow, Dietrich Wilhelm Bernhard 
von (18) 
Jahn, Wilhelm 
Jaster, Oscar Martin 
Jeckeln, Friedrich 
Jensen, Hermann 
Juttner, Max Paul Wilhelm 
Werner* (9) 
Kappelmeyer, Eduard 
Kasche, Siegfried Karl Viktor 
Johannes (24) 
Ketterer, Emil ( 8) 
Killinger, Manfred Freiherr von 
Knickmann, Heinrich August (14) 
Kob, Adolf Hajo Oltmann 
Korner, Karl 
Korsemann, Gerret 
Kraft, Karl 
Krausser, Fritz Ritter von 
Kruger, Friedrich Wilhelm 
Kuhme, Kurt 
Lasch, Kurt Arno 
Lauerbach, Fritz 
Lauterbacher, Hartmann 
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Lehmann, Friedrich Wilhelm Max * 
Lehmann, Hans 
Liebel, Willy * 
Linsmayer, Max 
Litzmann, Karl-Siegmund 
Hermann Julius (28) 
Lohmann, Johannes 
Lorenz, Werner 
Lucke, Karl Friedrich Wilhelm * 
Ludin, Hans Elard (1) 
Luetgebrune, Walter 
Lukesch, Hans Iva* 
Lutze, Viktor (27) 
Luyken, Max Otto (22) 
Manthey, Arno (16) 
Mappes, Georg Friedrich 
Marnitz, Meinhard Johannes 
Marxer, Otto (26) 
May, Franz 
Meyer-Quade, Joachim (5) 
Michaelis, Rudolf 
Mi:irchen, Wilhelm * 
Morozowisc, Hans E1ard von 
Mi:islinger, August 
Murr, Wilhelm 
Neufville, Georg von 
Nibbe, Walter 
Oberdieck, Georg 
Obernitz, Hans-Gunther von (13) 
Ohrt, Lorenz Karl * 
Pagels, Eberhard * 
Petersen, Hans * 
Pfeffer, Franz von * 
Flesch, Kurt Karl Friedrich 
Prutzmann, Hans-Adolf 
Raecke, Horst 
Rakobrandt, Arthur (2) 
Reimann, Erich Herrmann Julius 
Reiner, Rolf 
Reinhard, Wilhelm Adolf 
Reschny, Hermann 
Riecke, Hans-Joachim Ernst 
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Rigl, Robert Emil 
Ri:ihm, Ernst * 
Schepmann, Wilhelm (23) 
Schirach, Baldur von 
Schmauser, Ernst-Heinrich 
Schmid, Wilhelm 
Schmuck, Ludwig Julius Albert * 
Schneider, Albert 
Schneider, Georg Karl Friedrich 
Wilhelm 
Schneidhuber, August 
Schoene, Heinrich August (7) 
Schorlemer, Wilhelm Freiherr von 
Schormann, Robert August 
Wilhelm 
Schragmuller, Konrad 
Schramme, Otto ( 17) 
Schreyer, Karl * 
Schulz, Paul Gustav 
Schulze, Walter 
Seidel-Dittmarsch, Siegfried 
Seydel, Josef 
Spaing, Heinz 
Stegmann, Wilhelm 
Steinhoff, Emil ( 10) 
Stennes, Walter 
Stephani, Franz von 
Strasser, Gregor 
Tschammer und Osten, Hans von 
Turk, Oskar 
Uhland, Ludwig Adolf Gustav 
Ulrich, Kurt Albert Paul Harris von * 
Vielstich, Fritz Johann Albert Ernst 
Vogel, Hans-Josef 
Wagenbauer, Richard 
Wagener, Otto* 
Wagner, Gerhard 
Waldeck-Pyrmont, Josias Georg 
Erbprinz zu 
Walter, Otto Max 
Weinreich, Hans 
Weitzel, Fritz Philip 
Wittje, Curt 
Woyrsch, Udo von 
Zunkel, Gustav (21) 
Glossary 
Abitur: The most prestigious of several certificates awarded after pass-
ing exams at the end of secondary schooling in Germany. Tradi-
tionally it allowed entry into the university in any subject. 
Abteilung Organisation und Einsatz: Department for Organization 
and Operation in the OSAF. 
Akten: Records, files, dossiers. 
Alte Kampfer: "Old Fighters," members of the NSDAP before it came 
to power. 
AnschluK The unification of Germany and Austria in 1938. 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft: Labor collective. Formed by former members 
of the free corps as a means of finding employment and remain-
ing together as a (covert) military force. 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Nord- und West-deutschen Gaue: Working 
Association of the North and West German Gaue. An informal 
association of North- and West German Nazi Party leaders, 1925-
26. 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der vaterliindischen Kampfverbiinde: Working 
Group of Patriotic Combat Organizations. A cartel of radical 
Wehrverbiinde formed in Munich in 1923 of which the NSDAP 
was a part. 
Berlin Document Center: Major archive of biographical information 
from the National Socialist period collected by the Allies dur-
ing and after the war. Under U.S. administration until1994. 
Black Reichswehr: System of illegal military reinforcements formed 
by the Reichswehr from 1919 to the early 1920s, with the help 
of the Arbeitsgemeinschaften and the Wehrverbiinde. 
Brigade: SA unit between Gruppe and Standarte. 
Brigadehihrer: SA, SS, or NSKK brigadier general. 
Bund Oberland: A largely Bavarian Wehrverband formed out of the 
free corps of the same name. The major ally of the NSDAP dur-
ing the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923. 
Bund Wiking: Aboveground Wehrverband formed by Hermann 
Ehrhardt and led by former members of his free corps. 
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Bundesarchiv: German Federal Archives, headquarted in Koblenz. 
Bundesarchiv-Militiirarchiv: Military branch of the German Federal 
Archives in Freiburg. 
Chef des Ausbildungswesens (Chef-AW): A covert organization based 
on, but separate from, the SA and designed to train young men 
(mostly students) in military skills, 1933-35. 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP): German Workers' Party, the original 
name of the NSDAP. Founded in Munich in January 1919. 
Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF): The National Socialist Labor Organi-
zation. 
Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP): German People's Party. A small conser-
vative party in the Weimar Republic just to the left of the DNVP. 
Deutscher Kampfbund: German Alliance for Struggle. A cartel of radi-
cal organizations including the NSDAP formed September 1, 
1923, to force the overthrow of the Weimar Republic. 
Deutscher Tag (German Day): A type of nationalist festival often cel-
ebrated in the early 1920s. 
Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP): German National People's 
Party. The largest traditional conservative political party in the 
Weimar Republic. 
Deutschsozialistische Partei (DSP): German Socialist Party. A 
volkisch political organization and sometime rival of the 
NSDAP. 
Deutschvolkische Freiheitsbewegung (DVFB): German Volkisch Free-
dom Movement. Volkisch organization formed to continue the 
volkisch movement after the NSDAP and several other similar 
organizations were banned in the wake of the failed Beer Hall 
Putsch. 
Deutschvolkische Freiheitspartei (DVFP): German Volkisch Freedom 
Party. A volkisch political organization and sometime competi-
tor of the NSDAP. 
Deutschvolkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund: German Volkisch De-
fense and Defiance League. A radical volkisch organization in 
the early Weimar Republic. 
Disziplinargericht der Obersten SA-Fiihrung: SA Disciplinary Court. 
An internal SA court system. 
Einjiihriger Freiwilliger: A type of officer cadet in the German Em-
pire. Young men of good social background were allowed to 
volunteer as officer cadets for one year in lieu of their obliga-
tory military service, but had to pay for their own equipment 
and uniforms. 
Einwohnerwehr: Part-time civil guard formed in Germany under 
government auspices during the German Revolution. 
Feme: Informal system of "justice" designed to root out suspected 
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informants and maintain the secrecy of the Black Reichswehr 
and other illegal rearmament measures. 
Fememord: A murder committed by the Feme. 
Freikorps (Free Corps): Temporary, voluntary military formation 
formed by the German army and navy during the 1919 revolu-
tion. 
Freikorps Ehrhardt: One of the largest, most radical, and most impor-
tant free corps led by Captain Hermann Ehrhardt. 
Freikorps Epp: A large Bavarian free corps led by General Franz Ritter 
von Epp. 
Freiwilliger Arbeitsdienst (FAD): Voluntary Labor Service. A state-
sponsored but voluntary labor service designed to combat un-
employment during the Great Depression in Germany. Ances-
tor of the compulsory Reich Labor Service (RAD). 
Frontbann: A 11Super" Wehrverband founded in 1924 by a number of 
nationalist leaders including Ernst Rohm. 
Gau: Large regional division of the NSDAP. (The term was used by 
other organizations as well.) 
Gauleiter: Powerful head of a regional division (Gau) of the NSDAP. 
Gausturm: An intermediate-level SA unit, usually containing sev-
eral Standarten and from 1930 to 1933 grouping the SA resources 
of an entire Gau. 
Gerichts- und Rechtsabteilung: The Legal Department within the 
OSAF, which included a system of internal SA courts. 
Gleichschaltung: The 11 Coordination" (takeover or elimination) of 
private and state organizations by the NSDAP beginning in 1933. 
Grenzschutz: 1. Military formations used to defend German borders 
(especially in the east and northeast) during the German Revo-
lution. 2. Covert Reichswehr system of illegal reinforcements, 
arms depots, and training designed to slow an eventual enemy 
attack, particularly in the east. From the early 1920s to the mid-
1930s. 
GroGdeutsche Arbeiterpartei (GDAP): Greater German Labor Party. 
A small volkisch party. 
GroGdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft (GDVG): Greater German People's 
Community. Volkisch organization formed to continue the 
volkisch movement after the NSDAP and several other similar 
organizations were banned in the wake of the failed Beer Hall 
Putsch. 
GroGer Generalstab: Great General Staff. The general staff of the 
Imperial Army. 
Grundsiitzliche Anordnung der SA (Grusa): Fundamental SA regula-
tion. Series of orders issued by von Pfeffer under Hitler's signa-
ture, beginning in May 1927. Repeated and interpreted von 
Pfeffer's earlier SA orders (SABE). 
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Gruppe: 1. Section. The basic building block of the SA, 1927-31. 
(Rohm later changed the name to Schar). A group of three to 
thirteen men. 2. A large regional SA unit. 
Gruppenfuhrer (Gruf.): SA, SS, or NSKK major general. 
Gruppenstab zur besonderen Verwendung: Gruppe Staff for Special 
Duties, a secret staff unit within the SA intended to coordinate 
general relations and especially covert military training with 
the Reichswehr. 
Gymnasium: A type of secondary school in the German-speaking 
countries designed to prepare its pupils for university study or 
higher administrative positions. 
Handelsschule: A high school that concentrates on business skills. 
Heimwehr: An Austrian Wehrverband. 
Hilfspolizei: Auxiliary police created from SA, SS, and Stahlhelm 
members in 1933. 
Hundertschaft: Century. The pre-Beer Hall Putsch model for the 
Standarte. 
Institut fur Zeitgeschichte (IfZ): Institute for Contemporary History, 
Munich. A research center. 
Jungdeutscher Orden (Jungdo): A Wehrverband. 
Jungstahlhelm: Division of the Stahlhelm for young nonveterans. 
Kadettenanstalt: A military academy of the Imperial German or 
Austro-Hungarian army. 
Kampfzeit: The "time of struggle," the period from the founding of 
the Nazi Party to its ascension to power in January 1933. 
Kraftfahrstaffeln: SA or SS motor vehicle units. 
Kreisleiter: Head of a Nazi Party district, or Kreis, the equivalent of a 
county. 
Kyffhiiuserbund: A large German veterans' organization. 
Landesfuhrer: A Stahlhelm regional or state leader. 
Machtergreifung: The Nazi "seizure of power," January 1933. 
Marine-Stiirme: SA naval units. 
Nachrichtenstaffeln: SA or SS communications troops. 
Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalt (Napola): National Political 
Education Institute. A national school for future leaders estab-
lished by the NSDAP. 
Nationalsozialistische Automobilkorps (NSAK): National Socialist 
Automobile Corps. A Nazi Party organization under the SA for 
motor vehicle owners and enthusiasts. Ancestor of the NSKK. 
Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganisation (NSBO): National 
Socialist Industrial Cell Organization. A Nazi labor organiza-
tion. 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP): National 
Socialist German Workers' Party, also known as the Nazi Party. 
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Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Frontkiimpferbund (NSDF): Na-
tional Socialist German Association of Combat Veterans. 
Formed in March 1934 to replace the Stahlhelm. 
Nationalsozialistische Deutscher Juristen-Bund (NSDJB): National 
Socialist German Association of Jurists. A Nazi Party organiza-
tion for jurists. 
Nationalsozialistische Fliegerkorps (NSFK): National Socialist Ger-
man Flying Corps. A Nazi Party organization for flying enthusi-
asts. 
Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung (NSFB): National Social-
ist Freedom Movement. Organization formed to continue the 
volkisch movement after the NSDAP and several other similar 
organizations were banned in the wake of the failed Beer Hall 
Putsch. 
Nationalsozialistische Kraftfahrkorps (NSKK): National Socialist 
Motor Vehicle Corps. Originally a Nazi Party organization un-
der the SA for motor vehicle enthusiasts, it later became inde-
pendent. 
Nationalverband Deutscher Offiziere: National Union of German 
Officers. A radical veterans' organization. 
Oberfuhrer: SA, SS, and NSKK rank between colonel and brigadier 
general. 
Obergruppenfuhrer (Ogruf.): SA, SS, or NSKK lieutenant general. 
Oberste SA-Fuhrer (OSAF): Supreme SA leader. 
Oberste SA-Fuhrung (OSAF): The SA high command. 
Oberstes Parteigericht der NSDAP (OPG): Supreme Nazi Party Court. 
Offizierstellvertreter: A rank created during the First World War in 
the German army. A noncommissioned officer acting as an of-
ficer. 
Organisation Consul (OC): An underground organization under the 
auspices of Hermann Ehrhardt formed by former members of 
his free corps. Designed to infiltrate and unite the entire 
Wehrverband and nationalist movement with the goal of over-
throwing the Weimar Republic. Classed as a Wehrverband in 
this study. 
Organisation Todt (OT): A paramilitary construction and transport 
organization formed during the Third Reich. 
Ortsgruppenleiter: Head of a local chapter, or Ortsgruppe, of the 
NSDAP. 
OSAF-Stellvertreter: Powerful regional SA commander. First insti-
tuted in 1928 and replaced in February 1931 by the position of 
Gruppenfuhrer. 
Personalbogen fur Veriinderungen und Ergiinzungen nach erfollgter 
Ausfullung des Personalfragebogens: One of two questionnaires 
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used to supplement the information in the SA-Personal-
fragebogen. 
Personalfragebogen fur die Anlegung der SA-Personalakte: Question-
naire used for all SA-Fuhrer from Standartenfuhrer and above 
and for all full- time SA-Fuhrer of lower rank. This was the most 
complete SA questionnaire. Used from late 1936 to 1945. 
Personalhauptamt: The main office for personnel in the OSAF. 
Politische Organisation (PO): The political organization of the 
NSDA~ in contrast to the paramilitary affiliates, such as the 
SA. 
Rasse- und Siedlungs-Hauptamt: Race and settlement headquarters, 
a part of the SS high command. 
Realschule: A type of secondary school in Germany less prestigious 
and rigorous than the Gymnasium and designed to prepare pu-
pils for technical or practical occupations. 
Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD): Reich Labor Service. A compulsory labor 
service formed by the German government during the Third 
Reich. 
Reichsbanner: Left-wing Wehrverband close to the German Social 
Democratic Party. 
Reichsflagge: A mainly Bavarian Wehrverband. 
Reichskriegsflagge: A mainly Bavarian Wehrverband formed by a se-
cession from the Reichsflagge. 
Reichsluftschutzbund: Reich Civil Defense Association. A semipri-
vate civil defense association during the Third Reich. 
Reichsorganisationsleiter: Reich Leader of Organization. The deputy 
of Adolf Hitler in charge of Party organization. Position held by 
Gregor Stra~er until his dismissal from the Party in 1932. 
Reichsparteitag: The yearly Nazi Party rally in Nuremberg. 
Reichszeugsmeisterei: A part of the OSAF maintaining a system of 
sales outlets for uniforms and equipment of the SA and SS. 
Rohm Purge: Purge of the SA leadership June 30 1934. Led to the 
murder of nearly ninety individuals, including Rohm and anum-
ber of top SA leaders. Also known as the "Night of the Long 
Knives." 
SA-Befehl (SABE): SA Orders. Fundamental orders relating to the or-
ganization and use of the SA issued by von Pfeffer between 
November 1, 1926, and February 1927. 
SA-Fuhrer-Fragebogen: Questionnaire used for SA-Fuhrer from May 
1934 to 1936. Long but not as detailed as the Personalfragebogen. 
SA Gruppen-Schule: An SA school for lower-level leaders. 
SA-Hochschulamt: A division within the OSAF designed to coordi-
nate SA efforts in the universities and schools of higher learn-
ing, particularly covert military training. 
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SA-Personalbogen furVeranderungen und Erganzungen nach erfolgter 
Ausfullung des Personalfragebogens: One of two questionnaires 
used to supplement the information in the SA-Personal-
fragebogen. 
SA Reichsfuhrerschule: National school for mid- and upper-level SA 
leaders. 
SA-Reserve (SAR): The SA reserve. 
Saalschutz Abteilung: A precursor of the SA founded by Emil Maurice 
on or shortly after February 24, 1920, in Munich. 
Sekundareife: A secondary school degree which allowed a young man 
to fulfill his military service obligation as a one-year voluntary 
officer cadet. 
Selbstschutz Oberschlesiens (SSOS): Upper Silesian Self-Defense. An 
armed self-defense organization formed to defend German in-
terests in the contested border region of Upper Silesia. 
Schar: Section. The basic building block of the SA. A group of three 
to thirteen men. 
Schumacher Sammlung: Miscellaneous nonbiographical documents 
first collected in the Berlin Document Center and later trans-
ferred to the Bundesarchiv. 
Schutz- und Trutzbund (German-Volkisch Defense and Defiance 
League): One of the earliest volkisch organizations to achieve 
national prominence during the German Revolution and one of 
the most radically antisemitic. Founded in 1919 and banned in 
1922, although individual gruops hung on illegally for several 
more years. 
Schutzstaffel (SS): Elite paramilitary affiliate of the NSDAP founded 
in 1925 and later headed by Heinrich Himmler. Administered 
as part of the SA until 1934, when it became independent and 
eclipsed the SA in power and importance. First intended to pro-
vide bodyguards for Party leaders, it later ran the concentration 
camps and formed a "fourth branch" of the German armed forces 
(the Waffen-SS). 
Sicherheitspolizei: A kind of militarized police formed in the early 
Weimar Republic, which absorbed many former soldiers. 
Sondergericht der Obersten SA-Fuhrung: A special court system set 
up to carry out an internal purge of the SA in the wake of the 
Rohm Purge. Succeeded by the Disziplinargericht der Obersten 
SA-Fuhrung. 
Stabschef: Chief of Staff; actual head of SA from 1930 on. 
Stahlhelm: The largest veterans' organization in the Weimar Repub-
lic, it also functioned as a Wehrverband. Absorbed by the SA in 
1933-34. 
Standarte: SA unit between Sturmbann and Brigade. 
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Standartenfuhrer (Staf.): SA, SS, and NSKK rank between Obersturm-
bannfuhrer and Oberfuhrer; SA, SS, or NSKK colonel. 
Stegmann Revolt: A conflict between the SA Leader of Central 
Franconia, Wilhelm Stegmann, and the Gauleiter of Central 
Franconia, Julius Streicher, in January 1933. 
Stennes Revolt: Mutiny of OSAF-Stellvertreter Ost Walther Stennes 
in the spring of 1931. 
Sturm: Company. An SA, SS, or NSKK unit made up of several Trupps. 
Sturmabteilung (SA): 1. Mass paramilitary affiliate of the Nazi Party. 
Also called Brown Shirts or Storm troops. 2. Special assault troops 
formed in the Imperial German Army during the First World 
War. 
Sturmbann: SA, SS, or NSKK unit containing several Sturme. 
Tannenberg Bund: A volkisch organization very close to the 
Wehrverbande, led by former general Eric Ludendorff. 
Trupp: Troop. An SA or SS unit made up of several Scharen. 
Turn- und Sport Abteilung: Gymnastics and Sports Division. The 
official name of the first SA, founded on August 3, 1921. 
Unterfuhrer: Noncommissioned officer in the SA, SS, or NSKK. 
Untergruppe: SA unit between Sturm and Gruppe, which became 
the Brigade. Often coterminious with a Gausturm. 
Untersuchungs- und SchlichtungsausschuG: Investigation and Me-
diation Committee of the NSDAP. An internal Nazi Party orga-
nization formed to arbitrate disputes and investigate problems. 
Later grew into the Nazi Party court system. 
Verband Nationalgesinnter Soldaten: Union of Nationally Minded 
Soldiers. A radical veterans' organization. 
Vereinigte Vaterliindische Verbiinde Bayerns (VVVB): United Patri-
otic Organizations of Bavaria. A Bavarian cartel of conservative 
and radical groups formed in November 1922. 
volkisch: An adjective denoting an ultranationalist, antidemocratic 
populism that claimed to represent a kind of integral 
Germanness. Xenophobic in general, the volkisch movement 
was particularly identified with a virulent anti-Semitism. It was 
strongly influenced by Social Darwinism. 
Volkisch-Sozialer Block: Volkisch-Social Block. A coalition of 
volkisch organizations formed to participate in the Reichstag 
elections in 1924. 
Volkischer Beobachter: Volkisch Observer, the official newspaper of 
the Nazi Party. 
Volksgerichtshof: Nazi "People's Court." A parallel, extraordinary 
court system used for political crimes. 
Volkssturm: Military units formed late in the Second World War as 
part of a program of last-ditch mobilization in Germany. In-
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eluded special emphasis on ideological indoctrination, and very 
close to the Nazi Party as a result. 
Wahlkreis: Electoral district. 
Wehrkreis: Military district or region. 
Wehrstahlhelm: Division of the Stahlhelm made up of young men 
engaged in military sports training. 
Wehrwolf: A Wehrverband. 
Wehrverband (pl. Wehrverbande): Private paramilitary organization 
formed in Germany or Austria between 1919 and 1933. 
Zeitfreiwilliger: Part-time volunteer, or reservist, of a free corps or 
other military formation during the German Revolution. 
Zentrum: The Catholic Center Party in the German Empire and 
Weimar Republic. 
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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN NOTES 
BAK 
BDC 
Betr. 
DAP 
DNVP 
DVFB 
DVFP 
GDAP 
Gruf. 
IfZ 
NS 
OPG 
OSAF 
SA 
SABE 
SAR 
ss 
T&S Abteilung 
vorl. 
Bundesarchiv (Koblenz) 
Berlin Document Center 
Betriff (regarding) 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei 
Deutschnationale Volkspartei 
Deutschvolkische Freiheitsbewegung 
Deutschvolkische Freiheitspartei 
GroBdeutsche Arbeiterpartei 
Gruppenfiihrer 
Institut fur Zeitgeschichte (Institute for Contem-
porary History) 
national socialist/nationalsozialistisch 
Oberstes Parteigericht der NSDAP 
Oberste SA-Fiihrer/Oberste SA-Fiihrung 
Sturmabteilung 
SA-Befehl (order, command) 
SA-Reserve 
Schutzstaffel (elite guard) 
Turn- und Sport Abteilung 
provisional grouping of records 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The SA was founded in 1920 but disbanded after the failure of Hitler's 
Beer Hall Putsch in 1923. It was reestablished in 1925 after the ban was 
lifted on the NSDAP. For various reasons discussed below, the officers of the 
first ( 1920-23) SA are not specifically included in this study unless they were 
also top leaders of the "second" SA. 
2. See appendix for SA ranks and their U.S. equivalents. 
3. The creation of "party armies" or of paramilitary organizations is 
considered characteristic of both genuinely fascist movements and their 
conservative imitators in the interwar period. See, e.g., Stanley G. Payne, 
Fascism: Comparison and Definition (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1980), esp. 3-21i Peter H. Merkl, "Comparing Fascist Movements/' in 
Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism, ed. Stein Ugelvik 
Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust (Bergen, Oslo, Tromso: 
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Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 752-83; and Warren E. Williams, "Paramilitarism 
in Inter-State Relations: The Role of Political Armies in Twentieth-Century 
European Politics" (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1965). For the Weimar 
Republic in particular see James M. Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar 
Germany (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977h Hans-Joachim 
Mauch, Nationalistische Wehrorganisationen in der Weimarer Republik: 
Zur Entwicklung und Ideologie des "Paramilitarismus" (Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang, 1982); Richard Bessel, "Militarism us im innenpolitischen Leben 
der Weimarer Republik: Von den Freikorps zur SA," in Militiir und 
Militarism us in der Weimarer Republik, ed. Klaus-Jurgen Muller and Eckardt 
Opitz (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1978), 193-222; Eve Rosenhaft, "Gewalt in der 
Politik: Zum Problem des 'Sozialen Militarismus/" in ibid., 237-60; and 
Michael Geyer, "Der zur Organisation erhobene Burgfrieden," in ibid., 15-
100. For a different approach, which puts paramilitary organizations in the 
larger context of a crisis of the state in the twentieth century, see Bruce 
Campbell, "Death Squads: History and Definition," paper presented at the 
American Historical Association annual meeting, Atlanta, January 1996. 
4. See chapter 1 for a more detailed explanation of the "genealogy" of 
the SA, including such organizations as the Wehrverbande and the vi:ilkisch 
political parties. 
5. Moreover, during the Kampfzeit, the SA made up a significant propor-
tion of the total membership of the NSDAP, so even in this sense, the Nazi 
Party cannot be understood without understanding the SA. According to a 
priority message from the OSAF Fuhrungsamt to the head of the SA 
Reichsfuhrerschule (F2 no. 51328) of 3 September 1935 (in Bundesarchiv 
Kob1enz NS23/337), the strength of the SA in January 1933 was 427,538. (It 
is likely that this figure does not include either the SS or the Austrian SA.) 
Other sources give a size of 518,977: Andreas Werner, "SA: 'Wehrverband/ 
'Parteitruppe/ oder 'Revolutionsarmee'? Studienzur Geschichte der SA und 
der NSDAP, 1920-1933" (inaugural diss., Friedrich-Alexander-Universitat zu 
Erlangen-Nurnberg, 1964), 551-52. The total membership of the NSDAP on 
1 January 1933 was 849,009: NSDAP, Reichsorganisationsleiter, Parteista-
tistik (Munich, 1935), 1:16. Assuming that most SA members were Party 
members in January 1933 (a fairly safe assumption, despite earlier complaints 
from some Party officials that this was not the case), and taking the lower 
figure for SA membership, the SA amounted to approximately half of the 
total Party membership. 
6. It should be pointed out that the SS was a subordinate part of the SA 
until July 1934; consequently, SS leaders appear in this study if they were of 
the appropriate ranks before the SS separated from the SA. 
7. Another reason for concentrating on this particular group of SA lead-
ers became apparent in the course of research: not only were they the "gen-
erals" of the SA but a surprising number were also among the SA's first 
tactical commanders and actually created its very organization and tech-
niques at the grassroots levels. 
8. I have enjoyed the great benefit of being able to use the work of 
Mathilde Jamin while still in the design and research phase of this book. 
Not only did she point out these methodological considerations in much 
greater detail but she came to similar conclusions. See Mathilde Jamin, 
Zwischen den Klassen: Zur Sozialstruktur der SA-Fiihrerschaft (Wuppertal: 
Peter Hammer, 1984); Mathilde Jamin, "Methodische Konzeption einer 
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Quantitative Analyse zur sozialen Zusammensetzung der SA," in Die 
Nationalsozialisten: Analysen Faschistischer Bewegungen, Historisch-
sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen 9, ed. Reinhard Mann (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 1980), 84-97; Mathilde Jamin, "Zur Kritik an Michael Katers 
"Uberlegungen iiber Quantifizierung und NS-Geschichte," in Geschichte 
und Gesellschaft 4 (1978): 536-41; and Richard Bessel and Mathilde Jamin, 
"Nazis, Workers, and the Uses of Quantitative Evidence," in Social History 
4 (December 1979): 111-16. 
9. The SA even produced the first statistical study of its own leader-
ship to prove this contention. See "Woher kommen unsere SA-Fuhrer? Diese 
Statistik widerlegt die Behauptung, daB nur friihere Offiziere zu SA-Fiihrern 
ernannt werden," in Volkischer Beobachter (Munich edition), 30 January 
1933, suppl., 4. 
10. See, e.g., Conan Fischer, Stormtroopers: A Social, Economic, and 
Ideological Analysis, 1929-1935 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983); 
Conan Fischer, "The SA of the NSDAP: Social Background and Ideology of 
the Rank and File in the Early 1930s," Tournai of Contemporary History 17 
(1982): 651-70; Michael H. Kater, "Ansiitze zu einer Soziologie der SA his 
zur Rohm-Krise," in Soziale Bewegungen und Politische Verfassung 
(Industrielle Welt: Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises fur moderne 
Sozialgeschichte, special issue), ed. Ulrich Engelhardt, Volker Sellin, and 
Horst Sture (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1976), 789-831; Michael H. Kater, "Zum 
gegenseitigen Verhiiltnis von SA und SS in der Sozialgeschichte des 
Nationalsozialismus," Vierteljahresschrift fur Sozial- und Wirtschafts-
geschichte 62 (1975): 339-79; and Peter H. Merkl, The Making of a 
Stormtrooper (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 
11. Other examples of this approach include Jamin, Zwischen den 
Klassen; Richard Bessel, Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism: The 
Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany, 1925-1934 (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1984); and Eric G. Reiche, The Development of the SA in Nurnberg, 
1922-1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
12. Of course, the SA was "made" or "invented" by all of its members, 
not just the 178 officers at the very top. Yet these top leaders designed the 
national organization, set the policies, and often even tried out those poli-
cies at the grassroots level. Certainly, the question of how those policies 
were actually perceived and acted upon at the microlevel is an important 
one, but it is also a separate topic. Remember that the SA was a strictly 
hierarchical organization designed along military lines. This fact alone lim-
ited any potential influence of the rank and file and makes a study of its 
leadership essential to an understanding of the organization as a whole. 
13. See Jiirgen W. Falter, Hitlers Wahler (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1991 ); 
Michael H. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 
1919-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); Kater," Ansiitze zu 
einer Soziologie der SA his zur Rohm-Krise"; Mathilde Jamin, Zwischen 
den Klassen; Conan Fischer, Stormtroopers. 
14. These putative class attitudes themselves are often only assump-
tions. 
15. Note that internal comparisons of the top SA leadership with other 
subgroups within the SA, such as those performed by Mathilde Jamin in 
Zwischen den Klassen, do make sense at our present level of knowledge. 
Some studies of the SS have some comparable data, but since the SS was just 
180 Notes to Pages 7-11 
a subgroup of the SA before 1934, and since this book on the SA leadership 
consequently includes SS as well as SA leaders who held one of the top three 
levels of rank, there is considerable overlap, again making comparison diffi-
cult. See Herbert F. Ziegler, Nazi Germany's New Aristocracy: The SS Lead-
ership, 1925-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
16. Motivations based on class, gender, psychology, and personal gain 
were also present. They should not be minimized, but they cannot be ad-
dressed in this study given the limitations of the sources at hand. 
1. BACKGROUND 
1. The term comes from Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A 
Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1961). 
2. See, e.g., Bernd Felix Schulte, Die deutsche Armee, 1900-1914: 
Zwischen Beharren und Veriindern (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1977), and Michael 
Geyer, Deutsche Riistungspolitik, 1860-1980 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1984). For general reviews of the state of research into the German army just 
before the First World War, see Manfred Messerschmidt, Militiir und Politik 
in der Bismarckzeit und im Wilhelminischen Deutschland (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975), and Michael Geyer, "Die 
Geschichte des deutschen Militiirs von 1860-1945: Ein Bericht uber die 
Forschungslage (1945-1975)," in Die Moderne Deutsche Geschichte in der 
Internationalen Forsclmng (Geschichte und Gesellschaft, special issue 4), 
ed. Hans Ulrich Wehler (Giittingen, 1978), 256-86. 
3. On the social makeup of the Imperial officer corps see Karl Demeter, 
The German Officer Corps in Society and State, 1650-1945 (London: George 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965). On the Imperial Army in general see Gor-
don A. Craig, The Politics of thePrussian Army, 1640-1945 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1956); Martin Kitchen, A Military History of Germany 
from the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1975 ); and Militiirgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, ed., Deutsche 
Militdrgeschichte, 1648-1939, 6 vols. (Herrsching: Manfred Pawlak, 1983). 
4. On army control of Germany during the First World War, see Gerald 
D. Feldmann, Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1966). For the collapse of the German army in 
1918 and the development of the stab-in-the-back myth see the literature 
cited in Bruno Gebhardt, Handlnzch der Deutschen Geschichte, 8th ed., vol. 
4, Die Zeit der Weltkriege (Stuttgart: Union, 1965), 118-19. Among many 
other more recent treatments, see Hagen Schulze, Weimar: Deutschland, 
1917-1933 (Berlin: Severin und Siedlcr, 1982), 147-51, 189-90,200,206-9. 
5. It also had some surface plausibility, for it seemed to confirm the 
experiences of ordinary Germans and especially ordinary soldiers, who had 
been told throughout the war that they were winning and who could see 
that German armies were everywhere deep in enemy territory even at the 
very end of the war, but who then saw this supposed victory evaporate amid 
revolution and internal unrest. 
6. On the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP) see Gordon A. Craig, 
Germany, 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 506-9; 
Walter Kaufmann, Monarchism in the Weimar Republic ( 1953; reprint, New 
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York: Octagon Books, 1973); Wilfried Fest, Dictionary of German History, 
1806-1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 36-37; and Lewis Hertzman, 
DNVP: Right-Wing Opposition in the Weimar Republic, 1918-1924 (Lin-
coln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963). 
7. The standard work on the Nazi period is still Karl-Dietrich Bracher's 
monumental German Dictatorship (New York: Praeger, 1970). The standard 
organizational history of the Nazi Party is Dietrich Orlow, The History of 
the Nazi Party, 1919-1945, 2 vols. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1969, 1973). See also Hans Volz, Daten der Geschichte der NSDAP, 7th ed. 
(Berlin-Leipzig: A.G. Ploetz, 1938). 
8. On the volkisch movement in general, see Armim Mohler, Die 
Konservative Revolution in Deutschland, 1918-1932: Ein Handbuch, 2d ed. 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972), 131-38; George L. 
Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: The Intellectual Origins of the Third 
Reich (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964); Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Po-
litical Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (1964; reprint, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1988). The best local case study of the evolution 
of the volkisch movement into the NSDAP is Jiirgen Genuneit, Volkische 
Radikale in Stuttgart: Zur Vorgeschichte und Friihphase der NSDAP, 1890-
1925 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Dr. Cantz'sche Druckerei, 1982). 
9. Although volkisch ideas did infiltrate mainstream society, German 
society as a whole was not fundamentally and profoundly anti-Semitic, as a 
popular myth and some superficial scholarship contend. 
10. For example, the official newspaper of the Nazi Party, the Volkischer 
Beobachter, printed a regular column of news from like-minded volkisch 
organizations entitled" A us der Bewegung" into the mid-1920s, several years 
after the refounding of the NSDAP. 
11. There was some originality in the Nazi program, such as its focus on 
workers and the claim that it represented a kind of national German social-
ism (hence National-Socialist German Workers' Party), neither of which 
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Schramme, Walter Schulze, Heinz Spiiing, Wilhelm Stegmann, Kurt von 
Ulrich, and Fritz Weitzel. 
37. The following were veterans: Franz Bauer, Arthur Bockenhauer, 
Johann Heinrich Bohmcker, Walter Buch, Kurt Daluege, Karl Dincklage, 
Wilhelm Dittler, Otto Gumbel, Kurt Gunther, Edmund Heines, August 
Heissmeyer, Walter Heitmueller, Wilhelm Helfer, Ludwig Hess, Heinrich 
Himmler, Gerret Korsemann, Kurt Lasch, Viktor Lutze, Rudolf Michaelis, 
Franz von Pfeffer, Hermann Reschny, Wilhelm Schepmann, Heinrich 
Schoene, Otto Schramme, Walter Schulze, Heinz Spiiing, Wilhelm Stegmann, 
and Kurt von Ulrich. Rudolf Michaelis and Heinrich Himmler were both in 
the army but did not see combat. 
38. By professional I mean active officers as opposed to reserve officers 
or "Offiziere des Beurlaubtenstandes." Walter Buch, Karl Dincklage, Franz 
von Pfeffer, and Kurt von Ulrich were professional officers before the war. 
(Siegfried Kasche, not counted here, was an officer cadet during the war.) 
Edmund Heines, August Heissmeyer, Gerret Korsemann, Kurt Lasch, Viktor 
Lutze, Hermann Reschny, Wilhelm Schepmann, Heinrich Schoene, Walter 
Schulze, Heinz Spiiing, and Wilhelm Stegmann were reserve officers during 
the war. Otto Gumbel, not counted here, was a military administrator 
(Militiirbeamter) at a rank corresponding to an officer. Not counting Kasche 
and Gumbel, 41.6 percent of the group were officers by the end of the First 
World War. 
39. The free corps members include Franz Bauer, Arthur Bockenhauer, 
Edmund Heines, Heinrich Himmler, Siegfried Kasche, Gerret Korsemann, 
Rudolf Michaelis, Franz von Pfeffer, Otto Schramme, Walter Schulze, Heinz 
Spiiing, and Wilhelm Stegmann. This is 33 percent of the thirty-six, or 52 
percent of the twenty-three whose activities during this period are known. 
40. Wilhelm Schepmann, Viktor Lutze, and Kurt Daluege. Wilhelm Helfer 
joined the Schutz- und Trutzbund in 1920 and Arthur Bockenhauer followed 
in 1922. Five (13.8%) were thus members of the Schutz- und Trutzbund 
41. Six remained active in a free corps into the second quarter of 1920; 
the free corps involved are Ehrhardt, Loewenfeld, RoBbach, and the Eiserne 
Division. 
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42. This includes Edmund Heines, Walter Heitmueller, Franz von Pfeffer, 
and Heinrich Bennecke. 
43. Included are von Pfeffer and Schepmann. 
44. Twenty-one men in this group (58.3%) were members of the NSDAP 
by 1923, and sixteen (44.4%) were in the SA. Since not all of these members 
of the "first" SA were simultaneously Party members, a total of twenty-four 
members of this group (63.8%) were in either the SA or NSDAP or both by 
1923: Franz Bauer, Heinrich Bennecke, Arthur Bockenhauer, Franz Bock, 
Walter Buch, Kurt Daluege, Wilhelm Dittler, Gunther Grantz, Otto Gumbel, 
Kurt Gunther, Edmund Heines, Walter Heitmueller, Wilhelm Helfer, Ludwig 
Hess, Heinrich Himmler, Kurt Lasch, Viktor Lutze, Rudolf Michaelis, 
Hermann Reschny, Wilhelm Schepmann, Otto Schramme, Walter Schulze, 
Wilhelm Stegmann, and Fritz Weitzel. 
45. Information on Kurt Albert Paul Harris von Ulrich is taken from his 
BDC SA files unless otherwise noted. His Personalfragebogen (personnel 
questionnaire) of 6 January 1937 and a large file card with a clipped upper 
left-hand corner from the Oberste SA-Fuhrung (n.d.) were particularly use-
ful. A few minor details came from Stockhorst, Fiinftausend Kopfe, 428. 
46. The activities of four of the sixteen just before joining the SA/NSDAP 
are not clear from their records. 
47. This includes the Stahlhelm, the Nationalverband deutscher 
Offiziere, and the Reichsverband der Baltikumkampfer, all veterans' organi-
zations with interests wider than those associated with veterans' organiza-
tions today, as well as the Reichswehr and the police. 
48. They were considered moderate within the narrow context of the 
Wehrverbiinde, which within the broader spectrum of political belief in the 
Weimar Republic were generally quite radical. 
49. They include Heinrich Bennecke, Kurt Daluege, Wilhelm Dittler, 
Gunther Grantz, Otto Gumbel, Walter Heitmuller, and Ludwig Hess. 
50. Arthur Bockenhauer, Wilhelm Dittler, Kurt Gunther, Wilhelm Helfer, 
Viktor Lutze, and Franz von Pfeffer. There is some overlap with the Frontbann 
members because some underground SA units were also part of the Frontbann. 
51. Other political groups represented by one member each are the DNVP, 
the Deutsch-volkische Freiheitsbewegung, and the Deutsche National-
sozialistische Arbeiterpartei (Austrian NSDAP). For further discussion of 
the volkisch organizations mentioned here, please refer to chapter 1. 
52. The individuals were Franz Bock, Arthur Bockenhauer, Wilhelm 
Dittler, Gunther Grantz, Otto Gumbel, Walter Heitmuller, Ludwig Hess, 
Siegfried Kasche, Heinrich Schoene, Franz von Pfeffer, and Karl Dincklage-
30.5 percent of the entire group of thirty-six or 57.9 percent of the nineteen 
whose activities are known for certain. 
53. An example of an man who was active in both a volkisch organiza-
tion and the Frontbann is Gunther Grantz. See his BDC SA files. 
54. Of the twenty-eight whose activities are known, fifteen were in the 
SA and eighteen were in the NSDAP by November 1923. They include 
Heinrich Bennecke, Arthur Bockenhauer, Franz Bock, Walter Buch, Wilhelm 
Dittler, Gunther Grantz, Otto Gumbel, Kurt Gunther, Edmund Heines, 
Walter Heitmueller, Wilhelm Helfer, Ludwig Hess, Kurt Lasch, Viktor Lutze, 
Rudolf Michaelis, Hermann Reschny, Wilhelm Schepmann, Walter Schulze, 
Wilhelm Stegmann, and Fritz Weitzel. 
55. It is difficult to quantify this group, since membership depends on 
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many variables, but examples would be Edmund Heines, Wilhelm Helfer, 
Viktor Lutze, Gunther Grantz, Arthur Bockenhauer, Walter Heitmueller, 
Wilhelm Dittler, and Kurt Lasch. 
56. When the official dates for joining the SA and NSDAP are within six 
months of each other, it is safe to say that the individual actually joined 
both organizations simultaneously. The reasons for this have to do with 
differences in organization and procedure between the SA and the Party. 
The major reason is the fact that SA membership at this early date became 
effective immediately and was determined by the local group. Party mem-
bership, on the other hand, was administered centrally. An individual had to 
apply (and pay) for membership at a local level, but the application was then 
forwarded to the Gau (although in the very early days it was sometimes sent 
directly to Munich), and then forwarded periodically to the Party central in 
Munich as soon as enough applications were collected to make forwarding 
them worthwhile. Only once the application with the required membership 
fees had reached Munich and had been accepted and the applicant entered 
into the central Party card file was a Party number issued and the applicant 
considered a member of the Party. This process could easily take up to six 
months and could be delayed further by poor management or deliberate theft 
of the fees, which were common problems in the early days. Thus, two men 
in this chapter who actually joined the SA and NSDAP at the same time 
didn't get official credit for it: Arthur Bockenhauer received a late official 
date of Party membership due to sloppy bookkeeping either at the Gau or 
the Reich level: BDC SA file of Arthur Bockenhauer. Walter Schulze joined 
the Party in 1925, but he moved to an area where there was no local NSDAP 
group and thus dropped out of sight as far as the Party central was concerned 
and was forced to apply for a new membership number: BDC SS file of Walter 
Schulze. See Anton Lingg, Die Verwaltung der NSDAP (Munich: 
Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Franz Eher, 1940); Mathilde Jamin, Zwischen den 
Klassen, 71-73; Hans Buchheim, "Mitgliedschaft bei der NSDAP," in Institut 
fur Zeitgeschichte, Gutachten des Instituts fiir Zeitgeschichte (Munich: 
Selbstverlag des Instituts fur Zeitgeschichte, 1958 ), 1 :313-23; Office of Mili-
tary Government of the United States for Germany (OMGUS), 7771 Docu-
ment Center, Who Was a Nazil Facts about the Membership Procedure of 
the Nazi Party (Berlin: OMGUS, 1947), which is stored in the BDC library. 
57. See Jamin, Zwischen den Klassen, 72-73. The only exception is 
Heinrich Bennecke, who joined the SA in Leipzig and the NSDAP in Dresden, 
but even then, the two cities are only about sixty miles apart. Because he 
joined the NSDAP first and then the SA several months later, it is likely 
that the difference in cities is due to a change in residence because he began 
his studies at the University of Leipzig in 1926. See his BDC SA file. 
58. Viktor Lutze, Kurt Daluege, August Heissmeyer and Karl Dincklage, 
Stellvertretender Gauleiter, Heinrich Himmler, national level official, 
Heinrich Schoene, Wilhelm Stegmann, and Kurt von Ulrich, Ortsgruppen-
leiter, and Wilhelm Dittler and Kurt Gunther, officials in their Ortsgruppe. 
59. The rank Reichsleiter was actually introduced rather late, appar-
ently in the spring of 1933. In June 1933 there were only sixteen in the Party, 
although the number later increased: Orlow, Nazi Party, 2:74. Included are 
Wilhelm Schepmann, Viktor Lutze, and Franz von Pfeffer as chiefs of the 
SA, Heinrich Himmler as chief of the SS, Baldur von Schirach as head of the 
HJ, and Walter Buch as chief judge of the NSDAP. 
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60. Heinrich Bennecke, Kurt Daluege, Karl Dincklage, Otto Gumbel, 
August Heissmeyer, Siegfried Kasche, Gerret Korsemann, Walter Schulze, 
and Kurt von Ulrich. 
61. Heinrich Bohmcker, Heinrich Schoene, Heinz Spiiing, and Wilhelm 
Stegmann. 
62. Karl Dornemann, Rudolf Michaelis, and Hermann Reschny. 
63. Three of the above were Reichsleiter by virtue of the fact that they 
were the heads of the SA, but each of these three also had held some other 
Party office earlier. 
64. Information on Heinrich August Schoene comes from his BDC SA 
files unless otherwise noted. The following documents were particularly 
useful: Schoene's Personalfragebogen (personnel questionnaire) of 1 January 
1937, his Personalbogen (n.d.), his Lebenslauf (curriculum vitae) (n.d.), a let-
ter (draft) from the Chef des Hauptamtes Fuhrung to the Hauptamt 
Verwaltung of 4December 1942, and a large, green pay card from the Oberste 
SA-Fuhrung. 
65. An Obersekundareife was a certificate of completion of the 
Obersekunda, the seventh year of secondary school. It was inferior to the 
Abitur, which was the examination taken at the end of secondary education 
by those students on the college-preparatory track. 
66. The rank and position of only twenty-four are known for 1925, and 
of these, fifteen were leaders. 
67. Twenty-eight of the men in this chapter were born in 1900 or before. 
(I selected 1900 because it was the last age cohort to be drafted during the 
First World War.) By the end of the first quarter of 1930, nineteen were SA (or 
SS) leaders: Franz Bauer, Arthur Bockenhauer, Heinrich Bohmcker, Kurt 
Daluege, Karl Dincklage, Wilhelm Dittler, Kurt Gunther, Wilhelm Helfer, 
Ludwig Hess, Heinrich Himmler, Kurt Lasch, Viktor Lutze, Franz von Pfeffer, 
Hermann Reschny, Heinrich Schoene, Otto Schramme, Walter Schulze, 
Wilhelm Stegmann, and Kurt von Ulrich. The rank of seven could not be 
determined, and two had temporarily left the SA. (Edmund Heines was in 
prison, and Walter Buch was by then the head of the Party Investigation and 
Mediation Committee. Both had previously been SA-Fuhrer and are counted 
here.) 
68. The exception is Heinrich Bennecke. 
69. Heinrich Bennecke, Heinrich Bohmcker, Wilhelm Dittler, Kurt 
Gunther, Arthur Hess, Kurt Lasch, Rudolf Michaelis, and Otto Schramme. 
There were forty-eight officially recognized Standarten by this time: Volz, 
SA, 37-38, 65-66. A Standarte before the reorganization of 1931 had approxi-
mately 200-600 men and may be considered the SA equivalent of a regiment 
(see appendix). 
70. Kurt Daluege, Wilhelm Helfer, Wilhelm Schepmann, Heinrich 
Schoene, Wilhelm Stegmann, and Fritz Weitzel. 
71. The five OSAF-Stellvertreter were powerful regional SA command-
ers. 
72. Wolfgang Sauer, "National Socialism, Totalitarianism, or Fascism?" 
American Historical Review 73 (December 1967): 404-24. 
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3. THE DEFECTORS, 1927-1930 
1. This short biography of von Pfeffer is based on the following sources: 
Institut fur Zeitgeschichte Zs. 177, vol. 1 (von Pfeffer); BDC Research Sec-
tion materials (including copies of various Reichstag handbooks); Stockhorst, 
Fiinftausend Kopfe, 322; Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, 128; and Volz, SA (in 
IfZ Fan which contains numerous marginal comments by von Ffeffer. 
2. Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, 128-29; Frank, "Hitler and the Na-
tional Socialist Coalition/' 308-10, 343-46; and Werner, "SA/' 357. See espe-
cially the characterization of von Pfeffer in Henry Ashby Turner Jr., ed., 
Hitler aus niichster Niihe (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1978). 
3. See especially IfZ Zs. 177, Bd. I and the marginal comments in Volz, 
SA. 
4. Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, 130, even credits von Ffeffer with hav-
ing greater political experience than Hitler in 1926, which is a slight exag-
geration. It may not, however, be an exaggeration to say that von Pfeffer had 
learned certain lessons and digested past experiences better than Hitler had 
at that point. 
5. Viktor Lutze's contribution should not be underestimated. Lutze was 
one of the first to understand how to combine soldiering with politics. Among 
other innovations, he is responsible for the SA's system of ranks and insig-
nia. SeeDas Deutsche Fiihrerlexikon, 1934-1935 (Berlin: 0. Stollberg, 1934t 
294, and the numerous obituary articles in his BDC files. 
6. IfZ Zs. 177/1. See especially the interview of von Pfeffer by Dr. H. 
Krausnick and Dr. Freiherr von Siegle of 20 February 1953. On the 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft, see Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist Coali-
tion/' 110-59,308-10, and Joseph Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in 
the Nazi Party (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967), 71-89. 
7. Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, 128-30, generally accepts von Pfeffer's 
version, but Werner, "SA/' 356, raises objections. 
8. Hitler traveled to Westphalia for long talks with von Pfeffer in the 
summer of 1926 before his appointment, so they had adequate opportunity 
to discuss the SA and its mission and to come to an understanding: Volz, SA, 
39. Briefly, von Pfeffer favored an elite and highly disciplined SA with a 
strong sense of ideological commitment. He also rejected the purely mili-
tary approach and organization of the Wehrverbande. These were all things 
that appealed to Hitler. Yet von Ffeffer also wanted the SA to be strictly 
independent from the Party hierarchy, and he rejected putschism only for 
tactical reasons, not out of principle. Both of these latter points proved to be 
the source of considerable friction later on. See IfZ Zs. 177. 
9. Von Pfeffer, Oberster SA-Fuhrer," An die Herrn Gauleiter!" of 1 Oc-
tober 1926, and OSAF, SABE 1 Sturm£. of 1 November 1926, in BDC, 
Schumacher Collection, Ordner 403, 86-88. 
10. The Grusa, with one or two exceptions, repeated the SABE with 
minor corrections and changes. The difference between the two classes of 
orders was really that the Grusa were countersigned by Hitler as chairman 
of the NSDAP. This had the advantage of reinforcing von Ffeffer's authority 
vis-a-vis the Gauleiter and other Party leaders, while allowing the Party to 
distance itself from any lesser orders of an SA leader that might conflict 
with the law or draw the attention of the authorities: Bennecke, Hitler und 
die SA, 135. 
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11. Von Pfeffer's basic concept of the differences between the SA and 
the old army are presented best in SABE 15 "Lenkung von Massen-
Militarisches Vorbild" of 19 February 1927, in BDC, Schumacher Collec-
tion, Ordner 403. The organizational structure of the SA is taken here from 
Grusa IV, "Gliederung," of 4 June 1927, in BDC, Schumacher Collection, 
Ordner 403, 110. 
12. Schar will be used here to avoid confusion with the large regional 
level of command also called a Gruppe, which Rohm introduced to replace 
the OSAF-Stellvertreter regions: Werner, "SA," 535-37. 
13. It was also in tribute to the recognition by young combat officers of 
the First World War of the value and strength of small unit cohesion in build-
ing motivation and discipline. Almost all small unit commanders criticized 
the old army for ignoring this aspect of self-discipline and self-motivation in 
favor of absolute obedience. Although this recognition is sometimes attrib-
uted to the free corps, it does in fact stem from the First World War. The free 
corps merely provided a forum where young officers were given enough flex-
ibility and freedom to put their ideas into practice. 
14. Sturm, literally "storm," is translated here as "company" in En-
glish, even though the next highest unit after the squad in the American 
army is the platoon, and only then the company. This is done for two rea-
sons. First, the Sturm functioned more like a company than a platoon tacti-
cally. Second, when the SA later, under Rohm, set size limits on its units, 
the Sturm was given a set size that corresponded more to that of a company 
than a platoon. The Trupp gradually developed into a platoon size unit, but 
earlier it resembled a squad in size and use. Note, too, that the term Sturm 
and the other unit names chosen for the SA were deliberately different from 
those used by the army. The use of equivalent, nonmilitary terms in English 
would be confusing, so the German terms have been translated into the equiva-
lent English military terms, even though this is technically incorrect. 
15. After von Pfeffer's resignation, the Gausturm boundaries were re-
drawn to correspond to the Gau boundaries of the political organization, 
which had coincided with the Reichstag electoral districts since 1 October 
1928: Volz, SA, 45. Von Pfeffer's ideas in this regard were not unique among 
the right in Germany at the time; such a demand was a part of the 
Jungdeutscher Manifest, written in 1928 by Arthur Mahraun, the leader of 
the Jungdeutscher Orden. See Klaus Hornung, Der Jungdeutsche Orden 
(Dusseldorf: Droste, 1958), 84. 
16. Volz, SA, 46. 
17. Ibid., 59-60. Werner, "SA," 411-12. 
18. Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist Coalition," 380-81, note 
43; Werner, "SA," 415-17. 
19. Werner, "SA," 417-18. 
20. Nachrichtenstaffeln in German may refer to communications units, 
intelligence units, or both. Although the orders issued to the SA stressed the 
communications function, von Ffeffer's deep concern with knowing what 
was happening in the "enemy" camp and scattered references to local intel-
ligence gathering by the SA make it likely that he had both communica-
tions and intelligence gathering in mind from the start. 
21. Volz, SA, 51; Werner, "SA," 405f., 552-55. The NSAK later became 
the Nationalsozialistische Kraftfahrkorps (National Socialist Motor Corps, 
orNSKK). 
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22. Werner, "SA," 407; Volz, SA, 54. Mounted units later became a stan-
dard part of the SA throughout Germany. 
23. See the SA files of Horst Raecke and Wilhelm Boltz in the BDC. See 
also Volz, SA, 54. 
24. OSAF, SABE "SA-Reserve (SAR),'' 28 March 1929, in BDC, 
Schumacher Collection, Ordner 403, 113. See also Volz, SA, 55; Werner, 
"SA," 404. 
25. Volz, SA, 57; Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, 148; and the BDC SA 
files of Dr. Paul Hocheisen and Dr. Walter Schulze. 
26. Their common insistence on the independence of the SA was partly 
to avoid having to share their authority, but also the product of their com-
mon socialization as professional officers during the Wilhelmine Empire. 
27. The following fifty-nine men are included: Adolf-Heinz Beckerle, 
Robert Bergmann, Friedrich Wilhelm Bruckner, August Burger, Carl Caspary, 
Friedrich Damian, Edmund Diehl, Sepp Dietrich, Karl Freiherr von Eberstein, 
Paul Fassbach, Friedrich Fenz, Finck von Finckenstein, Herbert Fust, 
Leonhard Gontermann, Erich Hasse, Albert Heinz, Wolf Heinrich Graf von 
Helldorf, Otto Herzog, Paul Hocheisen, Walter Hoevel, Adolf Hiihnlein, 
Bernard Hofmann, Otto Ivers, Dietrich von Jagow, Wilhelm Jahn, Oscar 
Martin Jaster, Friedrich Jeckeln, Manfred Freiherr von Killinger, Karl Koerner, 
Karl Kraft, Fritz Lauerbach, Hartmann Lauterbacher, Max Lehmann, Max 
Linsmayer, Karl-Siegmund Litzmann, Max Luyken, Joachim Meyer-Quade, 
Georg Oberdieck, Hans-Gunther von Obernitz, Hans-Adolf Priitzmann, 
Arthur Rakobrandt, Erich Reimann, Hans-Joachim Riecke, Robert Rigl, Ernst 
Schmauser, August Schneidhuber, Ludwig Schmuck, Wilhelm Freiherr von 
Schorlemer, Robert Schormann, Hans von Tschammer und Osten, Oskar 
Tiirk, Ludwig Uhland, Fritz Vielstich, Hans-Josef Vogel, Richard Wagenbauer, 
Otto Wagener, Josias Erbprinz zu Waldeck-Pyrmont, Hans Weinreich, and 
Udo von Woyrsch. 
28. In other words, they were former active officers as opposed to offic-
ers of the reserve. Twenty-one men out of the fifty-nine who are the subject 
of this chapter were former professional officers (35.5%): Paul Hocheisen, 
Adolf Hiihnlein, Dietrich von Jagow, Oscar Martin Jaster, Manfred von 
Killinger, Karl Kraft, Karl-Siegmund Litzmann, Max Luyken, Georg 
Oberdieck, Arthur Rakobrandt, Robert Rigl, Ernst Schmauser, August 
Schneidhuber, Wilhelm Freiherr von Schorlemer, Robert Schormann, Hans 
von Tschammer und Osten, Ludwig Uhland, Richard Wagenbauer, Otto 
Wagener, Josias Erbprinz zu Waldeck-Pyrmont, and Udo von Woyrsch. 
29. Six out of fourteen men joining in 1929 were former professional 
officers (42.8%), as were fourteen out of twenty-nine men joining in 1930 
(48.2%). 
30. Thirty-five of the fifty-nine highest SA leaders who joined the SA 
from 1927 to 1930. 
31. See conclusion, note 6, below. 
32. Of the 1925-26 group, 41.6 percent had been officers, as compared 
with 59 percent in the 1927-30 group. 
33. Of the fifteen who joined in 1925-26 who had been officers, 26.6 
percent had been active officers and 73.3 percent had been reserve officers. 
Of those joining from 1927 to 1930 who were former officers, 63 percent had 
been active officers and 3 7 percent had been reserve officers. 
34. At this time Stabscbef meant chief of staff and not de facto head of 
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the SA, as it did after Hitler made himself supreme SA commander in title 
but not in practice. 
35. BDC files Otto Wagener, particularly his supreme Party court file V / 
760/1936; Turner, Hitler aus niichster Niihe, passim, which are actually 
Wagener's memoirs. See esp. 7-35, where he describes his recruitment for 
the SA. His convictions are amply detailed in Otto Wagener, Von der Heimat 
geiichtet (Stuttgart: C. Belsersche, 1920). See also Stockhorst, Fiinftausend 
Kopfe, 434. 
36. Examples are Bernard Hofmann and Kurt Kuhme (see their BDC SA 
files). Kuhme had been the head of a sports school with ties to the Reichswehr 
after leaving active service, but the basic principle still applies. Note that 
from 1927 on, the SA was able to pay a small but growing cadre of its staff 
and leadership full time. This money came from general Party funds trans-
ferred to the SA and from funds raised by the SA through business ventures. 
37. Forty-nine of the fifty-nine who joined from 1927 to 1930 served in 
the war (83%); forty-seven were combat veterans (79.6%). Corresponding 
figures for the 1925-26 group are 77.7 percent veterans and 72 percent com-
bat veterans. 
38. The average year of birth of the 1925-26 joiners was 1895 and ranged 
from 1874 to 1907, whereas the average year of birth of the 1927-30 group 
was 1892 and ranged from 1869 to 1909. 
39. Forty-five out of the fifty-nine men in this group whose activities 
are known (76%) were active politically or militarily in 1919. 
40. Twenty-five out of forty-five who were active, or 42.3 percent of the 
total of fifty-nine. They include Robert Bergmann, Friedrich Wilhelm 
Bruckner, Carl Caspary, Karl Freiherr von Eberstein, Friedrich Fenz, Graf 
Heinrich Finck von Finckenstein, Herbert Fust, Leonhard Gontermann, Wolf 
Graf von Helldorf, Walter Hoevel, Bernard Hofmann, Adolf Huhnlein, Otto 
Ivers, Dietrich von Jagow, Karl Kraft, Manfred Freiherr von Killinger, Fritz 
Lauerbach, Karl-Siegmund Litzmann, Hans-Adolf Prutzmann, Arthur 
Rakobrandt, Hans-Joachim Riecke, Fritz Vielstich, Richard Wagenbauer, Otto 
Wagener, and Josias Erbprinz zu Waldeck-Pyrmont. 
41. This is actually a very small number when the number of possible 
free corps is considered. My card file contains over 320 different entries, not 
all of which may have been truly autonomous free corps. Georg Tessin, 
Deutsche Verbiinde und Truppen, 1918-1939 (Osnabruck: Biblio, 1974), 95-
99, lists over 356 names of units, some of which may also have not been 
autonomous free corps. Gordon, Reichswehr, 67, states that he has found 
the names of over 400 free corps, but he lists fewer than this number on 414-
20. 
42. Ehrhardt, Epp, Eiserne Division, Loewenfeld, Deutsche Legion, 
Aulock, Liitzow, and Garde-Kavallerie-Schutzen-Division. 
43. Maercker, Wurttemberg, and Hesse. The missing free corps are the 
Deutsche Schutzendivision, Freiwillige Sturmabteilung Schlichtingsheim, 
Freikorps Oberbayern, Freikorps Graf Kaunitz, the OstpreuBisches Freikorps, 
and the Freiwilliges Reservekorps Kowno. 
44. Twenty-eight out of fifty-nine (47.4%). Only thirteen (22%) list only 
army service during the revolution, however; over half of the twenty-eight 
also served in some other sort of organization, usually a free corps or the 
Grenzschutz. The army and free corps service overlap, since some· men be-
gan in a free corps and then transferred to the regular army, others were 
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technically in regular army units but were assigned to a free corps, and oth-
ers called their free corps service army service, which it technically was. In 
assigning men to these different categories, the term they themselves used 
in their file questionnaires was usually the deciding factor. The only excep-
tion was where specific units were named. 
45. In the collapse of 1918, volunteers were recruited to protect 
Germany's eastern border. Those units which actually served in this capac-
ity were termed part of the Grenzschutz or Grenzschutz Ost. (This is to be 
distinguished from later border protection units also called Grenzschutz.) 
There is a potential for overlap here: Grenzschutz units were technically in 
the army, although in 1919 and 1920 they could also have been free corps or 
other volunteer units. The three men listed here under the Grenzschutz 
(Erich Hasse, Hans-Joseph Vogel, and Udo von Woyrsch) did not list a free 
corps. Two others (Arthur Rakobrandt and Otto Wagener) listed both 
Grenzschutz and one or more free corps. 
46. Hans Weinreich. 
47. Oscar Jaster and Erich Hasse. Jaster was also in the Karpathen-
deutscher Partei, and Hasse was also in the Grenzschutz. 
48. Karl Freiherr von Eberstein was in the DNVP, and Karl Koerner was 
in the Zentrum. 
49. The three organizations represented were the Stahlhelm (von 
Eberstein), the Hermannsbund (Friedrich Fenz), and the Vereinigte 
Vaterlandische Verbande Bayerns (Hans-Adolf Pn1tzmann). All three could, 
with some justification, equally well be considered Wehrverbande at this 
time. 
50. The levels of political, military, or paramilitary activity were as fol-
lows: 
1925-26 group: 1927-30 group: 
1920: 65% 66% 
1921: 49% 53% 
1922: 64% 56% 
1923: 76% 64% 
51. Twenty-nine members of this group (49.1%) belonged to at least one 
Wehrverband, including the Stahlhelm and Selbstschutz Oberschlesiens 
(SSOS). 
52. Erich Hasse was in the Schutz- und Trutzbund, and Herbert Fust 
was in the DVFP. 
53. This actually represents fourteen men (23.7% ), since many were 
members of either the SA or NSDAP but not both. They include Friedrich-
Wilhelm Bruckner, Carl Caspary, Karl Freiherr von Eberstein, Graf Finck 
von Finckenstein, Leonhard Gontermann, Wolf Graf von Helldorf, Adolf 
Hiihnlein, Dietrich von Jagow, Wilhelm Jahn, Hans-Gunther von Obernitz, 
Robert Schormann, Fritz Vielstich, Otto Wagener, and Hans Weinreich. 
54. By the end of 1923, fifteen members of the 1925-26 group were mem-
bers of the SA and eighteen were members of the NSDAP. Twenty of the 
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thirty-seven (54%) were members of either the SA or NSDAP by this time. 
55. Edmund Diehl was a longtime member of the DNVP, Karl Freiherr 
von Eberstein was a member in 1919 and 1920, and Wilhelm Jahn was a 
member in 1920 only. 
56. Arthur Rakobrandt. 
57. On the Jungdo see Hornung, Der Jungdeutsche Orden; on the 
Wehrwolf, see Fritz Kloppe, Der aristokratische Einheitsstaat (Halle-Saale: 
Wehrwolf, 1932); and Diehl, Paramilitary Politics, 22 7-41. Arthur Rakobrandt 
and Manfred von Killinger were in the Wehrwolf; Adolf-Heinz Beckerle, Albert 
Heinz, Oscar Jaster, Hans von Tschammer und Osten, Friedrich Jeckeln, and 
Josias Georg Erbprinz zu Waldeck-Pyrmont were Jungdo members. 
58. In the 1927-30 group, Wiking: Adolf-Heinz Beckerle, Manfred von 
Killinger, Hans-Gunther von Obernitz, and Fritz Vielstich; Stahlhelm: Karl 
Freiherr von Eberstein, Herbert Fust, Walter Hoevel, Bernard Hofmann, 
Wilhelm Jahn, Karl-Siegmund Litzmann, Georg Oberdieck, Arthur 
Rakobrandt, Erich Reimann, Hans-Josef Vogel, and Hans Weinreich; Bund 
Oberland: Fritz Vielstich, Sepp Dietrich, and Hans-Joachim Riecke. 
59. In the second quarter of 1920, twelve of the fifty-nine (20.3%) were 
in the Reichswehr, and four (7%) were in the police. In the Reichswehr were 
Carl Caspary, Friedrich Damian, Paul Fassbach, Walter Hoevel, Dietrich von 
Jagow, Oscar Jaster, Manfred von Killinger, Georg Oberdieck, Arthur 
Rakobrandt, August Schneidhuber, Richard Wagenbauer, and Udo von 
Woyrsch. In the police were Sepp Dietrich, Max Luyken, Hans-Joachim Vogel, 
and Hans Weinreich. At the same time, only four ( 11%) of the 1925-26 group 
were in the Reichswehr, and one (2.7%) was in the police. 
60. In 1923, three of the 1927-30 group were in the Reichswehr (Adolf 
Huhnlein, Erich Reimann, and Robert Rigl), and one was in the police (Hans-
Joachim Vogel). By this time none of those who joined the SA in 1925-26 
were members of either the police or the Reichswehr. 
61. Four of the thirty-six 1925-26 group (11.1 %) and eight of the fifty-
nine 1927-30 group (13.5%): Karl Freiherr von Eberstein, Friedrich Fenz, 
Heinrich Graf Finck von Finckenstein, Dietrich von Jagow, Manfred Freiherr 
von Killinger, Max Luyken, Hans-Adolf Prutzmann, and Otto Wagener. 
62. Two Ruhr sabotage veterans, von Pfeffer and Schepmann, joined the 
SA in 1925 (5%). Only one Ruhr-sabotage veteran, Oscar Jaster, joined the 
SA from 1927 to 1930, and he did so in 1927 (1.6%). Edmund Diehl, who 
actively fought against the separatist movement in the Rheinland and the 
Palatinate, and Hartmann Lauterbacher, who claimed to have participated 
in the fight against the occupation but was only fourteen in 1923, were not 
included. (Had they been, the percentage of Ruhr sabotage veterans would 
have jumped to 5 percent, the same as in the 25-26 group.) 
63. Of course, the general ideology of an organization, especially one 
such as the police or the army, does not necessarily have to be shared by all 
members. In fact, the discrepancy between the ideologies of the organiza-
tion and the individual may have been one of the main reasons causing mem-
bers of traditional conservative organizations to defect to the NSDAP from 
the late 1920s on. 
64. This thesis was first advanced by Peter Merkl to explain the careers 
of a certain group in his sample. See Peter H. Merkl, Political Violence un-
der the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1975), esp. parts 3 and 4, and 678-81. 
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65. Note that the term defector is therefore not to be taken literally; 
many "defectors" did not immediately join the NSDAP. 
66. Each individual who was ultimately included here had, at the very 
least, an SS-Fuhrerakte (officer personnel file), an SAPersonalfragebogen (per-
sonal questionnaire), or a Lebenslauf (short autobiography) and an SA 
Fuhrerfragebogen (officers' questionnaire). These are the most complete and 
useful types of documents used for this study. See the chapter on methodol-
ogy for information about the various kinds of SA and SS materials used for 
the biographies of the SA/SS leaders. Men with weak or incomplete docu-
mentation were rigorously excluded from this category, and everything was 
done to make sure that the "passive activists" were really "passive." 
67. Four more men might possibly fit in this category, but they had to be 
left out because their records were not strong enough for me to be sure that 
their apparent lack of activity was not due to incomplete information. Those 
included are August Burger, Friedrich Damian, Karl Koerner, Karl Kraft, Max 
Lehman, Ludwig Uhland, and Udo von Woyrsch. 
68. The earliest to join the Party in the category of the "passive activ-
ists" was Karl Kraft, who joined in May 1928. 
69. The exception was August Burger, an Austrian, who joined the SA 
in 1928 but didn't join the Party untill930. He is one of only a handful of 
men in this study who joined the SA a significant time before joining the 
Party. In Burger's case, the delay may have been due in part to poor book-
keeping by his local Party cell or to the more clandestine nature of the NSDAP 
in Austria. 
70. The highest rank was that of captain, held by Ludwig Uhland, a 
professional officer since 1908. 
71. Unless otherwise noted, the biography of Max Lehmann is taken 
from his BDC SA files. The following documents were particularly useful: 
his Personalfragebogen of 30 June 1938, the two official supplements, and a 
large file card from the Oberste SA-Fiihrung with a clipped upper left-hand 
corner (n.d.). 
72. A Brenner is either a distiller or an industrial worker tending a kiln 
or furnace. 
73. Kaufmann was a very elastic term by the 1930s; it could mean ev-
erything from an independent businessman to a store clerk. An apprentice-
ship as a Kaufmann generally meant on-the-job training as a sales clerk or 
office worker. 
7 4. These eight were 13.5 percent of the total group of 59 who joined the 
SA from 1927 to 1930. They were Friedrich Wilhelm Bruckner, Carl Caspary, 
Leonhard Gontermann, Fritz Lauerbach, Max Luyken, Hans-Adolf 
Prutzmann, Ernst Schmauser, and Otto Wagener. 
75. Priitzmann was too young to serve in the war, although he tried to 
make up for this later by joining a free corps. Wagener, Luyken, and Schmauser 
were professional officers, and Bruckner was a reserve officer before the war. 
The others were promoted to reserve officer rank during the war. Lauer bach 
is included here as a reserve officer, even though his rank, Feldhilfsarzt (aux-
iliary field physician), actually falls between the categories of commissioned 
and noncommissioned officers. 
76. Lauerbach and Bruckner were in Freikorps Epp, Wagener and 
Gontermann were in Baltic free corps, Prutzmann and Caspary were in Cen-
tral German free corps, and Luyken was in Freikorps Oberschlesien. Only 
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Schmauser was not in a free corps or otherwise active in 1919. 
77. Three joined the NSDAP in 1922 and 1923. Gontermann belonged 
only to the NSDAP, whereas Caspary and Bruckner were also members of 
the SA. Two others responded differently, joining vi:ilkisch groups only in 
1924, after the crisis of 1923 was actually over. Thus Schmauser joined the 
Vi:ilkisch-Sozialer Block, and Lauerbach joined the NS-Freiheitsbewegung 
in that year. Wagener and Pn1tzmann were slight exceptions to the above 
rule, since they were active in 1921 in addition to 1923-24, and Luykenheld 
a high leadership position in the Orgesch from 1920 to 1925. 
78. The date on which Hans-Adolf Prutzmann joined the Party is in-
ferred from his Party number, which was 142 290. This indicates a date 
sometime in the second half of 1929. Carl Caspary joined on 1 October 1929, 
and had the number 180 713. Paul Hocheisen joined the Party on 1 August 
1929 and had the number 145 058, and Ludwig Schmuck, who joined on 1 
May 1929, had the number 130 626. 
79. Schmauser and Priitzmann both joined the SA first, then transferred 
to the SS approximately a year later. 
80. Bruckner was born in 1884, Luyken in 1885, Schmauser in 1890, and 
Wagener in 1888. 
81. He even remained a member of the SA until August 1924, when he 
completed his degree and moved to another city. 
82. Unless otherwise noted, the information on Carl Caspary is taken 
from his BDC SA files. His Personalfragebogen of 1 August 1937 and the two 
official supplements were particularly useful. 
83. Neither his battalion nor the Nuremberg SA regiment were ever as 
strong as their names would imply. 
84. The Volkssturm was a last-ditch mobilization of old men, boys, the 
sick, and the infirm to resist the Allied invasion of Germany itself in the 
final days of the war. It had very close ties to the NSDAP to promote ideo-
logical enthusiasm. 
85. The individuals in this category include Adolf-Heinz Beckerle, Karl 
Freiherr von Eberstein, Friedrich Fenz, Herbert Fust, Wolf Heinrich Graf von 
Helldorf, Walter Hoevel, Wilhelm Jahn, Oscar Martin Jaster, and Hans 
Weinreich. 
86. Again, this idea is derived from Peter Merkl. See note 64 in this 
chapter. 
87. The exception is Adolf-Heinz Beckerle, who was born in 1902 and 
was thus too young to have served in the war. All of the veterans finished 
the war as officers, except for Herbert Fust, who was a noncommissioned 
officer. This was likely because of his youth-he was born in 1899-and the 
fact that he only served for two years. He became an officer in the Second 
World War. At least one member of the group and possibly two were profes-
sional officers before the war. 
88. Only Adolf-Heinz Beckerle and Wilhelm Jahn were not in a free 
corps or similar volunteer unit. On the other hand, two served in radical 
Baltic free corps. 
89. The vi:ilkisch organizations include the Deutschvi:ilkischer 
Offiziersbund (1), the Deutschvi:ilkische Freiheitspartei (2), the National-
sozialistische Freiheitsbewegung (2), the Deutschvi:ilkischer Freiheits-
bewegung ( 1 ), the Alldeutscher Verband ( 1 ), and the Deutschvi:ilkischer Schutz-
und Trutzbund (1). Numbers in parenthesis indicate number of members. 
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90. Information on Herbert Robert Gerhard Fust comes from his BDC 
SA file unless otherwise noted. The following documents were particularly 
useful: Fust's Personalfragebogen of 14 June 1936, with its two official supple-
ments, his curriculum vitae (n.d.), and his SA disciplinary court file F44/M/ 
34. He appears as number 12 in the group photo facing page 1. 
91. The Frontbann was a dead letter nationally by about mid-1925, fol-
lowing massive defections to the SA and the resignation of its commander, 
Ernst Rohm. Local groups did exist untill927, as Fust's case illustrates. 
92. The charge was "conduct liable to damage the Party." Fust was ac-
cused of taking part in wild, drunken parties, sexual affairs, and public visits 
to bordellos. He was also accused of submitting abnormally high expenses. 
93. Two years may seem short, but it must be remembered that in con-
text it is rather long, since rapid turnover of membership in the paramilitary 
bands and volkisch movements was the norm. These men were Edmund 
Diehl, Sepp Dietrich, Albert Heinz, Paul Hocheisen, Bernard Hofmann, Otto 
Ivers, Dietrich von Jagow, Manfred Freiherr von Killinger, Max Luyken, Georg 
Oberdieck, Hans-Gunther von Obernitz, Arthur Rakobrandt, Erich Reimann, 
Hans-Joachim Riecke, Robert Rigl, Robert Schormann, and Hans von 
Tschammer und Osten. 
94. The more radical an organization, the earlier its members tended to 
turn to and be absorbed by the SA and NSDAP. 
95. At the time the NSDAP was aware of the great importance of "de-
fectors" from other organizations. See the letter from Philipp Bouhler, NSDAP 
managing director, to all Gaue and independent Ortsgruppen of the NSDAP 
of 7 May 1928, in Schumacher Collection, Ordner 374 (transcript). 
96. Paul Hocheisen, Bernard Hofmann, Otto Ivers, Dietrich von Jagow, 
Manfred Freiherr von Killinger, Karl-Siegmund Litzmann, Georg Oberdieck, 
Hans-Gunther von Obernitz, Arthur Rakobrandt, Hans-Joachim Riecke, 
Robert Rigl, and Hans von Tschammer und Osten. This is 70.5 percent of 
the total. Note that only two of the seventeen men in this group did not 
serve in the war, and one of these nonveterans was an naval officer cadet 
after the war. 
97. This means men who were members of the elite general staff corps, 
a group separate from the main body of the regular officer corps, or who 
served in the GroBer Generalstab. It is quite different from the number of 
men who had experience in staff planning, which was much larger: Absolon, 
Wehrmacht, 1:47-48. 
98. Paul Hocheisen, Dietrich von Jagow, Manfred Freiherr von Killinger, 
Karl-Siegmund Litzmann, Georg Oberdieck, Arthur Rakobrandt, Robert Rigl, 
and Hans von Tschammer und Osten. This is 4 7 percent of the entire group 
of seventeen "defectors." A further member of the group, Sepp Dietrich, was 
a prewar professional NCO. Robert Schormann, another member of the" de-
fector" group who did not serve in the First World War, was later an officer 
cadet in the navy during the Weimar Republic. 
99. The generals were Robert Rigl, a brigadier general in the Austrian 
Federal Army, and Paul Hocheisen, a major general in the medical corps. 
The major was Arthur Rakobrandt, a captain who was promoted to major at 
his retirement. The colonel was Georg Oberdieck, who was a general staff 
corps major by the end of the war and who was promoted to colonel upon 
retirement. 
100. Georg Oberdieck was a general staff officer, Hans von Tschammer 
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und Osten served on the great general staff during the war, and Paul Hocheisen 
served in the Wurttemberg Ministry of War before the war. Bernard Hofmann, 
Karl-Siegmund Litzmann, Hans-Gunther Obernitz, Arthur Rakobrandt, and 
Robert Rigl all held staff positions during the war. 
101. This count does not include Reichswehr officers, although the 
Reichswehr is one of the organizations from which members of the "defec-
tors" category are drawn. 
102. Hans-Gunther von Obernitz was the national business manager 
(Reichsgeschaftsfuhrer) of Bund Wiking from 1924 to 1926, and Robert Rigl 
was the chief of staff (Stabsleiter) of the Deutscher Turnerbund. 
103. Hans von Tschammer und Osten was the state leader(GroBkomtur) 
of Saxony for the Jungdo; Dietrich von Jagow was the state leader 
(Landesfuhrer) of the OC/Bund Wiking in Wurttemberg from 1922 to 1927; 
Manfred von Killinger was the same for Saxony from 1922 to 1928; Max 
Luyken was the state business manager (Landesgeschaftsfuhrer) of the 
Orgesch in Saxony from 1920 to 1925. 
104. Georg Oberdieck was the Stahlhelm Gaufuhrer (regionalleader) for 
Hanover for one year sometime between 1924 and 1930; Hans-Joachim Riecke 
was in charge of all of the central German chapters of the Bund Oberland in 
1926 (possibly earlier as well), and Otto Ivers was a deputy regional leader of 
the Jungdo in the Rheinland between 1925 and 1927. 
105. Erich Reimann was a Stahlhelm county youth leader and county 
treasurer in Altona between 1926 and 1930, and Arthur Rakobrandt was the 
Stahlhelm and Wehrwolf county leader and also the county business man-
ager of the OstpreuBischer Heimatbund in Kreis Fischhausen (East Prussia) 
from 1922 to 1927. 
106. Albert Heinz was leader of a local Jungdo chapter from 1921 to 1927. 
107. Six of the "defectors" also joined the SA immediately as "officers," 
further proof of their leadership abilities: Sepp Dietrich, Paul Hocheisen, 
Otto Ivers, Dietrich von Jagow, Manfred Freiherr von Killinger, and Robert 
Rigl. 
108. An exception to this statement must be made regarding the 
Reichswehr/Reichsmarine. Here the reasons do not lie in internal develop-
ments within the military. Rather, they have to do with more personal con-
cerns of the people involved, concerns which may not be political at all. For 
instance, Paul Hocheisen left the Reichswehr because he retired. 
109. Edmund Diehl was a member of the DNVP from 1920 to 1927. Paul 
Hocheisen retired from the Reichswehr in 1929, and Robert Schormann left 
the Reichsmarine for unknown reasons in 1930. 
110. The "defectors" were members of only six Wehrverbande for a sig-
nificant period, though they were members of several others for shorter pe-
riods. 
111. Bernard Hofmann, Dietrich von Jagow, Karl-Siegmund Litzmann, 
Georg Oberdieck, Arthur Rakobrandt, and Erich Reimann. Rakobrandt was 
also a member of the Wehrwolf, which loosely affiliated itself with the 
Stahlhelm in 1924: Volker R. Berghahn, Der Stahlhelm, Bund der 
Frontsoldaten, 1918-1935 (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1966), 33. Von Jagow was also 
a member of the Wurttembergische Heimatschutz and had been a high leader 
in the Bund Wiking. 
112. Hans von Tschammer und Osten, Otto Ivers, and Albert Heinz. 
113. Manfred von Killinger, Dietrich von Jagow, and Hans-Gunther von 
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Obernitz. Killinger had also been in Wehrwolf and Oberland, and von Jagow 
joined the Stahlhelm for a short time after leaving the Bund Wiking. 
114. Sepp Dietrich and Hans-Joachim Riecke. 
115. Hans-Joachim Riecke and Sepp Dietrich. 
116. Hans Jurgen Kuron, "Freikorps und Bund Oberland" (Ph.D. diss, 
Friedrich-Alexander University, Erlangen, 1960), 185-96, 204-6. 
117. Diehl, Paramilitary Politics, 222-27, 234-35; Hornung, Der 
Jungdeutsche Orden, 55. The conflict in Saxony led to the resignation from 
the Jungdo of its state leader, Hans von Tschammer und Osten, who later 
joined the NSDAP and is a part of this group. 
118. Gabriele Kruger, Die Brigade Ehrhardt, 119-23; Berghahn, 
Stahlhelm, 108-9. 
119. One follower of Ehrhardt later claimed that von Killinger, the only 
one of the three here who joined the NSDAP immediately upon leaving the 
Bund Wiking, was actually sent into the NSDAP by Ehrhardt to be his eyes 
and ears in that organization and gradually transferred his loyalty to it while 
he was there. This is unsubstantiated but not implausible, and it is certainly 
in keeping with Ehrhardt's tactics of sending his men into various compet-
ing organizations to influence them and keep an eye on what they were 
doing: Ernst von Salomon, Der Fragebogen (1961; reprint, Reinbek bei Ham-
burg: Rowohlt, 1991), 113. 
120. Only one individual from the Bund Wiking (von Killinger), and one 
from the Reichswehr (Hocheisen) also joined the NSDAP within one year. 
121. Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 103-7, 130-31, 143. 
122. Unless otherwise noted, information on Georg Oberdieck is taken 
from a Lebenslauf dated 11 April1942 in the BDC. 
123. He was awarded the Iron Cross First and Second Class and the 
Knight's Cross First Class with Oak Leaves and Swords of the Order of the 
Lion of Zahringen. 
124. Only seven of the seventeen "defectors" were in a free corps, two 
on the eastern borders and three in the Ehrhardt Brigade. Three of those in a 
free corps entered the Provisional Reichswehr and served until1920, a sign 
that their free corps service was simply a continuation of their earlier mili-
tary careers. 
125. Due to the independence of the regional chapters of the Stahlhelm, 
the Gaufuhrer held considerable power and influence over the organization 
as a whole. 
126. Max Linsmayer was killed in action in May 1940 and was replaced 
by Gunther Grantz. 
127. Robert Bergmann, Heinrich Graf Finck von Finckenstein, Otto 
Herzog, Max Linsmayer, and Joachim Meyer-Quade. A major reason for the 
sparse nature of the available information on two men in this group, Max 
Linsmayer and Joachim Meyer-Quade, is the fact that both were killed in 
action in 1939 and 1940. For some unknown reason, SA records for those 
killed early in the war are missing, and the only available information con-
sists of collections of obituaries and short biographies prepared and/or col-
lected by the SA press office. Although these are often quite detailed, par-
ticularly when friends and colleagues of the deceased in the SA were asked 
to prepare them, they are not as thorough as the documents commonly found 
in the SA files. 
128. Robert Bergmann, Otto Herzog, and Joachim Meyer-Quade. 
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129. Robert Bergmann, Heinrich Graf Finck von Finckenstein, and 
Joachim Meyer-Quade were veterans. The two reserve officers were Finck 
von Finckenstein and Robert Bergmann. Bergmann had been an einjiihriger 
Freiwilliger before the war, although he was not commissioned until1915. 
130. The two were Finck von Finckenstein (Freiwillige Sturmabteilung 
Schlichtingsheim and Marine Brigade von Loewenfeld) and Robert Bergmann 
(Freikorps Epp). 
131. Again, the individual is Finck von Finckenstein. Since early Party 
membership carried great status in the NSDAP, it is highly likely that such 
information would have been included in an obituary or otherwise figure 
prominently in any surviving materials on a given individual, so that we can 
be relatively sure that Finck von Finckenstein was the sole member of the 
group to have been in the Party up to 1923. 
132. When he rejoined the SA, he actually joined the SS, which was a 
part of the SA at the time, whereas earlier, from 1927 to 1928, he had been a 
member of the SA proper. 
133. Robert Bergmann and Joachim Meyer-Quade were both district lead-
ers, and Otto Herzog was a business manager. 
134. The four Reichstag deputies were Joachim Meyer-Quade, Robert 
Bergmann, Otto Herzog, and Count Finck von Finckenstein. All but the lat-
ter were elected deputies before the assumption of power. Robert Bergmann 
later left the SS and resumed his Party career, but it should be noted that he 
did not actually leave the SS voluntarily, but was expelled as a result of the 
Ri:ihm Purge because he had been Ri:ihm's adjutant. 
135. IfZ Zs. 827 (Robert Bergmann) and Bergmann's SS Fuhrerakte in 
theBDC. 
136. This is 30.5 percent of the fifty-nine men in this chapter. A "posi-
tion of responsibility" in the Party is defined as any office at the level of 
Ortsgruppenleiter and above. The men include Robert Bergmann, Friedrich 
Wilhelm Bruckner, Paul Fassbach, Friedrich Fenz, Erich Hasse, Otto Herzog, 
Otto Ivers, Dietrich von Jagow, Karl Koerner, Hartmann Lauterbacher, Max 
Luyken, Joachim Meyer-Quade, Arthur Rakobrandt, Erich Reimann, Hans-
Joachim Riecke, Robert Rigl, Robert Schormann, and Otto Wagener. 
137. Kreisleiter was the highest Party position held by Joachim Meyer-
Quade, Max Luyken, Otto Ivers, Erich Hasse, and Robert Rigl. Several of the 
others who held higher ranks also served as Kreisleiter. 
138. Ten men fell into this latter category: Robert Bergmann (Gau staff, 
also former Kreisleiter), Friedrich Fenz (a deputy Gauleiter), Otto Herzog (a 
business manager in a Gau, and also a former district leader), Dietrich von 
Jagow (a Gau business manager), Otto Wagener (head of the Wirtschafts-
politisches Amt in the central Party administration), Karl Koerner (a Gau 
organization and personnel manager), Hans-Joachim Riecke (a Gau official 
and after 1933 a Gau inspector), Erich Reimann (a Gau secretary), Robert 
Schormann (a Gau official after 1933), and Friedrich Wilhelm Bruckner 
(Hitler's adjutant). 
139. Three of the five district leaders came from one of these two cat-
egories: Otto Ivers, Joachim Meyer-Quade and Robert Rigl. The other two, 
Erich Hasse and Max Luyken, were "sporadic activists." Six of the ten Gau 
or national level Party leaders came from one of these two categories: Rob-
ert Bergmann, Otto Herzog, Dietrich von Jagow, Erich Reimann, Hans-
Joachim Riecke, and Robert Schormann. 
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4. THE SPECIALISTS, 1931-1932 
1. Petzina et al., Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch, 3:119, table A, 
"Arbeitslosigkeit." As Bennecke correctly points out, this figure does not 
include the potentially large group of the underemployed, nor does it in-
clude the dependents (families) of the unemployed or the effect on com-
merce of the drastic reduction in spending caused by such widespread un-
employment: Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, 167-71. 
2. This short characterization of Rohm is taken from the following 
sources: Ernst Rohm, Die Geschichte eines Hochverrdters (Munich: Franz 
Eher, 1928: this edition is preferable to all subsequent ones); Eleanor Hancock, 
"Ernst Rohm and the Experience of World War 1," Tournai of Military His-
tory 60 (January 1996): 39-60; Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, 156-57; Frank, 
"Hitler and the National Socialist Coalition," 399-408; Werner, "SA," 517-
18. 
3. The Geneva Disarmament Conference seemed to offer a chance to 
obtain an increase in the Versailles treaty limits on the size of German armed 
forces. Rohm sought to obtain such an enlargement and to boost the influ-
ence of the SA through his plan to build a militia-based army. 
4. The following interpretation generally agrees with that of Eleanor 
Hancock, who is writing a biography of Rohm. See Hancock, "'Indispens-
able Outsider'? Ernst Rohm as Chief of Staff of the SA, 1931-1933," paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the German Studies Association, Se-
attle, 11 October 1996. 
5. In fact, he does not appear to have been the first choice. See Turner, 
Hitler aus ndchster Ndhe, 138-40. 
6. Jean Mabire, Rohm: I.:Homme Qui Inventa Hitler (Paris: Fayard, 
1983). 
7. Turner, Hitler aus ndchster Ndhe, 138-40, gives one example of 
Hitler's reserve, particularly regarding political insight. 
8. Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist Coalition," 457, suggests 
that Hitler intentionally chose Rohm because his homosexuality would leave 
him isolated within the Party and thus unable to participate in a fronde 
against him. 
9. Officially, Hitler was the supreme SA leader, whereas Rohm was 
only his chief of staff (Stabschef), but in fact it was Rohm who set the tone of 
the organization and who created all but the most fundamental policies. 
10. The exact date is from Volz, SA, 69. The figure for the strength of the 
SA is from Werner, "SA," 544. It should be treated as an estimate. 
11. Werner, "SA," 544-45. This had more of a symbolic meaning than 
anything else, since the SA could not be compared to the Reichswehr in 
terms of training, discipline, or equipment. 
12. OSAF Ib no. 316/32 of 1 January 1932 in the Bundesarchivin Koblenz 
(hereafter abbreviated as BAK) NS23/vorl. 123; OSAF, part 1 of 1 February 
1932, in BAK, Schumacher Collection, Ordner 415. Werner, "SA," 550-51, 
gives a January 1932 figure of 290,941. 
13. A Schnellbrief (priority message) from the OSAF Fuhrungsamt to 
the head of the SA Reichsfii.hrerschule (F2 no. 51328) of 3 September 1935 
(in BAK NS23/337), puts the strength of the SA in January 1933 at 427,538. 
(It is likely that this figure does not include either the SS or the Austrian 
SA.) Werner, "SA," 551-52 gives a slightly different figure of 518,977. For the 
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sake of comparison, note that the size of the SA on 1 January 1935 was 
3,543,099: NSDAP, Reichsorganisationsleiter, Parteistatistik (Munich: 
Hauptorganisationsamt, Amt Statistik, 1935), 3:70-71. As Bennecke rightly 
points out, this figure is likely well under the spring 1934 maximum size of 
the SA: Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, 214. 
14. Alleged plans to radically decrease the size of the SA as a means of 
subordinating it to the political organization had played a role in the first 
Stennes incident and the resignation of von Pfeffer. See Walter Stennes, Wie 
es zur Stennes-Aktion kam! (Berlin: Hausdruck von Walther Stennes, n.d.), 
2 (in IfZ Fa3h Werner, "SA," 465. 
15. Volz, NSDAP, 58; Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist Coali-
tion," 413-15. The only organizational benefit of this change was that it 
paved the way for a larger (even top-heavy) staff structure. On the other 
hand, it was tidier for R6hm and other former soldiers, and it provided a 
means of promoting SA leaders to reward them without necessarily giving 
them a higher command. 
16. The Sturmbann corresponded to a battalion in the German army. 
Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist Coalition," 412, argues that this 
similarity was not coincidental but a product of a deliberate militarization 
of the SA under Rohm. 
17. Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist Coalition," 418-19. In gen-
eral, on the introduction of the Sturmbann, see Frank "Hitler and the Na-
tional Socialist Coalition," 412-19, Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, 160, Werner, 
"SA," 535ff., Volz, SA, 71-72. 
18. Rohm later reintroduced the Brigade as an intermediate level be-
tween the Standarte and the Gruppe. 
19. Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist Coalition," 535ff.; Bennecke, 
Hitler und die SA, 160. Aside from helping the SA cope with greater num-
bers, this particular reform went a long way toward establishing better rela-
tions between the SA and the local Gauleiter, since under von Pfeffer, the 
Gausturm lines were deliberately drawn so as to ignore Gau boundaries. 
20. Werner, "SA," 535ff.; Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist Coa-
lition," 429; Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, 160. The most openly rebellious 
OSAF-Stellvertreter was Walther Stennes, but they were all very strong and 
independent personalities and all had made decisions at odds with the cen-
tral SA leadership in the past. 
21. The chronic lack of lower-level leaders resulted in considerable ef-
fort being put into the development of SA schools. These included not only 
the national Reichsfuhrerschule but also schools for leaders in each SA 
Gruppe, the so-called SA-Fuhrerschulen (originally SA-Fuhrer Vor-Schulen). 
See Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist Coalition," 422-29; Werner, 
"SA," 555-62; BDC SA file Kurt Kuhme; Standartenfuhrer Spaing, 
"Erziehungswesen und SA-Fuhrervorschulen," in Der SA-Mann, no. 6 of 
February 1932, 4. 
22. OSAF-Stellvertreter OstIa. no. 1161/31. St/v.B. to Rohm of 28 Feb-
ruary 1931 in Stennes-Aktion, and passim; Werner, "SA," 525-29. 
23. Information on the so-called Stennes Putsch has been taken from 
the following sources: OSAF Gerichts- und Rechtsamt file on the Stennes 
Putsch in the BDC; Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist Coalition," 
477-504; Werner, "SA," 524-34; Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism, 
120-21; Wie es zur Stennes-Aktion kam! 
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24. Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist Coalition," 435-36; Volz, 
SA, 72. Note that Stennes was the only OSAF-Stellvertreter who was actu-
ally deposed. Of the five remaining OSAF-Stellvertreter, four became 
Gruppenfuhrer and one became the inspector general of the SA and SS, so 
that not the individuals personally but only their overly powerful positions 
were actually under attack. 
25. Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist Coalition," 455-76. 
26. Frank in particular credits Rohm with truly disciplining the SA, 
which is an exaggeration at best. See, e.g., ibid., 399, 411. 
2 7. See the extended discussions of this in Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, 
157-59; Heinrich Bennecke, Die Reichswehr und der "Rohm-Putsch" 
(Munich und Vienna: Gunter Olzog, 1964), 13-16; Frank, "Hitler and the 
National Socialist Coalition," 515-30. 
28. Absolon, Wehrmacht, 1:35-39. 
29. Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist Coalition," 507-15. 
30. On the SA ban, see the following: Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, 182; 
Werner, "SA," 576-77; Karl-Dietrich Bracher, Die AuflOsung der Weimarer 
Republik ( 1955; reprint, Konigstein/Ts.-Dusseldorf: Atheniium Droste, 1978), 
424-38; Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic, val. 2, From the 
Locarno Conference to Hitler's Seizure of Power (New York: Atheneum, 
1970), 362-77. 
31. Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, 182, states that it was the Reichswehr 
which warned the SA, although he supplies little concrete proof. On the 
other hand, as a high SA leader he was in a position to have known at the 
time. It is clear that the SA was forewarned: Engelbrechten, Braune Armee, 
239-40. 
32. OSAF llano. 1549/32, Neuaufstellung der SA und SS: Fuhrerbefehl 
no. 1 of 1 July 1932, in BDC, Schumacher Collection, Ordner 404. 
33. See note 13 above. 
34. OSAF 2420/32, Fuhrerbefehl no. 2 of 9 September 1932, in BDC, 
Schumacher Collection, Ordner 410; Werner, "SA," 541££. 
35. Werner, "SA," 551-52; OSAF Ila no. 1549/32, Neuaufstellung der SA 
und SS: Fuhrerbefehl no. 1 of 1 July 1932; OSAF 2420/32, Fuhrerbefehl no. 2 
of 9 September 1932; OSAF 3520/32, Fuhrerbefehl no. 3 of 29 November 
1932, all in BDC, Schumacher Collection, Ordner 410; On the Gruppenstab 
z.b.V., see Bennecke, Reichswehr; Absolon, Wehrmacht, 1:35-134, 4:28-29. 
36. For example, 68 percent of all Stabschefs, Obergruppenfuhrer, and 
Gruppenfuhrer had already joined the SA before 1931. 
37. They included Richard Aster, Ernst BeiBner, Reinhard Boerner, 
Hermann Brauneck, Bruno Czerwinski, Axel Daiber, Walter Darn~, Ludwig 
Fichte, Hans Frank, Hans Friedrich, Hans Fuchs, Paul Giesler, Karl Haas, 
Heinrich Hacker, Walther Haug, Hans Peter von Heydebreck, Reinhard 
Heydrich, Franz Ritter von Horauf, Hans-Georg Hofmann, Paul Holthoff, 
Emil Ketterer, Adolf Kob, Fritz Ritter von Krausser, Friedrich-Wilhelm KrUger, 
Kurt Kuhme, Hans Lehmann, Willy Liebel, Werner Lorenz, Walter 
Luetgebrune, Karl Lucke, Hans Ludin, Georg Mappes, Meinhardt Marnitz, 
Wilhelm Morchen, Eberhard Pagels, Kurt Flesch, Ernst Rohm, Wilhelm 
Schmid, Ludwig Schmuck, Albert Schneider, Karl Schreyer, Paul Schulz, 
Siegfried Seidel-Dittmarsch, Josef Seydel, Gregor Strasser, and Otto Walter. 
38. Only five out of forty-six (10.8%) were not war veterans. They are 
Ernst BeiBner, Reinhard Heydrich, Hans Ludin, Walter Luetgebrune, and 
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Meinhardt Marnitz. Four of these five were too young to have been in the 
war. Luetgebrune was thirty-five when war broke out, but did not serve for 
reasons unknown. Axel Daiber, Hans Frank, and Georg Mappes served in 
the war, but did not see combat. 
39. Of the forty-four for whom this information is known, twenty-one 
(47.7%) were professional soldiers. Seventeen were professional officers 
(Hermann Brauneck, Hans Friedrich, Hans Fuchs, Karl Haas, Hans-Peter von 
Heydebreck, Reinhard Heydrich, Franz Ritter von Horauf, Hans-Georg 
Hofmann, Adolf Kob, Franz Ritter von Krausser, Friedrich-Wilhelm Kruger, 
Kurt Kiihme, Hans Ludin, Ernst Rohm, Karl Schreyer, Siegfried Seidel-
Dittmarsch, and Josef Seydel), three were professional enlisted men (Werner 
Lorenz, Karl Lucke, and Paul Schulz) and one (Kurt Plesch) was a profes-
sional military official (Militarbeamter). Note that Reinhard Heydrich and 
Hans Ludin began their careers as professional officers in the Reichswehr, 
not in the Imperial Army. 
40. At least thirty-two of the forty-one who served in the war were offic-
ers by the end of 1918. This is 69.5 percent of the entire group of forty-six, or 
78 percent of the veterans. Karl Lucke, a professional soldier, was an 
Offizierstellvertreter, meaning that he fulfilled the duties of an officer but 
was not considered a member of the officer corps. 
41. Of the thirty-two who were officers, ten were captains (Reinhard 
Boerner, Hans Fuchs, Hans-Peter von Heydebreck, Emil Ketterer, Adolf Kob, 
Fritz Ritter von Krausser, Ernst Rohm, Wilhelm Schmid, Siegfried Seidel-
Dittmarsch, and Josef Seydel) and four were majors (Karl Haas, Franz Ritter 
von Horauf, Hans-Georg Hofmann, and Kurt Kiihme) or the equivalents in 
the navy. Since many continued their service after the war, the final ranks of 
the officers in the group were even higher. 
42. At least fourteen of the forty-one veterans (34%) served in some sort 
of staff position. Reinhard Boerner, Hermann Brauneck, Friedrich-Wilhelm 
Kruger, Hans Lehmann, and Paul Schulz served as adjutants or orderly offic-
ers. Hans Fuchs, Heinrich Hacker, Hans-Peter von Heydebreck, Hans-Georg 
Hofmann, and AdolfKob served in regimental or divisional staffs. Franz Ritter 
von Horauf served on a corps staff, Ernst Rohm in the Bavarian Ministry of 
War, Siegfried Seidel-Dittmarsch at the army level and in the Prussian Min-
istry of War, and Hans Fuchs in the general staff corps. 
43. "Regular army" means (in contrast to the various types of tempo-
rary volunteer units created during the revolution) units of the old Imperial 
Army that were not yet demobilized or units of the embryo Provisional 
Reichswehr. Veterans of the regular army included Hans Friedrich, Karl Haas, 
Franz Ritter von Horauf, Hans-Georg Hofmann, Adolf Kob, Fritz Ritter von 
Krausser, Werner Lorenz, Karl Lucke, Kurt Plesch, Ernst Rohm, Wilhelm 
Schmid, Paul Schulz, and Siegfried Seidel-Dittmarsch. 
44. At the most, in the first quarter of 1919, sixteen of the group served 
in a free corps: Hans Friedrich, Hans Fuchs, Hans-Peter von Heydebreck, 
Reinhard Heydrich, Hans-Georg Hofmann, Franz Ritter von Horauf, Paul 
Holthoff, Fritz Ritter von Krausser, Friedrich-Wilhelm Kruger, Kurt Kiihme, 
Wilhelm Schmid, Gregor Strasser, Ernst Rohm, Karl Schreyer, Paul Schulz, 
and Josef Seydel. Note, however, that some of these men were assigned to 
their particular free corps as professional officers by the army high com-
mand. An example is Franz Ritter von Horauf, who was sent to be the gen-
eral staff officer of Freikorps Epp. 
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45. One member of the group was in an Einwohnerwehr (Emil Ketterer) 
and a second in a Zeitfreiwilligenverband (Ludwig Fichte) without also serv-
ing in a free corps or the army. A further individual (Eberhard Pagels) was a 
member of a Studentenwehr (armed student company), but only in 1920. 
46. Ten men in this chapter served in Freikorps Epp, although not all 
served in it at the same time (Hans Frank, Franz Ritter von Horauf, Hans-
Georg Hofmann, Fritz Ritter von Krausser, Ernst Rohm, Wilhelm Schmid, 
Karl Schreyer, Josef Seydel, Gregor Strasser, and Otto Walter). The other 
Bavarian unit was Freikorps Bamberg (Hans Fuchs). Hans Fuchs also served 
in Wehrregiment Munchen, which was formed by the Hoffmann govern-
ment to maintain order in Munich and was not properly a free corps. The 
other free corps include the Eiserne Division, the Baltische Landeswehr, the 
Eiserne Torpedobootsflotille, Freikorps von Lettow-Vorbeck, Weickhmann, 
Libow, Schlesien, Halle, Eulenberg, Lutzow, and von Heydebreck. 
47. Five (10.8%) were members of a volkisch organization in 1919 or 
1920: three in the Deutsch-Volkischer Schutz-und Trutzbund (Richard As-
ter, Reinhard Heydrich, and Kurt Plesch) and two in the NSDAP, one of 
which was earlier a member of the Thule Gesellschaft (Hans Frank and Ernst 
Rohm). Three were members of nonvolkisch political organizations: one of 
the DNVP (Adolf Kob), one of the DDP (Reinhard Boerner), and one of the 
Deutsch-Nationaler Jugendbund, really a youth group but associated with 
the DNVP (Reinhard Heydrich). Three were members of veterans' groups: 
one was a member of the Stahlhelm (Walther Haug), two were members of 
the Verband Nationalgesinnter Sol daten (Paul Holthoff and Gregor Strasser), 
and one was a member of the Deutsche Offiziersbund (Kurt Plesch) and later 
of the Nationalverband Deutscher Offiziere. Finally, one man was a mem-
ber of the Organisation von Pflugh-Hartung (Heinrich Hacker), a secret soci-
ety founded to prevent, through murder if necessary, the surrender to the 
Allies of Germans accused of war crimes. 
48. Very few nonmilitary organizations are found in the backgrounds of 
these men: three individuals belonged to the Deutsch-Volkische Schutz-
und Trutzbund in 1921 (Richard Aster, Reinhard Heydrich, Kurt Plesch), 
one each belonged to the DNVP (Adolf Kob) and the DDP (Reinhard Boerner), 
one belonged to the Deutsche Pfadfinder, a kind of boy-scout organization 
(Hans Ludin), one belonged to the Deutsch-Volkische Jugendschaft, a volkisch 
youth group (Reinhard Heydrich), and one belonged to the Technische 
N othilfe, a state-sponsored disaster relief/civil defense organization that could 
even be included among the paramilitary organizations (Meinhardt Marnitz). 
49. Seven members of the group of 1931-32 SA joiners were in the 
Reichswehr in 1922 and 1923 (Karl Haas, Reinhard Heydrich, Franz Ritter 
von Horauf, Hans-Georg Hofmann, Fritz Ritter von Krausser, Kurt Plesch, 
and Ernst Rohm) and six were in it in 1921 (in addition to the above-and 
minus Reinhard Heydrich-Wilhelm Schmid and Siegfried Seidel-Dittmarsch). 
Two served in the illegal Black Reichswehr from 1921 to 1923 (Hans Lehmann 
and Paul Schulz). Those who were members of the police might also be in-
cluded with the Reichswehr, since both were state organizations. Two mem-
bers of the group were in the police from 1921 to 1923 (Hans Fuchs and 
Adolf Kob). So 15.2 percent of the group were members of the Reichswehr in 
1923; this figure rises to 23.9 percent if the members of the Black Reichswehr 
and the police are included. 
50. Only two members of the group were members of the NSDAP in 
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1921 and 1922 (Hans Frank and Ernst Rohm), meaning that five joined in 
1923 (Heinrich Hacker, Emil Ketterer, Wilhelm Schmid, Josef Seydel, and 
Gregor Strasser). 
51. The eight were Hans Frank, Hans Fuchs, Emil Ketterer, Fritz Ritter 
von Krausser, Ernst Rohm, Wilhelm Schmid, Josef Seydel, and Gregor Strasser. 
All but Strasser and possibly Frank were later awarded the Blutorden in 
memory of their participation in the putsch. See the BDC files of the above 
and Klaus D. Patzwall, ed., Der Blutorden der NSDAP (Hamburg: Militaria-
Archiv Klaus D. Patzwall, 1985). Hans-Georg Hofmann was also eventually 
awarded the Blutorden, but his role during the putsch is not clear. 
52. Two members of our group were in the Stahlhelm in 1921 (Walther 
Haug and Kurt Plesch), three in 1922 (Hans Friedrich, in addition to Haug 
and Plesch), and five by the end of 1923 (Walter Darn? and Heinrich Hacker, 
in addition to the others). The Reichskriegsflagge, which was only founded 
in 1923 as a fission from the Reichsflagge, had three members from our group 
by the end of 1923 (Fritz Ritter von Krausser, Ernst Rohm, and Josef Seydel). 
Three members of the group were also in the Reichsflagge (Willy Liebel, 
Ernst Rohm, Josef Seydel). The only other organization which had more than 
one member from the group by the end of 1923 was the SA (Hans Frank, 
Gregor Strasser). 
53. Four men in the group were members of a total of five volkisch 
organizations by mid-1924. Three of these men were former NSDAP mem-
bers (Heinrich Hacker, Ernst Rohm, and Gregor Strasser). The one non-Party 
member now active in volkisch politics was Richard Aster, who had earlier 
been a member of the Deutsch-Volkische Schutz- und Trutzbund while serv-
ing in the Grenzschutz in 1919. 
54. Three of the six early PGs were members of the Frontbann. They 
were Ernst Rohm, Josef Seydel, and Heinrich Hacker. 
55. The Frontbann was represented by four members of the 1931-32 
group (the three mentioned in note 55 above, plus Fritz Ritter von Krausser), 
the Stahlhelm by six (Richard Aster, Walter Darn~, Hans Friedrich, Heinrich 
Hacker, Walther Haug, and Kurt Plesch), and the Reichswehr by five (Karl 
Haas, Reinhard Heydrich, Franz Ritter von Horauf, Hans-Georg Hofmann, 
and Hans Ludin), although the number continued to drop through 1924 and 
1925 due to repercussions from the putsch. One member of the group was 
also in the police in 1924 (Hans Fuchs). 
56. Richard Aster was a member of both the DVFB and the GDAP; Adolf 
Kob was a member of the Tannenberg Bund. 
57. Of the six members of the Frontbann or of a volkischorganization in 
1924, only Heinrich Hacker and Gregor Strasser joined the NSDAP in 1925 
or 1926, and Hacker left the NSDAP again in 1925 or early 1926 and did not 
rejoin until1929. 
58. At least four members of the 1931-32 group were members of the 
Stahlhelm in 1925: Richard Aster, Walter Darn'!, Hans Friedrich, and Walther 
Haug. One other, Paul Giesler, was a member of the Stahlhelm by 1927 and 
very possibly earlier. By 1930, Hans Friedrich and Walther Haug were still 
members, and Franz Ritter von Horauf had joined. All left the Stahlhelm by 
the end of 1930. The Reichswehr was represented by four members of the 
group between 1925 and 1930 (Karl Haas, Reinhard Heydrich, Hans-Georg 
Hofmann, and Hans Ludin), but they, too, left by the end of 1930. 
59. See, e.g., Heinrich Hildebrandt and Walter Kettner, eds., Stahlhelm 
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Handbuch, 4th ed. (Berlin: Stahlhelm, 1931). 
60. See chapter 3 above. "Serial activists" are defined above as men who 
were members of several organizations in succession. They seem to drift 
from one organization to another, as if searching for one that really expressed 
their interests and desires. 
61. The "sporadic activists" were characterized by little organized ac-
tivity except in crisis periods. These men were typically active in 1919, again 
in 1923, and then not again until they joined the SA/NSDAP. Paul Holthoff 
is the only member of the group who fits this model unambiguously; Kurt 
Kiihme and Fritz Ritter von Krausser come close, but their involvement 
with the Reichswehr makes their inclusion in the category problematic. As a 
result, the "sporadic activists" will not be discussed in detail in this chapter. 
62. The "passive activists" were men who were involved in very little 
or no organized political activity at all from 1920 until they joined the SA 
and NSDAP. The "defectors" were loyal members of a single organization 
(or a small number of organizations simultaneously) for a long time who 
then quit and "defected" to the NSDAP. The "Party soldiers" characteristi-
cally joined the NSDAP relatively early but did not then join the SA until a 
year or more had passed. Most of these men were also active in the political 
organization of the Party, and could have made a career in the Party appara-
tus as easily as they did in the SA. See the previous chapter for an elabora-
tion of these models. 
63. The four are Richard Aster, Heinrich Hacker, Adolf Kob, and Emil 
Ketterer. 
64. Emil Ketterer was a physician and was automatically exempt from 
field command, although his career was also mostly in higher staffs of the 
SA as an administrator, not as a "frontline" SA physician. 
65. Information on Aster is taken from his BDC files unless otherwise 
noted. His Personalfragebogen (personnel questionnaire) of 20 September 
1937, with its supplements and a transcript of his Lebenslauf (curriculum 
vitae) were particularly useful. 
66. Although the class of 1900 was the last to be eligible for the draft in 
Germany, not all young men from this class were called up. See Absolon, 
Wehrmacht, 1:8, esp. 8n. 45. 
6 7. The organization was banned in that year in nearly all German states. 
Note also that the S& T Bund made a deliberate effort to recruit soldiers in 
the Grenzschutz and in the free corps in 1919. See Lohalm, Volkischer 
Radikalismus, 215-22, 246-51. 
68. RoBbach, Mein Weg durch die Zeit, 64, 73-74; Waite, Vanguard of 
Nazism, 191-96, 137-38, and 188-91; Diehl, Paramilitary Politics, 78, esp. 
78nn. 6 and 7. 
69. His official membership date was June 1931, however. 
70. The best study on the German occupation of the East is still Alexander 
Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupational Poli-
cies (London: Macmillan, 1957). 
71. There were sixteen clear "defectors" in all, although because many 
of the men in this chapter connected to Ernst Rohm have incomplete records, 
the category is potentially larger. They are Walter Dane, Hans Friedrich, 
Hans Fuchs, Paul Giesler, Karl Haas, Walther Haug, Reinhard Heydrich, Hans-
Georg Hofmann, Hans Lehmann, Karl Lucke, Hans Ludin, Meinhard Marnitz, 
Kurt Plesch, Ludwig Schmuck, Josef Seydel, and Otto Walter. 
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72. They are Freikorps and Bund Oberland, the Stahlhelm, Freikorps 
Damm, the Frontbann, the Einwohnerwehr Danzig, the DNVP, the 
Reichswehr, the police, and the "Black Reichswehr" / secret Reichswehr 
Grenzschutz. 
73. These men are Karl Haas, Reinhard Heydrich, Hans-GeorgHofmann, 
and Hans Ludin. Note that Karl Haas was not actually a member of the 
Reichswehr but, rather, an officer in the Austrian Federal Army. Franz Ritter 
von Horauf and Fritz Ritter von Krausser probably could be added, but there 
is not enough information in their files to be sure. Even Ernst Rohm might 
well have been included, since he also "defected" from the army-albeit the 
Bolivian army. 
74. Hans Lehmann was a battalion commander in the Grenzschutz in 
Jii.terbog, and Hans Fuchs was an officer in the Bavarian Landespolizei. Both 
men entered their respective organizations as a direct result of their prior 
service in the Imperial Army. This mid-Weimar era Grenzschutz was an 
army-sponsored secret militia designed to supplement the army in time of 
war. Its main task was to slow down any enemy advance into Germany to 
allow time for mobilization and the preparation of a counterattack by regu-
lar army troops. It was similar in mission, but organizationally quite dis-
tinct from the Grenzschutz established during the German Revolution. See 
Absolon, Wehrmacht, 1:35-39; and Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, 147-
52, 220-32, 265-75, 350-56. 
75. It may be argued that men like Karl Haas or Hans Ludin, who en-
gaged in political activities that led to their dismissal from the service, are 
actually ideologically motivated true defectors in the usual sense of the word. 
76. Reichswehr members were forbidden to belong to any political party: 
Absolon, Wehrmacht, 1:74-76. 
77. Ludwig Schmuck came from Bund Oberland, where he was a local 
group leader. Josef Seydel had been the second-in-commando£ the Frontbann, 
and Karl Lucke came from Organisation Damm. Walter Darn~, Hans Friedrich, 
Walther Haug, and Kurt Plesch all came from the Stahlhelm. 
78. Information on Karl Lucke is taken from his BDC SA files unless 
otherwise noted. The following were particularly useful: his Personalfrage-
bogen of 15 June 1939, his Lebenslauf, "Bericht des Fuhrers der SA-Brigade 
2250 (Offenbach) Oberfuhrer Lucke, uber seine Verhaftung" (n.d.), "Meldung 
[report] des Obertruppfuhrers Erich Rebentisch" of 10 July 1934, and 
Personalstammkarte (green) for 1944 and 1945. 
79. See Absolon, Wehrmacht, 2:175-79, for an explanation of the pecu-
liar rank of Offizierstellvertreter. 
80. All information on Fuchs is taken from his SA files in the BDC 
unless otherwise noted. His Personalfragebogen of 14 January 1937 was par-
ticularly helpful. 
81. The Bavarian Landespolizei was a paramilitary police force intended 
to maintain domestic law and order in situations that were beyond the capa-
bility of local city police. It was organized along military lines and armed 
with a variety of light infantry weapons, including heavy machine guns, 
armored cars, and mortars. It was later absorbed into the Wehrmacht. It and 
the similar Bereitschaftspolizei (readiness police) or "Grii.ne Polizei" ("green 
police," after their characteristic uniforms which were green, in contrast to 
the blue of the normal city police) elsewhere were under state, as opposed to 
federal, control. See Gordon, Putsch, 120-21, 124-28, and Georg Tessin, 
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Deutsche Verbiinde und Truppen, 3:459-68. In general, see Jiirgen Siggemann, 
Die kasernierte Polizei und das Problem der inneren Sicherheit in der 
Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Auf- und Ausbau des innerstaatlichen 
Sicherheitssystems in Deutschland, 1918-1933 (Frankfurt am Main: R.G. 
Fischer, 1980). 
82. They were Ernst BeiGner, Reinhard Boerner, Hermann Brauneck, 
Bruno Czerwinski, Axel Daiber, Ludwig Fichte, Friedrich-Wilhelm Kruger, 
Werner Lorenz, Georg Mappes, Wilhelm Morchen, Eberhard Pagels, Albert 
Schneider, Paul Schulz, and Siegfried Seidel-Dittmarsch. The fourteen make 
up 30.4 percent of the entire 1931-32 group, and may be even higher if sev-
eral individuals are included whose files are sketchy or incomplete. Readers 
may note that Johann Fuchs could have been included in this category, since 
he left the police in 1925. He is classed as a "defector" and not as a "passive 
activist" due to his long membership in the police. 
83. The individual is the infamous Oberleutnant Paul Schulz. Given his 
character, it is likely that he would have appeared in another category had 
he not spent time in prison. He was a leading organizer of the illegal "Black 
Reichswehr" in Prussia. He became a close associate of Gregor Strasser in 
the NSDAP, and they left the Party at the same time. Schulz was later shot 
in the Rohm Purge and left for dead. He escaped Germany and worked as a 
businessman during the Second World War. He was responsible for saving a 
large number of Jews and other targets of the Nazi regime at considerable 
risk of his own life. See Paul Schulz, "Meine Erschiessung am 30. Juni 1934" 
(privately published, 1948; in IfZ F57); and Paul Schulz, "Rettungen und 
Hilfeleistungen an Verfolgten 1933-45 durch Oberlt. a.D. Paul Schulz" (pri-
vately published, 1967; IfZ Zs. A52). 
84. The six physicians are Hermann Brauneck, Bruno Czerwinski, Axel 
Daiber, Wilhelm Morchen, Eberhard Pagels, and Albert Schneider. 
85. Curiously, three of the "passive activists" joined the SS, not the SA. 
They were Friedrich-Wilhelm Kruger, Werner Lorenz, and Siegfried Seidel-
Dittmarsch. 
86. Information on Wilhelm Morchen is taken from his BDC SA files 
unless otherwise noted. His Personalfragebogen of 12 October 1937 and its 
supplements were particularly useful. 
87. A Feldhilfsarzt ranked similarly to a Feldwebelleutnant; both were 
technically noncommissioned officers who were given the responsibilities 
and many of the privileges of officers. The rank was reserved for medical 
students who were advanced in their studies but who had not yet passed 
their medical board examination. See Absolon, Wehrmacht, 2:50. 
88. A Vertrauensarzt was responsible for verifying insurance claims for 
long-term disability compensation and similar duties connected with health 
insurance and worker's compensation. 
89. The information on Paul Holthoff has been taken from his SA files 
in the BDC and Eric Stockhorst, Fiinftausend Kopfe, 206, unless otherwise 
noted. Among his BDC materials, the following were particularly useful: 
his SA-Fiihrer-Fragebogen (SA leader's questionnaire) of 1 November 1934, a 
large file card with a clipped left-hand corner from the OSAF (n.d.), and the 
two supplements to his Personalfragebogen. 
90. He officially joined the SA roughly one month before joining the 
Party. This is not typical of either the smaller group of "passive activists" or 
of the larger group of 1931-32 SA joiners among the highest SA leaders. It 
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may actually be due to a lag in Party bookkeeping, since the men in this 
chapter typically joined the NSDAP first, and only then the SA. See 18-19 
below. 
91. The Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten (Napola) were special 
Party schools that were intended to train a future governing elite. They 
emphasized ideological training. See Horst Dberhorst, ed., Elite fiir die 
Diktatur: Die Nationalpolitischen Erziehungsanstalten, 1933-1945. Bin 
Dokumentarbericht (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1969). 
92. In other words, thirty-four individuals out of the forty-six in the 
category of 1931-32 SA joiners. 
93. The men are Walter Darn~, Hans Frank, Hans Fuchs, Paul Giesler, 
Karl Haas, Hans-Peter von Heydebreck, Franz Ritter vonHi:irauf, Hans-Georg 
Hofmann, Kurt Kuhme, Werner Lorenz, Hans Ludin, Ernst Ri:ihm, Karl 
Schreyer, Josef Seydel, and Gregor Strasser. This is 32.6 percent of the group 
of forty-six. This number would be higher yet if men were included who 
reached the rank of Sturmbannfuhrer or higher within six months of joining 
the SA, or if the physicians were included. 
94. They are Ernst Bei£~ner, Walter Darre, Hans Frank, Hans Fuchs, Karl 
Haas, Hans-Peter von Heydebreck, Franz Ritter von Hi:irauf, Hans-Georg 
Hofmann, Adolf Kob, Friedrich-Wilhelm Kruger, Kurt Kuhme, Hans Ludin, 
Walter Luetgebrune, Ernst Ri:ihm, Karl Schreyer, Paul Schulz, Siegfried Seidel-
Dittmarsch, Josef Seydel, and Gregor Strasser. The nineteen are 41.3 percent 
of the total group of 46. 
95. Turner, Hitler aus niichster Niihe, 195. Note that in Ri:ihm's case, 
the fact that he was a known quantity outweighed Hitler's earlier disagree-
ments with him and rumors of his homosexuality: ibid., 197-201. 
96. BDC files of Kurt Kiihme and "Akt no. 49 Meuterei Stennes," in the 
BDC SA Allgemeine Personalakten. 
97. Schreyer and von Hi:irauf came from Ri:ihm's regiment, and von Hi:irauf 
later served with Ri:ihm in the staff of Free Corps Epp. Although the majority 
of these men were recruited by Ri:ihm for their military skills, note that 
Emil Ketterer, a physician, and Karl Schreyer, who was recruited specifi-
cally to handle SA finances and who was a former banker, were both also 
former Bavarian officers whom Rohm had known for a considerable time. 
See IfZ Zs. 357/2, Interrogation of Karl Schreyer on 28 May 1947 by the 
Counterintelligence Corps, and IfZ Sp2/1, Spruchkammer Akten des Grafen 
du Moulin-Eckart; BDC files of Josef Seydel, Franz Ritter von Hi:irauf, Emil 
Ketterer, and Fritz Ritter von Krausser. See also Gordon, Putsch, 346, and 
Gordon, Reichswehr, 245. Others who were well known to Ri:ihm but not 
necessarily recruited by him directly were Hans-Georg Hofmann and Wilhelm 
Schmid. 
98. The infamous "Feme Schulz" and organizer of the Black Reichswehr 
in Brandenburg. BDC files on Paul Schulz, and Walter Luetgebrune, Wahrheit 
und Recht fiir Feme, Schwarze Reichswehr, und Oberleutnant Schulz 
(Munich: J.F. Lehmann, 1928). 
99. Luetgebrune gained a great deal of notoriety in defending a series of 
celebrated right-wing activists. See Rudolf Heydeloff, "Staranwalt der 
Rechtsextremisten: Walter Luetgebrune in der Weimarer Republik," in 
Vierteljahreshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte 32 (July 1984): 373-421. See also von 
Salomon, Fragebogen, 271-77, 430-34. 
100. Information on von Heydebreck is scanty. What is clear is that he 
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was one of the most celebrated free corps leaders and nationalist activists in 
the Weimar Republic, who had a strong following above all in Silesia and 
eastern Germany. See von Heydebreck, Wir Wehrwolfe, and Stockhorst, 
Fiinftausend Kopfe, 195-96. 
101. To put it another way, 71.7 percent of the forty-six future highest 
SA leaders who joined the SA in 1931 or 1932 fall into one of six functional 
categories. 
102. They include Hans Fuchs, Karl Haas, Hans-Peter von Heydebreck, 
Franz Ritter von Horauf, Hans-Georg Hofmann, Adolf Kob, Fritz Ritter von 
Krausser, Kurt Kiihme, Hans Ludin, Ernst Rohm, Wilhelm Schmid, Siegfried 
Seidel-Dittmarsch, and Josef Seydel. 
103. At least eight of the thirteen had staff experience: Hans Fuchs, 
Hans-Peter von Heydebreck, Franz Ritter von Horauf, Hans-Georg Hofmann, 
Adolf Kob, Fritz Ritter von Krausser, Hans Ludin, and Siegfried Seidel-
Dittmarsch. Adolf Kob was a member of the Prussian general staff corps, 
Rohm and Seidel-Dittmarsch served in staffs in the Bavarian and Prussian 
War Ministries, while von Horauf had experience at the corps level. On the 
other hand, two of the seven, Hans Ludin and Peter von Heydebreck, served 
only briefly with staffs. Not included with the seven staff experts are Fritz 
Ritter von Krausser, Wilhelm Schmid, and Josef Seydel, all Bavarian cap-
tains whose records are too incomplete to reveal any staff training which 
they may have had. 
104. Kurt Kiihme left the Reichswehr as a major, Hans-Georg Hofmann 
left as a colonel, and Karl Haas left the Austrian Federal Army as a brigadier 
general (Generalmajor). 
105. Due to a lack of information, this could not be verified for Wilhelm 
Schmid, but he is the only possible exception. 
106. BDC files Kurt Kiihme; "Akt no. 49 Meuterei Stennes," BDC; 
Stockhorst, Fiinftausend Kopfe, 255; Frank, "Hitler and the National Social-
ist Coalition," 424. 
107. See his BDC SA files, especially "Das militarische und politische 
Werden des Staatssekretars SA-Obergruppenfiihrer Hofmann in der 
Nachkriegszeit," Franz Ritter von Epp, 1938. 
108. Werner, "SA," 407. 
109. BDC SA files of Emil Ketterer and Walter Schulze. 
110. For example, the SA-Fiihrerbefehle, the official orders announcing 
promotions, appointments, and other changes in command and personnel 
did not carry a separate rubric for physicians until February 1932. See OSAF 
Ila no. 430/32, Fiihrerbefehl no. 7 of 10 February 1932, in BDC, Schumacher 
Collection, Ordner 410. 
111. Hermann Brauneck, Bruno Czerwinski, Axel Daiber, Walther Haug, 
Emil Ketterer, Wilhelm Morchen, Eberhard Pagels, Albert Schneider, and 
Otto Walter. 
112. The two were Axel Daiber, who was a member of the Grenzschutz 
in his home province of West Prussia until he was forced to leave, and 
Eberhard Pagels, who was a member of a Studentenwehr (student militia) in 
Greifswald, where he was studying medicine, in 1920. Walther Haug is an 
exception here, since he was a member of the Stahlhelm from 1919 to 1931. 
113. Wilhelm Morchen and Eberhard Pagels. 
114. Albert Schneider. 
115. Hermann Brauneck, Emil Ketterer, and Otto Walter. 
216 Notes to Pages 107-111 
116. Information on Dr. Eberhard Pagels is taken from his SA BDC files. 
His obituary from the Frankfurter Oder-Zeitung of 23 March 1942 and his 
curriculum vitae, both in his BDC SA file, were particularly helpful. 
117. Information on Dr. Emil Ketterer is taken from his BDC SA files, 
especially his SA Fuhrer-Fragebogen (SA leader's questionnaire) of 22 May 
1935, and his SA Personalbogen (n.d.t and "SA Sanitatsgruppenfuhrer Dr. 
Ketterer/' in the Volkischer Beobachter (Munich edition), 19 November 1934. 
118. The Knight's Cross of the Order of the Lion of Zaringen was awarded 
by the Grand Duke of Baden. It was the third highest military order awarded 
by the Grand Duchy of Baden. The Knight's Cross was the lowest of the five 
levels of the order and was awarded 7,549 times in the First World War. See 
Klietmann, Pour le Merite und Tapferkeitsmedaille (Berlin: Verlag "die 
Ordenssammlung/' 1966), 6-7. 
119. The founding meeting of the NSDAP occurred on 2 7 February 1925 
in Munich. Although Ketterer gave 14 April1925 as his official date of mem-
bership, it is possible that he applied for membership in February, but was 
only issued a Party number by the overworked Party office in April. His 
number is certainly extraordinarily low. 
120. Ernst Beif~ner, Karl Lucke, Kurt Plesch, and Karl Schreyer. 
121. Information on Schreyer, as well as coming from his BDC files, has 
been taken mainly from IfZ Zs. 357/2, Interrogation of Karl Schreyer of 28 
May 1947 by the Counterintelligence Corps, and IfZ Sp2/1, Spruchkammer 
Akten des Grafen du Moulin-Eckart. 
122. He was convicted in 1930 under article 240, paragraph 1 of the 
Commercial Statutes for illegal futures transactions (Termingeschafte). 
123. They are included here because they did technically hold their SA 
ranks on an active basis. There were also eighty-eight honorary 
Gruppenfuhrer and Obergruppenfuhrer who are not included in this study. 
124. The Reich leader of organization (Reichsorganisationsleiter) was 
responsible for the entire administration of the Nazi Party aside from propa-
ganda, treasury, and Party affiliates. Gregor Strasser was the holder of this 
office when Rohm was given the administration of the SA. He may fairly be 
termed the second most powerful man in the entire Nazi Party. 
125. A third, Konstantin Hierl, was not included in this chapter because 
the exact date when he began his association with the SA is unclear, but he 
was also one of the members of the staff or the Reichsorganisationsleiter 
who became active SA Gruppenfuhrer at this time. 
126. Although these men received active SA commissions, a similar 
policy was applied to the award of honorary or inactive SA commissions, 
which were granted by Rohm both as a means of honoring former SA leaders 
who had to leave active service, and as a means of building bridges to the 
Party. Most of these more numerous honorary commissions went to Party 
officials who had some previous connection with the SA and who were vet-
erans and who had been active in either Wehrverbande or volkisch organiza-
tions in the early 1920s. Information on the honorary SA leaders was taken 
from the BDC files of eighty-eight honorary SA Gruppenfuhrer or 
Obergruppenfuhrer. 
127. He had of course been an SA commander and early SA organizer in 
Landshut before the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923. See Peter Stachura, Gregor 
Strasser and the Rise of Nazism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983). 
128. Walter Stennes was the OSAF-Stellvertreter Ost, or head of the SA 
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in eastern Germany. There were actually two Stennes crises: the first was a 
threat by Stennes and several of his subordinates in August 1930 to resign 
and suspend any SA activities if SA leaders were not included among the 
Party members proposed for election to the Reichstag. The second was more 
serious: Fearing a threat to the legality policy of the NSDAP, Hitler removed 
Stennes from his post on 31 March 1931. Stennes thereupon left the NSDAP 
and SA and took a fairly large number of his subordinate officers and men 
with him. His attempts to found a countermovement to the SA and NSDAP 
failed, yet the crisis was a major threat to Party unity. 
129. BDC Research Section file on Schulz; Akte des Obersten 
Parteigerichts and Parteikanzlei Korrespondenz Paul Schulz, both in the BDC. 
130. Information on Liebel comes from his BDC SA file (particularly his 
curriculum vitae of 7 April 1942 and a pink file card recording his entitle-
ment to the Dienstauszeichnung der NSDAP) and from Stockhorst, 
Fiinftausend Kopfe, 270. 
131. Information on Frank comes from Stockhorst, Fiinftausend Kopfe, 
140; Joachim Fest, Das Gesicht des Dritten Reiches: Profile einer Totalitarian 
Herrschaft, 7th ed. (Munich: R. Piper, 1980), 286-99; John Dornberg, Munich 
1923: The Story of Hitler's First Grab for Power (New York: Harper and Row, 
1982), 345; Das Deutsche Fiihrerlexikon, 129, and Rudolf Glandeck Freiherr 
von Sebottendorf, Bevor Hitler Kam: Urkundliches aus der Friihzeit der 
Nationalistischen Bewegung (Munich: Grassinger, 1933), 234. 
132. Information on Luetgebrune is taken from Heydeloff, "Staranwalt," 
passim, and von Salomon, Fragebogen, 430-44. 
133. Heydrich might arguably have been included in the category of 
"military specialist," as was Hans Ludin, the other Reichswehr officer with-
out experience in the Imperial Army. 
134. Darn~ had been a member of the Stahlhelm from 1923 to 1928, and 
Heydrich had been a member of several organizations, including two free 
corps, the Orgesch and the Deutsch-Volkische Schutz- und Trutzbund. See 
their respective SS Fiihrerakten in the BDC. In addition, on Darn~ see 
Stockhorst, Fiinftausend Kopfe, 98 and Das Deutsche Fiihrerlexikon, 21-22. 
135. The men were Meinhardt Marnitz, Reinhard Boerner, Hans 
Lehmann, Karl Lucke, Paul Giesler, Hans Friedrich, Richard Aster, Paul 
Holthoff, Heinrich Hacker, and Ludwig Schmuck. Only one of these men 
was promoted further, and only on an honorary basis. This was Paul Giesler, 
who originally transferred into the SA from the political apparatus of the 
Party. He was later drafted by the Party to become a Gauleiter in 1941. Only 
then was he promoted to (honorary) Obergruppenfiihrer. 
136. The three exceptions were Hans Friedrich (Gruf. 1933 ), Paul Giesler 
(Gruf. 1937), and Ludwig Schmuck (Gruf. 1939). Two of these three entered 
the SA at ranks equivalent to officer rank, which gave them an advantage 
over most of the other "good soldiers." 
137. Information of Ludwig Schmuck has been taken from his BDC SA 
files, and in particular his Personalfragebogen of 6 March 1937 with its later 
supplements and "SA-Gruppenfiihrer Schmuck" in the Bayreuther Kurier 
of 4 November 1942. 
138. The Stegmann Revolt was a conflict between the SA Leader of Cen-
tral Franconia, Wilhelm Stegmann and the Gauleiter of Central Franconia, 
Julius Streicher. It ended with Stegmann's mutiny and the resignation or 
expulsion of a significant portion of the SA under Stegmann's command. See 
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the BDC files on Wilhelm Stegmann and Eric G. Reiche, The Development 
of the SA in Niirnberg, 1922-1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 146-72. 
139. Fifteen of the forty-six were eventually promoted to Obergruppen-
fiihrer, and Ernst Rohm was of course the chief of staff and actual head of the 
SA. They were Hermann Brauneck, Hans Frank, Hans Fuchs, Paul Giesler, 
Franz Ritter von Horauf, Hans-Georg Hofmann, Emil Ketterer, Adolf Kob, 
Fritz Ritter von Krausser, Friedrich-Wilhelm Kriiger, Kurt Kiihme, Willy 
Liebel, Werner Lorenz, Hans Ludin, and Georg Mappes. Together, only 34.7 
percent of the group went beyond Gruppenfiihrer. Note that Ketterer was a 
Sanitats-Obergruppenfiihrer, and Mappes was a Verwaltungs-Obergruppen-
fiihrer. 
140. Hans Fuchs, Karl Haas, Franz Ritter von Horauf, Kurt Kiihme, Hans 
Ludin Ernst Rohm, Karl Schreyer, and Josef Seydel immediately, Richard 
Aster, Reinhard Heydrich, and Adolf Kob within one year. Exact dates for 
full-time SA employment are lacking for many of the men in this group, and 
the true number is certainly much higher. 
141. Twenty (43 .4%) began in staff positions: Ernst BeiEner, Walter Darre, 
Hans Frank, Hans Fuchs, Karl Haas, Hans-Peter vonHeydebreck, Franz Ritter 
von Horauf, Hans-Georg Hofmann, Adolf Kob, Friedrich-Wilhelm Kruger, 
Kurt Kiihme, Hans Ludin, Walter Luetgebrune, Ernst Rohm, Karl Schreyer, 
Wilhelm Schmid, Paul Schulz, Josef Seydel, and Gregor Strasser. Twenty 
(43.4%) entered as Sturmbannfiihrer or higher: Ernst Beif~ner, Walter Darre, 
Hans Frank, Hans Fuchs, Paul Giesler, Karl Haas, Heinrich Hacker, Hans-
Peter von Heydebreck, Hans-Georg Hofmann, Franz Ritter von Horauf, Fritz 
Ritter von Krausser, Kurt Kiihme, Hans Ludin, Walter Luetgebrune, Ernst 
Rohm, Wilhelm Schmid, Karl Schreyer, Paul Schulz, Josef Seydel, and Gregor 
Strasser. Note that this does not include the eight SA medical officers who 
entered at Sturmbannfiihrer or higher; counting them, the percentage is 60.8 
percent. 
142. Paul Schulz was also shot, but he managed to escape and tell the 
tale. See Paul Schulz, "Meine Erschiessung am 30. Juni 1934"; see also Heinz 
Hahne, Mordsache Rohm: Hitlers Durchbruch zur Alleinherrschaft, 1933-
1934 (Hamburg: Spiegel/Rowohlt, 1984), 7-22. Those shot from this group 
were Rohm himself, Gregor Strasser, Wilhelm Schmid, Peter von Heydebreck, 
and Fritz Ritter von Krausser. A list of those shot in the Rohm Purge may be 
found in Bennecke, Reichswehr, 87-88. See also Karl Martin GraE, "Edgar 
Jung, Papenkreis, und Rohmkrise, 1933/34" (Ph.D. diss., Rupprecht-Karl-
Universitat at Heidelberg, 1966), 292-95. 
143. Luetgebrune and Schreyer. 
144. Ernst BeiEner, Walter Dane, Paul Giesler, Heinrich Hacker, 
Reinhard Heydrich, Hans-Georg Hofmann, Emil Ketterer, Adolf Kob, 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Kruger, Kurt Kiihme, Willy Liebel, Werner Lorenz, Georg 
Mappes, and Gregor Strasser. 
145. Walter Darn~, Reinhard Heydrich, Hans-Georg Hofmann, Adolf Kob, 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Kruger, Kurt Kiihme, Werner Lorenz, Georg Mappes, and 
Gregor Strasser. 
146. Jamin, Zwischen den Klassen, 74-76; Klietmann, Deutsche 
Auszeichnungen, 247-50; Buchheim, "Mitgliedschaft bei der NSDAP," in 
Gutachten, 1:313-22. 
147. Paul Giesler. 
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148. Willy Liebel, Paul Schulz, and Otto Walter. 
149. Kreisleiter: Ernst Beif~ner, Ortsgruppenleiter: Hans Ludin and Georg 
Mappes. Of course, several, including Gregor StraBer or Hans Frank, even 
owed their high SA rank to their Party position in the first place, even though 
they were nominally "active" SA leaders. 
5. THE LATECOMERS, 1933-1934 
1. The classic studies on the Machtergreifung include Bracher, Die 
Auflosung der Weimarer Republik Karl-Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, 
and Gerhard Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung ( 1962; re-
print, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1974). For more recent views see Karl 
Dietrich Erdmann and Hagen Schulze, eds., Weimar, Selbstpreisgabe einer 
Demokratie: Eine Bilanz Heute (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1980); Volker Rittberger, 
ed., 1933: Wie die Republik der Diktatur Erlag (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 
1983). 
2. Although the SA plays a role in all of the more politically oriented 
accounts of the Nazi assumption of power, and there is a considerable body 
of literature dealing with the purge of Ernst Ri:ihm and the SA in 1934 that 
includes events of early 1933, very little research has been done specifically 
on the SA in this period. The best histories of the SA such as Bennecke, 
Hitler und die SA, Werner, or Frank all stop with the Machtergreifung or 
else gloss over many of the developments of 1933 and 1934 that do not di-
rectly concern the purge. 
3. This estimate is based on the following figures: 23,737,000 German 
males of age 15 or more in 1923 (Petzina et al., Arbeitsbuch, 3:28) and 
4,300,000 members of the SA in 1934, derived from adding the figure for the 
SAR II as of 1 January 1935 (roughly 1,400,000; from Parteistatistik, 3:76, 
cited in Mathilde Jamin, "Zur Rolle der SA im nationalsozialistischen 
Herrschaftssystem," in Der "Fiihrerstaat ": Mythos und Reali tat, ed. Gerhard 
Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker [Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981], 334) to the 
figure for the strength of the SA and SARI in August 1934 (roughly 2,900,000; 
from "SA Starkemeldung" [Report of Effective Strength], BAK, Schumacher 
Collection, Ordner 415, cited in Jamin, "Rolle," 334.) Note that this is only 
a rough estimate, however, since the exact strength of the entire SA in the 
early summer of 1934 is unclear. If anything, the above estimate for the size 
of the SA is on the small side, since the size of the SAR II decreased between 
the time of the putsch and 1 January 1935. 
4. See, e.g., Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951; re-
print, New York: World, 1958); Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and 
Social Power," American Political Science Review, no. 46 (1952): 357-75; 
William S. Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 
1959). For a critique of the "mass society" hypothesis, see Bernt Hagtvet, 
"The Theory of Mass Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic: A 
Re-Examination," in Who Were the Fascists! The Social Roots of European 
Fascism, ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust 
(Bergen, Oslo, Tromso: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 66-117, and Jurgen Fal-
ter, Hitlers Wahler (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1991). 
5. As long as measures were being directed against the left, the Stahlhelm, 
which supported the conservative-Nazi coalition, was also used. The sup-
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pression of civil rights and violent repression of dissent that characterized 
the consolidation of power in 1933-34 was in no way the sole responsibility 
of the Nazi Party, even though it did take the lead in these actions. 
6. See Bruce Campbell, "The SA after the Rohm Purge," Journal of 
Contemporary History 28 (1993): 659-74. Note that the distinction between 
"calculated" and "spontaneous" violence is somewhat misleading; the "spon-
taneous" violence was in fact quite calculated and encouraged by the NSDAP 
leadership (in its new role as masters of the state). Indeed, an organization 
like the SA existed only to institutionalize and manipulate "spontaneous" 
violence. 
7. A Schnellbrief (priority message) from the OSAF Fiihrungsamt to 
the head of the SA Reichsfiihrerschule (F2 no. 51328) of 3 September 1935 
(in BAK NS23/337) gives a figure of 427,538 for the SA proper for January 
1933. To this must be added roughly 27,000 Motor-SA, 24,500 SS, and25,000 
SA-Anwarter, as reported in OSAF, sec. 1, "Gesamtstarke [general strength] 
der SA nach 15.10.32. Septembermeldung" of 14 November 1932, in BAK 
NS23/vorl. 124. 
8. Kater, "Ansiitze zu einer Soziologie der SA," 799. 
9. OSAF F no. 4513 betr: Neugliederung der SA of 27 March 1934, in 
BAK, Schumacher Collection, Ordner 404. 
10. Kater, "Ansatze zu einer Soziologie der SA," 799. 
11. Jamin, "Rolle," 332. Little is known in any systematic way about 
why this turnover occurred. Disagreement with the Nazis' political course 
was a factor in some cases, but so was lack of interest or simple exhaustion. 
12. Ibid. See also the letter to the SA Gerichts-und Rechtsamt from 
Wilhelm Frhr. von Schorlemer of 14 July 1935, in his SA Disziplinarverfahren 
Akte (Aktenz. Sch 38/L/35) in the BDC, for an example ofresentment against 
newcomers, even from a high SA leader. 
13. OSAF I no. 1209/33 betr: Kopfstarken der SA: Neuaufstellungen von 
SA-Einheiten of 24 May 1933. SA units were ultimately not put on the state 
budget directly, but large lump sums for the SA were provided by the Minis-
try of the Interior from April to June 1934: Jamin, "Rolle," 340. 
14. Compare OSAF Qu. no. 3386/32, Diensteinteilung im Stabe der 
Obersten SA-Fiihrung of 1932 (after the July 1932 refounding of the SA at 
the lifting of the SA ban), with the schematic diagram attached to OSAF C. 
no. 1077/33 of 20 May 1933, both in BAK, Schumacher Collection, Ordner 
404. 
15. OSAF ErlaB no. 2 of 7 July 1933, and OSAF Ch. no.1350/33, Verfiigung 
betr: Neugliederung der SA of 7 July 1933, both in BAK, Schumacher Collec-
tion, Ordner 404. 
16. Many more Standarten actually existed but had not yet been awarded 
an official insignia: SA-Gruf. Max Jiittner, "Standarten des Aufbruchs und 
der Treue," NationalsozialistischeKorrespondenz, 28 August 1935, 4a; OSAF 
Ch. no. 1350/33, Verfiigung betr: Neugliederung der SA of 7 July 1933, in 
BAK, Schumacher Collection, Ordner 404; OSAF II no. 1328/33, Fiihrerbefehl 
no. 15 of 1 July 1933, in BDC, Schumacher Collection, Ordner 410. The new 
Brigade level, generally announced inCh. no. 1350/33 of 7 July 1933, was set 
down in specific terms in the Verfiigung betr: SA-Gliederungof 15 Septem-
ber 1933, as cited in "Die Organisation der Obersten SA-Fiihrung von 
5.1.1931-20.4.1944 einschliesslich Rangliste" von Dr. Horst Heinrich, in 
BAK NS23/438. Because of the way in which the Brigaden were numbered, 
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it seems likely that the number of Brigaden that were called for in July had 
already been increased by about one-third by September. 
17. Again, many more Standarte actually existed at this time but had 
not yet been formally awarded an insignia. These flags or standards were 
formally awarded to new SA units in great ceremonies usually held at Party 
congresses. It marked the official recognition and establishment of a new 
SA or SS Standarte, but of course these units actually existed long before 
they were awarded their insignia. This was often largely a financial matter: 
the insignia of a Standarte was very expensive, so before the NSDAP gained 
access to state coffers, it tended to wait as long as it could before awarding 
them: OSAF Ia no. 1549/32, Neuaufstellung (new formation) der SA und SS: 
Fiihrerbefehl no. 1 of 1 July 1932; OSAF 2420/32, Fiihrerbefehl no. 2 of 9 
September 1932; OSAF no. 3520/32, Fiihrerbefehl no. 3 of 29 November 1932, 
all in BDC, Schumacher Collection, Ordner 410; SA-Gruf. Max Jiittner, 
"Standarten des Aufbruchs und der Treue," Nationalsozialistische 
Korrespondenz, 28 August 1935, 4a; OSAF Ch. no. 1568/32, Verordnung of 6 
July 1932, in BAK, Schumacher Collection, Ordner 404; OSAF Qu no. 2410/ 
32, Verfiigung betr: Obergruppen of 9 September 1932, in BAK, Schumacher 
Collection, Ordner 404. 
18. Other major Wehrverbiinde which were also absorbed by the SA (SS) 
include the Wehrwolf and the Brigade Ehrhardt. Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 250-51; 
Alois Klotzbiicher, "Der politische Weg des Stahlhelms, Bund der Frontsoldaten 
in der Weimarer Republik: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Nationalen Opposi-
tion, 1918-1933" (Ph.D. diss., Universitiit Erlangen, 1964), 49. 
19. Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 151-253. 
20. Ibid., 251-52, 263-72; Klotzbiicher, "Der politische Weg," 263-67. 
21. Klotzbiicher, "Der politische Weg," 287-99; Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 
245-74. 
22. On the Wehrstahlhelm, see Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 267-69. By Janu-
ary 1934, 310,000 members of the Wehrstahlhelm were taken into the SA 
proper: Klotzbiicher, "Der politische Weg," 49. 
23. Klotzbiicher, "Der politische Weg," 299-301. The dates given in the 
text are the official ones; the process actually proceeded more slowly. See, 
e.g., the BDC files of Erich Wiethaus and Friedrich Liith. 
24. Klotzbiicher, "Der politische Weg," 301-2. 
25. OSAF Ch. no. 1456/33 betr: Eingliederung der Brigade Ehrhardt of 
10 August 1933. See von Salomon, Fragebogen, 423-28, for an account of the 
formal ceremony for the entry of the Brigade Ehrhardt into the SS, which 
throws light on the reluctance with which the absorption of the proud and 
independent paramilitary associations into the SA and SS was often made. 
26. OSAF Ch. no. 2273 betr: Organisation der SAR II of 12 February 
1934, in BDC, Schumacher Collection, Ordner 407. 
27. OSAF Ch. no. 569/34 betr: SARI of 25 January 1934; OSAF P2 no. 
4592/34 betr: Stellenbesetzung der SAR I of 5 March 1934, both in BAK, 
Schumacher Collection, Ordner 407. 
28. Only the strictly nonpolitical regimental veterans' associations were 
specifically exempted from his attacks. See OSAF Ch/Z1 no. 2254/34 betr: 
Vereine und Clubs of 26 February 1934, in BDC, Schumacher Collection, 
Ordner 415; OSAF Ch. no. 569/34 betr: SARI of 25 January 1934, in BDC, 
Schumacher Collection, Ordner 407. 
29. Dual membership in the NSDF and the SARI was allowed, but those 
222 Notes to Pages 125-129 
members of the SAR I who wished would be allowed to resign and join the 
NSDF. See the analysis in GraB, "Edgar Jung," 105-9. 
30. With the introduction of conscription in March 1935, the army no 
longer had need of the paramilitary and veterans' organizations as a covert 
source of manpower, and army support for any sort of preservation of the 
Stahlhelm evaporated. 
31. Klotzbiicher, "Der politische Weg," 306-9. 
32. Ibid., 49. 
33. See OSAF Ch. no. 800/33 betr: Aufnahme (enrollment) in die SA of 
20 March 1933, in BAK, Schumacher Collection, Ordner 407. 
34. Max Jiittner is a good example. See his BDC files. 
35. The SS presents one case where some individuals who entered late 
were able to rise to high rank, but many of them were specialists, and the 
expansion of the SS after the takeover of power was particularly great. 
36. A twelfth man, Franz May, joined the SA even later, in 1938. He is 
not included in this chapter because he represents a special case and be-
cause he joined so late. In brief, he was a leader of the Freiwilliger Schutzdienst 
of the Sudeten German Party in Czechoslovakia. He was unable to officially 
join the NSDAP and SA until the Sudetenland had been annexed to Ger-
many, although he worked for German army intelligence much earlier. Upon 
annexation he was immediately appointed to head the newly formed SA 
Gruppe in the Sudetenland. 
37. The men are George Dechant, Thomas Girgensohn, Max Jiittner, 
Hans Lukesch, August Moeslinger, Hans Elard von Morozowisc, Georg von 
Neufville, Lorenz Ohrt, Hans Petersen, Wilhelm Reinhard, and Franz von 
Stephani. 
38. Material on Hans Petersen is taken from Records of the U.S. 
Nuremberg War Crimes Trials Interrogations, 1946-49, National Archives, 
microfilm pub. Ml019, roll 52, interrogation of Hans Petersen of 22 October 
1946, as well as from his BDC files (particularly his curriculum vitae) and 
from Stockhorst, Fiinftausend Kopfe, 320-21. 
39. He was county organization leader of the south Bavarian county of 
Sonthofen from 1925 until1933 and a Party speaker. 
40. The SA Sonderkommissare were appointed in 1933 in Bavaria to 
represent and protect the interests of the SA in local and regional offices of 
the civil administration. The SA was particularly interested in securing jobs 
for its many unemployed members. 
41. Information about Hans Lukesch comes from his BDC files, espe-
cially from his Personalfragebogen of 1 May 1938 and its two supplements. 
See also Stockhorst, Fiinftausend Kopfe, 280. 
42. Georg Dechant, Thomas Girgensohn, Max Jiittner, AugustMoslinger, 
Hans Elard von Morozowisc, Georg Freiherr von Neufville, Lorenz Ohrt, 
Wilhelm Reinhard, and Franz von Stephani. They will be treated as one group 
in the following analysis, unless otherwise noted. 
43. Georg Dechant, Landesfiihrer Franken, Max Jiittner, Landesfiihrer 
Mittel deutschland, and Georg von Neufville, Landesfiihrer Wiirttemberg und 
Baden. 
44. Franz von Stephani, Bundeshauptmann of the Stahlhelm and also 
Oberstlandesfiihrer GroBberlin, Hans von Morozowisc, the leader of the 
Wehrstahlhelm and also Oberlandesfiihrer Brandenburg and Braunschweig, 
and August Moslinger, the Oberquartiermeister of the Stahlhelm. 
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45. Thomas Girgensohn in Berlin and Lorenz Ohrt in Hamburg. A 
Wehrsport regiment seems to have been similar to an SA Standarte in terms 
of size. On the Wehrsport units, see Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 134ff. and 193ff., 
and Klotzbiicher, "Der politische Weg," 211, 213ff. 
46. The Stahlhelm (after about 1927) was headed by its first and second 
Bundesfiihrer. Below them were the Bundesrat, made up of the first and sec-
ond Bundesfiihrer and five leaders of Landesverbiinde chosen by the two lead-
ers. Below it was the Vorstandsversammlung, made up of all of the 
Landesfiihrer and the leaders of the independent Gaue [regions], plus indi-
vidual members enjoying the special trust of the leadership and elected by 
the Landesfiihrer. Beside the Bundesfiihrer and Bundesrat for the day-to-day 
administration of the organization was the Bundesamt, a staff and adminis-
trative structure organized on a general staff model. It contained numerous 
offices and departments under three main divisions for politics, organiza-
tion, and finances. Although the two Bundesfiihrer and the Bundesrat made 
up the actual leadership, a great deal of power lay in the hands of the 
Landesfiihrer, since they had autonomy in their areas and together elected 
the two Bundesfiihrer every three years. The core leadership of the Stahlhelm 
would therefore be the Bundesfiihrer, Landesfiihrer, and the heads of the 
most important offices in the Bundesamt, roughly thirty to forty men. See 
Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 283-84 and 285, and Hildebrandt and Kettner, eds., 
Stahlhelm Handbuch, 76. 
47. See the table in Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 287, of Landesverbiinde as of 
1931. 
48. Leadership of the Stahlhelm was shared from 1927 to early 1933 by 
Franz Seldte and Theodor Duesterberg, the first and second Bundesfiihrer of 
the Stahlhelm. But in early 1933, shortly before he subordinated the Stahlhelm 
to the NSDAP, Seldte forced Duesterberg to resign. Therefore, there was 
only one Bundesfiihrer of the Stahlhelm at the time it was absorbed into the 
SA. See Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 257-63. Even though Seldte was presented 
with the rank of SA Obergruppenfiihrer in recognition of his subordination 
of the Stahlhelm to the NSDAP, this was only an honorary commission, and 
he never actually served as an active SA leader. SeeDer Oberste SA-Fuhrer II 
no. 1411/33, Fiihrerbefehl no. 16 of 1 August 1933, in BDC, Schumacher 
Collection, Ordner 410. 
49. Technically, members of the Stahlhelm were given a choice whether 
or not to join the SA, but for the Stahlhelm leaders this was not a genuine 
alternative when the Stahlhelm was first being absorbed into the SA and its 
future status within that organization was unclear. Immediate refusal would 
have been tantamount to open resistance to the Nazis and could have jeop-
ardized any future concessions to the Stahlhelm and the expected (but, as far 
as the SA was concerned, never seriously intended) autonomy for it within 
the SA. Moreover, resignation or refusal at this stage of the game for a 
Stahlhelm leader would have meant relinquishing any control or influence 
over events and over the Stahlhelm in the future. All of the former Stahlhelm 
members had ample opportunity to quit the SA without penalty once their 
absorption was complete. At the latest, the forced cutbacks in the SA in the 
wake of the R6hm Purge gave any SA member an unblemished pretext to 
leave. 
50. It is possibly true for one more individual, Thomas Girgensohn. 
51. Jiittner, von Stephani, von Morozowisc, and von Neufville were the 
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Prussians, Moslinger was the Bavarian, and Reinhard was the Wiirttemberger. 
52. Wilhelm Reinhard was already a major when the war broke out. It is 
possible that August Moslinger was, too, although the evidence suggests 
that he was a captain. 
53. Max Jiittner, August Moslinger, Georg von Neufville, Wilhelm 
Reinhard, and Franz von Stephani. It is not clear whether Thomas Girgensohn 
was an officer in the regular army or the reserves, but because he lost a leg in 
the war, he could not possibly have been taken into the Reichswehr. 
54. Von Stephani was a noble originally commissioned in an elite guards 
regiment. Von Neufville was also noble, and he, Wilhelm Reinhard, and Max 
Jiittner all had general staff experience. Reinhard, in addition, had been 
awarded the Pour le Merite, Germany's highest military decoration in the 
First World War. All six had also served actively in the German Revolution. 
55. On Stephani see Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 40, 268; Stockhorst, 
Fiinftausend Kopfe, 412; Deutscher Offiziersbund, ed., Ehrenrangliste des 
ehemaligen deutschen Heeres, 190, 127, 1015; and Franz von Stephani, "Der 
Sturm auf das Vorwiirtsgebiiude am 10 Januar 1919," in Das Buch vom 
deutschen Freikorpskiimpfer, ed. Ernst von Salomon (Berlin: Wilhelm 
Limpert, 1938), 39-40. On Max Jiittner see his BDC files and IfZ Zs. 251/1-2. 
Von Neufville may also have participated in the Kapp Putsch. 
56. Both Georg Dechant and Lorenz Ohrt were given commissions as 
reserve officer during the war. 
57. The exception is von Morozowisc, due to a lack of information. 
58. August Moslinger was in the regular army, and Lorenz Ohrt and 
Max Jiittner were Zeitfreiwilliger. Jiittner is also included as a member of a 
free corps, since he was not only a member of a Zeitfreiwilligenverband but 
he actually commanded a unit as a part of the Landesjiigerkorps, the core of 
which was made up of Freikorps Maercker and two other free corps. He 
listed both in his SA records. See Tessin, Deutsche Verbiinde und Truppen, 
59-60; BDC files of Max Jiittner. 
59. Georg Dechant, Thomas Girgensohn, Max Jiittner, and Hans Petersen 
were members of Freikorps, and three others were free corps commanders: 
Wilhelm Reinhard was the commander of Freikorps Reinhard, Georg von 
Neufville was the commander of Freikorps von Neufville, and Franz von 
Stephani was the commander of Freikorps Potsdam. 
60. Max Jiittner. 
61. Hans von Morozowisc. 
62. On the Nationale Vereinigung see Dieter Fricke, ed., 1830-1945: Die 
Biirgerlichen Parteien in Deutschland, 2 vols. (Berlin: Europiiische Buch, 
1968), 2:339-40. 
63. Little is known about these two groups, and they must have been 
quite small. Georg von Neufville led them. 
64. Georg Dechant was in the Reichsflagge, and Thomas Girgensohn 
was in the Reichsverband der Baltikumkiimpfer. 
65. Franz von Stephani. 
66. The individual was Max Jiittner. 
67. Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 13-54; Klotzbiicher, "Der politische Weg," 1-30. 
68. Max Jiittner and Thomas Girgensohn. 
69. Not that even among the highest SA leaders, only a minority (though 
a sizable one, especially among the 1925-26 group) were members of a volkisch 
organization. 
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70. Georg Dechant, Thomas Girgensohn, Lorenz Ohrt, and Franz von 
Stephani. 
71. The two are Georg Dechant, a Reichsflagge leader in Franconia, and 
Franz von Stephani, a leader of the Verband Nationalgesinnter Sol daten. See 
Klotzbucher, "Der politische Weg," 31-33, for a description of the way the 
Stahlhelm absorbed many smaller organizations. 
72. Information on Georg Dechant is taken from his BDC files, espe-
cially his Personalfragebogen of 7 June 1937. He was born in Franconia in 
1893. His father was a head forest administrator (Oberforstverwalter). He 
became a teacher, although he apparently did not exercise his profession for 
very long. He served in the First World War from 1914 to 1918, was wounded, 
decorated, and commissioned as an officer. When he returned, he served in 
Freikorps Epp and later the Transitional Reichswehr (Ubergangsheer) until 
December 1919. In 1920 he joined the Reichsflagge and from 1922 to 1933 
he was a full-time paid employee of the Reichsflagge and later of the 
Stahlhelm. He served in the Second World War, but only in a local flak unit 
so that he could continue his SA duties. He rose to the rank of captain in the 
Luftwaffe. His fate after the war is not known. 
73. There were occasional difficulties between Stahlhelm members and 
Party/SA members in Franconia in early 1934, just as there were elsewhere. 
Dechant apparently worked hard to end such difficulties and cooperate with 
the Nazis. See Der Sonderbevollmiichtigte fur Ober-, Mittel- und 
Unterfranken (von Obernitz) 1026/34 an den Sonderbevollmiichtigten fur 
das Land Bayern Obergruppenfuhrer Fuchs of 15 February 1934, betr: 
Verhiiltnisse in Koburg, in BDC SA files Hans Fuchs. 
7 4. The three are Max Juttner, Thomas Girgensohn, and Georg von 
Neufville. 
75. Information on Thomas Girgensohn is taken from his BDC files, 
especially his Personalfragebogen of 9 December 193 7 and its two supple-
ments, a large OSAF file card with a clipped upper left-hand corner (n.d.), 
and a large blue card recording wages and benefits payments for the years 
1942-44. 
76. See Alfred Fletcher, "Die Baltische Landeswehr," inBaltische Blatter 
12 (March 1929): 69-71; Baltischer Landeswehrverein, ed., Die Baltische 
Landeswehr im Befreiungskampf gegen den Bolschewismus: Bin 
Gedenkbuch (Riga: G. Li:iffler, 1929). 
77. He later married Freiin von Loudon, the daughter of one of the Bal-
tic-German noble families from Latvia. 
78. It is possible that the entire organization was absorbed into the 
Stahlhelm at this time, as many similar organizations already had been, but 
this is conjecture. 
79. Both Bundeshauptmann and Bundesbevollmiichtigter were relatively 
new positions in the Stahlhelm hierarchy due to its reorganization in 1933. 
Compare the 1931 Stahlhelm Handbuch with the organizational chart of 
the Bundesamt of the Stahlhelm in BAK, Schumacher Collection, Ordner 
470, n.d. (sometime after Duesterberg's resignation on 26 April 1933). The 
Jungstahlhelm was made up of young men of German background ages sev-
enteen to twenty-three: Hildebrandt and Kettner, Stahlhelm Handbuch, 117. 
80. Konstantin Hierl was a former professional officer who joined the 
NSDAP in 1927. He occupied a high position in the Party bureaucracy as its 
"Reich Leader of Organization II" from 1929 to 1933. He then became a 
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state secretary for the Voluntary Labor Service (Freiwillige Arbeitsdienst, 
FAD) in the Ministry of Labor, and later the head of the compulsory Reich 
Labor Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst, RAD), which absorbed the FAD. Although 
the labor service later declined in importance, in the early 1930s it was of 
great importance to the Nazis, who needed to gain public support through 
concrete amelioration of the unemployment problem. 
81. Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 267-68. 
82. Information on Lorenz Ohrt comes from his BDC files, particularly 
from his Personalfragebogen of 2 March 1937, and from a large OSAF file 
card with a clipped upper left-hand corner. 
83. While moving up in his SA career, Ohrt also served on active duty 
with the Wehrmacht. After completing training exercises in 1934 and 1936, 
he was commissioned as a first lieutenant of the reserve in 1937 and as 
captain in 1940. He saw combat with the Wehrmacht and was awarded the 
Iron Cross First and Second Class. He was later promoted to major. 
84. The sole exception was Georg Dechant, who did have a minor posi-
tion in the Deutsche Arbeitsfront but not in the Party administration proper. 
85. Max Jiittner, Georg von Neufville, and Lorenz Ohrt all joined the 
Party in 1933. Georg Dechant, Thomas Girgensohn, August Moslinger, and 
Wilhelm Reinhard joined in 1937. Only two never joined the NSDAP. Von 
Morozowisc also might have joined later had he not been killed in an acci-
dent in 1934. The case of the other, von Stephani, is unclear, and it is pos-
sible that he did later join the Party after he resigned from the SA. 
86. To be fair, it should be emphasized that von Morozowisc had had his 
disagreements with the SA leadership and might have left the SA if he hadn't 
died in an accident. Wilhelm Reinhard, the head of the Kyffhauserbund, left 
the SA when the SAR II, of which the Kyffhauserbund had been a part, was 
disbanded, but, sensing where the real center of power had gravitated, im-
mediately joined the SS, and so cannot be considered to have left the SA out 
of any ideological disagreement with National Socialism. 
87. Much of the Stahlhelm could also agree with the SA on the equally 
fundamental point of anti-Semitism: Berghahn, Stahlhelm, 65-67. 
88. Information on Jiittner comes from his BDC files, especially his 
Personalfragebogen of 22 February 1937 and its two supplements, his cur-
riculum vitae, and IfZ Zs. 251/1-2 (Max Jiittner). 
89. See the background chapter for information on the Zeitfreiwilliger. 
The Landesjagerkorps was a free corps formed and led by General Maercker 
from 1918 to June 1919. It was subsequently absorbed into the Reichswehr 
and was one of the most reliable and disciplined of all the free corps. See 
Tessin, Deutsche Verbiinde und Truppen, 59-60, 120, 177-78; Waite, Van-
guard of Nazism, 185; and Gen. Ludwig R. Maercker, Vom Kaiserheer zur 
Reichswehr: Geschichte der freiwilligen Landesjiigerkorps, 3d ed. (Leipzig: 
Koehler, 1922). 
90. This was Jiittner's official date of Party membership. Since it is after 
the 1 May 1933 moratorium on Party membership, it is likely that he ap-
plied for membership earlier and suffered the inevitable delay in processing. 
91. In November 1937 the Fiihrungsamt was elevated to be a Hauptamt 
(main office) within the Oberste SA Fiihrung. 
92. The SA was tried as an organization by the International Military 
Tribunal at the Trial of German Major War Criminals in Nuremberg in 1945 
and 1946. Max Jiittner was called to testify as a witness for the defense as 
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the senior surviving SA leader available to the court. See International Mili-
tary Tribunal, The Trial of the German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of 
the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, pt. 21: 
9th August, 1946 to 21st August, 1946 (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1949), 153-226. 
6. CoNCLUSION 
1. Note that the term corps is used here only in reference to the SA 
leaders included in this study and not in reference either to the totality of 
the SA leadership or to the SA as a whole. This issue is addressed for the SS 
by Robert L. Koehl in "Was There an SS Officer Corps?" unpublished paper, 
Citadel Symposium on Hitler and National Socialism, proceedings, 24-25 
April1980, Charleston, S.C., 1981. In many ways, the highest officers of the 
SA were more homogeneous than the better known SS officer corps of the 
late 1930s. 
2. Jamin, Zwischen den Klassen. 
3. They were born between 1869 and 1907; the average year of birth was 
1890. 
4. It is clear that the highest SA leaders were an extremely well edu-
cated group by the standards of their day. For example, 15.7 percent of the 
178 highest SA leaders held a doctorate (Ph.D., J.D., or M.D.) and a further 
24.7 percent had studied at the university level (including the Technische 
Hochschulen; the category includes incomplete university study, those hold-
ing a diploma, and all Rechtsanwii.lte [lawyers]). No study of the level of 
education of the SA as a whole has been done, nor is such a study likely in 
the near future. 
5. David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in 
Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967), 17, 41; 
Merkl, Political Violence, 289; Merkl, Stormtrooper, 411-45. 
6. Reliable information is available for 15 7 of the 179 men in this study. 
At least 58 were prewar professional soldiers (officers and enlisted men). 
Many more served one year in the army as voluntary officer cadets (Einjii.hriger 
Freiwilliger) or were members of the corps of cadets before the First World 
War, so that the number influenced by the spirit of the officer corps is actu-
ally greater. This is, of course, much greater than the percentage of profes-
sional soldiers in the male population of Germany before the war. In 1910 
(the last prewar census) the German Empire had 32,040,166 male inhabit-
ants: Statistisches [ahrbuch fiir das deutsche Reich 42 (1921/22): 2. In 1914, 
there were 30,739 officers and 105,856 noncommissioned officers in the army 
and 3,899 officers and 4,069 noncommissioned and warrant officers in the 
navy (Deckoffiziere), for an approximate 144,563 professional soldiers and 
enlisted men (this number is almost certainly slightly higher than the true 
number of professional military personnel): Statistisches [ahrbuch fiir das 
deutsche Reich 45 (1926): 445. This would mean that theoretically .45 per-
cent of German men were professional soldiers just before the First World 
War. It should be noted that three of the professional soldiers among the 
highest SA leaders studied here were, in fact, Austrians and not citizens of 
the German Empire in 1914. 
7. At least 135 of the 178 served in the First World War; 111 of the 140 
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for whom this information is known were commissioned as officers by the 
end of 1918 (79.2%). Remember that the raw data used in this study was 
taken primarily from SA personnel files. Although generally informative, 
they sometimes lack specific information, such as the exact date of a com-
mission. 
8. The classic statement of this thesis is Waite, Vanguard of Nazism. 
Koch, Der deutscbe Biirgerkrieg, is a more recent restatement of essentially 
-the same thesis. 
9. Seventy-four out of the 177 men (41.8%) for whom this could be 
determined were in a free corps in 1919. 
10. In 1919,67 (37.6%) of the 179 were in the army, 9 (5%) were serving 
in Grenzschutz or border protection units under army command, and 4 (2.2%) 
were in the police. Note that the army and Grenzschutz categories specifi-
cally exclude free corps. 
11. In 1919, 5 (2.8%) of the 178 highest SA leaders in this study served 
in a citizens' militia and 4 (2.2%) were Zeitfreiwilliger. 
12. In 1919, five members of the group (2.8%) belonged to a political 
party, excluding the NSDAP. The figure including the NSDAP is only eight 
(4.5%). The short-term nature of many of these early Party memberships is 
explained with the supposition that the men involved were searching for 
some sort of a response or affiliation appropriate to the changed conditions 
of the postwar era. Inexperienced in democracy, many soon abandoned these 
original Party memberships, either for affiliation with more radical organi-
zations or for temporary inactivity. 
13. Of the 17 4 highest SA leaders for whom information exists, 58 (33 .3%) 
were in a Wehrverband between 1921 and 1927. If the Stahlhelm is included 
as a Wehrverband, this figure rises to 72 ( 41.3% ) . 
14. Interestingly, the men joining in 1925 or 1926 had the lowest per-
centage of both free corps and Wehrverband membership (33%). Free corps 
membership rose in the 1927-30 group (42.3%), dipped slightly in the 1931-
32group (34.7%), and rose sharply in the 1933-34group (63.7%). Wehrverband 
membership followed a similar pattern, as shown in figures for 1925-26 
(44.4%), 1927-30 (49.1 %), 1931-32 (45.6%), and 1933-34 (90%). 
15. Eight (4.5%) of the 178 had been members of the DNVP or DDP. 
Note that membership was often of relatively short duration, suggesting 
that the future SA leaders were dissatisfied with the style and program of 
the more conventional conservative parties. 
16. Of the 178 highest SA leaders, 2 7 ( 15.2%) had been members in a 
volkisch political party. This was 77 percent of the thirty-five who had been 
in any sort of a political party. 
17. The single exception was Reinhard Boerner, who belonged to the 
DDP from 1919 to 1921. 
18. This idea first appeared in Frank, "Hitler and the National Socialist 
Coalition." Whereas Frank looks at this from a perspective of relations be-
tween the SA and the Party organization and thus stresses coalition and 
alliance, I wish to stress the blending of the two strains within the experi-
ences of the SA leaders. The new formula for success that resulted from this 
blending was the creation of both the SA leaders and those of the political 
organization of the NSDAP together. Had it been otherwise, the two groups 
could never have cooperated as effectively as they did, despite all internal 
quarrels. 
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19. An overemphasis on Hitler is still encountered in many German 
history textbooks: see, e.g., Dietrich Orlow, A History of Modern Germany, 
2d ed. [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1991), 159-60; Alan Bullock, 
Hitler: A Study in Tyranny [New York: Bantam Books, 1961 ), 101; Volker R. 
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